
*Hong Kong in the Shadow of China: Living with the Leviathan* (2016)

Emile Kok-Kheng Yeoh*

*University of Malaya*

**Abstract**

Richard C. Bush’s *Hong Kong in the shadow of China: Living with the Leviathan* (2016) represents an important study on post-“Handover” Hong Kong focusing on the making of the 2014 Occupy Campaign and Umbrella Movement and the impact on the coming development in politics, governance and economy of Hong Kong, taking into consideration China’s Hong Kong policy and the response of the Hong Kong people as well as the perspectives of Taiwan and the United States. This article, while reviewing the book, also provides a detailed analysis of the wider implications of the issues the author of the book has raised as regards Hong Kong – as China’s policy approach towards Hong Kong and by extension Taiwan and the struggle of the Hong Kong people, as well as the Taiwan people, to protect the political freedom and democratic rights they aspire to maintain (in the case of Hong Kong) and
that they have fought hard to secure (in Taiwan) have impacts that reach far beyond Hong Kong and Taiwan in the light of the PRC’s current relentless global projection, riding on the wave of her economic miracle, of her hard and so-called “soft” power in a through an intricate nexus of her domestic and foreign policies that not only serves to strengthen domestic governance and enhance international influence but also involves extraterritorial actions to maintain CCP’s one-party authoritarianism.

**Keywords:** Hong Kong, China, Chinese Communist Party dictatorship, soft power, Innenpolitik-Aussenpolitik nexus, Leviathan, dissent, dissidents, Liu Xiaobo, Taiwan, Confucius Institutes

1. Introduction

While the separation of Hong Kong and Taiwan from Mainland China during the decline of the Ch’ing Empire represented a product of the era of colonisation filled with humiliation by foreigners, within the overall progress of world civilisation, it also led to these two regions attaining freedom and prosperity [away from the repressive empire on the Mainland] bestowed by modern civilisation. In sharp contrast [...] the [Mainland] Chinese after being freed from the torment by colonial powers, instead of attaining liberation and freedom, have since been subjected to even more comprehensive and more brutal totalitarian subjugation [...] While the Chinese Communist Party’s dictatorial government has undergone an unequivocal great leap in its hi-tech operation, its political system and mode of governance still remain in the medieval era, hitherto having not given up the medieval myth of a greater empire-building. Internally, towards minority nationalities, it denies them freedom of autonomy. Externally, towards Taiwan, it
rejects making a promise of not using military force for unification; towards Hong Kong, it resorts to dictatorial coercive means of intervention in Hong Kong’s “One Country, Two System” autonomous governance, resulting in insurmountable barriers to Hong Kong’s political democratisation. One of the important principles underlying the post-WWII modern civilisation is the self-determination of a region’s inhabitants. Under this principle, the achievement of any unification to resolve conflict is not determined by military coercion by a powerful party, but by the voluntary choice of the minority groups [...] If unification could imply coercion and subjugation, there might as well be no unification.

– Liu Xiaobo (28th December 1955 – 13th July 2017), 2010 Nobel Peace Prize laureate and repeatedly jailed Chinese dissident and democracy advocate, granted medical parole on 26th June 2017 and sent into closely guarded hospitalisation only seventeen days before his death

Every once in a while, you come across a book that is both timely and manages to provide the reader valuable insights into various specific aspects of an issue while at the same time gives a critical and holistic understanding of an overall situation. Published in October 2016, less than nine months before the 20th anniversary of Hong Kong’s “Handover”, Richard C. Bush’s *Hong Kong in the shadow of China: Living with the Leviathan* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 400 pp. + xvi) is such a book. The book’s contents are divided into twelve chapters, followed by a conclusion (Chapter 13). After a short preamble on the tumultuous events of 2014 which obviously act as an overarching framework for the urgency of issues discussed in the book, a useful historical background from the formative years of
Hong Kong up to 1997 begins the book and set the stage for rest of the volume which at times alludes to a Greek chorus like in an ancient amphitheatre (most avidly in Chapter 5, “Debating Universal Suffrage Before Occupy: Round 1”, as the author describes the citizens of Hong Kong as in a political drama of three acts that began in 2013 and ended in the fall of 2014 dénouement in the form of the Umbrella Movement) and issues dire warnings over a possible future of Hong Kong careening down a treacherous slope in a life-mimicking-theatre situation as if drawn directly from a Greek tragedy. Like an ominous foreshadowing in a mystery novel, a tragedy has begun unfolding as the contest over how to select Hong Kong’s future leader has already turned into “a story that ends, rather tragically, with no election reform and a reversion to existing undemocratic mechanisms”, as Bush observes in Chapter 1 (“The Hong Kong Hybrid”) that introduces the first of his three perspectives.

2. Shocking Events

The author of this book, Richard Bush, with a Ph.D. degree specialising in China from Columbia University, United States, is a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution and the director of its Center for East Asia Policy Studies. He holds the Chen-Fu and Cecilia Yen Koo Chair in Taiwan Studies as well as a joint appointment as senior fellow at the Brookings John L. Thornton China Center. Bush rightly points out at the beginning part of the book that for anyone whose impression of Hong Kong was formed before 1989 – more exactly before the March to June 1989 student-led demonstrations on Tiananmen Square that ended with the horrific State violence in the 3-4 June night of massacre of defiant citizens in the streets of Beijing – the Occupy Campaign and Umbrella Movement that came in the autumn of 2014 was so unexpected and
shockingly unbelievable. The same can of course be said of the 3-month demonstrations on Tiananmen Square and the death-defiant stance of the Beijing residents during that fateful night of 3rd-4th June 1989 themselves.

While early in the germination period of classical Chinese philosophy two and a half millennia ago the founder of contemplative Taoism (道家), Lao Tzu (老子, c. 571-471 BC), had already commented, “民不畏死，奈何以死懼之?” [The people do not fear at all to die; / What’s gained therefore by threat’ning them with death?] (Tao Te Ching /《道德經》, Chapter 74), who would have foreseen the death-defying action of the supposedly docile subjects conditioned by more than 3 decades of personality-shattering brutal political campaigns of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) during the 3 months of June 1989 in Beijing, or the incredible sudden political awareness of the Hong Kong people during the same period that has been maintained hitherto? In both cases, such actions by a long politically docile (in China) or apathetic (in Hong Kong) people can be seen as a “civil society in self-defense” as described by Professor Ma Ngok of the Chinese University of Hong Kong, referred to by Bush in Chapter 4, “Hong Kong’s Liberal Oligarchy”, that in other, post-Tiananmen times is reflected in the almost a hundred thousand cases a year of the so-called “mass incidents” in China and the approximately twenty protests per day in Hong Kong (7529 in 2012, see Chapter 4) as issues, as sources of grievances, proliferated. Similar to those which are social issue-foctussed, unprecedented political, pro-democracy demonstrations (whether Tiananmen 1989 or Umbrella Movement 2014) also reflect Ma Ngok’s “civil society in self-defense”, in a recognised linkage between democracy and governance as analysed by Bush in Chapter 7, “Democracy and Good Governance”, in which he attempts to reconcile the differences between democracy advocates and democracy skeptics.
by focusing on four interrelated distinctions: (1) between democracy and
governance; (2) between the formal institutions of democracy and the
concept of feedback; (3) between legitimacy based on political process
and legitimacy based on performance; (4) between political development
and decay.

3. Democracy’s Loss of Confidence: Four Salient Trends

With regard to the first dichotomy just mentioned above, Bush lists in
good sequence various views from Samuel Huntington’s stress on the
creation of capable, autonomous, and clean institutions as prerequisites
for political development and responsible government prior to the
expansion of political participation, for instance, through democratic
institutions, to Francis Fukuyama’s recent argument that the best
sequence in which the building blocks of a developed system is
implemented is one in which the creation of rule of law comes before or
is accompanied by state building, and then only followed by democracy.
Such views clearly reflect an overall loss of confidence in seeing liberal
democracy as the best, viable political system resulted from events
globally in recent decades, as identified by Larry Diamond – cited by
Bush also in Chapter 7 – in the form of four salient trends that throw
doubt on the robustness of worldwide democracy: (1) growing number
of democratic breakdown including coups d’état and undermining of
electoral freedom and fairness; (2) bad governance resulting in
corruption and abuse of power leading to weakening in rule of law
and democratic freedoms; (3) resurgence of authoritarian regimes;
(4) decline of democratic efficacy and self-confidence. Here, it is indeed
interesting to note that the sequencing as argued by both Samuel P.
Huntington and Francis Fukuyama is exactly what has been argued by
the Chinese Communist Party (CCP)² in justifying its continued
dictatorship in political governance, in rejecting consideration of a change to multiparty electoral democracy. Huntington expressed his pessimism with democracy in his 1991 book *The Third Wave*, believing that democracy is only sustainable in countries with a substantial Western influence. As Bruce Gilley observes in “Democratic triumph, scholarly pessimism” (2010a), the written works on democracy since the 1990s have reflected a growing sense of insecurity among scholars who believe that history runs in cycles, and that democracy will run its course with the world finding itself returned to an authoritarian existence.

3.1. Uncertainty in Democratic Efficacy

It is also interesting to see the uncertainty in democratic efficacy leading to legitimacy based on performance trumping legitimacy based on political process, the distinction between which having been highlighted by Bush in this same chapter as mentioned earlier, or Pippa Norris’s bureaucratic autocracies (where state capacity is high but democracy is low) trumping her three other regime varieties – bureaucratic democracy (the best-case scenario where both variables are high), patronage democracy (where state capacity is low but democracy is high) and patronage autocracies (where both variables are low), as also referred to in Bush’s Chapter 7. Such phenomenon is also seen in the works of various researchers who found higher external efficacy for authoritarian countries like the one-party state of China than for multiparty liberal democratic countries like Taiwan. While internal efficacy refers to a citizen’s belief that s/he can understand and thus participate in politics, another type of political efficacy – external efficacy – refers to citizens’ belief that the government will respond to their demands. Yingtian Joseph Zhou and Ray Ou-Yang in their recent article, “Explaining high external efficacy in authoritarian countries: a comparison of China and Taiwan” (2017)³, explains this phenomenon in terms of institutional
differences between these two types of regimes – voters in democracies with real competitive multiparty elections who did not see their preferred candidates elected are predisposed to critical assessment of government responsiveness; elections incentivise democratic leaders to over-respond to certain groups vis-à-vis others; authoritarian leaders in countries without genuine democratic elections that confer them political legitimacy are compelled to cement performance-legitimacy by increasing responsiveness while democratic leaders with solid and clear electoral legitimacy may not deem it necessary to entertain particularistic demands made through unconventional channels like street protests. Or as Francis Fukuyama explains:

[...] the quality of Chinese government is higher than in Russia, Iran, or the other authoritarian regimes with which it is often lumped – precisely because Chinese rulers feel some degree of accountability towards their population. That accountability is not, of course, procedural; the authority of the Chinese Communist party is limited neither by a rule of law nor by democratic elections. But while its leaders limit public criticism, they do try to stay on top of popular discontents, and shift policy in response.⁴

Such perspective, as Arif Dirlik (2012: 283) explains, sees authoritarianism as making possible

[...] the rapid and efficient mobilization of resources not possible in a democratic society, exemplified by India, another so-called ‘developing economy’. The party-state may be repressive in other ways, but it is a force for innovation and efficiency economically.

To illustrate such argument typical of a “convert from neoliberalism to the Chinese model”, Dirlik quotes Fukuyama:

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The most important strength of the Chinese political system is its ability to make large, complex decisions quickly, and to make them relatively well, at least in economic policy. This is most evident in the area of infrastructure, where China has put into place airports, dams, high-speed rail, water and electricity systems to feed its growing industrial base. Contrast this with [democratic] India, where every new investment is subject to blockage by trade unions, lobby groups, peasant associations and courts.5

Dirlik finds this to be in line with Arundhati Roy’s argument (2011) on India:

Roy’s passionate condemnation of the government–corporate alliance against the interests of the rural population, especially the indigenous people, should give pause to facile contrasts between democratic India and dictatorial China. Equally important is the fact that Maoist activity has been the most effective among the indigenous people, the adivasis.6

3.2. Optimism Remains

The above observations notwithstanding, as Bush observes in Chapter 7, democracy “has been the focus of Western political thought since Aristotle and is now the presumptive standard to which all countries are expected to aspire” and even into the constitution of the People’s Republic of China are liberal freedom written and in the PRC’s State propaganda is the rule of law upheld. “Absent Hong Kong’s unique political context,” notes Bush, “the odds are very strong that it would make a successful transition to full democracy” for Hong Kong “shares all the attributes of other places that have made that transition and
consolidated a liberal and competitive order.” Bush further brings in, in addition to its normative advantage, democracy’s measure of historical determinism, more or less in line with the arguments of the modernisation theory.

3.3. Taiwan and the Modernisation Theory

Out of all the models which have been identified to explain different country’s political trajectories, e.g. of China’s and Taiwan’s distinctive paths of political development, the modernisation theory is arguably the most hotly debated in contemporary academic literature. This theory is an endogenous model which postulates a link between the “economic development complex” (i.e. factors related to economic development, such as industrialisation, urbanisation, education, and wealth) and democracy (Lipset, 1959). The simplest and earliest version of it argues that the more a(n authoritarian) country modernises, the more a “state of mind” favourable to liberalisation is promoted within her, and thus, the higher her chances are of democratising. This theory has frequently come under heavy attack due to its multiple issues with Western-centrism as well as oversimplification of the process of social and political change, but time and time again, it invariably persists in making comebacks into the academic spotlight, albeit in modified forms. The theory’s inescapable attraction is that, despite its inability to function as the one-size-fits-all explanation for how countries work which earlier modernisation theorists had anticipated that it would, it does still serve as the key to understanding the development of a large number of politically and economically significant countries. Taiwan is one such state whose development functions as a perfect textbook validation of the modernisation theory, for she has proven to be one of the most successful later industrialisers in the history of the twentieth century as well as a “best-case” democracy (Rigger, 2004).
3.4. China and the Modernisation Theory

While Taiwan’s political and economic trajectory sits easily within the contours of the modernisation theory, China’s case is much less clear-cut. While the modernisation factor may be used to explain the fall of KMT authoritarianism, on the flip side, it can also provide equally compelling evidence for explaining the CCP’s continued dominance, for China’s economic growth has been identified in both academic and popular discussion as a main factor in consolidating the CCP’s “performance legitimacy”. The CCP has faced many challenges ever since it began its reign of power; the disillusionment of the populace with the regime due to the Great Chinese Famine, for example, as well as the anger and turmoil which came about as a result of the 1989 Beijing massacre mark the big milestones in the CCP’s struggles for legitimacy. In recent years, the threats to their authority have grown much less dramatic, though no less insidious – much academic discussion has centred around how popular discontent caused by contemporary issues like burgeoning corruption, environmental destruction and deepening economic inequalities are threatening the party’s power. Despite all this, however, most academic measurements have found that the CCP enjoyed consistently high legitimacy levels. Gilley’s 2006 legitimacy index, for example, ranks China as the top 13th out of 72 states in terms of legitimacy scores, right upon the heels of Taiwan in the 12th place and beating out countries like Switzerland, New Zealand and South Korea (Gilley, 2006).

4. China’s Measure of Legitimacy

The CCP, however, appears to utilise methods for measuring legitimacy which are dissimilar to those used by academics such as Bruce Gilley, as
they focus more upon the formation of nodes of legitimacy crisis (Gilley, 2010b). By the standards of their measurements, the CCP’s legitimacy is, contrary to academic opinion, relatively low and brittle. Due to problems such as the high potential for preference falsification and the impossibility of measuring a nation’s revolutionary threshold, however, it is unfortunately somewhat difficult to judge whose interpretation is more relevant for predicting China’s future trajectory. (For further analysis upon the aforementioned concepts, one may refer to Timur Kuran’s 1991 article, “Now out of Never: The element of surprise in the East European Revolution of 1989.”)

4.1. The Irony of Public Trust

At a time when a trend of declining public trust is found throughout the world, especially in the wake of the recent financial crisis, Chinese confidence in the CCP is still one of the highest to be found relative to other countries, as can be derived from analyzing the Edelman’s Trust measurements (2012 Edelman Trust Barometer). It comes as quite the ironic revelation that this high legitimacy is widely attributed to the CCP’s purported success at bringing modernisation to the country. Since the failure of Mao Zedong’s communist ideology in serving as a valid source of legitimacy, the CCP has pragmatically turned to focus on economic performance to justify its rule.

Note that the positive link between modernisation and authoritarianism does not exclusively apply to the case of China; before Taiwan’s shift to democracy, her leaders had also taken steps to use modernisation to maintain their power in those changing times. In 1969, then-President Chiang Kai-shek (蔣介石) had appointed his son, then-Vice-Premier Chiang Ching-kuo (蔣經國), to the seat of chairman in the important economic planning agency of the Council for International Economic Cooperation and Development (CIECD). This move was
apparently meant to identify Chiang Ching-kuo with Taiwan’s “economic miracle”, for with this appointment, Chiang Ching-kuo would preside over “the Governor of the Central Bank, the ministers of Finance, Economic Affairs, Communications, and others concerned with fiscal affair” (Plummer, 1970: 20). Furthermore, after Chiang Ching-kuo assumed the throne in the wake of his father’s demise, his governmental reforms, while beneficial to the economy and transition to democracy, had the added advantage of maintaining popular support for the Kuomintang (國民黨, KMT)⁷, as the party was, in this fashion, associated with the favourable changes sweeping over the country. However, for Taiwan, modernisation eventually weakened the KMT’s authoritarianism more than it strengthened it, and so less attention has been paid to these details.

4.2. Redefinition of Public Interest

Such redefinition of the public interest has proven to be a masterful move especially in the case of China; as one may note from, for example, the data gathered by the 2007 World Values Survey, a high level of economic growth is by far the most important national goal as considered by the Chinese populace, and so the development of China into the economically dominant country that she is today has been viewed with much pride and nationalistic sentiment. Thus, actions which would challenge the government’s authoritarian grip, such as the fight for political freedom, must take a back seat, as they are considered highly likely to destabilise the economy as well. Such a stance is reflected in the works of academics such as Samuel Huntington and Joan Nelson (p. 23, as cited in Przeworski and Limongi, 1997), who argue that “political participation must be held down, at least temporarily, in order to promote economic development.” The modernisation theory thus makes a highly convincing case for explaining Taiwan’s
democratisation and is not completely incompatible with the realities of China’s current authoritarianism.

The question now is: what do we make of China’s so-called economic success?

5. China and Hong Kong’s “Liberal Oligarchy”

On the side of Hong Kong, Bush in his Chapter 4, “Hong Kong’s Liberal Oligarchy: Economic and Political Inequality”, examines the social implication of what he terms as a peculiarly Hong Kong-style hybrid regime of a “liberal oligarchy” which is different from most other hybrid regimes, e.g. Singapore or Russia with nominally competitive but in practice not objectively free and fair elections, constrained political freedoms and emasculated judicial independence. Hong Kong’s “liberal oligarchy”, as Bush calls the regime type, on the other hand represents a liberal system “in which human rights and freedoms are generally protected, with rule of law and an independent judiciary as the ultimate bulwark” but oligarchic with both economic and political powers being concentrated in the hands of a relatively small elite, and “limited role for free and fair elections in picking all the territory’s principal leaders, which could provide a check on the concentration of economic power” (see Chapter 3, “Hong Kong’s Liberal Oligarchy: Civil and Political Rights”).

5.1. The Marx-Engels Perspective

Bush provides an interesting conclusion in Chapter 4 from a presumed Marx-Engels perspective: a system created by the British imperial government has been sustained and institutionalised by the “Communist” Party of China – a system that, as Bush sees it, would meet Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels’s “definition of ‘the executive of
the modern [capitalist] state” – the State in a capitalist system that “had little or no autonomy of its own but was no more and no less than “a committee for managing the common affairs of the whole bourgeoisie.”” Or it could be a faute de mieux deal much akin to Karl Marx’s description of the Bonapartist regime in Der 18te Brumaire des Louis Napoleon (The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis-Napoléon Bonaparte) (1852) – his classic analysis of Bonapartism as a basis of State autonomy that rests mainly in the sharing of common interests between the State and the dominant group.

5.2. Bonapartism

While corporatism, or State corporatism, might not be a grand theory that could adequately explain the new, emerging developmental paradigm in post-1989 China’s astounding transition, it may yet prove to be helpful in understanding the inevitable transforming political landscape which, as Unger and Chan (2001) argued, could be moving in a “societal corporatist” direction in incremental shifts instead of the introduction of any form of political democracy, and as Unger and Chan further observed, the exclusion from these corporatist structures of the peasants and most of the non-State-sector workers whose grievances would thus be devoid of such mechanisms for articulation does not auger well for social and political stability. Some aspects of State corporatism may indeed recall the classic analysis of Bonapartism as a basis of State autonomy. Being propelled into a leading position by a balance of class forces, combined with the inability of the subordinate classes to exercise control over their supposed representatives in the State apparatus, the government – or here the Party-State – uses the leverage gained to preserve both the status quo and the interests of the dominant class. The dominant class (or the bourgeoisie, as in Karl Marx’s 1852 original description of the Bonapartist regime in Der 18te Brumaire des Louis
Napoleon), in turn, is willing to abdicate to a certain extent its opportunity to rule in exchange for other kinds of protection by the ensuing strong State (Stepan, 1985). Therefore it is important to recognise that the State, or a Party-State, is neither necessarily a neutral nor a passive actor. It may be perceived as an autonomous body that possesses its own interests and objectives independent from the rest of the populace. It can be a potentially disinterested party that engages in mediation and crisis management. However, it can also negotiate to achieve goals based on narrower interests. The State can use its influence to establish, entrench or expand its power (Enloe, 1980). In a way, while the 1989 events and tragedy can be seen as a culmination of the unstable development of an early stage of State corporatism since reform began partly due to the liberalism of the Hu Yaobang-Zhao Ziyang (胡耀邦－趙紫陽) administration, the tragedy can also be observed to be the catalyst of the subsequent authoritarian corporatist evolution and reaffirmation of the path of economic reform, after Deng’s “southern tour” (nanxun / 南巡), and economic success as realisation of the root causes of the tragedy had served to spur the CCP into attempting to reinvent itself as a strong, benevolent and enlightened ruler, or as Thomas Hobbes referred to in his 1651 treatise, “the generation of that great Leviathan”, the Leviathan as referred to in the title of Bush’s book.

This “liberal oligarchy” is a system that, in line with Marx and Engels’s thought, would produce “popular alienation and social conflict” as Hong Kong is increasingly witnessing, fuelled by “frustrations over the concentration of power” as many citizens are increasingly seeing the absence of electoral democracy as a “potent explanation for decline of social and economic opportunity”. Social protests in calling for true electoral democracy, with a free rein to select key officials, such as the Occupation Campaign and Umbrella Movement of 2014 are still possible in Hong Kong, unlike in any other parts of China, because the
1984 Sino-British Joint Declaration and the Basic Law have guaranteed that the pillars of a liberal order – genuine upholding of civil and political rights and judiciary independence in maintaining the rule of law, all being absent in any other parts of China – would remain in Hong Kong which, as Bush notes, represents “a decision Beijing likely came to regret, because after reversion, the city’s residents regularly took advantage of the political opportunities that the system provided” (see Chapter 2, “Negotiating Hong Kong’s Political System”) to challenge and protest against the CCP central government not only over its covert or overt intervention in Hong Kong’s governance but also its human rights abuses on the mainland across the Hong Kong border.

5.3. *China’s Leninist Corporatism*

Nevertheless, such oligarchic capitalist concentration of economic and political power is what Beijing prefers to see, for it fits well into China’s present mode of capitalist-corporatist structure, despite the fact that CCP still professes to be a Marxist-Leninist party. As Arif Dirlik and Roxann Prazniak see it, China’s present politico-economic and development model represents a part of the neo-liberal global capitalism:

[...] the most widespread causes of discontent – forceful expropriation of agricultural land, widespread dislocation of the population, severe exploitation of labour, social and spatial inequalities, corruption from the top to the bottom of the political structure, urban and rural pollution – are all entangled in the development policies that the PRC has pursued since the 1980s in its quest of “wealth and power” within the context of a neo-liberal global capitalism [...] The conversion of land into capital, the creation of a floating labour force available for this process, and the sale of cheap labour power to fuel an export-
oriented economy are all aspects of capital accumulation within a globalized capitalist economy.

(DIRLIK AND PRAZNIK, 2012: 295)

It is in this context that much of the CCP regime’s repressive policies can be accounted for by “how successful and rapid incorporation in global capitalism has come to shape the dynamics of the system and the behaviour of its various agents despite increasingly ineffective efforts on the part of the regime to shield society from the consequences of its own policies” (ibid.). Indeed, China’s post-June Fourth State corporatism, or referred to by some observers as “Leninist corporatism” (see, e.g., Hutton, 2006: 8, 98, 144-148), could provide a closer resemblance to Francisco Franco’s Nuevo Estado (New State), and the “harmonious society” vision declared in recent years does recall Franco’s vision of social cohesion and harmonious relationship between employers and workers via corporatism that would promote a close collaboration between them under the direction of the State and his corporatist policies to regulate the economy by controlling the conditions of work, wages, prices, production and exchange. This is not new, as

Daniel Chirot, using Romania as a case study, has argued that Communist one-party systems are one variant of corporatist states. The Communist state created vertical functional institutions and placed them under central control, with the express purpose of pre-empting any horizontal coalescing of class interests. Workers in a Communist party-state were not allowed to establish horizontal linkages freely. Their functional interests were to be channelled through the official trade union. In this schema, the differential interests within each corporate group were not recognized; enterprise managers and workers were assumed to have similar interests [...] In
the generic Leninist ‘transmission belt’ imagery, in its ideal state of operation the union provided a two-way conduit between the Party center and the workers […] but because the state was so powerful the top-down transmission of Party directives regularly suppressed the bottom-up transmissions relating to workers’ interests.

(Chan, 2008: 70-71)⁹

5.4. The Smell of Fascism

Regarding the Franquist Nuevo Estado parallel, with economic success and increased military might overshadowing its Asian neighbours, especially its destined nemesis, Japan, in what can be called this century’s turning of the tables, rising nationalism has been fed with a heavy dose of vainglory in the PRC. This may explain why the present authoritarian capitalist model of Chinese development does smell Fascist. After all, CCP’s governance model, given its domestic repression and its foreign policy behaviour especially in the East and South China Seas, does share the core characteristics of “classic Fascism” (as in Benito Mussolini’s Italy and Adolf Hitler’s Germany) as defined by the late Bertram Myron Gross, American social scientist and Professor of Political Science at Hunter College of the City University of New York, in his provocative book Friendly fascism: The new face of power in America (1980): 1) “a tight Government-Big Business oligarchy with charismatic dictator or figurehead, and expansionist, scapegoating, and nationalistic ideologies”; 2) “liquidation or minimalisation of multiparty conflict and open subversion, with little use of democratic machinery and human rights”; 3) “negative sanctions through ruthless, widespread, and high-cost terror; direct action against selected scapegoats”; 4) “ceaseless propaganda, backed up by spies and informers, to consolidate elite support and mobilise masses”; 5) “widespread benefits through more jobs, stabilized prices, domestic
spoils, foreign booty, and upward mobility for the most faithful”. (Gross, 1980: 170)

Table 1 Characteristics of “Classic Fascism” (Gross, 1980)

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Source: Gross (1980: 170).10

5.5. “Dictator’s Learning Curve”

Gross’s last two characteristics of “classic Fascism” (i.e. anxiety relief through participatory spectacles, mass action, and genuine bloodletting; and internal viability based on sustained, frantic, and eventually self-destructive expansion) will not find a parallel in today’s PRC, and this is not surprising as time has changed, and open bloodletting is no longer how modern dictators work, in contrast to the despots of the yesteryears,
notes William Dobson in *The dictator’s learning curve* (2012), “in the more ambiguous spectrum that exists between democracy and authoritarianism. Most strive to win their people’s support by making them content, but failing that, they are happy to keep their critics off balance through fear and selective forms of intimidation.” (Dobson, 2012, ppb 2013: 6)

5.6. *The Right to Leave*

Talking about the Russian situation, William Dobson (2012)’s source noted that unlike the former Soviet citizens who had few legal protections, for today’s Russian citizens the Russian constitution “guarantees the same set of freedoms and rights as any Western constitution [but] actually only one right is really observed – the right to travel abroad, to leave.” The effect of this is that “many people who might have opposed the regime simply left”, notes Dobson – “while the dictatorship of the Soviet system required closed borders, the authoritarianism of Putin’s Russia aims to sustain itself with open borders and passports.” (Dobson, 2012, ppb 2013: 7) Exiling political activists who are too well-known in the West to be too damaging for the authoritarian State in continuing to persecute them has always been a good option. Earlier example of Chinese dissidents so exiled during the post-Mao era included Wang Dan (王丹) and Wei Jingsheng (魏京生) through the usual procedure of giving them a severe jail sentence and then granting them medical parole, or in the case of the late Fang Lizhi (方励之) who sought refuge in the US embassy during the June 1989 crackdown and was allowed later to leave for America. Similarly, the blind *weiquan* (维权, “rights-defending”) lawyer Chen Guangcheng (陈光诚) also sought refuge in the US embassy after his escape from house arrest with the help of He Peirong (何培蓉, “PearlHer” / 珍珠) and other *weiquan* activists and was later allowed to leave for America.

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There are rumours in the past that negotiation had been going on regarding possible similar solution for Liu Xiaobo which Liu allegedly 
rejected.\textsuperscript{11}

In an interview by the \textit{Sunday Telegraph} (UK) published on 18th May 2014 as that year’s 25th anniversary of the Beijing massacre was 
approaching, retired businessman and former triad boss Chan Tat-ching 
(陳達錡, “Brother Six” / 六哥), mastermind of the legendary 
Operation Siskin (or “Operation Yellowbird” / 黃雀行動) that 
successfully spirited hundreds of dissidents in danger out of China in the 
wake of the June Fourth massacre of 1989, recalled how he went 
personally to Beijing in the 1990s to negotiate for the release of two 
of his operatives involved in the Operation Siskin who were arrested by 
the Chinese police and sentenced to 6 years’ imprisonment, after the 
Hong Kong Alliance in Support of Patriotic Democratic Movements in 
China (the Alliance / 香港市民支援愛國民主運動聯合會 / 支聯會) 
failed to rescue them within half a year as Chan requested them to do. 
Interestingly, as the plucky mastermind of the Operation Siskin related to 
\textit{Sunday Telegraph} in the interview, at that time he told the Chinese 
authorities that they should in fact thank him for bringing out of China 
those people who gave them such headache, and in response, the 
Chinese authorities told him that they would release his people if he 
stopped the Siskin rescue operation.\textsuperscript{12}

\subsection*{5.7. Subtler Forms of Coercion}

“Today’s dictators understand that in a globalized world the more brutal 
forms of intimidation – mass arrests, firing squads, and violent 
 crackdowns – are best replaced with more subtle forms of coercion”, 
notes Dobson, “Rather than forcibly arrest members of a human rights 
group, today’s most effective despots deploy tax collectors or health 
inspectors to shut down dissident groups. Laws are written broadly, then
used like a scalpel to target the groups the government deems a threat.” Or like that Venezuela activist’s joke cited by Dobson that (the late) President Hugo Chávez ruled through the motto “For my friends, everything, for my enemies, the law.” (ibid.: 5) However, imprisonment can work as well like firing squads – for the almost nine thousand political prisoners\(^{13}\), endless years of incarceration, torture, and high prospect of dying from “accident” (like Peng Ming / 彭明 and environmentalist Lei Yang / 雷洋 last year) and from “undetected” or “late detected” illness (like Liu Xiaobo this year, Tibetan lama Tenzin Delek Rinpoche in 2015, human rights activist Cao Shunli / 曹顺利 in 2014).\(^{14}\) In the light of such brutality, the Chinese Communist Party dictatorship could not even be in the league of Dobson’s “Learning Curve” dictators. For Chinese prisoners of conscience who are already subjected to physical abuse, malnutrition and denial of health care clearly represents a way to further intimidate and punish them and to tell others outside the prison what type of fate awaits them if they continue their activities like Liu Xiaobo did and not toe the Party line like Mo Yan ( 莫言 ), the State-celebrated Nobel Literature prize laureate, has always been doing.

5.8. The Nazi Parallel

Not only that what the Communist Party dictatorship is doing has rendered the PRC a close parallel to classic Fascism, a close comparison has recently repeatedly been drawn, much to the chagrin of the CCP, between the death of Liu Xiaobo and the death of Carl von Ossietzky (who like Liu, also a committed pacifist) whom Adolf Hitler threw into a Nazi concentration camp and died in 1938 (see Table 2). They are the only two Nobel Peace Prize laureates who were awarded the prize while being imprisoned and who then died in custody. Liu was granted medical parole on 26th June 2017, apparently to spare the authorities the
Table 2 The Fate of China’s Liu Xiaobo and Nazi Germany’s Carl von Ossietzky: A Parallel

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nobel Peace Prize laureate</th>
<th>Liu Xiaobo</th>
<th>Carl von Ossietzky</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Time &amp; place</td>
<td>21st-Century China under Communist Party dictatorship</td>
<td>Adolf Hitler’s 1930s Nazi Germany</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year of award &amp; circumstances</td>
<td>Awarded Nobel Peace Prize in 2010 while in Chinese prison</td>
<td>Awarded Nobel Peace Prize in 1935 while in Nazi concentration camp</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Authorities’ response 1</td>
<td>Chinese Communist Party government would not let Liu Xiaobo’s wife Liu Xia go to collect the award on his behalf and instead placed her under permanent house arrest</td>
<td>Hitler would not allow a member of Carl von Ossietzky’s family to collect the award on his behalf</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Authorities’ response 2</td>
<td>Mention of Liu Xiaobo’s 2010 Nobel Peace Prize (like the 1989 June Fourth massacre) is banned in China</td>
<td>Mention of Carl von Ossietzky’s 1935 Nobel Peace Prize was banned in Nazi Germany</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Authorities’ response 3</td>
<td>Chinese government protested Liu Xiaobo’s award (but it celebrated when State writer Mo Yan was awarded Nobel Literature Prize two years later)</td>
<td>Nazi government protested von Ossietzky’s award and issued a government decree that forbade German citizens from accepting future Nobel Prizes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Authorities’ response 4</td>
<td>Also as a response to Liu Xiaobo’s Nobel award, a “Confucius Peace Prize” was launched</td>
<td>Nazi government also responded to von Ossietzky’s Nobel award by setting up its own “German National Arts and Science Prize”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Circumstances of death</td>
<td>Liu Xiaobo was granted medical parole only in the terminal stage of his illness and sent into closely guarded hospitalisation, only seventeen days before his death on 13th July 2017</td>
<td>Carl von Ossietzky died in hospital on 4th May 1938 while still in police custody</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

bad publicity of having him die in jail, and sent into closely guarded hospitalisation only seventeen days before his death. Carl von Ossietzky was sent in May 1936 to a hospital under Gestapo surveillance and died on 4th May 1938 in hospital, while still in police custody, from tuberculosis as well as illness resulted from of the abuse he suffered in concentration camp.

6. Who Says the Leviathan Is But a Mythical Beast? – Hong Kong People’s Fear for the Future

As Bush notes in Chapter 1, “The Hong Kong Hybrid”, during British colonial era of rapid economic growth, the Hong Kong people seemed to have “a single-minded focus or obsession: making money and securing a decent standard of living […] the general idea of popular elections for the territory’s leaders was probably far from most people’s minds and the details even further”. The Hong Kong people then happily left political governance to the British colonial masters and were happily making money in an “economic city’ with a solely economic reason for existing”. Why has this hedonistic outlook undergone such a sea change once the prospect of “returning to the embrace of the Motherland” set in? Again, as Bush cites John Darwin, a specialist on British colonial history, in this first chapter, “Hong Kong’s political history makes nonsense of the decolonizing process as it is usually imagined” as it had undergone no significant change and would “never travel the colonial cursus honorum from crown colony rule to representative and then responsible government”. So why has the Hong Kong people been fighting the Beijing government now to demand the right of complete freedom to elect the city’s top leader whereas this is something they never voiced during the British colonial era?
The answer probably lies in the title of this book, *Hong Kong in the shadow of China: Living with the Leviathan*, or more specifically, where the title ends.

**6.1. The Great Unification and the Leviathan**

From imperial experiences, the Great Unification (*dayitong* / 大一統) with a strong central government (imperial court in the old days) has always been seen in Chinese lores as what would make China great; a fragmented China with a weak central government (e.g., a weak Ch’ing court, or during the early Republican period rise with warlordism) is considered the cause of “Hundred Years of National Humiliation” (*bainian guochi* / 百年國恥). In fact, when Liu Xiaobo was arrested for organising the signing of Charter 08 (*Lingba Xianzhang* / 零八憲章), the latter included an Item 18 “A Federated Republic”16 for which Liu was ostensibly charged – for coupled with the shopworn conspiracy theories is the federal taboo, in which federalisation is inevitably seen as a prelude to disintegration, though how far that threat is genuinely believed remains dubious as liberal democracy could be the ultimate fear since democratisation tends to go hand-in-hand with federalisation.

Unitarism can be distinguished from federalism in the fact that a unitary system has only one effective and determinate level of government, namely the central government by whom the territorial or local administrative subunits of government are determined and to whom they are subordinate, with the relationship being one of a *revocable* delegation of power to the territorial units by the central authority, as Thomas Hobbes said in *Leviathan* (1651), “The only way to erect such a common power, as may be able to defend them from the invasion of foreigners, and the injuries of one another […] is, to confer all their power and strength upon one man, or upon one assembly of men, that may reduce all their wills, by plurality of voices, unto one will

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[...] This is the generation of that great Leviathan [...]” – in order to avert the ominous path to the state of *bellum omnium contra omnes* that would vindicate Thomas Hobbes’s portentous judgement in *Leviathan*, “The condition of man [...] is a condition of war of everyone against everyone.” This “state of nature” – the war of all against all, Hobbes argued in *Leviathan*, could only be averted by a strong central government. And with the Leninist legacy of the ruling Chinese Communist Party, this Hobbesian Leviathan, this dominating, powerful central State, becomes a fully justified dictatorship.

6.2. The Leninist Leviathan

As Lenin was sometimes said to have stood Marx on his head (in an analogy to Marx’s claim that he had stood Hegel on his head), Lenin’s main ideological contrast *vis-à-vis* Marx in the former’s support of the idea of a dictatorship (in contrast to Marx’s view of the state as a feature of class society to be used by a politically conscious working class to bring about the transfer of power from the bourgeoisie and then be abolished) has clearly remained the ideological mainstay from the Maoist era to the present post-economic reform era of the CCP:

Now we are repeating what was approved by the Central EC two years ago … Namely, that the Soviet Socialist Democracy is in no way inconsistent with the rule and dictatorship of one person; that the will of a class is at best realised by a Dictator who sometimes will accomplish more by himself and is frequently more needed.

(Lenin (Владимир Ленин)’s “On Economic Reconstruction”
speech on 31st March 1920, in
First Russian Edition)¹⁷
Or dictatorship of a Party which would not in any way tolerate any real or potential challenge to its monopoly of political power through demand for multi-party competitive elections that it labels as a foreign ploy to bring about a “colour revolution” or “peaceful evolution” to destabilise China, to “hurt the feelings of the Chinese people”.

6.3. Beyond the Threat of Creeping “Mainlandisation”: The Existential Fear

Far above the post-1997 threat of creeping “Mainlandisation”, it is the very nature and deeds of this brutal, ruthlessly dictatorial Leviathan that never fail to give the Hong Kong people the chill, the morbid fear of the future, fear for the fate of their next generation. While the Hong Kong people might just watch, though not without trepidations, as spectators from a safe distance the madness that descended on mainland China during Mao’s brutal political campaigns including the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution (無產階級文化大革命), the atmosphere changed when the “return to the Motherland” became imminent. Whatever reassurance the Hong Kong people felt during the more liberal reform years of Hu Yaobang and Zhao Ziyang was squandered when the Communist Party resorted to a massacre in Beijing on that fateful night of 3rd-4th June 1989 to settle the Tiananmen crisis and the subsequent large-scale arrests, imprisonment and even execution of dissidents. Whatever reassurance that had since returned with continued open-door policy and economic boom was squandered again with the mysterious death of Li Wangyang (李旺陽) towards the end of the Hu Jintao-Wen Jiabao (胡錦濤-溫家寶) administration, the intensification of political repression under the subsequent Xi Jinping-Li Keqiang (習近平-李克強) administration, and finally the outrageous disappearance of the Causeway Bay Five (see Bush’s Chapter 6, “Electoral Reform After Occupy: Round 2”) that brought closer home
for the Hong Kong people the dreaded future directly under the CCP dictatorship.

6.4. The Causeway Bay Five Disappearances

As Bush’s Chapter 6 shows by devoting a section to “The Lee Bo Case” (section title), although Lee Bo is not the most important among the five from Mighty Current/Causeway Bay who mysteriously disappeared, his case has managed to turn the disappearances into a cause célèbre because he definitely did in fact go missing in Hong Kong (see Figure 1) which raised the dreaded spectre of the CCP regime having finally crossed the line drawn by the “one country, two systems” agreement and made cross-border arrests of Hong Kong-based dissidents. However, even more chilling is probably the fact that on 13th November 2015, Thailand’s military junta government put China’s exiled dissident cartoonist Jiang Yefei (姜野飛), dissident and human rights activist Dong Guangping (董廣平) together with Mighty Current co-owner and Causeway Bay Books shareholder Gui Minhai on a plane chartered by the Chinese government and deported them to China. For the vast Hong Kong people who are seeing the daily erosion of civil liberties and political freedoms after the Handover to the “motherland” in 1997, the Thai military junta government’s complicity with the Chinese authorities in kidnapping Gui Minhai to mainland China is particularly ominous. When Gui Minhai, the China-born Swedish national and co-owner of the Mighty Current publishing company and shareholder of the Causeway Bay Books (owned by Mighty Current since 2014), known for selling books critical of the Chinese government including those published by Mighty Current, failed to return from a holiday in Thailand’s beach resort town of Pattaya in October 2015, he was the fourth person linked to the company who had disappeared in that same month.
**Figure 1** Mighty Current and Causeway Bay Disappearances

(1) 14th October 2015 – Mighty Current publishing company’s general manager Lui Por (呂波) logged in for the last time onto the computer of Causeway Bay Books (銅鑼灣書店, owned by Mighty Current since 2014) before his disappearance (and some sources later reported him being arrested in Shenzhen / 深圳, Guangdong Province, China, on 15th October).

(2) 15th or 22nd October 2015 – Mighty Current publishing company’s business manager Cheung Chi-ping (張志平) went missing in Dongguan (東莞), Guangdong Province, China.

(3) 17th October 2015 – Gui Minhai (桂民海), co-owner of the Mighty Current publishing company and shareholder of the Causeway Bay Books, went missing while vacationing in Pattaya, Thailand.

(4) 23rd October 2015 – Causeway Bay Books’ manager Lam Wing-kei (林榮基) was last seen in Hong Kong before his disappearance and his wife filed a missing persons report with the Hong Kong police on 5th November (but some sources later reported he being arrested in Shenzhen on 24th October).

(5) 30th December 2015 – Causeway Bay Books’ shareholder Lee Bo (李波, Paul Lee) went missing in Hong Kong.
6.5. Cross-border Arrests

Such cross-border “soft-power” silencing of dissidents backed by PRC’s present ability to offer lucrative opportunities through market, trade and investment has reached worrying proportions. The exiled dissident Chinese cartoonist, Jiang YeFei, who fled to Thailand in 2008 after being imprisoned and tortured by the Chinese authorities for criticising their handling of the deadly 2008 earthquake in Sichuan, was arrested by police in Thailand for illegal immigration on 28th October 2015 and put on a plane chartered by the Chinese government back to China on 13th November, despite the fact that the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) had recognised his refugee status and Canada had offered to take both him and his family in. Besides Jiang YeFei, as mentioned earlier, deported by the Thai government back to China together with him on the plane on 13th November were Dong Guangping, a dissident and human rights activist who had refugee status, and Gui Minhai, the previously mentioned publisher of books critical of the Chinese government who was born in China but had acquired Swedish nationality and worked at a publishing house in Hong Kong.

6.6. The ASEAN Deportations

The Thai government’s policy choice to please the Chinese government by helping the latter to export its domestic repression across its borders has been long recognised. In July 2015, Thailand deported nearly 100 members of Muslim Uyghur illegal migrants who were wanted by China back to the PRC, drawing condemnation from the United States and human rights groups and sparking protests in Turkey, home to a large Uyghur diaspora. The New York-based Human Rights Watch said the Uyghurs faced “grim” maltreatment back in China, and Sophie Richardson, China director for HRW stated that “Thailand should make
it clear it won’t further violate international law by immediately announcing a moratorium on additional deportations of Turkic people to China.”¹⁸ Thailand is not the only member of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) to do so, though, nor is she the first.

In 2011, Malaysia detained 16 Uyghur illegal immigrants and deported 11 back to China, while the other five managed to register with the UN refugee agency UNHCR and were released into its custody. HRW said a Uyghur forcibly returned to China by Malaysia in 2011 was sentenced to six years in prison on charges of separatism, the same charge invoked to sentence the economist and ethnic Uyghur rights advocate Professor Ilham Tohti to life imprisonment in 2014. Then on 31st December 2012 Malaysia deported six more Uyghurs back to China. HRW said the men registered with UNHCR in Kuala Lumpur while in detention and were to have their claims reviewed when they were deported, and the UNHCR said in a statement that it had sought the men’s release into its custody while their claims were being assessed and regretted that they were deported despite its intervention. HRW said the forced return of these Uyghurs to the PRC was a grave violation of international laws and Muslim minority Uyghurs repatriated to China from elsewhere in the past have expressed fear of torture, long jail terms or the death penalty.¹⁹ Cambodia, another ASEAN member country, also forcibly deported back to China 20 Uyghur asylum-seekers, nineteen of whom had fled to Cambodia from Xinjiang in the wake of the July 2009 riots in the city of Urumqi, fearing persecution by the Chinese authorities. UNHCR was in the process of reviewing their applications for refugee status when Cambodia succumbed to pressure from the Chinese government to deport the 20 individuals, including two children. The Cambodian government’s action to deport them back to China attracted international condemnation as fears mount that these individuals would suffer severe human rights violations upon their
return.\textsuperscript{20} Elsewhere more recently, as Amnesty International reported in early August 2017, more than 20 Uighur students studying in Egypt were forcibly deported by the Egyptian authorities back to China, while about 200 more remained at risk of being forcibly deported back to China “where they would be at real risk of serious human rights violations”\textsuperscript{21}, an action that has been condemned by some non-governmental organisations as being related to China’s recent billion-dollar concessional loan to Egypt.\textsuperscript{22}

\textbf{6.7. Transborder Surveillance and Extraterritorial Suppression of Dissent}

Even if these exiled dissidents have been able to find relatively safe havens overseas, extraterritorial suppression of dissent can still go on. A blatant example of such extraterritorial attack on dissent is reflected in the exiled blind Chinese civil rights activist Chen Guangcheng’s accusation that he was being forced to leave New York University for “as early as last August and September, the Chinese Communists had already begun to apply great, unrelenting pressure on New York University, so much so that after we [i.e. Chen and his wife and son] had been in the United States just three to four months, NYU was already starting to discuss our departure with us.”\textsuperscript{23} Despite N.Y.U.’s denial of the allegation and its law school’s claim that the fellowship as that given to Chen was always to be for one year, it is probably difficult not to link that turn of events to the then newly opened New York University Shanghai (NYU Shanghai), the first university jointly operated by China and the U.S., and part of a major initiative the NYU law school calls its Global Network University.\textsuperscript{24}

This brings to mind an episode related by Tiananmen student leader Wang Dan, whose name tops China’s Most Wanted list for the 21 Tiananmen Square Protest leaders and who was arrested and imprisoned
in 1989 immediately after the massacre and arrested and jailed again in 1995 for his continued political activism and released and exiled to the United States in 1998. In Dr Wang Dan’s memoir *Cong Liusi dao liuwang* [from June Fourth to exile] (2012) he says that there were objections from some quarters among the academics during the approval process for him to teach at Taiwan’s National Cheng Kung University in 2011 presumably for fear of adverse effect on the university’s academic collaboration with China, leading him to caution about the inclination of “Hongkongisation” in Taiwan (in the form of “not to make the Mainland unhappy” kind of self-constraint taking root) and its impact on Taiwan’s political development (Wang, 2012: 395-396).

Parallel to such covert operations to put dissidents overseas under tight Chinese surveillance is the escalating influence the Chinese government is exerting on free academic enquiry overseas, leading to self-censorship of academics critical about China’s human rights violations and brutal repression of dissent. To be able to engage in free academic enquiry, and to live the life of an intellectual with dignity, “one had to make the presumption of freedom. And a further presumption: that one’s work would be treated as having been created with integrity.” (Rushdie, 2012, ppb 2013: 117) It is precisely such presumptions on the part of the world’s academia that has been increasingly eaten away in the relentless drive of extraterritorial academic co-optation through huge deployment of funding, propaganda and manpower in the name of academic and educational exchange (including the Confucius Institutes / 孔子学院) to move academics to shy away from speaking openly about human rights violations in China proper and in the frontier regions under CCP’s military occupation, CCP’s political authoritarianism and suppression of civil liberties and political rights; in short, anything deemed by Beijing as “sensitive subjects”.

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Unbelievable as it is, the latest most remarkable episode of such successful co-optation has to be, threatened with the shutting down of the entire CUP site in China, Cambridge University Press’s recent bowing to pressure from Beijing to remove 315 articles and book reviews on its China site from the *China Quarterly (CQ)* dating from recent months all the way back to the formative years of the journal in the 1960s, most of which relating to topics deemed sensitive to the Chinese Communist Party such as the Cultural Revolution, Tiananmen Square, Tibet, Xinjiang, Hong Kong, and Taiwan, as revealed in an undated screenshot of an email to the *China Quarterly*’s editorial board from the journal’s editor that came to light on Friday, 18th August 2017.  

James Leibold at Australia’s La Trobe University, scholar on China and Xinjiang, called CUP’s decision “shameful” and Georgetown University professor James Millward wrote in an open letter that CUP’s action represented “a craven, shameful and destructive concession” to the Chinese government’s “growing censorship regime” (Millward, 2017). After a weekend of intense international backlash from academics and activists including a petition signed by hundreds of academics and facing boycott of its publications, CUP reversed its decision and informed the *China Quarterly* editor that the articles would be restored. As Dr Tim Pringle, editor of the *China Quarterly*, succinctly put it, the incident indicated “a deeper underlying issue around the contradiction between academic freedom and the allure of the Chinese market”.

6.8. Voltaire Would Not Be Safe Today …

Despite William Dobson’s reference to modern dictatorship’s open borders mentioned earlier, even though being safe from State persecution beyond China’s shores, for exiled dissidents to coordinate a resistance movement through influencing China’s students overseas and
expatriates is not a simple task given CCP’s tight surveillance of the country’s citizens sojourning overseas through covert operation network and allegedly an extension of the country’s so-called “soft power”.

In recent years Australian media reported that the Chinese government had set up large covert informant networks inside Australia's leading universities to put the Chinese academic staff and students under surveillance in order to protect Beijing’s “core interests”. According to an article by John Garnaut, the Asia Pacific editor for Fairfax Media, published in The Sidney Morning Herald, China is establishing an extensive secret network of informants in Australia’s major universities, including the University of Sidney and the University of Melbourne which have over 90,000 students from China, who now have the opportunity to be exposed to ideas and activities which are prohibited in China.33 The Chinese government is allegedly using the China student associations in Australia for collecting intelligence and promoting political activities, according to the article, with function in parallel to the other intelligence networks operated by the Chinese diplomatic mission. Among the lecturers and Chinese-born students interviewed “who have suffered repercussions because of comments they made in Australian classrooms which were reported through Chinese intelligence channels”34, the article highlighted the case of a Chinese senior lecturer at a high-ranking Australian university who was interrogated four times by the Chinese intelligence agency regarding his comments made at a seminar about democracy at the University of New South Wales. The article also gave another case of a Chinese student in Australia who met with the Dalai Lama, leader of the Tibetan government-in-exile. The Chinese intelligence got to know about this through its informant network, according to the report, and the student’s parents back in China were subsequently asked by security officials to restrain their child’s behaviour.
According to a former Chinese diplomat Chen Yonglin (陈用林) who has defected to Australia, the Chinese government is also using students to infiltrate dissident organisations, especially those related to Tibet and Falungong (法輪功). The Chinese Consulate-General in Sidney vehemently denied all these allegations. Chen Yonglin, the former First Secretary of the Chinese Consulate-General in Sidney who defected in 2005 for Australian political asylum, stated that his main job during the four years and two months at the Consulate-General was to keep watch on the dissidents. He also pointed out that Chinese spies in Australia, who numbered over a thousand, were involved in kidnapping targeted dissidents back to China. This reminds us of Voltaire’s words and experience as related in Salman Rushdie’s 2012 memoir Joseph Anton: “Voltaire had once said that it was a good idea for a writer to live near an international frontier so that, if he angered powerful men, he could skip across the border and be safe”, and indeed “Voltaire himself left France for England after he gave offense to an aristocrat, the Chevalier de Rohan, and remained in exile for seven years.” (Rushdie, 2012: 15) Alas, as the author of Joseph Anton, the fugitive writer who was the thirteenth on The Times’s 2008 list of the fifty greatest British writers since 1945 proceeded to remind us from his own bitter experience: “But to live in a different country from one’s persecutors was no longer to be safe. Now there was extraterritorial action. In other words, they came after you.” (ibid.: 15-16) The said Australian media report just acts to confirm the well-known fact that China’s nationals overseas are under close surveillance for detection of any activities which could be considered as anti-CCP.

6.9. A Hong Kong Disillusioned

As for Hong Kong, since the time when the June 1989 Beijing massacre “shattered the illusions of Hong Kong residents that the [post-Mao] CCP
was a humane regime, and called into question the widespread assumption that Beijing would take a benign approach to Hong Kong after reversion” (as Bush comments in his Chapter 2, “Negotiating Hong Kong’s Political System”), the chilling examples of how PRC now continues to treat its dissidents and political prisoners, the unending stream of tragedies from Cao Shunli to Peng Ming, from Li Wangyang to Liu Xiaobo, and a future prospect that they never had to considered when they were under British rule has been made more real when China again breached the “one country, two systems” agreement to snatch Lee Bo from Hong Kong soil, and when China could even with the complicity of a client government in Bangkok snatch Gui Minhai from streets of Pattaya.

7. Impact on Taiwanese Perception

There is a Chinese proverb from the pre-Ch’ in dynasty (先秦, before 221 BC) classic Tso-chuan (左傳, composed probably during the latter half of the 4th century BC, during the Warring States era / 戰國時代): ch’un wang ch’ih han (唇亡齒寒, literally “if there be no lips the teeth feel cold”, i.e. sharing a common fate; neither can survive without the other; one’s demise is the premonition of the other’s doom). It is indeed in this vein that Bush begins his Chapter 11, “Hong Kong and Taiwan”, with the statement: “What happens in Hong Kong has implications not only for Hong Kong and the future of China but also for Taiwan and the United States”. For the U.S., as Bush will deal with in more details in the subsequent Chapter 12, “United States Policy toward Hong Kong”, U.S. position on Hong Kong and the latter’s pro-democracy struggles is contingent upon what America sees as the implication for the possible future political change in China and Sino-U.S. relations as well as the coming world order under the shadow of superpower relations.
Nevertheless, the fact that during Hong Kong’s Occupation protests, as Bush notes in Chapter 12, “Washington probably took the strongest position of any foreign government, mainly through statements that boiled down to support for a truly competitive election” would actually serve to further raise “fears in the Chinese regime, which inferred from the sympathy felt by many in Hong Kong for the plight of the demonstrators and the assistance that some protest leaders received from the territory, that Hong Kong’s political system might be used as a platform to subvert the Communist regime”, as Bush has already cautioned in Chapter 1, “The Hong Kong Hybrid”.

7.1. “If There Be No Lips …”

As for Taiwan, as Bush says in Chapter 11, “Hong Kong and Taiwan”, it was Beijing’s original “hope that a successful transition in Hong Kong would create a positive demonstration effect for Taiwan and gradually reduce the latter’s recalcitrance”. That probably explains why Beijing is restrained or feeling the need to be restrained in its handling of Hong Kong – though the Hong Kong High Court’s stripping four opposition lawmakers, “Long Hair” Leung Kwok-hung ( 長毛 梁國雄 ), Nathan Law Kwun-chung ( 羅冠聰 ), Lau Siu-lai ( 劉小麗 ) and Edward Yiu Chung-yim ( 姚松炎 ), of their seats in the legislature, for improper oath-taking, coincidentally a day following the death of Liu Xiaobo, did not help to improve Beijing’s image in the eyes of the pro-democracy Hong Kong or Taiwan people.

This is definitely not alarmist talk – just witness the sudden Sunflower Student Movement ( 太陽花學運 ) that was sweeping Taipei through March-April 2014, led by hundreds of thousands of student protesters enraged by President Ma Ying-jeou ( 馬英九 )’s “Politburo-esque maneuver”37 to enact a trade pact with China to open up the island state’s service industries without fulfilling the promise to allow a clause-
by-clause review before implementation. The ultimate source of the protest movement is the increasing wariness felt by Taiwan’s younger generation of, besides and more than the economic impacts of effective merging the two economies though the trade pact, the foreboding sense of China’s incremental political control over Taiwan and the “Hongkongisation” of Taiwan’s hard-won democracy.

7.2. “Hongkongisation” of Taiwan or “Taiwanisation” of Hong Kong?

It is interesting to note that Hong Kong’s Umbrella Movement that came six months later did draw some inspiration and borrow some political tactics from Taiwan’s Sunflower Movement, as Bush points out in his Chapter 11, “Hong Kong and Taiwan”, in a “demonstration effect from Taiwan to Hong Kong” which Professor Sonny Shiu-hing Lo (盧兆興) of the Hong Kong Institute of Education calls the “Taiwanisation of Hong Kong politics”:

The “Taiwanisation” of Hong Kong politics can be seen in the way local pro-democracy campaigners are pushing for change. The Taiwanese have a strong sense of their own identity. In recent years, the SAR has also witnessed the growth of a very strong Hong Kong identity, in some extreme cases leading to calls for secession or even independence by a minority of vocal Hongkongers […] Younger Hongkongers, like their counterparts in Taiwan, are increasingly distrustful of political parties. Taiwan’s students demonstrated their political autonomy during the Sunflower movement. Similarly, the Hong Kong student movement spearheaded the Occupy protests. 

(Lo, 2015)³⁹

Besides that “Hong Kong’s young activists have been taking inspiration from the Taiwanese democracy movement”, with the Sunflower
students’ movement six months earlier helping to shape Hong Kong’s Occupy campaign, Lo also points out that “Taiwan’s rowdy electoral campaign styles, punctuated with violence, are emerging in Hong Kong”, and finally concludes that while “Beijing may well seek to use the Hong Kong model of democratisation to appeal to Taiwan for political dialogue, Taiwanese-style politics has already penetrated Hong Kong, elevating the Taiwan factor in shaping Beijing's policy towards Hong Kong and its political development, now and in the years to come.” (ibid.)

8. The Butterflies and the Bear: Which Way Does Soft Power Go?

If we see the series of events and developments in Hong Kong since the June Fourth 1989 Beijing massacre in relations to China and Taiwan, despite the intensive work of the powerful and resourceful Beijing’s United Front Work (統戰) in Hong Kong through, as Wai-man Lam and Kay Chi-yan Lam (2013) describe, “the soft tactics of integration, cooptation and collaboration, as well as the hard tactics of containment and denunciation” that all seek to “ultimately consolidate China’s hegemony in the local society” (Lam and Lam, 2013: 306), it is difficult to see any success in China’s exercise of her so-called “soft power” (a “factor of growing significance in the competition in overall national strength” – as described by former president Hu Jintao in a 2007 speech to the national congress of the CCP in declaring an openly stated strategy to enhance culture as a part of soft power). On the contrary, Taiwan, through the “Taiwanisation” of Hong Kong politics, have made impressive soft-power inroads into Hong Kong based on its vibrant liberal democratic culture as a “best-case democracy” (Rigger, 2004) in the Greater China area. In a dialogue session at the closing dinner of the 11th World Chinese Entrepreneurs Convention in October 2011,
Singapore’s leader and founding father the late Lee Kuan Yew (李光耀, 16th September 1923 – 23rd March 2015) said not without a tone of disdain, “I don’t see either Hong Kong or Taiwan influencing the path of China. China is 1.3 billion people. It has a destiny of its own, a certain momentum of its own […] A small island – in the case of Hong Kong six, seven million, and in the case of Taiwan twenty something million – cannot change 1.3 billion Chinese.”

8.1. The Butterflies Flap Their Wings

Lee had his point. However, to resolutely say that Hong Kong and Taiwan would not be able to have any influence on the future path of China’s political, social and economic development could be debatable. While political demonstration effect of Taiwan’s vibrant, best-case, liberal democracy mentioned above is on Hong Kong, just an atypical small region of the otherwise extremely repressive China, and while it is true that such demonstration effects of freedom and liberal democracy or even momentous protest actions as in Rangoon in 1988 and Beijing in 1989, though having a tremendous moral and psychological impact or even arousing major national and international attention, as Professor Gene Sharp reminds us, they are by themselves “unlikely to bring down a dictatorship, for they remain largely symbolic and do not alter the power position of the dictatorship” (Sharp, 2010: 61), yet despite all the dismal projections and series of heart-rending disappointments since 1989, probably it would be mildly encouraging to note that a key element in this causation is the perspective of time frame. “The air does not cease to have weight, although we no longer feel that weight”, says Émile Durkheim (1895). Under brutal repression, simmering ripple effects that was set of by Taiwan’s successful transition from Kuomintang dictatorship to liberal multi-party competitive electoral democracy and by the Hong Kong people’s valiant struggle to protect
their freedom and democratic rights, that culminated in the Occupy Campaign and Umbrella Movement in the autumn of 2014, take time to break through the surface to eventuation through an often slow, meandering process of fermentation or even metamorphosis while brewing social forces bringing along subliminal emergent changes\(^\text{43}\) (as depicted in Figure 2) continue to threaten to subvert the stability of well laid-out projectable changes\(^\text{44}\) envisaged by the ruling regime; hence patience is called for.

**Figure 2** China’s Sociopolitical and Socioeconomic Transformation Pre- and Post-June Fourth, 1989: Projectable and Overt and Subliminal/Latent Emergent Changes

Projectable change post-1989: Deng’s strategy brought continuous economic reforms leading to economic miracle; FOUR cardinal principles reasserting and upholding CCP’s political supremacy; thought control; resistance to bourgeois liberalization; Deng’s “stability above all else” directives led to Party-State’s ruthless repression; socialism with Chinese characteristics; Party-State’s promotion of fundamental definition of human rights as just the people’s rights to be led, to be sheltered to be educated and to be employed; continued Dengist stance against adopting North Atlantic democracy and its mass politics (quarantine separation of powers) for checks and balances, promoting central State nationalism and cracking down on peripheral nationalism; controlled intra-Party democratization, grassroots democracy; village elections, “stick and carrot” co-optation and control of intellectuals, building of “harmonious society”; central State’s tacit consent to local repression under the guise of pragmatism; crackdown on Falungong; becoming world’s 2nd largest economy while in the early 21st century...  

Creating a new situation

Greatly expanded popular demand for a more liberal and just society, as backlash to the accentuated corruption and social injustice as by-products of market-oriented economic reforms unaccompanied by liberal democratic political reform and Deng Xiaoping’s insistence of “bourgeois liberalization”, led to the hot crisis of 1989, followed by cold shocked to political institutional change after the June Fourth massacre...

Creating a new situation

Projectable change post-1989: emergence of middle class; rise of corporatist nationalism - March 2003

Emerging vocabulary of activism...

Greatly expanded popular demand for a more liberal and just society, as backlash to the accentuated corruption and social injustice as by-products of market-oriented economic reforms unaccompanied by liberal democratic political reform and Deng Xiaoping’s insistence of “bourgeois liberalization”, led to the hot crisis of 1989, followed by cold shocked to political institutional change after the June Fourth massacre...

Subliminal and latent emergent change post-1989: Taiwan’s democratization (December 1996) “Handover” of Hong Kong (1997) and Macau (1999): loss of political and civil liberties in China, Genes’s passing (2008) and Sino-Japanese rapprochement (2009); deepening socioeconomic inequalities, interregional contradictions, economic and social anarcho-soclitarian “mass incidents”, political and economic desperation, deepening corruption in government, social groups, worker suicides, plight of village leadership; subliminal, uncontrolable, subconscious, underground, underground movements, underground, underground movements, underground movements...

Creating a new situation

Subliminal and latent emergent change post-1989: Taiwan’s democratization (December 1996) “Handover” of Hong Kong (1997) and Macau (1999): loss of political and civil liberties in China, Genes’s passing (2008) and Sino-Japanese rapprochement (2009); deepening socioeconomic inequalities, interregional contradictions, economic and social anarcho-soclitarian “mass incidents”, political and economic desperation, deepening corruption in government, social groups, worker suicides, plight of village leadership; subliminal, uncontrolable, subconscious, underground, underground movements, underground movements...

Creating a new situation

Turning point: facing the real will to change, dealing with resistance to change...

Alternative U-process of transformative change

Uncovering roots of crisis, unfolding preconceived radical principles...
While there might not be enough ripples to momentarily change the
tide of events for a country as huge as China, as Lee Kuan Yew felt, and
a ruling party as entrenched as CCP, one may recall the theoretical
example given by the “butterfly effect” of the late American
mathematician and meteorologist Professor Edward Norton Lorenz, who
was professor emeritus at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology
(MIT) and a pioneer of the chaos theory, in which the formation of a
hurricane is being contingent on whether or not a butterfly somewhere
far away had flapped its wings a couple of weeks earlier. Recent years’
positive developments in democratic reform in Burma came more than
two decades after the “8888” (8th August 1988) Rangoon massacre.
Taiwan’s full conversion to liberal democracy came only about half a
century after the 228 (28th February 1947) massacre. The painful
memory of the June 1989 Beijing massacre is but just around three
decades old. The brutal reign of the Soviet Communists lasted just seven
decades, compared to its predecessor, the three-century long Romanov
dynasty. The rule of the CCP has just been over six decades, a speck in
the millennia-long history of Chinese dynasties, mostly each lasting a
few centuries.

8.2. “Poking the Bear”

To judge the success and failure of social action or the ultimate impact
of rippling demonstration effects however small and insignificant the
source could look like at the moment, a right perspective on time is
pertinent, as the literary world’s most well-known fugitive from
dogmatic terror illustrates on the resiliency of art: “The poet Ovid was
exiled by Caesar Augustus to a little hellhole on the Black Sea called
Tornis. He spent the rest of his days begging to be allowed to return to
Rome, but permission was never granted. So Ovid’s life was blighted;
but the poetry of Ovid outlasted the Roman Empire. The poet
Mandelstam died in one of Stalin’s labor camps, but the poetry of Mandelstam outlived the Soviet Union. The poet Lorca was killed by the Falangist thugs of Spain’s Generalissimo Franco, but the poetry of Lorca outlived Franco’s tyrannical regime.” Such time consideration and call for patience was clearly in her mind when President Tsai Ing-wen (蔡英文) of Taiwan (Republic of China), who was included in the decision-makers category of U.S.-based Foreign Policy magazine’s 100 Leading Global Thinkers of 2016 for “for poking the bear”, i.e, for not kowtowing to the CCP dictatorship of Mainland China, and instead telling the latter to “face up to the reality that the Republic of China [i.e. Taiwan] exists and that the people of Taiwan have an unshakable faith in the democratic system”46, said in her condolences for Liu Xiaobo that she sent on Twitter in both Chinese and English right after Liu’s death, which ended with a reference to his 2010 Nobel Lecture in Absentia, “I have no enemies: My final statement”47:

We hope that the Chinese authorities can show confidence in engaging in political reform so that the Chinese can enjoy the God-given rights of freedom and democracy. This will be a turning point in cross-strait relations. The Chinese dream is not supposed to be about military might. It should be about taking ideas like those from Liu Xiaobo into consideration. Only through democracy, in which every Chinese person has freedom and respect, can China truly become a proud and important country. If the Chinese Dream is democracy, then Taiwan will provide any assistance necessary to achieve this objective. I believe that this is what he would have wanted. Liu Xiaobo had no enemies, because democracy has no enemies.48
9. Chinese “Soft Power” Overhyped

In the latest ranking (2016/2017) of countries by soft power according to the British magazine Monocle, it seems that China, ranked 20th (one place up from 2015/2016), would still have some way to go to compete with the liberal democracies that are above her, including Japan and South Korea in the East Asian region (see Table 2). According to this latest investigation by Monocle on soft power based on government standard, diplomatic facilities, cultural exports, educational capability, business environment, etc., topping the list in 2016/2017 is the United States (which has moved up superseding Germany that topped the list in 2015/2016), followed by Germany, Japan, United Kingdom, France, Australia, Canada, Sweden, Switzerland and Denmark among the top ten.49

That the recent claim of China’s increasing “soft power” is much overhyped was also reflected in, for instance, the comments of Professor Qiao Mu ( 喬木 ) of the Beijing Foreign Studies University ( 北京外國語大學 ) in 2013 on that year’s Country Ratings Poll of 25 countries and the European Union conducted by GlobeScan, an international polling firm, and the Programme on International Policy Attitudes at the University of Maryland for the BBC’s World Service which shows global views of China’s influence having deteriorated sharply to reach their lowest level since the poll began in 2005, with positive views falling eight points to 42 per cent and negative views rising eight points to 39 per cent. Perceptions of China are seen plunging markedly not only within the EU, expectedly worst in Japan (with only 5 per cent holding positive views against 64 per cent holding negative views), but also in China’s regional neighbours which are not her traditional enemies, e.g., Australia (swinging around dramatically from the previous survey’s 61 per cent positive and 29 per cent negative to this survey’s 36 per cent

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### Table 2


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ranking</th>
<th>Country</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>United States of America (2)</td>
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<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Germany (1)</td>
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<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Japan (4)</td>
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<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (3)</td>
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<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>France (5)</td>
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<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Australia (6)</td>
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<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Canada (10)</td>
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<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Sweden (7)</td>
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<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Switzerland (8)</td>
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<td>10</td>
<td>Denmark (9)</td>
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<td>11</td>
<td>Italy (12)</td>
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<td>12</td>
<td>Spain (11)</td>
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<td>New Zealand (13)</td>
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<td>Portugal (19)</td>
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<td>Norway (16)</td>
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<td>Republic of Korea (15)</td>
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<td>18</td>
<td>Finland (18)</td>
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<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>Brazil (22)</td>
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<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>People’s Republic of China (21)</td>
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<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>Austria (17)</td>
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<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>Belgium (20)</td>
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<td>23</td>
<td>Singapore (23)</td>
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<td>24</td>
<td>India (–)</td>
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<tr>
<td>25</td>
<td>Poland (24)</td>
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Notes: Turkey which was ranked 25th by the 2015/2016 survey is no longer among the 25 by 2016/2017. India which was not among the 25 ranked by the 2015/2016 survey is ranked 24th by 2016/2017.

positive and 55 per cent negative). Admitting that “the rating had put China in an ‘embarrassing’ position, compared to the nation’s rising economic power and the national image it sought to project”, sighed Professor Qiao Mu, “It seems China is getting rich fast but its influence ranking is dropping dramatically […] China is drawing more attention globally, for its increasing foreign aid and participation in international affairs, but now it turns out that the values and the political system China holds are not accepted by the world.”

9.1. “Soft Power” and Innenpolitik-Aussenpolitik Nexus

The reservations above notwithstanding, if we consider the impressive outreach of China’s economic power as the main driver of its “soft power”, it should still be noted, in an ominous application of Innenpolitik-Außenpolitik nexus, not only that such influence makes the global economy a friendly place for Chinese commerce, but the much touted Chinese “soft power” derived therefrom has been put to excellent use to extract complicity from foreign governments in assisting the PRC’s domestic oppression on political freedom and civil liberties to reach beyond the country’s borders. Despite the euphoric accolades enthusiastically heaped upon China’s supposedly rising “soft power”, the only clear nature revealed regarding this Chinese “soft power” so far has either been spurious or iniquitous. Spurious in giving the impression that traditional Chinese culture is supposed to spread across the globe by the strong China, not least through the so-called “Confucius Institutes” – a monstrosity of propagandic misnomer and misinformation; iniquitous, both in terms of extending domestic oppression on political freedom and civil liberties, muzzling of free speech and free media and trampling on human rights across her borders, and exporting her Leninist corporatist model to the despotic regimes and neo-authoritarian rulers of flawed democracies in the developing world which now find alliance or
potential alliance with this biggest dictatorship on the planet a balancing safeguard against Western sanctions over their trampling on human rights and helping them keep their heads above water.

9.2. The “Soft Power” Conundrum

One of course can argue that the fact that China could offered herself to these developing world’s autocratic regimes as a standard bearer signifies soft power, but choosing the preference and perspective of the autocratic regimes over those people whom they trample under their boots, of those kleptocracies over those of the very people they victimise, by itself is enough to discredit such definition of soft power. While Samuel Huntington does remind us that soft power “is power only when it rests on a foundation of hard power” (Huntington, 1996: 92), and Joseph S. Nye does say that “soft power can be wielded for bad purposes as well as good” and thus should not be “embraced as the ethical alternative [to hard power]” (Nye, 2015: 6), some definition problems still exist when an increasing number of developing countries’ authoritarian kleptocrats are getting Chinese money (hard power) to bail themselves out and to secure votes and are then in turn acting as China’s local mouthpiece to promote the authoritarian “China model” among the people through accepting China’s ideological inroads (including the Confucius Institutes) that serves to sell to the world the justification of China’s internal political oppression.

9.3. From Weiwen to Guo’an

As Juan Pablo Cardenal and Heriberto Araújo summarise in the report of their field survey in over 25 countries across the globe on China’s expanding influence among the developing countries that for the overriding political and economic interest of the Party-State, whenever
China sees an opportunity, she invariably “chooses to act as an accomplice in these excesses rather than acting as a guardian of the law”, and following from that, it is “not just the fact that China has become the great champion and favourite business partner of the world’s most repressive regimes (Burma, North Korea, Iran, Sudan, Cuba), or that its state-owned companies often enjoy carte blanche in their dealings as a result of the dizzying effect of the all-powerful Chinese state. What is just as important is the infiltration and acceptance of Chinese standards and values – which are highly ambiguous when it comes to good business practices or labour, social or environmental issues – throughout Beijing’s sphere of influence” (Cardenal and Araújo, 2011, tr. 2013, 2014: 262).

In this regard, extending domestic repression across China’s borders is an obvious and inevitable policy shift in line with the apparent change in *modus operandi*, ever since the cases related to Hong Kong’s “Umbrella Movement” – the November 2014 trial of Xie Wenfei (謝文飛) and Wang Mo (王默), supporters of the Hong Kong “Umbrella Movement” who were arrested with several others on charges of “inciting subversion of state power” (煽動顛覆國家政權罪) – by the Xi Jinping administration from a “weiwen” or “stabilisation” (維穩模式) strategy whereby the local authorities decided their own course of action, to one of “guo’an” or “national security” (國家安全) whereby the central government began to centralise coordination of the whole country’s security measures, the latter also in taking advantage of the current global War on Terrorism. The switch from “weiwen” to “guo’an” obviously reflected the concern of the CCP when a National Security Commission (NSC) was formally established in January 2014, with President Xi Jinping as chairman, and Premier Li Keqiang and Zhang Dejiang (張德江, president of the National People’s Congress) as vice-chairmen, to better integrate the handling of internal and external

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threats, which was followed by a series of steps over 2014 that included also the May release of PRC’s first National Security Blue Book that, as Bush notes in his Chapter 5, “Debating Universal Suffrage Before Occupy: Round 1”, warned that China was threatened by the “export of Western democracy”. Hong Kong was apparently mentioned in an article of the People’s Daily published on the same day of the Blue Book release, according to Bush (Chapter 5) that described NSC’s four functions including coordinating the response to specific threats involving international actors. As Xi Jinping called on the Politburo for “a resolute strike on secession, infiltration and sabotage by hostile forces within and outside China” (see Bush, Chapter 5), reflecting Bush’s description earlier in the chapter that the Chinese statecraft as having “been shaped by something of a siege mentality” and a “tight linkage between external and internal security in Chinese thinking”. Hence, an intricate combination of Innenpolitik and Außenpolitik is imperative, with the latter inclusive of PRC’s so-called “soft power”, in creating more “friendly” or client states who would support or even collaborate (though CCP’s extraterritorial actions) with PRC in the latter’s suppression of domestic dissent and buying off critics in the foreign academia.

9.4. “Soft Power” Dysfunctional

In Chapter 9, “What Hong Kong Can Do to Improve Governance and Competitiveness”, Bush doubts the accusation that the young people are to be blamed for causing Hong Kong’s political troubles, and notes that political disaffection actually extends to all demographics among the pro-democracy Hong Kongers although he does accept that “those under thirty are the most alienated from the political system and have the strongest Hong Kong-first identity”. He cited Singapore scholars Yew Chiew Ping and Kwong Kin-ming’s survey findings pointing to the
Table 3 The Politics of Patriotism (Joel Westheimer, 2006)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ideology</th>
<th>Authoritarian Patriotism</th>
<th>Democratic Patriotism</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ideology</td>
<td>Belief that one’s country is inherently superior to others.</td>
<td>Belief that a nation’s ideals are worthy of admiration and respect.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primary allegiance to land, birthright, legal citizenship, and government’s cause.</td>
<td>Primary allegiance to set of principles that underlie democracy.</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Nonquestioning loyalty.</td>
<td>Questioning, critical, deliberative.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Follow leaders reflexively, support them unconditionally.</td>
<td>Care for the people of society based on particular principles (e.g., liberty, justice).</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blind to shortcomings and social discord within nation.</td>
<td>Outspoken in condemnation of shortcomings, especially within nation.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conformist; dissent seen as dangerous and destabilising.</td>
<td>Respectful, even encouraging, of dissent.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slogans</td>
<td>My country, right or wrong.</td>
<td>Dissent is patriotic.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>America: love it or leave it.</td>
<td>You have the right to NOT remain silent.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Historical Example</td>
<td>McCarthy Era House Un-American Activities Committee (HUAC) proceedings, which reinforced the idea that dissenting views are anti-American and unpatriotic.</td>
<td>The fiercely patriotic testimony of Paul Robeson, Pete Seeger, and others before HUAC, admonishing the committee for straying from American principles of democracy and justice.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contemporary Example</td>
<td>Equating opposition to the war in Iraq with “hatred” of America or support for terrorism.</td>
<td>Reinforcing American principles of equality, justice, tolerance, and civil liberties, especially during national times of crisis.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

fact that “Beijing has inadvertently contributed to the rise of Hong Kong identity and a concomitant decline of the Chinese identity” through its “fatally flawed” top-down effort to transplant patriotic sentiments and sense of national identity53, and University of Hong Kong scholars Elaine Chan and Joseph Chan’s argument that the Hong Kong people’s patriotism is underlain by liberal democratic values54 – a socio-psychological legacy of a century under British rule.

9.5. Dissent as the Highest Form of Patriotism

That “dissent is patriotic” (see Table 3) as a principle of democratic patriotism as in Westheimer’s formulation, being opposed to authoritarian patriotism’s demanding allegiance to the government’s cause and therefore opposing dissent, harkens back to the quotation “dissent is the highest form of patriotism”. This is often attributed to Thomas Jefferson, though no evidence has been found according to Anna Berkes in her Thomas Jefferson encyclopedia entry of “Dissent is the highest form of patriotism (Quotation)” that found the earliest usage of the phrase, which was used repeatedly during the Vietnam-War era, in a 1961 publication, The use of force in international affairs55: “If what your country is doing seems to you practically and morally wrong, is dissent the highest form of patriotism?”56

Unwillingness on the part of Beijing to take into consideration such socio-psychological makeup of the Hong Kong people as the legacy of long British rule and the Taiwanese who have fought hard and shed blood to gain today’s political freedom and civil liberties thus spells the failure of its “soft power” offensive to win the hearts and minds of people in Hong Kong and Taiwan. As Salman Rushdie says in Joseph Anton, “We have the freedoms we fight for, and we lose those we don’t defend.” (Rushdie, 2012, ppb 2013: 528) The right to dissent as the highest form of patriotism is something the Hong Kongers and the
Taiwanese have learned through hard lessons, through blood and sweat, and that marks their democratic patriotism apart from the authoritarian patriotism promoted by the CCP Party-State in Beijing that sees political dissent as highly dangerous and destabilising and persecution of dissidents, even to death in the cases such as Cao Shunli, Li Wangyang and Liu Xiaobo, as justifiable in the name of maintaining stability and prosperity. This not only applies in the context of Hong Kong and Taiwan, but has wider implications for China’s so-called “soft power” drive in the global arena.

9.6. Soft Power for Good and for Bad

Soft power “is not a choice between hard realism and idealism but simply another form of power which can be used to get desired outcomes”, said Joseph S. Nye in his foreword to the 2015 Portland report *The Soft Power 30: A global ranking of soft power* (p. 6) in which China was ranked last, at the 30th. Thus soft power should not be “misappropriated to cover all courses of action outside military force and, as such, […] embraced as the ethical alternative [because] soft power can be wielded for bad purposes as well as good, as Hitler, Stalin, and Mao each demonstrated.” (ibid.)

The Portland index of soft power, first introduced in 2015, is compiled by Portland, a London-based PR firm together with, earlier, ComRes (CommunicateResearch Ltd), which ran opinion polls on international attitudes to different countries, and later, the USC Center on Public Diplomacy (CPD), a partnership between the Annenberg School for Communication and Journalism and the School of International Relations at the University of Southern California. Countries for the Portland index were said to be chosen to provide a representative sample of the world’s major powers from every geo-political region through a selection process that includes the
Table 4 Portland’s Soft Power 30: 2017 Results (2015 ranking in brackets)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ranking</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>United States of America (3)</td>
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<td>People’s Republic of China (30)</td>
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<td>Russian Federation (–)</td>
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<td>Brazil (23)</td>
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<td>30</td>
<td>Turkey (28)</td>
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Notes: Israel and Mexico which were ranked 26th and 29th respectively in 2015 when the Portland index was first introduced are no longer among the 30 by 2017. The Russian Federation and Hungary which were not among the 30 in 2015 are ranked 26th and 28th by 2017.

major OECD countries, the emerging BRIC nations and some smaller countries that are considered to have achieved an outsized level of influence. The 2017 ranking of 30 countries is shown in Table 4.

9.7. Chinese Soft Power’s Feet of Clay

Similar to the Monocle index, the Portland index of soft power seems to show China advancing impressively, moving up fast from the 30th place in 2015 (when the Portland index was first introduced) to 25th in 2017. The change is smaller in the case of China in the Monocle index, climbing only marginally from the 21st place in the 2015/2016 survey to the 20th by 2016/2017. The Portland report attributes China’s rise in its ranking to the country’s driving the global agenda forward with leading the establishment of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank in addition to the opening of more than 500 Confucius Institutes across the world and extensive international branding campaigns, and even more impressively, the country’s rising cultural appeal – being now tied with Italy for the largest number of UNESCO World Heritage Sites, thus leading to significant improvement in the polling data. However, the Portland report’s conclusions have been called into question by some soft power experts. Yuen-yuen Ang, a political scientist at the University of Michigan, described the Portland index’s understanding of soft power as “superficial”, as according to her, soft power “is not simply likeability or a nice image” but being able to impose a country’s standards upon everyone else “as the global best standards”.

Seen from this perspective, China’s global outreach whether in economic (foreign direct investments with highly criticised business practices including collusion with local corrupt autocrats, flaunting local labour rights and environmental concerns) or political terms (the demonstration effect of the authoritarian “China model” of governance for developing countries’
authoritarian or illiberal democratic regimes – Pippa Norris’s bureaucratic autocracies, patronage democracy and patronage autocracies as referred to also in Bush’s Chapter 7, “Democracy and Good Governance” – which find alliance with the world’s biggest dictatorship useful against Western sanctions over their trampling on human rights and helpful in their regimes’ survival against local pro-democracy forces) would not qualify as soft power successes.

This throws doubt on the Portland report’s placing China within the top ten countries under the “(global) engagement” sub-index (see Table 5) among the Soft Power 30, as this sub-index aims, according to the report, “to measure a country’s diplomatic resources, global footprint, and contribution to the international community” (2015: 21; 2017: 30). The Portland report’s placing PRC within the top ten countries under the “culture” sub-index (see Table 5) among the Soft Power 30 is also questionable. While the Portland report says “When a country’s culture promotes universal values that other nations can readily identify with, it makes them naturally attractive to others” (2015: 21; 2017: 30) and hence its inclusion of a “culture” sub-index, it is ironical that “universal values” happen to constitute one of the seven dangerous Western notions warned of in a confidential internal document known as “Document No. 9” first published in July 2012: (1) (Western) constitutionalism/constitutional democracy (with the independence of the judiciary), (2) universal values (of freedom, democracy and human rights), (3) civil society (and civil rights), (4) (pro-market) economic neo-liberalism, (5) independent mass media (“Western news values”, i.e. press freedom), (6) historical nihilism (i.e. criticisms of CCP’s past mistakes), and (7) questioning the “Reform and Open” policy (with its connection to the “power elite bourgeois class”). The first six notions (as highlighted in Bush’s Chapter 5, “Debating Universal Suffrage Before Occupy: Round 1”) that were inveighed against in Document No. 9 are those that
Table 5 Derivation of Soft Power Resources: 2017 Ranking of Top 10 Countries across Six Sub-indices of Portland Index (2015 ranking in brackets)

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Note: (-) Country not among top 10 for a sub-index in 2015.
the Party saw as ideas then circulating in China that represented a direct challenge to its rule, as “Document Number 9 warned that ‘failure in the ideological sphere can result in major disorder’ and called on leaders at all levels to face the threat posed by Western political ideas”, reflecting the worries conveyed in an unpublished speech of Xi Jinping in December 2012 that “wavering ‘ideals and convictions’ of the Soviet Communist leaders” had led to the collapse of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), and in a four-part video on the decline and fall of the Soviet Union disseminated in 2013 that “elaborated on Xi’s theme of the danger of following a Soviet path” (see Bush’s Chapter 5). Coverage of these dangerous “Western” values, principles or ideas in classrooms is strictly forbidden. They were also banned from the official media. Placed in the context of Bush’s book, as the author correctly observes, the “irony of Document Number 9 was that at least some of these ‘threatening’ ideas were entrenched realities in the Hong Kong SAR”. The perils of the “7 speak-nots” (qi bujiang / 七不講) lie in:

- The core objective of promoting “universal values” is to get rid of the leadership position of the Chinese Communist Party.
- The suggestion of “civil society” is to establish new political forces outside the CCP’s grassroots organisations.
- The idea of “neo-liberalism” is to oppose the State’s macro-economic adjustment and control policy.
- To promote “Western news values” is to oppose party mouthpieces on which the CCP has always been insisting, to get free from the Party’s leadership of the mass media, and to practice “glasnost” that the Soviet Union followed during the perestroika period, in order to cause disorder to the Party and society through disconcerting public opinion.
- “Historical nihilism” aims to highlight the historical problems under the Party’s leadership in order to negate facts that have already been
widely accepted by the people, and to derogate drastically and attack Mao Zedong and Mao thought, in order to totally negate the historical function of the CCP during Mao’s time, with the eventual purpose of weakening or even overthrowing the legitimacy of the Party’s leadership.

- Various views that aim to distort the “Reform and Open” policy point to the emergence of a “power elite bourgeois class” and State capitalism, and consider China’s reform as not thorough while economic reform can only be perfect through political reform.

In addition, there was another 16-item “Suggestions” internal document that was issued on 4th May 2013 which probably contained the earlier form and source of the “7 speak-nots” of Document No. 9, which clearly reveals the urgency of the need for tightening of thought control by including new topics that were previously not considered off-limits. The question here is: with the rejection of all these including the “universal values” which the Portland report itself refers to, what type of “soft power” is that when the report talks about the PRC? On the other hand, the notoriety of the dubious Confucius Institutes, which the Portland report refers to as an example of PRC’s soft power success, is already well documented.

9.8. Confucius Institutes’ Dubious Mission

In mid-June 2014 the American Association of University Professors (AAUP), a 47,000-member association which was founded in 1915 to guard academic freedom, accused the Confucius Institutes which “function as an arm of the Chinese state” of flouting basic rules of academic freedom and integrity, and called for the agreements between Confucius Institutes and close to 100 universities in the United States to be either cancelled or renegotiated to ensure that the value of free speech
would be safeguarded. Otherwise, in its strong-worded statement, the authoritative AAUP urged universities in the United States to “cease their involvement” with the Confucius Institutes as most “agreements establishing Confucius Institutes feature nondisclosure clauses and unacceptable concessions to the political aims and practices of the government of China”, while the academic activities “are under the supervision of Hanban, a Chinese state agency which is chaired by a member of the Politburo and the vice-premier of the People’s Republic of China”.62 “Specifically,” said the AAUP statement, “North American universities permit Confucius Institutes to advance a state agenda in the recruitment and control of academic staff, in the choice of curriculum, and in the restriction of debate.”63

Similarly, the Canadian Association of University Teachers (CAUT) has earlier urged all Canadian universities to sever all ties with the Confucius Institutes as these on-campus institutions were playing “too close a role in the development of university curricula” and bringing about a “fundamental violation of academic freedom”. “Simply put,” said CAUT executive director James Turk in a 17th December 2013 statement, “Confucius Institutes are owned and operated by an authoritarian government and beholden to its politics.”64

The University of Manitoba had earlier declined offers for a Confucius Institute “because of worries about the potential whitewashing of controversial subjects such as Taiwan or the Tiananmen Square massacre”, and another Canadian university, McMaster University, announced plans in February 2013 to “shut down its Confucius Institute due to concerns, raised in an Ontario Human Rights tribunal case, that the school required instructors to swear not to be members of Falun Gong”65.
9.9. “Trojan Horses with Chinese Characteristics”

In a testimony paper aptly titled “Confucius Institutes: Trojan horses with Chinese characteristics” presented to the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations of the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the United States House of Representatives on 28th March 2012, American social scientist Steven Westley Mosher representing the Population Research Institute pointed out that the Confucius Institutes’ “seemingly benign purpose leaves out a number of purposes both salient and sinister, namely, sanitizing China’s image abroad, enhancing its ‘soft power’ globally, and creating a new generation of China watchers who [are] well-disposed towards the Communist dictatorship.” At the outset of his testimony, Mosher – who in 1979 was the first American social scientist to visit mainland China and the first research student from the United States to conduct anthropological research in post-Cultural Revolution rural China, and whose expulsion from Stanford University’s Ph.D. programme in the mid-1980s became a cause célèbre in the academic world – gave his personal “experience in how the Chinese Party-State deals with its overseas academic critics”:

Following my expose of human rights abuses in China’s one-child policy in the early eighties, the PRC, acting through the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, put tremendous pressure on my university, Stanford University, to deny me the Ph.D. Beijing went so far as to threaten to abrogate its scholarly exchange program with the U.S. unless I was, in its words, “severely punished” for speaking out. In other words, I know from personal experience how ruthless the CCP can be when it comes to pursuing its own interests and how sycophantic, not to say craven, some academic administrators can be.
Even for those who are disposed to see in this a person with an axe to grind, it would not be easy to dismiss the facts that Mosher, currently the president of the Population Research Institute, presented:

While the Confucius Institutes are sometimes compared to France’s Alliance Française and Germany’s Goethe-Institut, this is misleading. Unlike the latter, Confucius Institutes are neither independent from their government, nor are [sic] do they occupy their own premises. Instead, they are located within established universities and colleges around the world, and are directed and funded by the so-called Office of Chinese Language Council International (Hanban), located in Beijing, which answers in turn to the Ministry of Education of the People’s Republic of China and, chiefly, to the United Front Work Department of the Chinese Communist Party. In fact, the Chairman of the Confucius Institute is none other than Liu Yandong, who served as the head of the United Front Work Department from 2002 to 2007.

9.10. Chinese “Soft Power” and the United Front Work

On the United Front Work Department, as well as the “democratic parties” (minzhu dangpai / 民主党派), Mosher went on to explain:

The purpose of the United Front Work Department, it should be noted, is subversion, cooption and control. During the Communist revolution, it subverted and coopted a number of other political parties, such as the Chinese Socialist Party, into serving the interests of the Communist Party. After the establishment of the PRC, it continued to control these parties, which were allowed to exist on sufferance, albeit as hollow shells, to create the illusion of “democracy” in China. That it has *de facto* control over the Hanban
suggests, more strongly than anything else, what one of the chief purposes of the Confucius Institutes are, namely, to subvert, coopt, and ultimately control Western academic discourse on matters pertaining to China.

Also in this regard, in their paper “China’s United Front Work in civil society: The case of Hong Kong” (2013), Wai-man Lam and Kay Chi-yan Lam of the University of Hong Kong pointed out that

To strengthen its rule, China has actively promoted patriotism in the form of “China can say no” and rejection of foreign intervention. In addition, it has attempted to develop a set of standards different from the West, so that it would not be evaluated on the same ground as in liberal democracies. Series of attempts have been made to deny the relevance of certain Western concepts, notably human rights and democracy.

(Lam and Lam, 2013: 304)

Such concern over educational institutions serving willingly as vehicles for State-guided propaganda of a regime paranoiacally suspicious of free critical inquiry beyond its control could indeed be grave in view of their potential influence on the outlook and orientation of the human agency. Herein also lies the danger of the current fashionable glorification of the “Beijing Consensus” (à la Joshua Cooper Ramo, 2004) or a “China Model”, the increasing influence and acceptance of which is tantamount to a subliminal universal acceptance of an authoritarian, repressive political model of development where economic advancement takes unquestionable precedence over liberal democracy, free political choice, free speech and human dignity.
9.11. Subliminal Political Brainwashing

As seen above, the currently fashionable so-called “soft power” (à la Joseph S. Nye, Jr, 1990, 2004) projection of China includes such politico-cultural outposts like these over 360 Confucius Institutes and over 500 Confucius classrooms (孔子教室) worldwide, but language teaching and learning is never purely about language, for it inevitably embodies the inculcation of not only cultural values but subliminal political brainwashing through textbooks (including what is omitted in them) and “cultural immersion programmes”, as Steven Mosher’s testimony reminded us: “It is naïve to think that teachers trained in the PRC will limit themselves to teaching language and cultural programs, while avoiding such controversial subjects as China’s military buildup, its abysmal human rights record, and its distain for democracy. Such subjects invariably come up in the classroom, and Beijing’s trained cadre of ‘language teachers’ will know exactly how to allay the concerns of their young and impressionable charges.”

9.12. Cultural Deception

Yu Ying-shih (余英時) is an Emeritus Professor of East Asian Studies and History at Princeton University who has taught at three Ivy League universities (Princeton, Harvard, and Yale) and the University of Michigan and had been the president of New Asia College, Hong Kong, and vice-chancellor of the Chinese University of Hong Kong. He was named on 15th November 2006 the third recipient of the John W. Kluge Prize for lifetime achievement in the study of humanity. Professor Yu has always advocated, in the face of the conventional generalisation on Confucianism, that liberal Confucian values unshackled by imperial ideology of the dynasties are not incompatible with democracy. He had been a vocal critic of the authoritarian Taiwanese government on the
Kaohsiung/Formosa Incident (高雄 / 美麗島事件, 1979) and provided strong, vocal and concrete support for China’s democracy movement following the 1989 Beijing massacre. The Princeton China Initiative (普林斯頓中國學社), fruit of Yu and his wife’s indefatigable efforts, became an unforgettable post station and asylum for many exiled intellectuals and student leader following the Beijing massacre. As revealed in an interview, the 19-year-old son of Yu’s female cousin was killed near the Chang’an Jie (長安街, literally “Street of Eternal Peace”), the main theatre of the June Fourth massacre that spanned across Beijing when People’s Liberation Army (PLA) troops fired into the crowds blocking their advance towards Tiananmen Square during that fateful night of 3rd-4th June 1989.

On 22nd March 2012, Yu Ying-shih was interviewed at Princeton by writer Bei Ming (北明), programme host of Radio Free Asia, for his opinions on the Confucius Institutes. Regarding why a regime which has not been known to be attaching primary importance to humanistic culture or education (witness the first thirty years’ political campaigns and strengthening of Marxist-Leninist-Maoist hybrid ideology during the CCP’s over six-decade reign and the second thirty years’ rugged materialism under economic reform) is now backing the global dissemination of the Chinese language with national strength, Yu saw the motivation as twofold. The first is for commercial convenience especially in the initial stage of the Confucius Institute initiative, since the ancient Chinese teacher and philosopher Confucius is well-known to the outside world and the name of Marxist-Leninism was getting inconvenient, and hence exploiting the name of Confucius would create an illusion that the CCP has changed and is now identifying with something quintessentially Chinese. The deception is reflected in the fact that Confucian studies organisations like the International Confucian Association (國際儒學聯合會 / 國際儒聯) etc. are all civil or semi-
civil organisations and no CCP leaders even including former premier Wen Jiabao who had tried so hard to cultivate for himself the image of a traditional humanistic Chinese patriarch had ever dared to openly praise Confucius or promote Confucianism, and that a colossal statue of Confucius which appeared in January 2011 on Tiananmen Square was removed in hardly three months after intense backlash from inside the CCP. Hence, exploiting the name of Confucius to popularise the Chinese (Mandarin) language has nothing to do with ideology.

9.13. CIs and the United Front Work

Besides the economic, commercial reason, there is also a political dimension of the Confucius Institute initiative – that of the United Front Work. While there have even been accusations from Western governments and scholars alleging Confucius Institutes being involved in espionage, the more apparent victim of the Confucius Institutes is academic freedom, according to Yu. Huge fundings have been used for political purposes, as foreign universities including those in the United States, United Kingdom, Sweden, etc. are being “bought up” as the Confucius Institutes make inroads into these higher education institutions. Such fundings have been used to, through unwritten conditions, dissuade the beneficiary universities from employing or inviting academics who are considered “anti-PRC”. This has led to an atmosphere of intimidation preventing academics from voicing anti-CCP opinions, especially among those who are yet to receive long-term tenure.

9.14. Reopening the “Confucian Shop”

While considering the political motive of Confucius Institutes to have already overtaken the commercial, Yu did not agree with certain worries on the part of some Western, Indian and Japanese media circles that
along with Chinese language teaching, certain ideology, presumably Marxism-Leninism-Maoism, is being imparted. Yu felt that this is totally impossible as there should be absolutely no such intention on the part of the Chinese authorities as even the CCP government itself no longer believes in the Marxist-Leninist-Maoist ideology and has hardly ever brought it up. The only concrete thing the CCP government now believes in is its absolute political power – the Chinese Communist Party’s continued unchallenged one-party rule (yidang zhuanzheng / 一黨專政) – that is intricately linked to huge pecuniary interests of the élites from the party leaders’ families to the PLA. This is the bottom line that cannot be abandoned. This is what China wants countries all over the world to accept: CCP’s yidang zhuanzheng is Chinese democracy, or “socialist democracy with Chinese characteristics”; and CCP’s yidang zhuanzheng is closely related to Chinese traditions, to Confucius.

What is intrinsically the most attractive part of Confucius for the CCP when it is promoting the name of the sage? It has to be Confucius’ teaching of not to defy one’s superiors and start a rebellion – that emphasis on reverence and obedience based on the feudal social order of human relationship and filial piety. On the contrary, the Confucian insistence on the critique of political power and the contingent nature of political mandate, as well as the emphasis on the voice of the people in governance and the importance of public discourse and individual responsibility for social action have to be conveniently ignored or given a warped reinterpretation. What the CCP has been selectively promoting is the era-specific imperial dynasty-serving decadent feudalistic component of Confucianism – the same kind of ancient holy laws being promoted by religious fundamentalists as heavenly mandated and hence infallible. These constituted the “Confucian shop” (Kongjiadian / 孔家店) that the May Fourth Movement (Wusi Yundong / 五四運動, 1919) had aimed to destroy. “The CCP is reopening the
Kongjiadian because its Majiadian (馬家店, “Marxist shop”) has failed miserably,” quipped Professor Yu.

9.15. Buying off Academic Opinions

In terms of management, unlike the British Council, the Goethe-Institut or formerly the United States Information Agency, the currently over 360 Confucius Institutes and over 500 Confucius classrooms are aggressively infiltrating universities all over the world and directly represent China’s United Front Work backed by huge funding to make political inroads into the core of the foreign, especially Western, universities in an effort to alter the international, Western in particular, views on the CCP regime. Funding from the CCP regime through the Confucius Institutes is increasingly controlling the direction of Western research on contemporary China. As such external fundings mean a lot to cash-trapped universities, especially State universities, in times of economic recession and education budget cuts, they work to create campus environments more and more untenable for academics with anti-CCP regime viewpoints and lead to the muzzling of the harsh critics of the PRC who are now in fear of not getting long-term tenures due to their open criticism of the CCP regime.

In other words, the United Front Work through the Confucius Institutes is implanting a perception that the CCP’s one-party rule is most suitable for China. The CCP is not asking anybody to accept the Marxist-Leninist ideology which it is not even mentioning, observed Yu, but there is only one main thing one has to accept: there is only the rule of the Communist Party of China, and that is the only true order of things, right and proper, perfectly justified, and this is in line with Chinese historical traditions and perfectly in conformity with the teachings of Confucianism. The June 1989 Beijing massacre might not be right, but the CCP through its “soft power” (which this paper would
argue, monetary “hard power” of funding in disguise as “soft power”) is asking everyone to accept that the bloody crackdown was inevitable for the good of China.

9.16. CI’s “Kiss of Death”

On the other hand, Yu is critical of the view from some quarters that regardless of the ulterior motive of the CCP’s exploitation of the name of Confucius, it would always be a positive development for China to promote the name of Confucius at the expense of the Marxist-Leninist ideology. Instead, to Yu, by exploiting the name of Confucius, the CCP is giving Confucianism a “kiss of death” – the same negative impact as bestowed by its warped, shameless reinterpretation to justify its own absolute political control upon a list of terms ranging from “People’s” to “democracy” to “human rights”.

In other words, the CCP’s brazen usurpation of the name of Confucius for the Party’s own rebirth could lead to the destruction of Confucianism and the second death of Confucius. What the May Fourth Movement wanted to destroy in 1919 was neither Confucianism nor the name of Confucius, for whom the reformist leaders like Hu Shih (胡適) and Ch’en Tu-hsiu (陳獨秀) had great respect, but the repressive Confucian “religion” (Kongjiao 孔教), also derisively dubbed Confucian “shop” (Kongjiadian 孔家店) – the use of Confucius’ name as a political instrument of the ruling class for the absolute subjugation of the masses through the indoctrination of unquestioning obedience, of the “three cardinal guides and five constant virtues” of the era-specific, dogmatic, repressive “Confucian” ethical code of mingjiao (名教, or lijiao 礼教) under the guise of the quintessential Confucianism (rujiao 儒教). The Confucius Institute initiative represents the CCP’s reopening of the Kongjiadian, not to be taken by deception to be considered as efforts to revitalise Confucianism.
9.17. Neither Educational, nor Cultural, nor Ideological

In summary, Yu reminds us that the Confucius Institutes have nothing to do with education or culture. They have never been aimed to promote education or culture, not even any ideology. Hence they also have nothing to do with ideology. On the contrary, they have everything to do with economic interest (through hard, economic power) and with the United Front Work of the CCP (through coercive, political power). The Confucius Institutes do not constitute, though widely mistaken to be, a cultural phenomenon, but political behaviour, pure and simple. Confucius Institutes are the old “Confucian shops” (*Kongjiadian*) with a new name. The CCP has managed to set up hundreds of such outlets overseas, and they are selling well. In short, as this paper would argue, the Confucius Institutes have nothing to do with “soft power” but a subterfuge that has everything to do with cold, hard authoritarian State power.

After all, propaganda may be part of soft power, but soft power “is more than propaganda, at least in the sense of disguising or misleading” (Dirlik, 2014: 314) and the PRC’s deployment of the idea has reduced “soft power” to propaganda (*ibid.*). Ultimately, all these efforts to make inroads into foreign governments, academia and societies at large – including those that are ostensibly cultural or educational – would amount to State-orchestrated (United Front Work especially in the context of Hong Kong and Taiwan) hard, brute power in disguise as soft.

10. Conclusion

Richard C. Bush’s *Hong Kong in the shadow of China: Living with the Leviathan* (2016) is one of those books that only occasionally appears that not only impresses with both comprehensive and detailed coverage of its subject matter, injected with outstanding insights, informed
opinions, and original understanding and explications but above all, written with a touchingly humanistic perspective as well. Right at the beginning the author of the book deviates from normal practices and acknowledges first of all his debt not to people and institutions, which would follow, but to a place: Hong Kong, and his love and care for Hong Kong and her people, his deep concern for their problems – whether their struggle for political freedom and democracy or socioeconomic inequalities exacerbated by mode of governance – and worries for their future can be felt from page to page throughout the book. It is a book that never fails to inform and never fails to inspire. It is for this reason that what started out as a simple review of the book has here turned into a longer and more detailed analysis of the wider implications of the issues the author of the book has raised as regards Hong Kong – as China’s policy approach towards Hong Kong and by extension Taiwan and the struggle of the Hong Kong people, as well as the Taiwan people, to protect the political freedom and democratic rights they aspire to maintain (in the case of Hong Kong) and that they have fought hard to secure (in Taiwan) have impacts, in some ways teleological, that go far beyond Hong Kong and Taiwan in the light of the PRC’s current relentless global projection, riding on the wave of her economic miracle, of her hard and soft power (in the case of the latter, as this article has argued, is no more than a subterfuge, a ruse, to clothe hard power in a soft power mantle).

The PRC’s advance in influencing world and domestic perceptions of the CCP regime takes a complex mix of strategies. Renowned political scientist the late Sterling Professor Emeritus of Political Science at Yale University Robert Alan Dahl used six main “influence terms” to explain the varieties of power: rational persuasion, manipulative persuasion, inducement, power, coercion and physical force (Dahl and Stinebrickner, 2002; Stinebrickner, 2015; Dahl, 1999).
CCP’s foreign and domestic policies lay everything out as if all are done with nice *rational persuasion*, telling the truth and explaining why the world should support China’s peaceful rise which will always contribute to a win-win conclusion, and why her citizens should support the only party – an “advanced, selfless and united ruling group” (‘進步、無私與團結的執政集團’ according to the teaching manual of Hong Kong government’s controversial 2012 MNE proposal)\(^7\) – that has always been in power since 1949 and will always be.

Richard Bush, in the beginning chapters, first frames Hong Kong’s current political quagmire against the ominous looming silhouette of the gargantuan Leviathan to the north (Chapter 1, “The Hong Kong Hybrid”), and then moves on to narrate the pre-Handover negotiation of Hong Kong’s political future where ironically the two parties negotiating were both outside of Hong Kong and where we are told that “London’s working assumption was that if it demanded too much, Beijing would carry out its repeated threat to unilaterally impose its own plan for Hong Kong’s political system” and furthermore, “Britain also had to balance its goals for Hong Kong against its other interests concerning China” (Chapter 2, “Negotiating Hong Kong’s Political System”). Thus was sowed the seeds of Hong Kong’s tragedy today by forces beyond the control of the Hong Kong people, whose fate helplessly lied in the hands of the two powers who, as the author tells us, “played a public and private game”. If nice *rational persuasion* would not work, in the toolkit of the CCP regime is a tactic a notch lower, that of *manipulative persuasion*. This paper has shown that Hong Kong is just a small patch of playing ground amidst the larger environment where CCP is playing out its “China Dream”. In a broader context, for the PRC, even having recovered her human face to some extent from the legacy of the inhuman Maoist excesses, nice *rational persuasion* has never worked and *manipulative persuasion* has always been the main tool the CCP regime
employs to convince other world powers, the West, the world bodies, and the international financial, educational, and other institutions to forfeit their ethical, moral, and political principles, to turn a blind eye to her human-rights abuses, in order to reap the potential benefits promised in exchange for cooperation.

The importance the CCP leaders see in extending influence beyond the domestic soil (on the mainland, but also Hong Kong after the Handover) to the international arena is also explained in the book’s Chapter 5 (“Debating Universal Suffrage Before Occupy: Round 1”) where Bush describes the Chinese statecraft as having “been shaped by something of a siege mentality”, and there “remains a ‘tight linkage between external and internal security in Chinese thinking.’” Backed by hard economic might, enhancing influence especially in the developing world, as the paper has argued, not only strengthens China’s geopolitical clout amidst superpower rivalry, but also helps to facilitate the extraterritorial suppression of dissent with the collusion of her “friendly” or client states like the kidnapping of Gui Minhai in Pattaya and repatriation of Uighur refugees as referred to earlier in this paper.

The other chapters in the book range from a discussion of a political hybrid that Bush calls Hong Kong’s “liberal oligarchy” and its role in the continuing of the Hong Kong society’s socioeconomic inequalities (Chapter 3, “Hong Kong’s Liberal Oligarchy: Civil and Political Rights”; Chapter 4, “Hong Kong’s Liberal Oligarchy: Economic and Political Inequality”), to a detailed analysis of the aftermath of the Occupy Campaign and Umbrella Movement and the implications for Hong Kong politics and governance where “the changes were not necessarily for the better” (Chapter 6, “Electoral Reform After Occupy: Round 2”), insights into the issues of democracy, governance and legitimacy in the context of Hong Kong (Chapter 7, “Democracy and Good Governance”) and a detailed examination of the Hong Kong
economy (Chapter 8, “Hong Kong’s Economy”) and its future prospects in terms of governance and competitiveness where comparison is made between Hong Kong and the city state of Singapore from which it differs in various ways including Hong Kong’s political economy being “built on rent-seeking” which according to Bush “is at the heart of the system’s oligarchic character” (Chapter 9, “What Hong Kong Can Do to Improve Governance and Competitiveness”). Most significantly, the author notes, the “Chinese government was happy to accommodate a political economy based on rent-seeking because it felt comfortable vesting power in the Hong Kong people who gained the most rents.”

However, as the author also points out here, “economic growth that does not benefit the broad majority of citizens leads to more than ‘political bickering’ [which has been blamed as to undermine good governance and investor confidence], and to significant public protest against the concentration of power that Hong Kong’s political system has fostered.” Such is the dilemma that both the Hong Kong people and their overlord in Beijing are facing. The more uncompromising Beijing is in its rejection of the Hong Kong people’s demand to freely vote for any Chief Executive without obstruction from the central government, the more resentment and distrust it will engender among the Hong Kong people, given PRC’s dismal and worsening human rights record, and more protests in various forms will occur, and more repressive measures and intervention there will be from the centre through overt or covert actions and pressures as well as “the soft tactics of integration, cooptation and collaboration, as well as the hard tactics of containment and denunciation” (Lam and Lam, 2013: 306) of Beijing’s United Front Work in Hong Kong which in Dahl’s “influence terms” represent veering from the softer rational persuasion and manipulative persuasion to carrots-and-sticks inducement and gliding further downwards to resort to the exercise of naked power, coercion and physical force. This vicious
cycle of coercion-resistance-more coercion-greater resistance is one where no one from both sides could find a way out, as the author laments in concluding Chapter 10 (“China, Hong Kong, and the Future of One Country, Two Systems”) that, referring to the hardline comments on the recent years’ rise of political radicalism in Hong Kong by the dean of Beijing’s Tsinghua University Law School who is also “a major articulator” of China’s central government policy concerning Hong Kong, “placing all the blame for Hong Kong’s troubles on the Hong Kong SAR and [...] unwillingness to acknowledge that Beijing’s own policies may have empowered the very radicals [accused of] ill will toward the state suggest that creativity on the part of the Central People’s Government is unlikely to be revealed anytime soon.” Again, as this paper has been pointing out, the implications of such policy orientation of the PRC extend far beyond Hong Kong to impact upon Taiwan and cross-Strait relations (Chapter 11, “Hong Kong and Taiwan”) and the foreign policy of the United States (Chapter 12, “United States Policy toward Hong Kong”).

Similar policy approaches on the part of China can also clearly be seen impacting upon many developing countries. For the developing world leaders who are struggling with poverty, political insecurity, and with their own political glass houses to guard, the lower means of induction, among Dahl’s “influence terms”, is that which is applied to secure their support and cooperation, via rewards in terms of aid, investment and trade, or punishments in the form of withdrawing or withholding these opportunities. For the overseas Chinese community leaders and business class, the same means of bribery or vote-buying is employed to secure their support, allegiance and loyalty.

Bush in his final chapter, Chapter 13, “Conclusion: The Future and Value of the Hong Kong Hybrid”, brings in the issue of reputation: “What China does regarding North Korea, the Senkaku Islands, the
Spratly Islands, Taiwan, Tibet, and Hong Kong, too, will help define for China’s neighbors and for the world what kind of great power China is becoming, and so alter their assumptions about corresponding policy. Hong Kong is certainly not the most important issue on this list, but it is on the list.” Herein lies the unique importance of this latest book on Hong Kong and her struggle for democracy, and on the impact and implications of the Occupy Campaign and Umbrella Movement, with remarkable coverage and in-depth analysis of China’s intricate Innenpolitik-Außenpolitik nexus today. With Hong Kong as the central reference point, the Innenpolitik of this overshadowing Leviathan, as this article has devoted ample space to show, continues to instil fear among the Hong Kong people for their future as intensifying domestic repression which was most recently symbolised by the tragic death of Liu Xiaobo, and just before that of Tenzin Delek Rinpoche, Li Wangyang, Cao Shunli, Peng Ming and Lei Yang, all while in custody or under State surveillance. On the other hand, its Außenpolitik focuses not only on the projection of an image of revival, power and glory – in both economic and military terms – to feed the nationalist craving for self-pride among its domestic audience for the purpose of regime legitimization and in the case of Hong Kong for instilling a sense of patriotic esteem for the “Motherland” after “reversion” (the term Bush uses in the book), but also on facilitating extraterritorial suppression of dissent and buying off foreign critics through the exercise of what the CCP regime itself considers “soft power”, including via the Confucius Institutes, a dubious “soft power” outfit whose real role to which this article has also devoted substantial length in elucidation.

As this article’s wider coverage and explication of the causes and implications of the CCP central State’s strategic and operational policies, domestic and foreign, that radiate from its Hong Kong policy and its interaction with the Hong Kong people’s sociopolitical action show, it is
indeed opportune and of remarkable importance not only to the people of Hong Kong who are still fresh from the Occupy Campaign of 2014, but also to the Mainland Chinese citizens as well as the global community, that an unusually comprehensive yet in-depth contribution had arrived to fill a void in the related literature with this publication in October 2016, just slightly more than half a year towards the twentieth anniversary of Hong Kong’s “Handover” (or “reversion”), of Richard C. Bush’s *Hong Kong in the shadow of China: Living with the Leviathan* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 400 pp. + xvi).

**Notes**

* Dr Emile Kok-Kheng Yeoh (楊國慶), with a Ph.D. on ethnopolitics in socioeconomic development from the University of Bradford, West Yorkshire, England (1998), is the Department Head and an Associate Professor of the Department of Administrative Studies and Politics, Faculty of Economics and Administration, University of Malaya, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. He is the founding editor of the triannual academic journal *Contemporary Chinese Political Economy and Strategic Relations: An International Journal (CCPS)* jointly published by the Institute of China and Asia-Pacific Studies of Taiwan’s National Sun Yat-sen University (臺灣國立中山大學) and the University of Malaya’s Department of Administrative Studies and Politics, was the director of the Institute of China Studies (ICS), University of Malaya, from 13th March 2008 to 1st January 2014, the founder and editor of the institute’s then top-tier Scopus-indexed triannual academic journal, the *International Journal of China Studies (IJCS, Vol. 1, 2010 – Vol. 5, 2014)*, and is currently also a member of the international editorial committee of several journals in Asia and Latin America. Among his latest publications in recent years are “Political governance and strategic relations: Domestic-foreign policy

1. Liu Xiaobo (劉曉波) (20th December 2005). 如果統一就是奴役 [if unification is subjugation]. In: Liu Xiaobo (劉曉波) (2011). 追尋自由—— 劉曉波文選 (Strive for freedom: Selected writings of Liu Xiaobo), with an introduction by Yu Ying-shih (余英時). Washington, D.C.: The Laogai Research Foundation (勞改基金會), pp. 251-259 (see pp. 253-254, my translation). Leading intellectual dissident activist from the 1989 Tiananmen demonstrations and hunger strikes to Charter 08 – for which he was sentenced to 11 years of imprisonment – Dr Liu Xiaobo was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize on 8th October 2010 but was unable to receive it as he was serving his 11-year sentence. He received his Ph.D. from the Beijing Normal University in 1988 with his thesis “Shenmei yu ren de ziyou” (審美與人的自由) [aesthetics and human freedom].
2. Or officially the “Communist Party of China” (CPC, 中共産黨).
7. Or officially the “Kuomintang of China” (中華民國).
8. In the context of modern multiethnic societies, particularly those with an economy dominated by the minority, members of the demographically/politically dominant group are often willing to grant greater autonomy to a State (and its élite managers), which implements preferential policies in their favour.
11. Such rumours, while highly convincing, were as usual unconfirmed, just like the alleged negotiations conducted in recent years by the State with the Mothers of Tiananmen on terms of compensation for death of their children in the 1989 massacre.
12. *ODN*, 20th May 2014. (東方日報 / *Oriental Daily News* / *ODN* is a Malaysian daily in Chinese.)
13. Presently eight thousand seven hundred and sixty-five, according to *Political Prisoner Database* of the U.S. Congressional-Executive Commission on China. (Peter Mellgard, “This visualization shows China’s jailed, murdered and missing political prisoners”, *The WorldPost* (a partnership of *HuffPost* and the Berggruen Institute), 17th March 2017
(updated 19th March 2017). <http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/political-prisoners-china-database_us_589a1d83e4b09bd304be3300>)


15. In another context, after failing to find what Geoffrey Brennan and James Buchanan suggested in their “Neo-Hobbesian” Leviathan models of public finance – which “see government as a revenue-maximizing Leviathan, but depart from the strict Hobbesian perspective” by assuming that the Leviathan can be partially constrained by a constitution (Engineer, 1990: 419) – that Leviathan will have much more scope for action in a relatively centralized public sector, Wallace Oates thus concluded in his 1985 seminal paper “Searching for Leviathan” when he metaphorically threw up his hands in despair: “Perhaps, after all, Leviathan is a mythical beast.” (Oates, 1985: 756).

16. Such suggestions for China, which vary in arrangement details, include a prominent confederation proposal of a “中華聯邦共和國” (“Federal Republic of China”), a “Third Republic” – the first republic being 中華民國 (Republic of China) and the second, 中華人民共和國 (People’s Republic of China) – proposed by Yan Jiaqi (嚴家其) (1992) encompassing the “loose republics” of Taiwan, Hong Kong, Macau, Tibet, Inner Mongolia and Xinjiang (in an arrangement like that of the European Union) and “close republics” consisting of the rest of present-day China (in an arrangement akin to the US’s). Yan obviously had in mind some sort of coexistence of federal and confederal systems within a single country.


24. Ibid.
25. Wang Dan received his Ph.D. in 2008 from Harvard University with his thesis “A comparative study of State violence in Mainland China and Taiwan in the 1950s”.


27. Regarding Wang Dan’s accusation, see also his Facebook posting on 13th January 2012: “現在我已經離開成大 [i.e. 國立成功大學 ]，有些話終於可以說了：大家可能很奇怪，為什麼我在成大一年，都沒有開課，而只是與學生社團合辦 “中國沙龍”。原因就是：儘管成大的校方領導熱誠歡迎我，儘管很多成大的同學，包括陸生很期待上我的課，但是有一些成大的老師卻強烈反對，而说不出口的理由就是擔心影響到與對岸的交流！！結果就是我在成大一年，卻沒有開成課。如此荒唐的事情如果不是發生在我身上，我恐怕不會相信。但是各位台灣的朋友，這就是事實。這個事實就是：中共的陰影，已經籠罩在台灣的上空了！！中共並沒有進來台灣，台灣已經有人開始恐懼和自律了！！你們還感覺不到，是因為你們還沒有被影響到。而我，已經感受到了這個影響。這就是我說 “民主的失去是不知不覺的 ”的原因。各位台灣的朋友，明天，當你們投票的時候，請你們問問自己：你們希望台灣進入一個講誰來教書，都要考慮中共的臉色的時代嗎？！！” <https://zh-cn.facebook.com/permalink.php?story_fbid=10150484826348027&id=105759983026>


38. Now the Education University of Hong Kong (香港教育大學).
43. Based on Reeler’s threefold theory of social change (Reeler, 2007).
44. See note above.

GlobeScan’s 2014 Country Ratings Poll further confirmed this: “The UK is the country whose perceived influence in the world has most improved
from 2005 to the present […] Conversely, China’s perceived influence has worsened the most over the same decade”, though views of China “have stabilised in 2014 after the sudden deterioration that occurred in 2013.” (“BBC World Service Poll” (2014 Country Rating Poll BBC GlobeScan), Embargo 23:01 GMT 3 June 2014 <http://www.globescan.com/images/images/pressreleases/bbc2014_country_ratings/2014_country_rating_poll_bbc_globescan.pdf>)


57. “China climbs on soft power index while Trump pulls US down, but the gap’s still yuuuuge: An annual index shows China’s influence around the world is on the rise, while the US, thanks to ‘America First’, is losing...

58. First published in July 2012,《關於當前意識形態領域情況的通報》 (“Communiqué on the Current State of the Ideological Sphere” is a confidential internal document widely circulated in 2013 within the CCP but not available to the public. In July 2013 this secret document was allegedly leaked to an overseas Chinese news site by 71-year-old dissident journalist Gao Yu (高瑜), who was in turn sentenced to a seven-year imprisonment for “leaking state secrets”.

59. “網上廣泛流傳的中共「七不講」文件，要求高校教師不能講普世價值、新聞自由、公民社會、公民權利、黨的歷史錯誤、權貴資產階級和司法獨立。” (see “習近平新政：七不講後又有十六條” [Xi Jinping’s “New Deal”: After “7 Can’t-Says” there are also the “16 Items”], BBC 中文網, 28th May 2013. <http://www.bbc.com/zhongwen/trad/china/2013/05/130528_china_thought_control_youth.shtml?print=1>).

60. “習近平新政：七不講後又有十六條” [Xi Jinping’s “New Deal”: After “7 Can’t-Says” there are also the “16 Items”], BBC 中文網, 28th May 2013. <http://www.bbc.com/zhongwen/trad/china/2013/05/130528_china_thought_control_youth.shtml?print=1> (宣揚“普世價值”的核心目的是排除黨的領導;“公民社會”主張是要在基層黨組織外建立新的政治勢力;“新自由主義”理念反對國家進行宏觀調控;提倡“西方新聞觀念”，是反對黨一貫堅持的“喉舌論”，要擺脫黨對媒體領導，搞蘇聯當年改革時推行的“公開化”，用搞亂輿論來搞亂黨、搞亂社會;“歷史虛無主義”的要害是針對黨領導下的歷史問題，否認人們已普遍接受的事實，極力貶損和攻擊毛澤東及毛澤東思想，全盤否定毛澤東時期中國共產黨的歷史作用，目的是削弱甚至推翻黨的領導的合法性;歪曲改革開放的種種說法則認為，改革中出現了官僚資產階級、國家資本主義，認為中國改革不徹底，只有進行政治改革才能完善經濟改革等等。)

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61. The article "A Hundred Missed Opportunities: How to Strengthen and Improve the Thought of Younger Lecturers in Higher Education Institutions" [regarding some suggestions on the political work to strengthen and improve the thought of younger lecturers in higher education institutions]. (See "Xi Jinping's "New Deal": After "7 Can't-Says" there are also the "16 Items"), BBC 中文網, 28th May 2013. <http://www.bbc.com/zhongwen/trad/china/2013/05/130528_china_thought_control_youth.shtml?print=1>.


63. Ibid.


65. Ibid.


67. Chang’an Avenue / Chang’an Jie (長安街, literally “Street of Eternal Peace”) was the main theatre of the June Fourth massacre that spanned across Beijing when People’s Liberation Army (PLA) troops fired into the crowds blocking their advance towards Tiananmen Square during
that fateful night of 3rd-4th June 1989. Massacre along Chang’an Avenue/Boulevard (with heaviest casualty on the night of 3th-4th June 1989 but as a whole lasted from about 10 p.m. of 3rd June to the midnight of 5th June) mainly occurred along the route of PLA advance at the Wanshou Lu (萬壽路) junction, Muxidi (木樨地) intersection, Fuxingmen (復興門, Fuxing, i.e., “revival”, Gate) outside Yanjing Hotel (燕京飯店) and Minzu Hotel (民族飯店), and Xidan Bei Dajie (西單北大街, Xidan North Street) junction along West Chang’an Avenue at Xinhuanmen (新華門, Xinhua, i.e. “new China”, Gate) and Nan Chang Jie (南長街) junction onto Tiananmen Square (天安門廣場) from the western side and from the eastern side of the Chang’an Avenue near Hongmiao (紅廟) to Jianguomen (建國門, Jianguo, i.e. “nation founding/building”, Gate), along East Chang’an Avenue near Beijing Hotel (北京飯店) and Nanchizi Dajie (南池子大街, South Chizi Street) junction onto Tiananmen Square (Yazhou Zhoukan (亞洲週刊) (1989). 驚天動地的一百日 [a hundred days that shook heaven and earth]. Hong Kong, p. 80). In addition, massacre also occurred along Qianmen Dajie (前門大街, Qianmen, i.e. “front gate”, Street – PLA’s southern approach to Tiananmen that night), at Chongwenmen (崇文門, Chongwen, i.e. “culture/civilisation revering”, Gate), between Jianguomen and Chaoyangmen (朝陽門, Chaoyang, i.e. “sun facing”, Gate), the approach to the university district and around Peking University (北京大學), Yiheyuan (頤和園, Summer Palace imperial garden) and Tsinghua University (清華大學) (ibid.). Outside Beijing, similar massacre at that time mainly occurred in Chengdu (成都), the capital city of Sichuan Province.

68. 「孔子學院及其影響 —— 專訪余英時」[Confucius Institutes: a special interview of Yu Ying-shih], 《縱覽中國》[China overview], 8th April 2012.

69. Or K’ung Tzu / Kong Zi (孔子).
70. *San gang wu chang* (三綱五常) as specified in the feudal ethical code: the three cardinal guides of “ruler guiding subject, father guiding son, and husband guiding wife”, and the five constant virtues of “benevolence, righteousness, propriety, wisdom and fidelity”.

71. “進步、無私與團結的執政集團”， according to teaching material “China Model National Conditions Teaching Manual” (《中國模式國情專題教學手冊》) of the Moral and National Education (MNE, 德育及國民教育) school curriculum proposal which the Hong Kong Professional Teachers’ Union has accused as being a brainwashing political action.

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(updated version of the 1995 AJCA article).


Yazhou Zhoukan (亞洲週刊) (1989). 驚天動地的一百日 [a hundred days that shook heaven and earth]. Hong Kong.


