FOREWORD

Upon the Second Anniversary of Occupy Campaign / Umbrella Movement in Hong Kong: Essays in Honour of a Pro-Democracy Sociopolitical Movement

Emile Kok-Kheng Yeoh

PROLOGUES

The Mouse That Roared: The Democratic Movement in Hong Kong

Arif Dirlik

The Occupation Campaign in Hong Kong: A Participant’s View

Joseph Yu-sho’ut Cheng

THE OCCUPATION

The Occupy Central Campaign in 2014 Hong Kong

Steven Chung Fun Hung

The Mobilization of Memory and Tradition: Hong Kong’s Umbrella Movement and Beijing’s 1989 Tiananmen Movement

Johan Lagerkvist and Tim Rühlig

Occupation as Prefiguration? The Emergence of a New Political Form in the Occupy Central Movement

Zhongxuan Lin and Shih-Diing Liu

Citizen Camera-Witnessing: A Case Study of the Umbrella Movement

Wai Han Lo

DEMOCRACY, IDENTITY AND THE ROAD AHEAD

Booing the National Anthem: Hong Kong’s Identities through the Mirror of Sport

Brian Bridges

The Unfinished Experimentation of Political Parties in Hong Kong – Reflections from Theoretical and Experiential Perspectives

Sze Chi Chan and King Fai Chan

Scholarism and Hong Kong Federation of Students: Comparative Analysis of Their Developments after the Umbrella Movement

Benson Wai-Kwok Wong and Sanho Chung

Post-Umbrella Movement: Localism and Radicalness of the Hong Kong Student Movement

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Migrants and Democratization: The Political Economy of Chinese Immigrants in Hong Kong

Stan Hui Wai Wong, Ngok Ma and Wai-man Lam

The Rise of Civic Nationalism: Shifting Identities in Hong Kong and Taiwan

Justin Kwan

BOOK REVIEW

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Focus

From Handover to Occupy Campaign

Democracy, Identity and the Umbrella Movement of Hong Kong

Focus Issue Editors

Joseph Y.S. Cheng and Emile K.K. Yeoh
**Contents**

**Foreword**
- Upon the Second Anniversary of Occupy Campaign / Umbrella Movement in Hong Kong: Essays in Honour of a Pro-Democracy Sociopolitical Movement  
  *Emile Kok-Kheng Yeoh*
  
  Page 635

**Prologues**
- The Mouse That Roared: The Democratic Movement in Hong Kong  
  *Arif Dirlik*
  
  Page 665
- The Occupation Campaign in Hong Kong: A Participant’s View  
  *Joseph Yu-shek Cheng*
  
  Page 683

**The Occupation**
- The Occupy Central Campaign in 2014 Hong Kong  
  *Steven Chung Fun Hung*
  
  Page 699
- The Mobilization of Memory and Tradition: Hong Kong’s Umbrella Movement and Beijing’s 1989 Tiananmen Movement  
  *Johan Lagerkvist and Tim Rühlig*
  
  Page 735
- Occupation as Prefiguration? The Emergence of a New Political Form in the Occupy Central Movement  
  *Zhongxuan Lin and Shih-Diing Liu*
  
  Page 775
- Citizen Camera-Witnessing: A Case Study of the Umbrella Movement  
  *Wai Han Lo*
  
  Page 795
Democracy, Identity and the Road Ahead

Booing the National Anthem: Hong Kong’s Identities through the Mirror of Sport  819
Brian Bridges

The Unfinished Experimentation of Political Parties in Hong Kong – Reflections from Theoretical and Experiential Perspectives  845
Sze Chi Chan and King Fai Chan

Scholarism and Hong Kong Federation of Students: Comparative Analysis of Their Developments after the Umbrella Movement  865
Benson Wai-Kwok Wong and Sanho Chung

Post-Umbrella Movement: Localism and Radicalness of the Hong Kong Student Movement  885
Che-po Chan

Migrants and Democratization: The Political Economy of Chinese Immigrants in Hong Kong  909
Stan Hok-Wui Wong, Ngok Ma and Wai-man Lam

The Rise of Civic Nationalism: Shifting Identities in Hong Kong and Taiwan  941
Justin P. Kwan

Book Review

reviewed by Emile Kok-Kheng Yeoh
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CCPS Vol. 2 No. 2 (August/September 2016)
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FOREWORD

Upon the Second Anniversary of Occupy Campaign / Umbrella Movement in Hong Kong: Essays in Honour of a Pro-Democracy Sociopolitical Movement

28th September 2016 is the second anniversary of the Occupy Campaign / Umbrella Movement in Hong Kong. It is also the last anniversary of the said sociopolitical event, which arguably represents a most important milestone in Hong Kong’s post-1997 development, before 1st July 2017 that will mark the 20th anniversary of the “Handover”. It was on 28th September two years ago that pro-democracy protestors occupied the Admiralty (金鐘), Causeway Bay (銅鑼灣), Mong Kok (旺角)\(^1\) and Tsim Sha Tsui 尖沙嘴 areas of Hong Kong in a momentous campaign initially planned out earlier by the “Occupy Central with Love and Peace” (讓愛與和平佔領中環 / 和平佔中, OCLP) movement, but launched earlier than scheduled when overtaken by the development of events, metamorphosed into unprecedented scale of demonstrations at multiple locations and was transformed into what was dubbed by the world media as the “Umbrella Movement” when umbrellas, which protestors were using to protect themselves when the police attacked them with tear gas and pepper spray, became a symbol of the occupation campaign. The scale of the protest movement, the zeal and passion of the
participants and the personal sacrifices they were willing to make in pursuing the objective of the campaign and the bravery they showed in facing the formidable machinery of repression wielded by the State and at one stage an ominous prospect of a repeat of the 1989 Beijing massacre, as well as the broad-based support from the wider Hong Kong society, reflected a culmination of almost two decades of grievances against the central government of the People’s Republic of China (PRC)\(^2\) whose one-party dictatorship not only continues to exhibit and strengthen its relentlessness in suppressing dissent in the vast Mainland but also shows an incremental, creeping infiltration of authoritarianism into the Hong Kong society, as reflected most lately by the disappearances of the Causeway Bay Five.

To commemorate the second anniversary of this Occupy Campaign a.k.a. Umbrella Movement (雨傘運動), the present issue of *Contemporary Chinese Political Economy and Strategic Relations: An International Journal* entitled *From Handover to Occupy Campaign: Democracy, Identity and the Umbrella Movement of Hong Kong* represents a collection of specially selected articles focusing on this momentous event, its background of determining factors, theoretical and ideological underpinnings, as well as its implications for the future of the Hong Kong people’s valiant struggle for democracy against the backdrop of the formidable odds, since the 1997 “Handover”, as being under the sovereignty of a gigantic country with an entrenched ruling Chinese Communist Party (CCP)\(^6\) regime that has no foreseeable intention of allowing for a transition from the present repressive one-party dictatorship to liberal democracy that would respect political freedom and civil liberty, or of relaxing its intolerance for dissent. The obstacles are daunting for the cold reality that the “many freedoms and rule of law Hong Kong people enjoyed were less appealing to a regime
Figure 1 Mighty Current and Causeway Bay Disappearances

Key:³
(1) 14th October 2015 – Mighty Current publishing company’s (巨流出版社)’s general manager Lui Por 呂波 logged in for the last time onto the computer of Causeway Bay Books (銅鑼灣書店, owned by Mighty Current since 2014) before his disappearance (and some sources later reported him being arrested in Shenzhen 深圳, Guangdong Province, China, on 15th October).
(2) 15th or 22nd October 2015 – Mighty Current publishing company’s business manager Cheung Chi-ping 張志平 went missing in Dongguan 東莞, Guangdong Province, China.
(3) 17th October 2015 – Gui Minhai 桂民海, co-owner of the Mighty Current publishing company and shareholder of the Causeway Bay Books, went missing while vacationing in Pattaya, Thailand.

CCPS Vol. 2 No. 2 (August/September 2016)
(4) 23rd October 2015 – Causeway Bay Books’ manager Lam Wing-kei 林榮基 was last seen in Hong Kong before his disappearance and his wife filed a missing persons report with the Hong Kong police on 5th November, but some sources later reported him being arrested in Shenzhen on 24th October. Later upon returning to Hong Kong (“on bail”) in mid-June 2016, Lam confirmed that he was indeed arrested once he crossed into Shenzhen in October 2015, and he suspected that he had already been tailed by mainland agents since two or three years ago. In response to Lam’s revelation, Hong Kong’s Chief Executive Leung Chun-ying 梁振英 emphasised that it was unacceptable and illegal for law enforcement personnel from outside Hong Kong, including from Mainland China, to operate in Hong Kong.5

(5) 30th December 2015 – Causeway Bay Books’ shareholder Paul Lee (Lee Bo 李波) went missing in Hong Kong.

that preferred a population obedient to its strictures and a legal system more pliable at the service of Communist Party power”, as Arif Dirlik lays out plainly in his prologue, “The Mouse That Roared: The Democratic Movement in Hong Kong”, and the fact that the Mainland Chinese government now appears to consider its relationship with Hong Kong’s pro-democracy movement “as contradiction between enemies”, as Joseph Yu-shek Cheng reminds us in his contribution to the prolegomena, “The Occupation Campaign in Hong Kong: A Participant’s View”. It will be a very difficult period ahead for the pro-democracy forces of Hong Kong, as Cheng foresees, and the struggle between them and the establishment-backed, increasingly powerful and resourceful local pro-Beijing United Front (統戰) is set to bring about further deterioration of the polarisation of Hong Kong society.

For a full understanding of what transpired during those tumultuous 79 days, the campaign’s background and determining factors, the roles of structures and agents on both sides of the State and NVA (nonviolent
action), and the Umbrella Movement’s wider and far-reaching impact on the sociopolitical future of Hong Kong, the ten articles here in this focus issue of CCPS, From Handover to Occupy Campaign: Democracy, Identity and the Umbrella Movement of Hong Kong, following the prolegomena, are grouped into two sections, with four articles under the first section, “The Occupation”, followed by six article under the second section, “Democracy, Identity and the Road Ahead”.

The Occupation

Truth is on the march; nothing can stop it now.

— Émile Zola (1840-1902)

This first section, “The Occupation”, after the prolegomena begins with Steven Chung Fun Hung’s paper, “The Occupy Central Campaign in 2014 Hong Kong”, that first introduces to us the details of the Occupation campaign of 2014, and the triggering factors, in particular the issue of political reform and government’s political reform package involving small circle nomination for Chief Executive election. Also highlighted are the challenges faced by the pro-democracy protestors in facing a combination of State power, pro-establishment mobs and hired thugs presumably from the triads. Such involvement of the triads (also witness the triad-style, almost fatal, cleaver attack on 明報 (Ming Pao)’s replaced editor-in-chief Kevin Lau Chun-to 劉進圖 earlier in 2014 with suspected political motive) is particularly intriguing, if we look back at the triads’ involvement at a critical juncture in contemporary China when diverse social forces were galvanized into an almost inconceivable joint action against a ruthless central State: the now legendary “Operation Siskin” or “Operation Yellowbird” (黃雀行動) in the wake of the June Fourth massacre of 1989.

CCPS Vol. 2 No. 2 (August/September 2016)
Known as “Secret Passage” at an earlier stage, “Operation Siskin” was a loosely structured Hong Kong-based rescue syndicate hurriedly put together by some key members of the Hong Kong Alliance in Support of Patriotic Democratic Movements in China (愛國民主運動聯合會, “the Alliance”), Hong Kong actors-cum-filmmakers John Shum Kin-fun 岑建勳 and Alan Tang Kwong-wing 鄧光榮 and businessman and triad boss Chan Tat-ching 陳達鈺 (“Brother Six”/六哥) in the immediate aftermath of the June 1989 Beijing massacre. While the United States and Hong Kong’s British colonial government were undoubtedly involved in the rescue missions to various degrees and the costly and highly dangerous operations were financed mainly by both Hong Kong’s businessmen and her underworld among other benefactors, Operation Siskin owed much to the organizing strengthen and network of the Hong Kong underworld, mainly the smuggling triads, which successfully rescued, by one estimate, more than 300 to 400 wanted student leaders, democracy activists, scholars and writers, mainly from June to the end of 1989, but with sporadic operations lasting till June 1997, just before the “Handover” of Hong Kong to China.\(^7\) Things have apparently changed much over these years since 1989.

While some factions of Hong Kong’s pro-democracy movement today are trying to distance their political struggle from Mainland China’s pro-democracy movement (in the country and in exile) in the name of localism and have become increasingly antagonistic towards the annual Victoria Park commemoration of the June Fourth massacre, a comparison between the 79-day Umbrella Movement (28th September – 15th December) in 2014 Hong Kong and the 50-day Tiananmen Movement (15th April – 3rd June) in 1989 Beijing is inevitable, given the intricately linked demographic and sociopolitical development in both colonial-era Hong Kong and Mainland China and the impact of the
June Fourth massacre in Beijing on the sociopsychological identity transformation (which is increasingly post-1997 bordering on an ethnogenesis) and political consciousness of the Hong Kong people. The next article in this section, “The Mobilization of Memory and Tradition: Hong Kong’s Umbrella Movement and Beijing’s 1989 Tiananmen Movement”, by Johan Lagerkvist and Tim Rühlig provides such a comparison between the two movements, highlighting the important role played by the “Tiananmen generation” of political activists in Hong Kong in promoting democracy locally in Hong Kong which they considered as part of the effort in bringing liberal democracy to the whole of China, amidst CCP’s relentless effort to erase the 1989 massacre from the collective memory of the Mainland Chinese citizens. With due attention paid to the rise of localism and the receding influence of the “Tiananmen generation” in Hong Kong’s pro-democracy movement, this thought-provoking paper offers a detailed comparison between the two movements in various aspects such as background, build-up, goals, frames, protest culture, outcomes as well the era-specific goals and external environments.

In pointing out the importance of “mobilization of memory” in pro-democracy movements and the implications of the rise of localism in Hong Kong’s protest culture to the CCP regime, the findings of Lagerkvist and Rühlig’s paper inevitably also lead us to think of the implications of Hong Kong’s emerging rejection of the “mobilization of the Tiananmen memory” to the Hong Kong democracy movement itself. Does Hong Kong really have the capital, resources and leverage to go alone in her quest for genuine democracy? Is a severance of the local movement from the struggle for democracy and political freedom in Mainland China really necessary or even wise? As Lagerkvist and Rühlig point out, mutual exchanges between Hong Kong’s Umbrella Movement and Taiwan’s Sunflower Movement had illustrated the
importance of interregional linkages between advocates of pro-
democracy activism. This is especially significant given the still
experimental characteristics of these student-led mass movements, or the
“new social movements” referred to in the next paper by Zhongxuan Lin
and Shih-Diing Liu, “Occupation as Prefiguration? The Emergence of a
New Political Form in the Occupy Central Movement”.

Contemplating the 2014 Occupy Campaign in Hong Kong in its
nature as a “laboratories of experience” that manifests the emergence of
a form of “prefigurative politics” which is seen to have been deeply
rooted in Hong Kong’s political context since the 1997 “Handover”, Lin
and Liu bring to our attention a “new way of ‘doing’ politics” that raises
deep questions about representation and leadership in protest
movements.

Focusing on similar concerns is the fourth paper in this section,
“Citizen Camera-witnessing: A Case Study of the Umbrella Movement”
by Wai Han Lo, which sees the Umbrella Movement as sharing the
common ethos of many other social movements in other regions and
countries in recent years in the spirit of “self-actualization” – a new form
of “self-help” movement, characterized by the active participation of the
young generation, that allows room for individual creativity and
diversified action. Lo, however, has the theme of her paper concentrated
specifically on one particular aspect of this “self-help” movement in
2014 Hong Kong – citizen camera-witnessing through the use of mobile
camera phone as a mode of civic camera-mediated mass self-testimony
not only to the State’s brutal repression but also to the beauty of human
nature in the movement that through audiovisual, even real-time, sharing
via electronic social media and the Worldwide Web, helps to shape the
public images of the movement’s participants, engendering sympathy
and support for the cause, thus promoting a new form of social
mobilization.
Nevertheless, despite the idealism and beauty of such “self-help” movements, symbolic or even iconic protest actions, as in Rangoon in 1988, Beijing in 1989 and Hong Kong in 2014, while having a tremendous moral and psychological impact and arousing major national and international attention, as Professor Gene Sharp\(^8\) reminds us, they are by themselves “unlikely to bring down a dictatorship, for they remain largely symbolic and do not alter the power position of the dictatorship” (Sharp, 2010: 61), or in the case of Hong Kong’s relations with her Beijing overlord unlikely to bring about Beijing’s agreement with the Hong Kong people’s aspiration for genuine liberal democracy that promises full political freedom and civil liberties. Why is this so?

The three factors of instrumental activities, bargaining power and ideology, according to Vaughan and Archer (1971), represent necessary (though might not be sufficient) conditions of success for assertive groups. On the other hand, facing these assertive groups is institutional domination whose success also depends upon the existence of three necessary conditions, namely monopoly, constraint and again, ideology. Juxtaposing Vaughan and Archer’s two constructs gives the composite schema as shown in Figure 2. Monopoly is used here in the Weberian sense of the word, referring to CCP’s monopoly of political power. The corresponding feature on the side of democracy movement or civil rights activism comprises instrumental activities defined as the sum of actions to devalue the political monopoly of the authoritarian ruling party on which domination is based. However, for the dissidents, instrumental activities are not enough, whether for successful civil rights assertion or striving for political liberalization. Bargaining power, according to Vaughan and Archer, is as necessary as “an alternative to the use of violence and yet implies a degree of organization which would make revolt effective if reform were denied” (Vaughan and Archer, 1971: 27). However, its two components of numerical strength and organization are
**Figure 2** Assertion, Constraint and Institutional Conflict

![Diagram](https://example.com/figure2.png)

Source: Yeoh (2014: 222), Figure 5. Schema based on Vaughan and Archer (1971: 16-32).

crucial to its effective use and success – the two elements which the pro-democracy movement in Hong Kong and particularly the “prefigurative politics” referred to by Lin and Liu or the “self-help” movement described by Lo are presently lacking.

This brings us to the next section of this focus issue, “Democracy, Identity and the Road Ahead”.

**Democracy, Identity and the Road Ahead**

DESORMAIS [Henceforth!]

– Motto of the Cliffords (1310-1676), Gatehouse,
Skipton Castle, North Yorkshire

Sze Chi Chan and King Fai Chan in their paper, “The Unfinished Experimentation of Political Parties in Hong Kong – Reflections from Theoretical and Experiential Perspectives”, pick up where we just left
off in the last section by pointing out that the first challenge which civil activists in Hong Kong’s post-“Handover” budding civil society is facing, in responding to the grand new environment ushered in by the Sino-British Agreement in 1997, was whether to transform the pressure groups, such as those comprised of community workers, unionists and student activists who practiced mainly a “protest-advocacy” model in political bargaining which may work just fine in colonial Hong Kong, into political parties in a parliamentary democracy in the new political milieu of PRC’s Hong Kong Special Administrative Region.

According to Chan and Chan, citing the idea of activist-scholar Yeung Sum 楊森, the new instrument of a political party – which we are now witnessing as a new political option being weighed by the post-Umbrella Movement veteran student leaders and activists from the movement – unlike pressure group politics that advocates only the interest and well-being of specific groups, “demands political groups to embrace a wider horizon and bear a more inclusive vision” which will also serve to strengthen bargaining power and widen support base in challenging the establishment to bring about genuine democratic reform. In this case, support base in terms of numerical strength refers not only to members directly within the pro-democracy movement or directly active in the movement in some capacity, but also the “third parties” or members of the “the general public” that the movement would need to win over as “allies” or at least “friendly neutrals”, as shown in Figure 3.

Winning over uncommitted third parties is absolutely important for any chances of success in nonviolent action (NVA) assertion of the movement, in a process referred to by Irwin and Faison (1978) as a “political jujitsu” in which shifts of attitude are important as well as shifts of behaviour “because both sides adjust their actions according to how they gauge their support”. Above the “third parties” in Figure 3 are “opponents” who, from the perspective of the
Figure 3 Process of NVA Assertion vis-à-vis Party-State

Source: Yeoh (2014: 234), Figure 10. Schema based on Irwin and Faison (1978).

NVA proponents, represent potential converts especially among State-coopted intellectuals, emerging middle class, disgruntled working class but also moderates and reformers in the ruling echelons and bureaucracy, and from the point of view of the Party-State, the ultimate sovereign of the SAR, the dejected and demoralized leaders and members of the NVA movements who feel lost fighting an unequal battle with no success in sight and who are at the edge of losing conviction in their movements that they feel are increasingly becoming irrelevant facing the continuously growing strength of the Party-State and its proxy in the SAR.

Such tactics are crucial for if “the assertive group has limited members willing to engage in concerted action and a low degree of internal organisation, while the dominant group has a strong and highly organized portion of its membership engaged in applying constraints, domination is likely to prove stable” (Vaughan and Archer, 1971: 28). However, such variations in relative numerical and organizational
strength on the two sides could only account for their relative degrees of success in this process of “political jujitsu”, as Vaughan and Archer caution, for a parameter inevitably influencing this power interplay that has to be taken into account is “the alliances either group can form in order to acquire wider support for either domination or assertion” (ibid.), i.e. not only the active and passive opponents but also the “neutrals”, the uncommitted third parties, to win over as portrayed in Figure 3. In striving to arouse doubts and conflicts among their opponents, for instance, agents of repression could induce cracks in activists’ solidarity and causes the activism to be stymied by appearing moderate and conciliatory to certain more “agreeable” factions in order that they would abandon their goals. This represents an important component of the United Front work. Internal cracks are more prone to occur under a situation where the NVA movement is relatively weak in bargaining power as well as instrumental activities, as portrayed in Figure 4.

From a broader perspective, subtle or overt forms of suppression as illustrated above could come in different forms, but what Gene Sharp identifies as four mechanisms of change produced by NVA in their opponents could similarly be mechanisms through which the Party-State, besides outright violent suppression, could break its opponents in the NVA movements, namely, conversion, accommodation, nonviolent coercion, and disintegration (Sharp, 2010: 35-37), tactics long recognised to be employed by Beijing’s United Front work in Hong Kong, or as Wai-man Lam and Kay Chi-yan Lam (2013) describe, “the soft tactics of integration, cooptation and collaboration, as well as the hard tactics of containment and denunciation” that all seek to “ultimately consolidate China’s hegemony in the local society” (Lam and Lam, 2013: 306). The danger that lies herein is multifaceted, as pointed out in three other articles in this section – “Scholarism and Hong Kong Federation of Students: Comparative Analysis of Their Developments...
Figure 4 State Domination and NVA Assertion


after the Umbrella Movement” by Benson Wai-Kwok Wong and Sanho Chung, “Post-Umbrella Movement: Localism and Radicalness of the Hong Kong Student Movement” by Che-po Chan, and “Migrants and Democratization: The Political Economy of Chinese Immigrants in Hong Kong” by Stan Hok-Wui Wong, Ngok Ma and Wai-man Lam.

While Wong and Chung’s paper reflects the concern over the difficult situations faced respectively by the Hong Kong Federation of Students and Scholarism in the post-Umbrella Movement era – for HKFS including loss of creditability and wave of members’ withdrawal, and for Scholarism mainly a manpower sustainability and leadership

Contemporary Chinese Political Economy and Strategic Relations: An International Journal 2(2) 2016
succession problem, Wong, Ma and Lam’s empirical study using the Asian Barometer survey data raises the disturbing issue of immigrants from Mainland China post-Handover – who are seen as, by self-selection, “politically more conservative, more content with the status quo, and less supportive of progressive political change (i.e. fast democratization) than the native population in Hong Kong” – being reliable supporters of the pro-Beijing coalition in the elections in Hong Kong, thus representing a barrier to democratisation in Hong Kong.

Chan, on the other hand, highlights the rise of radical localism that stems from the frustration felt by Hong Kong’s younger generation over the failure of the Umbrella Movement, and as a strong reaction to Mainland China’s interference in Hong Kong affairs and the Hong Kong government’s compliance to such an interference, leading to further polarisation of the Hong Kong society and fractionalisation among the pro-democracy forces, exemplified for example by the rising radical localist perspective of denying Hong Kong people’s “Chinese” identity and of the overriding focus on distancing Hong Kong from China and escaping Beijing’s political control, which has led to even the questioning of the nature of Hong Kong’s annual commemoration of the 1989 Beijing massacre, including the slogan of “rehabilitation of June Fourth” (pingfan liu-si 平反 六四) used by the Hong Kong Alliance in Support of Patriotic Democratic Movements of China. The last point here, about the “pingfan liu-si” slogan, nevertheless, reflects a divergence in strategic approach and ideological orientation not solely related to this recent rise of radical localism in the post-Umbrella Movement era in Hong Kong but also even among the pro-democracy activists and June Fourth survivors over the conventional use of the term “pingfan 平反” (i.e. to rehabilitate or to redress a mishandled case) in the demand “to pingfan June Fourth”. The concern is understandable as the demand for the CCP regime “to pingfan June Fourth” is rightly, as argued by those
opposing the use of the term, tantamount to admitting the legitimacy of
the CCP regime who is merely asked to rehabilitate the 1989 protests as
a patriotic movement, to release those remained jailed for the protests
and to apologize to and compensate those injured during the brutal
crackdown or persecuted thereafter and families of those who were slain
on the Chang’ an Avenue \(^{10}\) and elsewhere in Beijing in June 1989, and to
allow the long-exiled former protesters to return home. Hence, while no
one doubts the political defiance shown by China’s (mainly exiled)
democracy movement, the current debate over the continued use of the
word “pingfan” could probably reflect the internal dilemma concerning
the determination and the ultimate aim of China’s and Hong Kong’s
democracy movements and their leadership, as well as throw light upon
the current disarray of these movements.

Whether it be the rise of radical localism vs the pan-Chinese
approach of the “Tiananmen generation” of pro-democracy activists or
the political orientation of Mainland Chinese immigrants vis-à-vis that
of native Hong Kongers, the problem at hand ultimately boils down to
the issue of identity, which forms the specific focus of the other two
papers that respectively begins and ends this section – “Booing the
National Anthem: Hong Kong’s Identities through the Mirror of Sport”
by Brian Bridges and “The Rise of Civic Nationalism: Shifting Identities
in Hong Kong and Taiwan” by Justin P. Kwan. With sport being seen as
a means to express or reflect nationalism or for the government to
advance “patriotic” agenda, Bridges examines the rise of “localism” in
Hong Kong especially as a post-Occupy phenomenon by looking at
recent sporting fixtures, while at the same time tracing the issue back to
the pre-Occupy era, using case studies of the 2008 Beijing Olympics and
the 2009 East Asian Games.

As Nicolae Gheorghe (1991) notes, it has been a widely observed
phenomenon that while government responds to challenges from ethnic
community organizations that seek to influence public policy, “within an inverted and complementary paradigm [...] ethnic communities take shape as response to stimuli which induce a process of ethnogenesis” (Gheorghe, 1991: 842-843). Such an inverted paradigm, as shown in the lower flow line in Figure 5, wherein State policy has induced reethnicisation and polarisation among ethnic minorities or even ethnogenesis in places like Spain’s Andalucía or some other imagined communities, as described by Benedict Anderson (1983, 1991) who defines a nation as a community socially constructed and ultimately imagined by the people who perceive themselves as part of that group. As Anderson observes, “regardless of the actual inequality and exploitation that may prevail in each, the nation is always conceived as a deep, horizontal comradeship. Ultimately it is this fraternity that makes it possible [...] for so many millions of people, not so much to kill, as willingly to die for such limited imaginings” (Anderson, 1991: 6-7).

The sovereignty of a nation-state is imagined, according to Anderson, because the concept was born in an age in which Enlightenment and Revolution were destroying the legitimacy of the
divinely-ordained, hierarchical dynastic realm, giving rise to the national
dreams of freedom whose gage and emblem were the sovereign state.
Similarly, other historicist (in contrast to the primordialists) like Ernest
gellner (1983) and Eric Hobsbawm (1990) also posit that nations and
nationalism are products of modernity and have been created as means
to political and economic ends, and the nation, assuming the nineteenth-
century conceptual entity of a nation-state, is the product of nationalism
– but not vice versa – through the unification of various peoples into a
common society or community.

This is exactly what is occurring in China’s ethnic frontier regions
of Xinjiang, Tibet and Inner Mongolia where the CCP central State’s
repressive, uncompromising and inflexible political paradigm verging on
internal colonisation, coupled with massive Han 漢 demographic and
economic invasion leading to resource exploitation and local cultural
and environmental destruction, is pushing local resentment,
reethnicisation and polarisation to an extreme of desperation (as
reflected in the horrifying Tibetan self-immolations) or to a boiling point
(as manifested in the regional unrests and Xinjiang-based cross-province
terror attacks). Are we observing a similar phenomenon of ethnogenesis,
or reethnicisation of the local people, with a distinctive southern lingnan
嶺南 ethnocultural identity in contrast to the northern “Mandarin” (官
話) culture, unfolding in Hong Kong, especially in the post-Occupy era
as a reaction against increasing northern interference, domination and
oppression emanated from the authoritarian political centre in Beijing?
Or maybe not only in Hong Kong, as Kwan’s comparison between the
Umbrella Movement in Hong Kong and the Sunflower Movement in
Taiwan shows, in terms of national identity patterns and formation, and
how the rise of civic nationalism is furthering the nation-building project
in these two polities which has led to increasingly widening identity gap
between them and Mainland China.
Finally, closing this August/September 2016 focus issue of CCPS is a book review article on Joseph Yu-shek Cheng’s 2013 edited monograph, *The second Chief Executive of Hong Kong SAR: Evaluating the Tsang years 2005-2012.*

**Postscript**

We have it in our power to begin the world over again.

– Thomas Paine (1776), *Common sense,* Appendix to the Third Edition

This August/September 2016 focus issue of *Contemporary Chinese Political Economy and Strategic Relations: An International Journal* thus represents both a written testimony and an in-depth case study. It is a written testimony, in an age when forced mass amnesia and persecution of memory have become effective tools of ruthless authoritarian governments to perpetuate their rule, to a valiant movement by the Hong Kong people that began on 28 September and lasted for 79 days in the autumn of 2014 to hold their destiny in their own hands. “… while I recognize the dangers to truth of relating scholarship to life,” says University of Washington historian Alan Wood in his preface to *Limits to autocracy* (1995)11, “I also believe that we who live by the pen bear some measure of obligation, however tenuous, to those who die by the sword.” Even though Hong Kong’s Occupy Movement of 2014 did not end that tragically in a massacre as Beijing’s Tiananmen Movement did 25 years earlier, if the intensification of PRC’s repression of dissent in the past year both in the domestic and global context (witness the kidnapping of Gui Minhai from Pattaya) could be a sign of what is to come for China under continued uncompromising political monopoly of the increasing authoritarian post-reform-era CCP party-State capacity,
even a further liberalized authoritarian regime (*dictablanda*) or a restrictive, illiberal democracy (*democradura*)\(^2\) seems to be increasingly fading from the horizon. Thus the challenge that Hong Kong’s pro-democracy movement is facing is indeed daunting. It is in this climate that the present issue of *CCPS* with its specific focus on the Occupy Campaign / Umbrella Movement comes in timely, for this momentous event that represents a most important milestone in Hong Kong’s road of sociopolitical transformation and that is set to have far-reaching effect on Hong Kong’s future – which will be dealt with in great detail in the ten articles following Dirlik and Cheng’s prelegomena – stands out to be “so monumental, so symbolic, so glorious, and speak so eloquently to our highest ideals that they transcend the immediacy of the news”, in the words that were originally a description of that other, similar, movement just under three decades ago, “History demands that [it] be preserved.”\(^3\)

Besides bearing testimony, this focus issue of *CCPS* is also a valuable case-study analysis of a movement participated by between 1.2 to 2 million people – which was the largest pro-democracy protest in the territory since 28th May 1989 when about a quarter of the Hong Kong people took to the streets in a show of support for the 50-day pro-democracy demonstrations in Beijing’s Tiananmen Square that ended tragically shortly later on that fateful night of 3rd-4th June when a beleaguered regime finally responded with a massacre to reclaim the capital from the unarmed peaceful protesters – from various perspectives including sources and determining factors, structure and organisation, theoretical and ideological underpinnings, achievements and failures, as well as its aftermath and impact on the future.

Before ending this foreword, we would like to thank all the contributing authors of the articles in this focus issue, and the anonymous reviewers of these articles for their invaluable efforts in making the publication of this August/September 2016 *CCPS* focus issue
of From Handover to Occupy Campaign: Democracy, Identity and the Umbrella Movement of Hong Kong possible. We are deeply grateful to Joseph Yu-shek Cheng, Arif Dirlik and Brian Bridges for their great support in the organizing of this volume; without their help the publication of this worthy issue on Hong Kong’s Occupy Campaign / Umbrella Movement would not have been possible. Finally, we are also grateful to our proof-readers, Mr Goh Chun Wei 吳俊偉 and Mr Dylan Hii Yong Jie 許永杰 for their crucial assistance in checking the final galley proofs and CRCs, and to Miss Wu Chien-yi 吳千宜 for the journal’s website construction and maintenance. The responsibility for any errors and inadequacies that remain is of course fully mine.

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Notes
1. The transliteration being from the older names 望角，芒角。
2. People’s Republic of China (中华人民共和国) consists of 31 provincial-level administrative units including sheng 省 (i.e. provinces of Anhui 安徽, Fujian 福建, Gansu 甘肃, Guangdong 广东, Guizhou 贵州, Hainan 海南, Hebei 河北, Heilongjiang 黑龙江, Henan 河南, Hubei 湖北, Hunan 湖南, Jiangsu 江苏, Jiangxi 江西, Jilin 吉林, Liaoning 辽宁, Qinghai 青海, Shaanxi 陕西, Shandong 山东, Shanxi 山

CCPS Vol. 2 No. 2 (August/September 2016)
西，Sichuan 四川，Yunnan 雲南 and Zhejiang 浙江），
zizhiqù 自治區 (i.e.
“autonomous regions” – each a first-level administrative subdivision
having its own local government, and a minority entity that has a higher
population of a particular minority ethnic group – of Guangxi 廣西 of the
Zhuang 壮，Nei Monggol/Inner Mongolia 內蒙古 of the Mongols,
Ningxia 寧夏 of the Hui 回，Xizang/Tibet 西藏 of the Tibetans and
Xinjiang 新疆 of the Uyghurs) and zhixiashi 直轄市 (i.e. municipalities
directly ruled by the central government – Beijing 北京，
Chongqing 重慶，Shanghai 上海 and Tianjin 天津). After the “Handover”
(or “huìguì 回歸” from the perspective of the PRC, i.e. “return” [to the
motherland]), the British colony of Hong Kong and Portuguese colony of
Macau officially became the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region
(香港特別行政區) and Macao Special Administrative Region (Região
Administrativa Especial de Macau, 澳門特別行政區) of the People’s
Republic of China respectively in 1997 and 1999. The now vibrantly free
and democratic island state of Taiwan – officially still “Province of
Taiwan, Republic of China” (中華民國臺灣省) – remains a sovereign
country of her own, since the conclusion in 1949 of the Chinese Civil War,
outside the control of Mainland China’s ruthlessly authoritarian Chinese
Communist Party regime.

3. See Yeoh (2016: 43, Figure 2), with adjustment in item 4 based on latest
confirmed information.

4. ODN, 21st June 2016 (東方日報 / Oriental Daily News / ODN is a
Malaysian daily in Chinese).

5. Ibid.

6. Or officially the “Communist Party of China” (CPC, 中國共產黨).

7. See “黃雀行動背後港人捨命救危內情” [inside story of how Hong Kong
people risked their lives to embark on rescuing those in danger behind the
Operation Siskin] by Jiang Xun 江迅, originally published in Yazhou
Zhoukan 亞洲週刊 [Asia week], Issue 23, 14th June 2009; reproduced in

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8. Multiple-time Nobel Peace Prize nominee, Gene Sharp is Professor Emeritus of Political Science at the University of Massachusetts Dartmouth. <http://in.reuters.com/article/2012/02/27/nobel-peaceidINDEE81Q0HL20120227>

9. Or more correctly transliterated, “jūjutsu”. Jūjutsu 柔術 is a Japanese martial art of close combat, using no weapon or only a short weapon, for defeating an armed and armored opponent by manipulating the opponent’s force against himself rather than directly opposing it with one’s own force. Jūjutsu, which dates back to the 17th century, is an ancestor of Aikidō 合氣道 which was developed in the late 1920s, as referred to by Stephen Zunes (2009) when he says, “As with the martial art of aikido, nonviolent opposition movements can engage the force of the state’s repression and use it to effectively disarm the force directed against them.”

10. Chang’an Avenue/Chang’an Jie 長安街 (literally “Street of Eternal Peace”) was the main theatre of the June Fourth massacre that spanned across Beijing when People’s Liberation Army (PLA) troops fired into the crowds blocking their advance towards Tiananmen Square during that fateful night of 3rd-4th June 1989. Massacre along Chang’an Avenue/Boulevard (with heaviest casualty on the night of 3rd-4th June 1989 but as a whole lasted
from about 10 p.m. of 3rd June to the midnight of 5th June) mainly occurred along the route of PLA advance at the Wanshou Lu 萬壽路 junction, Muxidi 木樨地 intersection, Fuxingmen 復興門 (Fuxing, i.e., “revival”, Gate) outside Yanjing Hotel (燕京飯店) and Minzu Hotel (民族飯店), and Xidan Bei Dajie 西單北大街 (Xidan North Street) junction along West Chang’an Avenue at Xinhua门 新華門 (Xinhua, i.e. “new China”, Gate) and Nan Chang Jie 南長街 junction onto Tiananmen Square (天安門廣場) from the western side and from the eastern side of the Chang’an Avenue near Hongmiao 紅廟 to Jianguomen 建國門 (Jianguo, i.e. “nation founding/building”, Gate), along East Chang’an Avenue near Beijing Hotel (北京飯店) and Nanchizi Dajie 南池子大街 (South Chizi Street) junction onto Tiananmen Square (《驚天動地的一百日》, Yazhou Zhoukan 亞洲週刊 (1989), p. 80). In addition, massacre also occurred along Qianmen Dajie 前門大街 (Qianmen, i.e. “front gate”, Street – PLA’s southern approach to Tiananmen that night), at Chongwenmen 崇文門 (Chongwen, i.e. “culture/civilization revering”, Gate), between Jianguomen and Chaoyangmen 朝陽門 (Chaoyang, i.e. “sun facing”, Gate), the approach to the university district and around Peking University (北京大学), Yiheyuan 頤和園 (Summer Palace imperial garden) and Tsinghua University (清華大學) (ibid.). Outside Beijing, similar massacre at that time mainly occurred in Chengdu 成都, capital city of Sichuan Province. While the official death toll stood at four hundred and forty-three, 223 of whom were soldiers and police officers, plus 5,000 soldiers and police officers and 2,000 civilians wounded in the crackdown, exiled dissidents estimated the number of civilians, workers and students killed in the Beijing crackdown during the night of 3rd-4th June 1989 to be from 2,000 to 3,000, while Soviet sources in 1989 put the number massacred in Beijing as 3,000, as cited by Mikhail Gorbachev at a politburo meeting in 1989 (ODN, 19th August 2011).


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Prologues
The Mouse That Roared: 
The Democratic Movement in Hong Kong*

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Abstract
The popular uprising in recent years in Hong Kong – “Occupy Central” a.k.a. Umbrella Movement – has again brought to the fore the question of the Special Administrative Region’s relationship with Mainland China post-1997 “handover” of the territory by the British colonial government to the People’s Republic of China. This article argues that the protests have their origins in a consciousness born of the anxieties provoked by the prospect of unification in the 1980s and 1990s, further evolved against the background of the unstable “one country, two systems” arrangement openly favoring the corporate and financial ruling class in Hong Kong which is in turn prepared to align its interests with those of the Communist regime in a mutually beneficial relationship. It also posits while the upheaval in Hong Kong bears similarities to other “Occupy” movements elsewhere in the economic issues that inform it, it may be viewed as the latest chapter in a narrative that goes back to the 1980s – the emergence of a neoliberal global capitalism of which the
PRC has been an integral component, and the Tiananmen movement which was one of the earliest expressions of the social and political strains created by shifts in the global economy.

**Keywords:** Hong Kong, Beijing, democracy, “Occupy” movement, “one country, two systems”, protest, Tiananmen

In 1997, the British government handed Hong Kong over to the People’s Republic of China (PRC) after 150 years of colonial rule. Some observers at the time could not but wonder if Hong Kong would be absorbed and remade by the behemoth to the north, or transform with its proverbial dynamism “the motherland” that already was undergoing radical change. The popular uprising under way in recent years in Hong Kong is the most recent indication that the question was not an idle one. The answer is yet to come.

Hong Kong investments and technology played an important part in the 1980s in laying the ground for the PRC’s economic take-off. The “special economic zones” that were set up in Guangdong province at the beginning of “reform and opening” (改革開放) as gateways to global capitalism (while keeping the rest of the country immune to its effects) were intended to take advantage of the dynamic capitalism of neighboring Hong Kong. And they did. To this day, Guangdong leads the rest of the country in industrial production and wealth. It also heavily resembles Hong Kong with which it shares a common language and, despite three decades of separation after 1949, common cultural characteristics. Hong Kong has continued to play a crucial part in the country’s development.

It has been a different matter politically. Since the take-over in 1997 the leadership in Beijing has left no doubt of its enthusiasm for the oligarchic political structure that was already in place before the end of
colonial rule, the many freedoms and rule of law Hong Kong people enjoyed were less appealing to a regime that preferred a population obedient to its strictures and a legal system more pliable at the service of Communist Party power. Already in the 1980s, Hong Kong people’s doubts about unification with the “motherland” were obvious in the exodus of those who could afford to leave to places like the United States, Canada and Australia. The exodus speeded up following the Tiananmen 天安門 tragedy in 1989 which put to rest any hopes that reforms might open up a greater space for political freedoms. The colony practically disqualified itself as any kind of political inspiration for the Mainland with the enthusiastic participation of Hong Kongers in the Tiananmen movement leading up to the June Fourth massacre, and annual commemorations thereafter of the suppression of the student movement. In the early 1990s the Party under Deng Xiaoping 鄧小平 settled on the example of Singapore as a model more attuned to its own authoritarian practices.

The same reasons that made the regime suspicious of Hong Kong people for their “lack of patriotism” due to the legacies of colonialism have made Hong Kong into an inspiration as well as a base for radical critics of the regime struggling for greater freedom and democracy on the Mainland. The take-over of 1997 was under the shadow of Tiananmen, but even so few would have imagined at the time that within two decades of the celebrations of the end of colonialism and “return” to the motherland, protestors against Beijing “despotism” would be waving British flags. Once the initial enthusiasm for “liberation” was over, Hong Kongers rediscovered as the source of their “difference” the colonial history which in nationalist historiography appeared as a lapse in the nation’s history, a period of humiliation remembered most importantly to foster nationalist sentiment. PRC democracy activists such as the jailed Nobel Prize winner Liu Xiaobo 劉曉波 have drawn the ire of the regime
for suggesting that Hong Kong’s freedoms and democratic sentiments were legacies of colonial acculturation that Mainlanders had missed out on.¹

Recent years’ protests have their origins in a consciousness born of the anxieties provoked by the prospect of unification in the 1980s and 1990s, and even though both the Mainland and Hong Kong have changed radically in the intervening period, the Hong Kong identity that assumed recognizable contours at the time is a fundamental driving force of the protests.² The immediate issue that has provoked the protests – call for universal suffrage in the selection of the chief executive and legislative council (立法会) of the Special Administrative Region – harks back to the Basic Law (基本法) of 1984 agreed upon by the British and the PRC as a condition of unification. The Basic Law stipulated that Hong Kong would be subject internally to its own laws for fifty years after the take-over under a system of “one country, two systems” (一国两制), with its own chief executive and a legislature elected by an election committee representing various functional constituencies in a corporatist arrangement. The arrangement openly favored the corporate and financial ruling class in Hong Kong which was in turn prepared to align its interests with those of the Communist regime in a mutually beneficial relationship. The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (SAR) was something of a political counterpart to the “special economic zones” – an exception that was granted not to compromise national sovereignty but as an act of sovereign power. In all matters pertaining to governance and the law, the SAR would be accountable to the National People’s Congress (NPC) in Beijing. Hong Kong was granted representation in the NPC which, like all representation in that body, has served more to consolidate central control than to allow for the democratic airing of public opinion and grievances.
“One country, two systems” was an unstable structure. It was important to the PRC for patriotic reasons to put an end to the colonialism at its doorstep and retrieve territory lost a century and a half ago. But some compromise with the departing British was unavoidable given the strategic importance to the new project of development of the global corporate and financial hub that was Hong Kong. The autonomy granted to Hong Kong was subject to the good faith of the Beijing government. What might happen if the PRC no longer needed this hub seemed like a remote contingency in the 1980s, but already by the 1990s there was talk of the rise of Shanghai as a competitor. It is not out of the question that the recent unrest which may undermine faith in Hong Kong as a corporate and financial center is not entirely undesirable to the regime now that preparations have been completed to launch a new financial center in Shanghai.

A similar uncertainty attended the issue of governance under the system. The Basic Law held out the possibility of democratic government and universal suffrage in Hong Kong subject to circumstances to be determined by the NPC. It nourished hopes in democracy, but reserved for Beijing final say on when and how democracy was to be exercised. There were no guarantees that full democracy would be granted if Hong Kongers invited the displeasure of the government in Beijing – or circumstances within the country made it undesirable. This is the immediate issue in the recent protests (along with public dissatisfaction with the current chief executive, Leung Chun-ying 梁振英 who, like his two predecessors since 1997, is widely viewed as a Beijing puppet). To Hong Kong democracy advocates, the offer of universal suffrage is a mockery of the promise of full democracy when the choices are limited to candidates carefully selected by an electoral commission packed with Beijing loyalists.
The take-over in 1997, and the circumstances of its negotiation, had one very significant consequence that in likelihood was unanticipated: the politicization of Hong Kong society. Hong Kong long had a reputation as a cultural and political “desert”. The British colonial regime was successful in diverting popular energies to the struggle for everyday existence, and for those who could, the pursuit of wealth. At the height of the Cultural Revolution on the Mainland in 1967, labor disputes erupted into riots against the colonial government led by pro-Beijing leftists. But sustained political activity dates back to the negotiations surrounding the take-over, especially the mobilization instigated by the Tiananmen movement in Beijing. Politics over the last twenty-five-plus years has revolved around the assertion of a Hong Kong identity against dissolution into the PRC. As a new political consciousness has found expression in the efflorescence of a Hong Kong culture in film and literature, the latter has played no little part in stimulating political activity. Ironically, while the goal of “one country, two systems” was to ease Hong Kong into the PRC, the very recognition of the differences of Hong Kong from the rest of the country would seem to have underlined the existence of a Hong Kong identity that differentiated the former colony from the rest of PRC society.

The recent protests have focused attention on issues of governance. Far more important are the social tensions and the economic transformations that lend urgency to protestors’ demand for political recognition and rights. One important indication is the part young people – teenagers – have played in the protests. Joshua Wong 黃之鋒, who has emerged as a leader, is seventeen years old, which means that he was born in 1997, the year of the take-over.

The generation Wong represents has come of age in a society subject to deepening social and economic problems. The wealth gap in Hong Kong is nothing new, but as elsewhere in the world, inequality has
assumed critical proportions with increased concentration of wealth in the hands of the elite allied with Beijing. Since 1997, the experience of marginalization has been intensified with the inundation of the city by Mainlanders with their newfound wealth which has increased prices of commodities, put pressures on public services – including housing, health and education – and introduced new cultural fissures. Some Hong Kong businesses prefer Mainland customers on whose business they have come to be dependent. In the 1990s, Mainlanders living in Hong Kong used to complain about the prejudice they suffered from Hong Kongers with their pretensions to superior cultural sophistication. That has been reversed. Even the most uncouth Mainlanders are likely to look down on Hong Kongers for not being authentically Chinese, which typifies PRC attitudes toward Chinese populations elsewhere. While Hong Kongers complain about “locusts” from the North, a very-unConfucian Peking University professor descended from Confucius refers to Hong Kongers as “bastards” contaminated by their colonial past. The central government in Beijing, sharing the suspicious of southerners of its imperial predecessors, is engaged in efforts to discourage the use of Cantonese while instilling in the local population its version of what it means to be “Chinese”. We may recall that the recent protests were preceded two years earlier by successful protests against Beijing-backed efforts to introduce “patriotic” education to Hong Kong schools. It is not that Hong Kong people are not patriotic. They are very patriotic indeed. But their patriotism is mediated by their Hong Kong identity, a very product of the take-over that Beijing would like to erase.

The upheaval in Hong Kong bears similarities to “Occupy” movements elsewhere in the economic issues that inform it. It also has its roots in the special circumstances of Hong Kong society, and its relationship to Beijing. The movement may be viewed as the latest
chapter in a narrative that goes back to the 1980s, the emergence of a neoliberal global capitalism of which the PRC has been an integral component, and the Tiananmen movement which was one of the earliest expressions of the social and political strains created by shifts in the global economy. The demands for democracy in the protests are clearly not merely “political”. Democracy is important to the protestors not only as a means to retrieving some control over their lives, but also to overcome inequality. The authorities in Beijing are quite aware of this link. A Law professor from Tsinghua University in Beijing who also serves as an advisor on Hong Kong affairs has announced that democracy would jeopardize the wealthy who are crucial to the welfare of Hong Kong’s capitalist economy. It may seem ironic that a Communist Party should be devoted to the protection of wealthy capitalists, but that is the reality of contemporary PRC society that the protestors are struggling against.\(^3\)

The protests are also the latest chapter in the formation of a Hong Kong identity which assumed urgency with the prospect of return to the “motherland” in the 1980s. This, too, is a threat to a regime in flux that finds itself threatened by identity claims among the populations it rules over. It seems superfluous to say that allowing to the people of Hong Kong the self-rule they demand would have adverse consequences in encouraging separatism among the various ethnic groups already in rebellion against the regime, and further stimulate democracy activists among the Han population. Hitherto pro-Beijing Kuomintang leader in Taiwan, Ma Ying-jeou 馬英九, has voiced his opposition to unification under the “one country, two-systems” formula.\(^4\)

It would probably take something of a miracle for the protest movement in Hong Kong to achieve its stated goals. Rather than risk a Tiananmen-style confrontation, the authorities had taken a wait-and-see attitude, waiting for the movement to spend its force, or opponents to
force it to retreat. There were signs then that the movement had run its course in clashes between the protestors and members of the general public weary of the disruption of life and business. It is suspected that the attackers included members of Triad gangs. Whom they might be serving is, for the moment, anybody’s guess.

What the next chapter might bring is uncertain, to say the least. It is unlikely that a movement that has been in the making for two decades will simply fade away into oblivion. The problems it set out to resolve are very real, and offer little sign of resolution, and the movement has proven its resilience through the years. The distinguished scholar of Hong Kong-Mainland relations at the City University of Hong Kong, Joseph Cheng Yu-shek 鄭宇碩, who is also an advocate of democracy, stated in an interview that: “All the protesters here and Hong Kong people know it is extremely unlikely the Chinese leaders will respond to our demands … We are here to say we are not going to give up, we will continue to fight on. We are here because as long as we fight on, at least we haven’t lost.”5 The fight goes on even as Beijing and pro-Beijing forces in Hong Kong further deepen their control over crucial aspects of Hong Kong society – in addition to the economy, the legacies of judicial, educational, press and cultural freedoms inherited from British colonial rule.

* * *

Struggles for autonomy in Hong Kong raise significant theoretical and political questions about issues of “Chineseness” as well as the relationship between colonialism and historical identity-formation. The struggle for autonomy in Hong Kong, similarly to the struggles in Taiwan for independence, challenges both popular and scholarly usage in which “Chineseness” appears as a transparent category, if only in the
suggestion that there are different ways to be Chinese. Declarations that “we are not Chinese, we are Hong Kongers” or “we are not Chinese, we are Taiwanese” are at one level protests against political homogenization that presupposes a homogeneous political identity centered in Beijing. In a deeper sense, they raise questions about a racialized ethnic and national identity in the name of local identities that nourish off the experience of diverse historical identities that challenge de-historicized and de-socialized notions of “Chineseness”.⁶

In both cases, moreover, the local identity is entangled in colonial histories, in one case British and, in the other, Japanese colonialism. Hong Kong and Taiwan as historical formations throw up questions about colonialism and identity-formation that have not received the attention their importance demands. This may sound strange, as the relationship between colonialism and identity has been at the center of much postcolonial scholarship. The obsessive preoccupation of this scholarship with Euro/American colonialism has limited its historical and theoretical scope, however, and channeled inquiry into the impact of colonization on the colonizer, on the one hand, and, on the other hand, the appropriation of the colonial by native subjects in strategies of resistance that mocked the anticipations of the colonizers. These emphases are understandable given the anti-hegemonic goal of postcolonial criticism to counter Euro/American colonialist assumptions that have shaped modern forms of knowledge, including knowledge of the colonized. What has been lost sight of in the process, however, are the ways in which the colonizer’s culture did indeed transform the colonized, setting them in new historical directions, even if the directions taken were not what the colonizers had expected them to be. The postcolonial critique of cultural and epistemological Eurocentrism owes much of its inspiration and language to these very forms of knowledge. Resistance to colonialism is a powerful source of identity
formation, but only if we recognize that it already presupposes the colonial as an integral moment.\(^7\)

The suggestion that colonialism is a source of historical identity does not sit well with nationalist historiography in which colonial episodes appear as black boxes lost to national history, whose consequences are best erased in the recovery of national integrity and belonging. Colonial episodes appear in this perspective as deviations from the evolution of national identity rather than constituents of its formation. Their cultural effects are deemed undesirable, if not illegitimate, and need to be erased in order for national consciousness to take root.\(^8\)

I think it may be observed fairly that such thinking dominates views of Hong Kong and Taiwan in Chinese nationalist historiography, most fervently presently in the PRC. When the PRC government decided to describe the end of British rule in Hong Kong as “huigui” (回歸), with its connotations of “returning home”, the implication was that Hong Kong had been in involuntary exile for a hundred and fifty years, and was now returning to its proper historical path by joining the “motherland”. The same kind of de-historicized thinking characterizes views toward Taiwan as well: that it is time for Taiwan to return to the Motherland after a century of separation first under Japanese colonialism, and then as the stronghold for the renegade Kuomintang which, ironically, long held to the view of “one China” and still seems to. It is also taken for granted, I may add, by many foreigners, among them many students of “China”.

Subsequent developments in Hong Kong have shown the fallacy of any such assumption. The colonial legacy has proven to be more deep-seated than the regime had wished. It would be simplistic to attribute Hong Kong demands for democracy and independence to lingering nostalgia for colonial rule, or even the political and legal norms
established under it. 9 Though the legal system it put in place is superior by far to anything that might be expected of the Beijing government, colonial rule did not allow democracy either. The dissatisfaction with Mainland rule involves many other factors, from increasing inequality and popular frustration at being unable to do anything about it, to the virtual invasion of newfound wealth from the Mainland which has introduced new social and cultural tensions into Hong Kong society at all levels. The openly acknowledged alliance between the Beijing government and the Hong Kong economic elite adds a class dimension to the struggle for local autonomy against central control. The greedy and crass behavior of many Mainland tourists with their arrogant, proprietary attitude toward Hong Kong has material consequences for the population at large in putting pressure on public resources such as education and medical care, not to speak of pressure on everyday commodities, as well as on cultural orientation, pitting the cultural attributes of “real Chinese” against colonialism-infected locals, who in turn claim cultural superiority by dint of the colonial past. These conflicts have led to the racialization of relations between Hong Kongers and Mainlanders. 10 Emergent voices in Hong Kong, following the earlier example of Taiwan independence advocates, openly proclaim that “Hong Kong is not Chinese”. 11

While of the utmost significance, the question here is not merely that their colonial pasts produced institutional and cultural structures that differentiate Hong Kong and Taiwan from the Mainland. Neither is it merely a matter of memories of colonialism, which hardly applies to the young generations that have led the recent struggles against Mainland claims. What is equally significant is that the colonial pasts offer alternative historical narratives that are invoked against the nationalist narrative of a single history based upon common ethnicity and imagined cultural homogeneity that justifies Beijing’s claims. It is easily
concluded from the perspective of these alternative narratives, that unification with the Mainland adds up to little more than a new round of colonialism.\footnote{12}

Notes

+ This article is a revised and updated version of an article that was first published in Turkish and English in the newspaper Agos, October 6, 2014. The original is also available on boundary 2, online <http://boundary2.org/2014/10/29/the-mouse-that-roared-the-democratic-movement-in-hong-kong-2/>.

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4. The case of Taiwan is discussed in greater detail in Arif Dirlik, “Taiwan: The land that colonialisms made”, *boundary 2* (forthcoming).


7. Similar points have been made, with reference to Japanese colonialism, in Liao Ping-hui and David Der-wei Wang (eds), *Taiwan under Japanese...*


12. This question was raised early on by the US scholar of Hong Kong origin, Rey Chow. See, “Between colonizers: Hong Kong’s postcolonial self-writing in the 1990s”, Diaspora: A Journal of Transnational Studies, Vol. 2, No. 2 (Fall 1992), pp. 151-170.

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The Occupation Campaign in Hong Kong: 
A Participant’s View

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Abstract

The Occupation Campaign in Hong Kong ended on December 15, 2014 after 79 days reflected the protesters and pro-democracy groups’ wish to tell the world that they are not going to give up the cause of democracy and that they will continue to fight despite the understanding that it will be extremely difficult to change the decision of the Chinese leadership in the short term. In the eyes of the supporters of the pro-democracy movement, the challenge facing Hong Kong people is not just fighting for a democratic electoral system, but also struggle to maintain their core values, their lifestyles, and their individual dignity – an uphill battle given that the local business community firmly toes the Beijing line. While the political struggles of the young people of Hong Kong are perceived to have brought hope to the pro-democracy movement, the prospects for democracy remain far from promising.

Keywords: Hong Kong, Occupation Campaign, protest, pro-democracy movement, united front, China, Beijing
1. Introduction

When the Occupation Campaign ended on December 15, 2014 after 79 days, over 80% of Hong Kong people, as reflected by public opinion surveys, wanted the campaign to end so as to avoid the inconvenience caused to the city’s traffic and the confrontations between those who supported and those who opposed the campaign. It was quite clear to all parties concerned that the Chinese authorities would not allow Hong Kong people genuine choices in the election of the Chief Executive in 2017.

Supporters of the campaign, on the other hand, believed that they had won an important victory. In the first place, the number of participants exceeded the expectations of the pro-democracy movement; and the campaign won the sympathy and support of the international community. The protesters basically maintained their peaceful orientations, and no one had been badly hurt. It would have a significant demonstration effect in China, though the actual impact was difficult to estimate. The Chinese authorities’ denial of democracy for Hong Kong people resulted in a substantial price to be paid in their Taiwan policy. At the end of 2014, the Kuomintang lost badly in the local elections, and one of the important factors was the electorate’s perception of “today’s Hong Kong, tomorrow’s Taiwan”. Chinese leaders’ objective of winning the hearts and minds of Taiwan people suffered a severe setback. Despite the fact that the Chinese authorities and the Hong Kong government had condemned the campaign as illegal and bound to be futile, the latter had to initiate a public dialogue with the student leaders, though they met only once and the consultation produced no results.
2. The Chinese Authorities’ Position

In June 2014, the Chinese authorities released a White Paper\(^3\) telling Hong Kong people that whatever power the Special Administrative Region (SAR) has, it comes from Beijing. In the following August, the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress announced its decision on the framework governing the election of the Chief Executive in 2017\(^4\). The decision provides that the pro-establishment elites will return a majority of the Nomination Committee, which will then screen the entire list of the candidates in the election.

The verdict was clear. When the Chinese authorities are willing to pay the price, they can ensure their final say on everything in the SAR. The price is the end of Hong Kong exceptionalism; Hong Kong people have to understand that they are very dependent on the support from Mainland China, and they must cease to generate trouble for the Central Government. They have to accept Chinese leaders’ implementation of “one country, two systems” (一國兩制) and their limits on the democratization process in the territory.

Apparently the services that Hong Kong has been providing for China’s modernization can now be easily replaced. If Hong Kong talents choose to emigrate, experts from Mainland China are only too eager to fill the vacancies. The question is: Hong Kong people are free, and this free spirit has been the fountain of the territory’s innovations. The Marxist-Leninist regime in Beijing does not believe in this; its priority is to maintain stability and its monopoly of political power.

The Chinese authorities throughout the political reform processes from the beginning of 2013 to the final voting on the reform bill in the Legislative Council (立法會) in June 2015 refused to engage in serious negotiations with the pro-democracy movement in the territory. They also rejected all the proposals offered by the so-called “moderate” groups. The final plan announced by the SAR government in fact
adopted all the most conservative elements of the suggestions and models advanced by the pro-establishment political parties. Chinese leaders simply cannot accept that a Chief Executive candidate they endorse would be rejected by Hong Kong people, and a candidate not accepted by them would be elected by the local community.

Since the massive protest rallies on July 1, 2003, Chinese leaders have been feeling more insecure about the local situation. This sense of insecurity has led to more local interferences and substantial resources diverted to strengthening the pro-Beijing united front. These interferences have generated more resentment from Hong Kong people, in turn leading to more interferences, thus creating a vicious circle. Apparently, Chinese leaders had to understand that Hong Kong is a free society; without this freedom, the spirit of Hong Kong will be lost and it will become just another Shanghai.

From 1997 to 2008, Hong Kong people’s trust for the central government and their identification with the Chinese nation had been strengthening, according to well-established public opinion surveys. Since then, both trends have been reversed; and the declines have been quite sharp in the recent two years or so. This is food for thought for the Chinese leadership. Unfortunately it still maintains a Marxist-Leninist mindset, and it refuses to relax control.

Beijing’s response to the community’s grievances, protests and demand for democracy has been more economic support measures within the Closer Economic Partnership Arrangement framework and more resources to drum up political support for the pro-Beijing united front. The former have failed because the economic benefits have not trickled down to the grassroots. The latter have partially been counter-productive as reflected by public opinion polls.

In the absence of democracy and in view of its unsatisfactory performance, the SAR government has been suffering a legitimacy

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deficit so much so that it has lost the political will to introduce serious policy reforms to tackle the basic livelihood issues ranging from housing to long-term finance for hospital services, an adequate pension system, etc.

Increasingly Hong Kong people perceive business-government collusion as the principal cause for policies favouring major business groups at the expense of ordinary people. The SAR government’s failure in ensuring a steady adequate land supply has created price hikes beyond the affordability of even the young middle class. Management fees of the Mandatory Provident Fund (pension scheme) are regarded unreasonably high, favouring the banking sector. The supermarket business is a duopoly, and even Carrefour failed to enter the market.

3. Hong Kong People’s Responses

In the first half of 2015, opinion surveys constantly indicated that slightly more than 50% of Hong Kong people wanted the SAR government’s reform bill to go through the Legislative Council, and around 40% of the people demanded the Legislative Council to reject the political reform bill\(^6\). However only about 30% of the respondents in the surveys clearly endorsed the political reform bill as democratic or satisfactory; hence about 20% of the community desired the political reform bill to go through the legislature simply because they did not want to confront Beijing; they wanted to avoid confrontations in the society and gave a higher priority to political stability.

Supporters of the local pro-democracy movement felt cheated. The decision of the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress at the end of August 2014 allows no room for a democratic electoral system enabling people to have meaningful choices in an election with genuine competition. Hong Kong people will be granted universal
suffrage in the 2017 Chief Executive election. But the establishment will capture a vast majority of seats in the Nomination Committee returned by a narrow franchise of less than 300,000 in a population of seven million; and this absolute majority will then control the entire list of candidates.

A vast majority of Hong Kong people fully accept China’s sovereignty over the territory, and they have no serious intention to challenge the Chinese authorities. They consider that since 1997, Chinese leaders have chosen three Chief Executives for Hong Kong, and their performances have been far from satisfactory. When can Hong Kong people elect their own leaders? The community believes that it is sensible enough to elect someone who will cooperate with Beijing to ensure the territory’s stability and prosperity; the Chinese leadership needs not worry that the electorate will choose someone ready to confront it all the time.

In the eyes of the supporters of the pro-democracy movement, the challenge facing Hong Kong people is not just fighting for a democratic electoral system. They have to struggle hard to maintain their core values, their lifestyles, and their individual dignity. They are reluctant to see Hong Kong reduced to just another big city in Mainland China. This is an uphill battle because the local business community firmly toes the Beijing line.

The younger generations in general refuse to be subdued. They believe that time is on their side; the government has lost its legitimacy, and it will find it extremely difficult to secure effective governance. The picture in the near future is grim, but Hong Kong people have proved that their free spirit always survives. Young people are especially frustrated as they have been suffering from a decline in upward social mobility opportunities, more limited career prospects, and severe difficulty in acquiring their own accommodation which affects their
marriage plans.

In sum, the demand for democracy has been strengthening as the status quo is less tolerable. Hong Kong people certainly understand that democracy is not a panacea, but many of them realized that democracy is an indispensable element in the solution in the deep social and economic contradictions.

The protesters as well as the pro-democracy groups realized that it will be extremely difficult to change the decision of the Chinese leadership in the short term. They want to tell the whole world, however, that they are not going to give up the cause of democracy, that they will continue to fight. As long as they do that, at least they can maintain their dignity and principles. They also realize that if they do not speak out now, they may have little chance to do that in a few years’ time.

The Occupation Campaign obviously could not last very long. But it is only a part of an on-going civil disobedience movement which will continue. The purpose is to expose the lack of legitimacy of the SAR government; and that without democracy, it will find it extremely difficult to secure effective governance.

4. The Road Ahead

In the past two decades or so, Hong Kong people have clearly indicated their demand for democracy through public opinion surveys. It is obvious, however, that not too many people are willing to make a sacrifice for the cause; after all, the status quo is acceptable and confrontation with Beijing is too daunting a challenge. The local economy is increasingly dependent on that of Mainland China.

Grievances, however, have been accumulating. A vast majority of people believe they have been suffering from a decline in living standards since 1997. They resent the deteriorating gap between the rich
and poor, and the poor performance of the three Chief Executives chosen by the Chinese leadership. They cannot accept that ordinary people have no say in the election of the Chief Executive, while they have no intention to challenge China’s sovereignty over the SAR.

A significant feature of the Occupation Campaign was its spontaneity, but this spontaneity also implied difficulties in coordination. How to ensure that the pro-democracy groups will speak with one voice and maintain unity in action will be the biggest challenge ahead. There are natural differences between the moderates and the radicals.

The mobilization power of the pro-Beijing united front is not to be underestimated. It has a powerful and resourceful machinery, and it has cultivated four to six thousand civic groups in the past years. The united front has been trying to smear the pro-democracy activists and absorb them with carrots and sticks; the approach of divide and rule has also been adopted. These tactics are effective to some extent.

All parties concerned wanted to avoid a Tiananmen Square (天安門廣場) kind of scenario, and they succeeded. But Hong Kong society will be further polarized. The political struggles of the young people are perceived to have brought hope to the pro-democracy movement although the prospects for democracy are far from promising.

In May 2015, senior Chinese officials came to Shenzhen just across the border to meet Hong Kong’s legislators, indicating that the pro-democracy movement might be divided into “moderates” and “diehards”. The latter support Hong Kong’s independence, try to subvert the Chinese Communist regime and collude with foreign forces; the central government will resolutely struggle against them – meaning suppression. The former still uphold “one country, two systems”; though they embrace different political views, the Chinese authorities will treat them as friends and both parties can engage in communication.
This is typical united front tactics of divide and rule. Upholding “one country, two systems” implies accepting the framework defined by the Chinese authorities, and the “moderates” would then be allowed to remain politically active according to the rules set by Beijing; the “democratic parties” in Mainland China probably serve as an example. The baseline is defined by the Chinese authorities; refusal to accept brings suppression.

This categorization intends to limit the scope of activities on the part of the pro-democracy groups and the student movement, and to strengthen the SAR government’s deterrence. As “rational security” is now declared a policy concern, the demand for democracy by the local community becomes a secondary consideration.

Suppression may help to bring temporary calm, but will exacerbate social and political contradictions in the intermediate and long term. The rising local consciousness of some Hong Kong young people is a warning sign; from waving British colonial flags in demonstrations a few years ago, some radical groups now declare that they are not Chinese, adopting a behaviour pattern similar to that of the “deep Green” groups in Taiwan.

On June 18, 2015, voting on the political reform bill in the Legislative Council finally took place. As expected, the pro-democracy legislators held on to their original position to oppose the bill, and they were joined by the independent from the medical constituency. Due to bad co-ordination and misunderstanding, the pro-establishment legislators withdrew to wait for one of their members and only eight stayed to vote in favour of the bill. This created serious embarrassment on the part of the pro-Beijing united front as their internal rivalries and incompetence were fully exposed. The original demonstrations against the pro-democracy movement had to be cancelled, and the newspaper advertisement spaces earlier booked to condemn the pro-democracy
groups the following day were replaced by apologies instead.

Worse still, Hong Kong people clearly perceived that the pro-establishment legislators are accountable to Beijing and not to the local electorate. Soon after the embarrassing vote, those who stayed to support the bill eagerly told the media that the Central Liaison Office had phoned to thank them, and those who were absent rushed to the same office to explain. They only apologized to Hong Kong people as an afterthought; and they ignored the Chief Executive C.Y. Leung 梁振英 entirely.

It appears that the Chinese authorities now consider their relationship with the pro-democracy movement in Hong Kong as contradiction between enemies. The local pro-Beijing united front will try to limit the seats won by the pro-democracy political parties in the District Council elections in November 2015 and the Legislative Council elections in September 2016. The former has a district edge as it now has a resourceful and sophisticated electoral machinery; it has established a strong grassroots network; and it can count on assistance from the government, the business community and the bulk of the media. The latter mainly rely on the fact that a considerable segment of Hong Kong people wants to maintain effective checks and balances mechanisms.

In the wake of the stalled political reform, the C.Y. Leung administration declared that it would concentrate on economic and livelihood issues. As its popularity remains low and its relationship with civil society has hardly improved, it cannot expect to secure adequate support for its major policy initiatives easily. Divisions within the pro-establishment camp are still a problem. With substantial fiscal reserves at its disposal, the C.Y. Leung administration can introduce minor policy measures to please the public though, i.e., measures described as distributing “candies” like waiving the payment of public housing rents for one or two months, giving an extra month of old age allowance and
social security payments to the recipients, etc.

The pro-democracy groups realize that they have to endure a very difficult period ahead. They too understand the road to attract the majority of the community and hence they have to engage in peaceful civil disobedience campaigns. Social stability will likely be maintained, though the polarization of society will worsen.

Notes

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2004). He has been a Justice of Peace since 1992 and was the founding president of the Asian Studies Association of Hong Kong (2005-2007). During 2006-2008, he served as the secretary-general of the Civic Party. He was involved in the launch of the New School of Democracy and served as convener of the Alliance for True Democracy in Hong Kong.

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7. See Sing Ming, “Explaining mass support for democracy in Hong Kong”, Democratization, Vol. 17, No. 1 (2010), pp. 175-205; “People’s satisfaction with HKSARG’s pace of democratic development”, HKUPOP
The Occupation
The Occupy Central Campaign in 2014 Hong Kong

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Abstract

The political movement in 2014 Hong Kong was unprecedented. Benny Tai advocated the Occupy Central Movement that he intended to promote democratization of the Hong Kong constitutional reform in 2014. The campaign was aimed at the Chief Executive election in 2017 and the Legislative Council election in 2020 which was the decision and promise by the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress on the proposal of Hong Kong democratization political reform. This was a civil disobedience movement in Hong Kong which started on 28th September 2014. Protestors blocked roads and expected to paralyze the Central, the financial area of Hong Kong, in order to fight for genuine universal suffrage for the elections of the Chief Executive and all members of the Legislative Council. The movement was quite successful in calling forth the consciousness of Hong Kong people and the occupation was extended to 79 days, but, as a consequence, it could not attain any constitutional democratic or political reforms in Hong Kong.

Keywords: Umbrella, suffrage, democracy
1. Introduction

The original proposal of the democratization movement by Benny Tai Yiu-ting 戴耀廷 was the Occupy Central issued in early 2013 which was advocated later by the name of Occupy Central with Love and Peace ( 让爱与和平占领中环 / 和平佔中 ). It was unusual in Hong Kong as the mode of social movement was exceptionally radical and the civil disobedience movement intended to paralyze the financial center of Hong Kong.

On the other hand, the challenge to the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region after 1st July 1997 is to build up the model of “Hong Kong people ruling Hong Kong” with a “high degree of autonomy” as it was promised by the People’s Republic of China government. On the road of democratization in terms of the electoral mechanism of the Chief Executive by universal suffrage, it went to an unexpected political deadlock in 2014. The democratic camp wished to push for public nomination of the Chief Executive candidates and the election of the Chief Executive by full universal suffrage without screening out any politically undesirable candidates by the central government. However, the proposal of Beijing and the Hong Kong government adopted the screening method and opted for a more cautious approach to political reform and democratization. The dispute gave rise to the unexpected but forecasted Umbrella Movement, which reacted strongly against the Standing Committee of National People’s Congress interpretation of the Basic Law ( 基本法 ) on 31st August 2014. The political turmoil persisted until the voting result came from the Legislative Council ( 立法會 ) on 18th June 2015, as the political reform package proposed by the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region government and supported by Beijing was vetoed and finally the political reform package was rejected by the Hong Kong people. The
dispute over political reform was temporarily halted, but profound political distrusts continue between the Hong Kong people and the government on the one hand, and the democrats and Beijing on the other.

The road to universal suffrage in Hong Kong, meaning direct election of the Chief Executive by the ordinary people, has been hindered by the Chinese central government’s reluctance to implement the “genuine” universal suffrage in Hong Kong’s political system. On the other hand, the pro-democracy legislators in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region’s Legislative Council voted against the government’s political reform bill in the summer of 2015, showing an absence of any political will to make compromise with both Beijing and the HKSAR government. As a result, political reform in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region has become stagnant. This paper intends to describe and explain the key issues of the Occupy Movement in Hong Kong in the winter of 2014 with the background, occurrences and consequences.

2. Background of the Political Reform in Hong Kong

The starting of Hong Kong political transition appeared after the signing of Sino-British Joint Declaration in September 1984, planning the transfer of Hong Kong’s sovereignty from Britain to China in July 1997. The British administration decided to democratize Hong Kong’s political system from 1985 onwards, but China actually opposed the rapid pace of democratic reform. Another paradox came in 1993 when the last colonial Governor Chris Patten tried to push democratic reform to its utmost limit without violating the Basic Law, but again Beijing opposed his rapid democratic reform.

The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region was established on 1st July 1997 and the constitutional arrangement was based on the Basic
Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the People’s Republic of China. The Basic Law was drafted by the leadership of the China government in accordance with the Sino-British Joint Declaration on the future of Hong Kong in 1984 and it was passed and enacted by the National People Congress of the People’s Republic of China on 4th April 1990, and came into effect on 1st July 1997.

Owing to the agreement of China and Britain, all the legislators elected in 1995 would be able to extend their duties to 1999 and election would also be arranged for their new term of service. But Patten further democratized the election mechanism for the election of the Legislative Councilors in 1995 and its arrangement was unacceptable by China’s government. Therefore, the Provisional Legislative Council was established and early intervention on Hong Kong affairs was introduced by the China Central Government before 1997. The sovereignty’s change on 1st July 1997 indicated that Hong Kong should operate as a quasi-democracy under the Chinese Communist Party-led regime. Table 1 shows the brief political history in Hong Kong. Some areas will be discussed in more details in the following sections.

The political arrangement of the Chief Executive Election and the Legislative Council Election of Hong Kong was done by the Basic Law until 2007. So we could see that, even the number expanded gradually, with regard to the number of members (refer to Table 2) entitled to elect, the Chief Executives were elected by a small-circle election and their representativeness was obviously not sufficient enough. The executive-led model was preferred by China and it harmfully lacked democratic accountability and suffered from insufficient legitimacy of the Chief Executive of Hong Kong.
**Table 1** Timeline of Hong Kong’s Political Events and Institutional Democratization

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>The Preparatory Committee was formed by China, responsible for implementation work related to the establishment of the HKSAR.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>Provisional Legislative Council was set up with the handover of sovereignty; members were elected by the selection committee only.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>First post-handover LegCo election held in May 1998; the democrats acquired two thirds of votes.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>The Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress issued an interpretation of right of abode issue, overturning parts of the Court of Final Appeal decision and undermining judicial independence.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>The LegCo was re-elected and the democrats lost 180 thousand votes compared with election results in 1998.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>The Chief Secretary, Anson Chan 陳方安生, resigned and stepped down and the post was taken by Donald Tsang 曾蔭權, indicating conflicts between civil servants.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>The legislation of anti-subversion law was introduced and two mass demonstrations were gathered in December, one supported and the other opposed the legislation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>More than 500 thousand people joined historic march against proposed legislation of anti-subversion law on 1st July and it triggered new democratic movement.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>The Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress ruled out the implementation of universal suffrage before 2012 on 26th April.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>Tung Chee-hwa 董建華 stepped down and Donald Tsang gained the position of the Chief Executive but his political reform package could not gain enough support from the LegCo.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 1 (continued)

2006  The consultation of Goods and Services Tax was introduced and the positive non-intervention policy no longer adopted was announced, but these were unwelcome policies and the government gave these up later.

2007  Following the movement for conservation of Star Ferry Pier, Protecting Queen’s Pier as the conservation movement for cultural heritages and collective memories.

2008  Newly appointed undersecretaries and political assistants with the disclosure of foreign passports and salaries, and Employees’ Retaining Levy waiver controversy questioned the administrative credibility and competence.

2009  Consultation on Methods for Selecting the Chief Executive and Forming the LegCo in 2012; the democrats continuously fought for universal suffrage and started to discuss the Five Constituencies’ Resignation movement.

2010  In the by-election 17.1% of voters cast ballots but 24% of voters who were under 30 years of age actively participated and finally they were dubbed the Five Constituencies Referendum movement.

2011  Pro-Beijing camp won largest number of seats in the District Councils elections in November amidst major splitting within the pan-democracy camp.

2012  Leung Chun-ying 梁振英 was elected as the Chief Executive with doubtful leadership and governance, leading to fiercely increased social turmoil and political dispute.

2013  Occupy Central with Love and Peace was formed on 27th March but the society was experiencing antagonism with more pro-Communist Party or government groups being established to mobilize counteracting forces to attack civil society.
Table 1 (continued)

2014  The NPCSC decided on 31st August that the nomination of the Chief Executive election by so-called universal suffrage should be done by a small circle of nomination committee and the Occupy Movement was started on 28th September with the protests causing strong differences in Hong Kong society.

2015  The political reform package was tabled to the LegCo and vetoed as 8 legislators voted in favour of and 28 voted against it on 18th June. The protesting march on 1st July had the Hong Kong Independence Party participated but the enthusiasm of participation declined.

2016  The incident dubbed the “Fishball Revolution” escalated from the Hong Kong government’s crackdown on unlicensed street hawkers during Chinese New Year holidays and violent clashes broke out between protesters and police.

Table 2 Number of Members of Election Committee for the Chief Executive Election in Hong Kong in Different Years

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Number of members</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>1200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2017</td>
<td>1200</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
On the other side, the members of the Legislative Council are elected by a different mechanism, called Geographical Direct Elections, Electoral College and Functional constituencies; observing its transformations can help us cast lights on the various political actors and their considerations, including the China factor, the HKSAR government and the pro-democracy camp. In other words, these institutionalized reforms of the Legislative Council reflect the extent of democratization of the Hong Kong political system. Table 3 shows the development of democratic elements of the Legislative Council by introducing elections to the organization. Democratization should be correctly understood by the ratio of members directly elected. It will further be elaborated about the history of democratizing process in Hong Kong.

The Legislative Council was in the past composed of the Electoral College, functional constituencies and geographical directly elected members. In fact, the only genuine democratic elections can be done by geographical constituencies and the legislators are directly elected by people based on the “one man one vote” principle.

For the democratization process of Hong Kong political system, Article 45 of the Basic Law states that:

The ultimate aim is the selection of the Chief Executive by universal suffrage upon nomination by a broadly representative nominating committee in accordance with democratic procedures.

And Article 68 asserts that “The ultimate aim is the election of all the members of the Legislative Council by universal suffrage.”

These stipulations are widely interpreted as saying that the election by universal suffrage of Hong Kong’s Chief Executives must be achieved in the coming future. In order to gain the support of Hong Kong people, Lu Ping 鲁平, the late director of the Hong Kong and
Table 3 The Ways of Forming Legislative Council Members after Elections Adopted

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Years</th>
<th>Official or appointed</th>
<th>Electoral college</th>
<th>Functional constituencies</th>
<th>Directly elected</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1988</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>10\textsuperscript{a}</td>
<td>21 + 9\textsuperscript{b}</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>30 + 5\textsuperscript{c}</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: (a) 10 members of Electoral College were elected by all directly elected District Boards’ members, so it was characterized as a way of indirect democracy which is something like the Prime Minister elected by the election results of the Parliament in Britain.
(b) The nine functional consistencies contained members to be elected by all working labours in Hong Kong and 10 members of Electoral College were elected by all directly elected District Boards’ members.
(c) The five members to be elected were elected district councilors and all voters, except if they owned the other votes of functional constituencies, were enabled to vote. Based on the situation nowadays, the 2016 LegCo election mechanism will not be changed and will follow the mechanism adopted in 2012.
Macau Office of the People’s Republic of China government, said that, as quoted in the *People’s Daily* on 18th March 1993, “How Hong Kong develops democracy in the future is a matter entirely within the sphere of Hong Kong’s autonomy, and the central government cannot intervene.” (in Chinese) And again, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China made a similar statement in 1994, saying that: “The democratic election of all Legislative Councilors is a question to be decided by the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region and it needs no guarantee by the Chinese government.” (in Chinese)

The intention of the legislation of anti-subversion law was to implement the so-called responsibility of the Hong Kong special Administrative Region in helping to protect the national security. On the contrary, the civil society questions the institutional limitation of the political opportunity. Democracy is not guaranteed. It further politicalizes the Hong Kong society. The public outrage towards the anti-subversion bill changed an urge for universal suffrage in 2004. More demonstrations were organized fighting for democracy. And since the anti-subversion law was shelved in 2003, Hong Kong people started to commemorate the First of July – supposed for the founding of the Chinese Communist Party in 1921 and also the establishment of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region in 1997 – instead as the day of demonstration with marches and protests in an annual political action led by the Civil Human Rights Front (see Table 4).

Hong Kong’s political development had obviously lagged in the face of well-documented China’s efforts to impede progress toward direction of universal suffrage. On the topic of double direct elections, Beijing and the HKSAR government adopted a go-slow approach in order to stem the tide of the pro-democracy movement. A policy statement was suddenly issued in 2011. Three principles regarding the
### Table 4 Headline Themes of 1st July Marches with Numbers of Participants Estimated by Different Organizations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Headline theme</th>
<th>Frontier</th>
<th>HKU</th>
<th>Police</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>To oppose the anti-subversion law, power to the people</td>
<td>500000</td>
<td>429000-502000</td>
<td>35000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>Striving for universal suffrage in ’07 and ’08 for the Chief Executive and legislators</td>
<td>530000</td>
<td>180000-207000</td>
<td>200000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>To oppose government collusion, striving for universal suffrage</td>
<td>21000</td>
<td>20000-24000</td>
<td>11000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>Creating hopes for universal suffrage and democracy with equality and justice in Hong Kong</td>
<td>58000</td>
<td>33000-39000</td>
<td>28000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>Achieving universal suffrage, improving livelihood</td>
<td>68000</td>
<td>30000-34000</td>
<td>20000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>The same dreams, the same rights, power to the people, improve people’s livelihood</td>
<td>47000</td>
<td>16000-19000</td>
<td>15500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>Administrative blunders and disparity, power to the people, improve people’s livelihood</td>
<td>76000</td>
<td>32000-37000</td>
<td>26000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>July 1st move forward, Hong Kong’s future in my hands</td>
<td>52000</td>
<td>22000-26000</td>
<td>20000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>Give us universal suffrage, overthrow landlord hegemony, Donald Tsang to step down</td>
<td>218000</td>
<td>59000-67000</td>
<td>54000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 4 (continued)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Headline theme</th>
<th>Frontier</th>
<th>HKU</th>
<th>Police</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>Kick off collusion, defend freedom and fight for democracy</td>
<td>400000</td>
<td>90000-100000</td>
<td>63000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>People’s autonomous, immediate universal suffrage, ready for the Occupy Central</td>
<td>430000</td>
<td>92000-103000</td>
<td>66000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>Direct civic nomination, repealing functional constituencies, defend Hong Kong’s autonomy, not worried about intimidation</td>
<td>510000</td>
<td>154000-172000</td>
<td>98600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>Restart the process of electoral overhauls, Leung Chun-ying to step down</td>
<td>48000</td>
<td>27000-30000</td>
<td>19650</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Institutional development were set by both Beijing and the HKSAR government. They were: (1) one country should be the first priority; (2) Hong Kong should continue to be executive-led and (3) the political leader should be patriotic. (Hui, 2013: 223) They generated a discourse on whether the future Chief Executive candidates who were elected would really be patriotic enough to govern Hong Kong. Patriotism and political correctness loomed as the criteria of political reforms in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region. The Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress made a decision ruling out universal suffrage in Hong Kong before 2012. As the promise of democratization was postponed, the procrastination policy adopted by Beijing and the Hong Kong government caused a further rise of contentious politics in

Contemporary Chinese Political Economy and Strategic Relations: An International Journal 2(2) • 2016
Hong Kong (*ibid.*: 240).

It is, to a certain extent, an unescapable politicization scenario in Hong Kong. As a matter of fact, the conflicts between the Hong Kong people and China have been triggered by the tensions of divergence and convergence (Lo 2009: 179). The struggles are whether the political system can really be democratically institutionalized. Hong Kong’s democratization started from direct elections of the Legislative Council for the first time in 1991 where the proportion of directly elected members was only 30%. When 50% of the members of the Legislative Council were directly elected in 2004, there were basically no further steps for democratization of Hong Kong’s political system. The reason was that both Beijing and the HKSAR government wished to keep the other half of the legislators being returned from functional groups in which political control could be exerted more easily. The political spectrum of Hong Kong was orchestrated by these tensions of requesting institutionalization and democratization process.

In fact, this political genealogy of Hong Kong was changed due to the beginning of de-colonization in the territory in 1985, when some elected seats were introduced to the Legislative Council. The controversial focus always remains the degree of democratization. The period from 1985 to 2016 has indicated that the prominent political changes in Hong Kong both stimulated but also ironically limited democratization. The Basic Law is a Chinese legislation deriving its authority from the Constitution of the People’s Republic of China. The National People’s Congress owns its decision and interpretation of the implementation of the Basic Law. So, basically, it serves as the instrument on domestic common law and the legal jurisdiction of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region’s government by the authorization of the National People’s Congress of the People’s Republic of China.
Table 5 Direct election results of the LegCo (seats gained, % shares and votes) for years 1998-2012

<table>
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<tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(20 seats)</td>
<td>(24 seats)</td>
<td>(30 seats)</td>
<td>(30 seats)</td>
<td>(35 seats)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DAB</td>
<td>5 (25.2%)</td>
<td>7 (28.4%)</td>
<td>8 (22.7%)</td>
<td>7 (20.1%)</td>
<td>9 (20.2%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>373428</td>
<td>374780</td>
<td>402420</td>
<td>347373</td>
<td>366140</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FTU</td>
<td></td>
<td>1 (3.0%)</td>
<td>2 (5.7%)</td>
<td>3 (7.1%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>52565</td>
<td>86311</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New People’s Party</td>
<td>1 (4.1%)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2 (3.8%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>61073</td>
<td></td>
<td>68097</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberal Party</td>
<td>0 (3.4%)</td>
<td>0 (1.9%)</td>
<td>2 (6.7%)</td>
<td>0 (4.3%)</td>
<td>1 (2.7%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>50335</td>
<td>24858</td>
<td>118997</td>
<td>65622</td>
<td>48702</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Establishment individuals</td>
<td>1 (2.0%)</td>
<td>1 (4.9%)</td>
<td>1 (1.6%)</td>
<td>2 (5.0%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>25773</td>
<td>86071</td>
<td>19914</td>
<td>97084</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Establishment others</td>
<td>0 (1.8%)</td>
<td>0 (2.7%)</td>
<td>0 (1.1%)</td>
<td>0 (1.7%)</td>
<td>0 (1.3%)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>35905</td>
<td>35637</td>
<td>18685</td>
<td>20455</td>
<td>22484</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Establishment overall</td>
<td>5 (30.4%)</td>
<td>8 (36.6%)</td>
<td>12 (37.5%)</td>
<td>11 (39.8%)</td>
<td>17 (40.3%)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>449668</td>
<td>461048</td>
<td>660052</td>
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Contemporary Chinese Political Economy and Strategic Relations: An International Journal 2(2) ♦ 2016
### Table 5 (continued)

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<td>Civic Party</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Party</td>
<td>9 (42.9%)</td>
<td>9 (31.6%)</td>
<td>7 (25.2%)</td>
<td>7 (20.6%)</td>
<td>4 (13.7%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>634635</td>
<td>417873</td>
<td>445988</td>
<td>312692</td>
<td>247220</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Frontier</td>
<td>3 (10.0%)</td>
<td>2 (6.8%)</td>
<td>1 (6.9%)</td>
<td>1 (2.0%)</td>
<td></td>
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<td>148507</td>
<td>89529</td>
<td>93200</td>
<td>33205</td>
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<tr>
<td>Labour Party</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2 (7.3%)</td>
<td>2 (5.0%)</td>
<td>2 (2.8%)</td>
<td>3 (6.2%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>96752</td>
<td>89185</td>
<td>73253</td>
<td>112140</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NWSC</td>
<td>1 (%)</td>
<td>1 (4.5%)</td>
<td>1 (3.3%)</td>
<td>1 (2.8%)</td>
<td>1 (2.4%)</td>
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<td>38627</td>
<td>59348</td>
<td>59033</td>
<td>42441</td>
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<td>ADPL</td>
<td>0 (4.0%)</td>
<td>1 (4.8%)</td>
<td>1 (4.2%)</td>
<td>1 (2.8%)</td>
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<td>59034</td>
<td>62717</td>
<td>74671</td>
<td>42211</td>
<td>3634</td>
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<tr>
<td>People Power</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td>3 (9.7%)</td>
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<td>176250</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LSD</td>
<td>0 (1.4%)</td>
<td>2 (5.5%)</td>
<td>3 (10.1%)</td>
<td>1 (4.9%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>18235</td>
<td>97203</td>
<td>15339</td>
<td>87997</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Democrats</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1 (1.6%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>28621</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democrats others</td>
<td>2 (6.6%)</td>
<td>1 (4.2%)</td>
<td>1 (4.2%)</td>
<td>0 (2.5%)</td>
<td>0 (3.1%)</td>
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<td>98440</td>
<td>54795</td>
<td>73549</td>
<td>37515</td>
<td>55330</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democrats overall</td>
<td>15 (66.2%)</td>
<td>16 (60.6%)</td>
<td>18 (61.9%)</td>
<td>19 (59.5%)</td>
<td>18 (57.3%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>979199</td>
<td>799240</td>
<td>1096272</td>
<td>901707</td>
<td>1036998</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 5 (continued)

Remarks: DAB: The Democratic Alliance for the Betterment and Progress of Hong Kong (民主建港協進聯盟); FTU: the Hong Kong Federation of Trade Unions (香港工會聯合會), started to separate with DAB from 2004; New People’s Party (新民黨) formed in 2011 and counted Regina Ip Lau Shukye 葉劉淑儀 before it; Civic Party (公民黨) formed in 2005 and counted by shares in 2004 election; NWSC: Neighbourhood and Workers’ Service Center; ADPL: Association for Democracy and People’s Livelihood (香港民主民生協進會); LSD: League of Social Democrats (社會民主連線) formed in 2006 and counted Leung Kwok-hung 梁國雄 and Albert Chan Wai-yip 陳偉業 before it.

Legally, although the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region retains the common law system which operates smoothly as before, the role of the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress remains controversial. It interpreted the Hong Kong Basic Law in mid-1999 over the right of abode issue, and most controversially, in mid-2014 over the method of the selection of the Chief Executive in 2007, thus arousing huge debate and outcry over the Standing Committee’s proper role in Hong Kong’s constitutional and political framework. Although Article 158 of the Hong Kong Basic Law empowers the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress to interpret the contents of the Basic Law, its exercise of power of interpretation has become a political act giving rise to endless socio-political and legal debates.

However, the election results were generally obvious that the pan-democratic blocs could win the election on direct elections, even though the establishment camp approached the marginal recently (see Table 5). These election results, of course, could not guarantee Beijing’s control.
on Hong Kong affairs. The implementation of universal suffrage may make the central government lose the control of Hong Kong. Therefore, the mechanism of elections adopted may be the way of controlling the election results by the central government of the People’s Republic of China.

Based on the understanding of the Basic Law, the selection mechanism of Chief Executive and all members of the Legislative Council must be ultimately done by ways of universal suffrage. The Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress resolved this political deadlock exactly on 29th December 2007 by expressing that:

The election of the 5th Chief Executive of the HKSAR in 2017 may be implemented by the method of universal suffrage; that after the Chief Executive is selected by universal suffrage, the election of the Legislative Council of the HKSAR may be implemented by the method of electing all members by universal suffrage.

The Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress allowed for possible direct election of the Chief Executive in 2017 and the full direct election for the legislature in 2020. However, there would be uncertainties about any of these promises because they would be subject to further discussions, negotiations, amendments to electoral ordinances, and agreement on how to implement these universal suffrages (Tan, 2008). Tan could observe that:

People have begun to wake up to realization that the Basic Law, Hong Kong mini-constitution, has been worded in such a way that full democracy as the world understands it will remain a pipe dream long after the Basic Law has outlived its usefulness.

(Tan, 2008)
As the central government agreed that Hong Kong would implement universal suffrage for the Chief Executive’s election in 2017, the realities and technicalities of the implementation of political reform become the focal point of disputes.

Leung Chun-ying took up duty as the Chief Executive on 1st July 2012. Yet, the first day for him on duty was characterized by a hundred thousand protestors calling for him to step down (refer to Table 5). His governorship is so questionable as the legitimacy crisis and image problem become a political burden that jeopardizes his government and governance.

The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region experienced three Chief Executives’ governance in these nineteen years – Tung Chee-hwa (1997-2005), Donald Tsang (2005-2012), Leung Chun-ying (2012-now). Basically, the controversial governance of the three Chief Executives has made the Hong Kong people generally feel more politically powerless. The Tung regime was characterized by reforms without much consultation with the participations of the public; the Tsang administration focused on the status quo without drastic measures taken to tackle the huge income gap between the rich and the poor and other housing and livelihood issues; and the Leung administration has been seen as relatively hardline toward political opponents. The most important task of his term of governance is obviously the implementation of political reform based on the decision of the China government in 2012. Even though the mechanism of electing the Chief Executive by universal suffrage is doubtful, the government does execute its planning on the implementation of the Beijing-designed universal suffrage.

The crux of Hong Kong’s political and constitutional debate was the electoral method of the Chief Executive and of the members of the
Legislative Council, both of which represent the extent of democratization and institutionalization of Hong Kong’s political system. Up to now, the Chief Executive of Hong Kong can only be elected by 1,200 electing members and 50% (35 seats) of the Legislative Council’s members could be elected by direct elections, whereas the rest of legislators are elected by functional constituencies in which most occupational groups tend to be either pro-government or pro-Beijing. And the mechanism of electing 30% of the members of Legislative Council had been started from 1991.

Democratization in Hong Kong indicates the degree of decolonization under the British governance and, in fact, a highly autonomous governance system is promised under the China regime. The degree of political institutionalization and democratization can be defined as an extent of peaceful, legal and regularized transfers of power from the executive-led administration to the ordinary people. Indeed, this vision is hampered by the Hong Kong government elites and Beijing officials responsible for Hong Kong, for they see the executive-led administration as a virtue without surrendering power to the legislative branch, unfortunately, not to mention the marginalized civil society and the ignored ordinary citizens.

Under these circumstances, democratization is a long process in Hong Kong in which the governmental authorities from both the Hong Kong leadership and Beijing attempt to limit its pace and scope, while social movements have been initiated by the pro-democracy forces to fight for a more extensive realm and reasonable and rational pace of democratic change. Hence, the fight for democracy symbolizes Hong Kong’s social movement and mass participation. The social movement in Hong Kong has been triggering mass mobilization of the Hong Kong people to an unprecedented extent, as in the anti-national education policy campaign in the summer of 2012 and then the Umbrella
Movement in September-December 2014. That is to say, if the issues mobilized are suitable enough, the democratic social movement obviously can acquire sufficient support by the Hong Kong people.

The international wave of democratization that swept over the world at the last quarter of the twentieth century, during which the number of democratic countries increased from less than 40 to more than 120, did provide an impetus for Hong Kong’s democracy movement. This figure represented more than 62% of the earth’s population at the end of the twentieth century. Many Hong Kong democrats believe that, as the people of Hong Kong have in general a high level of education and high-ranked economic background, they should enjoy the political right of nominating their Chief Executive candidates and then directly electing the one they prefer in the coming future. In the nearby Chinese society of Taiwan the transition from an authoritarian regime to a fully democratized constitution was attained within 15 years from 1982 to 1996, which was also the period of the beginning of Hong Kong’s political transition.

After the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress of the People’s Republic of China had a decision regarding political reforms proposed to the electoral system of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region on 31st August 2014, the planned and organized protests were triggered. The decision was premeditatedly designed to be extra-ordinarily restrictive and tantamount to the prescreening process of any candidates for the Hong Kong Chief Executive election in 2017 before the candidates are capable of being presented to the Hong Kong electorate.

The students of Hong Kong expect a genuine universal suffrage for Hong Kong political leaders. There was an unreasonable imbalance in the nominating committee for the 2017 Chief Executive election. The Occupy Movement of Hong Kong in 2014 was triggered and became
extra-ordinarily radical. The following section will elaborate this event in detail.

3. The Initiation of the “Occupy” Social Movement

The prediction that “real” universal suffrage would not be implemented was made on 16th January 2013, when Benny Tai issued his article in *Hong Kong Economic Journal* (信報財經新聞), a prominent political and economic newspaper in Hong Kong. It was titled 〈公民抗命的最大殺傷力武器〉[the greatest destruction weapons of civil disobedience]. The first sentences expressed that:

C.Y. Leung will not give any specific commitments for the 2017 and 2020 universal suffrage at his Policy Address. The fight for real universal suffrage is really being looked forward to by many Hong Kong people for decades to come. The next round of political reform discussion about this question cannot be procrastinated further. However, based on the current situation, the opportunity that Beijing will let Hong Kong have truly universal suffrage is very slim.

The three advocates are Rev. Chu Yiu-ming 朱耀明, Benny Tai Yiu-ting and Chan Kin-man 陳健民. They mobilized this campaign and believed that a truly harmonious society in Hong Kong could only be built upon a just and fair political system. The society of Hong Kong must be democratic enough for the election of the Chief Executive by universal and equal suffrage. The success of the campaign relies on the initiatives of individuals in different communities. Whoever participating in the campaign should uphold its three fundamental convictions as follows:
(1) The electoral system of Hong Kong must satisfy the international standards in relation to universal suffrage. They consist of the political rights to equal number of vote, equal weight for each vote and no unreasonable restrictions on the right to stand for election.

(2) The concrete proposal of the electoral system of Hong Kong should be decided by means of a democratic process, which should consist of deliberation and authorization by citizens.

(3) Any act of the civil disobedience, which aims to fight for realizing a democratic universal and equal suffrage in Hong Kong though illegal, has to be absolutely non-violent.

Tai presented his proposal of the “Occupy Central” movement and suggested that the actions would only be non-violent with civil disobedience. The idea was that the protesters would occupy the main passages of the Central District illegally and aim to paralyze the economic and political center and to force Beijing to change its political standpoint (Tai, 2013). However, he thought that the actions would be notified beforehand. If more than ten thousand people could participate in an oath of common action, the organizers would be able to exert tremendous political pressure on the opponent (Tai, 2013). Hereafter, “Occupy Central with Love and Peace” was formed as a political and social movement on 27th March 2013. The organizers announced that the protest would begin in 2014 if the government’s political reform proposals for universal suffrage failed to meet the required international standards.

The advantages of the campaign are that it could help to call forth social consciousness and awareness concerning the importance of the political reform for Hong Kong’s people and future. On the other hand, it would give the justification for the Chinese central government of being menaced to implement the policy that the democrats want.
Unfortunately, the society of Hong Kong was dislocated as to whether the campaign would make the economic situation degenerate since it is commonly agreed that it is the people’s livelihood that matters most.

Qiao Xiaoyang 喬曉陽 served as the chairman of the Basic Law Committee and expressed on 24th March 2013 that the Chief Executive candidates must love China and Hong Kong and do not confront the Chinese central government. Li Fei 李飛 worked as Qiao’s successor of the Basic Law Committee’s chairman and stressed again on 22nd November 2013 that the Chief Executive must be accountable (in fact, more acceptable) to the central government as well as Hong Kong. The statements revealed the fact that the central government was making an election mechanism which can guarantee the expected election’s result.

On the other hand, Leung Chun-ying announced on 17th October 2013 and established the Task Force on Constitutional Development. It was navigated by the Chief Secretary for Administration Carrie Lam 林鄭月娥, Secretary for Justice Rimsky Yuen 袁國強, and Secretary for Constitutional and China Affairs Raymond Tam 譚志源. The Consultation Document for the Methods for Selecting the Chief Executive in 2017 and for Forming the Legislative Council in 2016 was then issued on 4th December 2013 and entitled “Let’s Talk and Achieve Universal Suffrage”. It started a five-month public consultation. The consultation ended with heated debates over the rights or wrongs on the issue of the Occupy Central Movement. Furthermore, Leung escaped himself from directly participation of the political reform cleverly and it was obviously the contentious center which Donald Tsang, the former Chief Executive, ever actively and foolishly chose to take part in. The consultation just ended with heated debates on support for or against the issues of the Occupy Central campaign.

The Practice of the “One Country, Two Systems” Policy in the Hong Kong Special Administrative System which was issued by the State
Council of People’s Republic of China on 10th June 2014 was not common. It could be seen as the most important document after 1997 on Beijing’s hardline policy toward Hong Kong, especially acting against the Occupy Central Movement. It expressed again that:

All those who administrate Hong Kong … have on their shoulders the responsibility of correctly understanding and implementing the Basic Law, of safeguarding the country’s sovereignty, security and development interests, and of ensuring the long-term prosperity and stability of Hong Kong. In a word, loving the country is the basic political requirement for Hong Kong’s administrators … The chief executive must be accountable to the central government and the HKSAR with respect to implementing the Basic Law. All this is necessary for displaying sovereignty, ensuring loyalty to the country by the mainstay of Hong Kong administrators and helping them to subject to oversight by the central government and Hong Kong society, while taking their responsibility for the country, the HKSAR and Hong Kong's residents.

The public opinions were gathered by a civil referendum. It was preformed from 20th to 29th June 2014 and ended with 792,808 votes representing the opinion of requesting more democratic universal suffrage and calling for the public to be allowed to nominate candidates for the Chief Executive election. Also, 691,972 voters voted to express the ideas that the Legislative Council should veto any political reform proposal if the election mechanism actually failed to meet the international standards. During these days, the website was attacked by organized hackers who were mainly coming from China. On the contrary, the American firm CloudFlare helped to counteract this unique and sophisticated attack (Kaiman, 2014) in making the referendum
process run smoothly. On the other side, the mock polling station was attacked by a pro-China group and chaos was created but it was stopped by citizens. Michael DeGolyer said that it was very clear form the surveys that the vast majority of the people voting in this referendum were doing it as a reaction to this white paper (cited in Kaiman, 2014). And the action was followed with a hundred thousand people’s march for democracy on 1st July 2014. However, Hong Kong’s society was so highly politicized. Political actions among Hong Kong people were extremely frequent and massively mobilized.

On the contrary, the pro-Beijing forces launched the Alliance for Peace and Democracy (保普選保和平大聯盟，formerly the Protect-Universal Suffrage and Anti-Occupy Central Alliance / 保普選反佔中大聯盟) which was founded on 3rd July 2014, countering the influence from the pro-democracy blocs. They gathered to confront the supporters of the Occupy Central Movement and a month-long signature campaign was launched. The action was for the pro-government and pro-Beijing citizens to oppose violence, especially the Occupy Central Movement.

Convener Robert Chow 周融 said that it was necessary to build up an organization in which citizens could express their views as to whether they support peaceful universal suffrage or a violent Occupy Central (Siu, 2014). Finally, the Alliance claimed that it collected over 1.5 million signatures. Viewing by the website of Alliance for Peace and Democracy, there were 1528 organizations that signed for the movement. Culminating the petition campaign, an anti-Occupy Central parade was held on 17th August 2014. The organizer claimed that there were 200 thousand participants. Even though the media discovered that people were employed to participate in the march, the mobilization counteracted the democrats’ social movement and caused media attention and reporting very much. The mobilization from both sides demonstrated a severe societal split and the fragmentation of political
forces into pro-Occupy Central Movement and anti-Occupy campaign.

The political bargaining power between the Hong Kong people and the China government was asymmetric in that the decision of the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress made the nomination procedure relatively paternalistic on 31st August 2014. The decision stated that a nomination committee would be similar to the previous Election Committee in nominating two or three candidates in the final round for citizens to directly elect their Chief Executive. Moreover, each of these final candidates would have acquired the support of more than half of all members of this nominating committee. The decision was widely seen as extremely restrictive because the candidates should be screened by the nomination committee. From the perspective of Beijing, however, this model of electing the Chief Executive shall be the most democratic one with the element of centralism being emphasized. Moreover, the mechanism of forming the Legislative Council in 2016 cannot change. Nevertheless, following any new mechanism for the election of the Chief Executive, the method of electing the Legislative Council by universal suffrage would perhaps be adopted with the approval of the State Council. In other words, the reform of the Chief Executive election must precede that of the Legislative Council election.

The Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress decided the proposed reforms to the Hong Kong electoral system, and then protests began almost immediately. The democrats only promised to veto the revolting proposal. It was planning the civil disobedience protests. Students led the strike and school boycott beginning on 22nd September 2014. The pro-democracy Hong Kong Federation of Students and Scholarism\(^2\) protested outside the government headquarters on 26 September. They maintained class boycotts during this period and participants were mainly tertiary students. The class strike of secondary
students attracted only about 1,000 on 26 September. Observers doubted about whether the Occupy Central Movement had sufficient participants. However, the over-reaction of police force to the students triggered more citizens to support the action, especially after the arrest of student leaders like Joshua Wong Chi-fung 黃之鋒 and Alex Chow 周永康.

Moreover, the protesters blocked the roads to stop the reinforcement of the police from reaching the Government Headquarter Office overnight. So, the police used pepper spray and the protesters defended themselves with their umbrellas. Hereafter, Umbrella became a symbol of the occupation movement. In the afternoon of the 28th September 2014, people flooded to Admiralty (金鐘) in support of students and the police blockaded all accesses to the Government Headquarters. Police responded by tear gas. Unpredictably, after the tear gas canisters were used on the late afternoon of 28th September, the crowd became out of control until the morning of 29th September. The excessive use of force and violence in dispersion of protesters by the Hong Kong Police force antagonized and frustrated public feelings. Thousands more people started to join with the social movement and occupied major thoroughfares of Hong Kong.

The conflicts between participating citizens and the police escalated into a 79-day large-scale Occupy Central Movement. The original plan of the Occupy Central with Love and Peace was actually not implemented but it was re-directed or transformed as the Occupy Movement or the Umbrella Movement. The protesters did not choose to occupy the Central District but they chose to occupy Admiralty, Causeway Bay (銅鑼灣), Mong Kok (旺角) and Tsim Sha Tsui 尖沙嘴. The actions were convened through Internet and the crowd could gather thousand people within an hour on that night. Police could not control the occupation. Demonstrations continued outside the Hong Kong Government Headquarters and eventually triggered more citizens
to occupy the districts.

These were the unprecedented scale of demonstrations and multiple locations and changed the Umbrella Movement into such a self-managed and non-centralized occupation. These areas remained closed to traffic for almost 80 days. The Occupy Movement maintained in the streets from 28th September to 15th December exactly. Moreover, the activists of the movement were intimidated with threats, put under surveillance or tailed, subjected to invasions and became victims of hacking. They also received hate mails and nuisance telephone calls. Some evidences showed that the intimidation was from official sources.

Furthermore, groups of anti-Occupy movement actions attacked suffragists. They included triad members. The barricades and tents of the protesters were torn down and damaged by illegal forces. Some protesters suffered different injuries during conflicts. The police were accused of inaction when protesters were under these illegal attacks, while numerous instances of excessive violence by police were reported as well. Apparently pro-government mobs or triads were used to attack protesters so that the Hong Kong government did not have to assume responsibility, and such action can help to demonstrate the contemptibility, despicability and filthiness of the Communist Party governance.

4. The End of Democratic Movement

After the end of the Occupy Central Movement in December 2014, the government issued The Consultation Document on the Method for Selecting Chief Executive by Universal Suffrage on 7th January 2015. They still insisted on the validity and applicability of the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress’s decision and so the democrats boycotted this consultation in protest of the decision.
Pro-democracy activists protested fiercely against such an election framework set by the government. They pointed out that it would hardly be a truly democratic and open election. The two month’s consultation ended on 7th March and later, the government released *The Report on the Recent Community and Political Situation in Hong Kong*. The report expressed the official standpoints about the Occupy Movement. Needless to say, the democrats reacted negatively to the report.

This is according to the Appendix I and II of the Basic Law that the bills on the amendments to the method for selecting the Chief Executive and the proposed amendments to such bills should be introduced by the Government of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region to the Legislative Council. Amendments must be made with the endorsement of a two-thirds majority of all the members of the Legislative Council and the consent of the Chief Executive. The recent most crucial political outcome was the voting result of the Hong Kong LegCo on the decision of political reform on 18th June 2015. The decision of the Standing Committee of the Chinese People’s Congress and the controversial political reform proposal of the HKSAR’s government could not be passed. After the voting result in LegCo, both sides remain profoundly distrustful of each other. Fingers-pointing and political accusations abound.

Basically, the constitutional settings during this period were British-designed as well as result of negotiation with the Chinese government. If we were wise enough, we should know that the HKSAR’s government could not give any democratization improvement on Hong Kong’s political reform after the transfer of sovereignty. The political election reforms had been voted down as, on the one hand, the pro-democracy politicians actually united to resist and refuse the Beijing-dominated political reform packages, and on the other hand, most pro-Communist Party politicians walked out to give up voting. As a result, the crucial
and critical moment of voting just ended up with eight casting their votes in support of the political reform package and twenty-eight voting against it. According to Appendix One of the Basic Law, the political reform of the election of the Chief Executive should gain not less than two thirds of legislators to vote for passing this reform mechanism. With 70 legislators, the political reform decision should have more than or equal to 47 supporters of the Legislative Council.

The annual rally of the 1st July is about democracy and human right struggles in Hong Kong. As the Beijing-dominated electoral reform was rejected by the LegCo on 18th June 2015, the democracy advocates hope that a strong show of new public support on the streets that can help to re-activate a new reform agenda back on the social movement. Thirty thousand Hong Kong protesters still flocked to Victoria Park for the pro-democracy march in July 2015 but other people dismissed the march as pointless.

The Hong Kong government announced in August 2015 that it would initiate legal proceedings on a few student leaders. The incessant political disputes were unfortunately spreading to university campuses, where the University of Hong Kong was embroiled in the dispute over whether a pro-democracy professor should be appointed by the council members as a pro vice-chancellor. Even after the Umbrella Movement ended, its legacy appeared to be felt at the university campuses where councils usually have members appointed by the Chief Executive, Leung Chun-ying. The role of the Chief Executive in the university councils was so controversial that some democrats have pointed to future debates over the democratization of university councils in the coming years.

The night of the Chinese Lunar New Year on 8th February 2016 witnessed a civil unrest incident. It was very uncommon that young activists attacked police suddenly. Batons and pepper spray were applied by the police and two warning shots were fired. After these, protesters
threw bricks, glass bottles, flower pots and trash bins toward the police. At last, they set fires in the street. This was the worst outbreak of rioting since the 1960s. As a consequence, the university student unions issued statements condemning police violence and expressing their support for those who took part in the protest. They always express that, between the high wall and the egg, they must stand on the side of the egg.

5. Discussion and Conclusion

Hong Kong was made a famous international city-state by Britain before July 1, 1997. Hong Kong under the British rule could be seen as a successful model of colonialism in which a capitalist society was combined with an international monetary, financial and trading center. It also became a window for the People’s Republic of China’s economic modernization starting from the mid-1980s onwards. The features of Hong Kong under British rule were marked by economic prosperity, relative socio-political stability, and cultural tolerance. All these have faded nowadays.

When its sovereignty was reverted to the People’s Republic of China, Hong Kong is under the governance of neo-colonialism. Hong Kong people fought for the interest of the populace. Matters of concern range from reaching the Joint Declaration with China without consultation with the Hong Kong people to the British reluctance of democratizing Hong Kong’s colonial polity much earlier and faster (cited in Lo 1997: 139). They were further frustrated by the conservative reforms proposal on the road to achieve democracy after the establishment of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region under Chinese rule.

Even the re-colonization project was started earlier by Britain; the democratizing transition was not begun at the last minute of
decolonization. This Hong Kong democratization was begun under the British sunset regime only which helped to arrange the democratizing steps from 30% of the LegCo seats directly elected in 1991 to 50% of these seats directly elected in 2004. The changing circumstances inside both Hong Kong and the People’s Republic of China, especially with the rise of China since the early 2000s, have made the “one country, two systems” principle more complex and challenging in social, political, economic and cultural aspects. While the central government promised the so-called universal suffrage, Hong Kong people can clearly see that the officials will only allow “patriotic” candidates to run in the Chief Executive election. There were frustrations over such a slow or retrograde democratizing process in Hong Kong. Many people feel that their autonomy is eroded in Hong Kong as China’s influence is enhanced. The Occupy Movement was spectacular but not successful.

Democratization cannot help the democratic blocs to develop. The development and maintenance of Hong Kong democrats actually represent a slow democratization process because democracy is still demanding. We cannot claim that the politicization of Hong Kong was a result of political reforms. We can conclude that the institutionalization process of Hong Kong politics do make the fluctuation of Hong Kong political scenes. That is to say that the struggles and conflicts entertain Hong Kong politics very much.

Ironically enough, the supporting figures showed public opinion so diversified by two large blocs nowadays. We may re-consider what politics make or what makes politics. Generally speaking, politics are going to deal with people’s livelihood. Politics may be made by political competitions among political parties or blocs. But it cannot help to explain the political spectrum of Hong Kong. The democratic movement took a halt but the Hong Kong people have to be patient as “hasty men do not get hot tofu”. China is in political struggles and power conflicts
among the Communist Party leaders. Hong Kong cannot be independent. 

The democratic road is quite uncertain after the political reform package was vetoed. The central government can stick to their decision on setting such limits for the Chief Executive and LegCo elections. The democrats can continuously express the idea of fighting for genuine universal suffrage. Democracy was, is and will be undeveloped or underdeveloped in Hong Kong.

Politically, the HKSAR has entered a stage of incessant political disputes over the proper method, pace and directions of political reform. With a centralized and relatively paternalistic and authoritarian regime in the PRC, democratization in the HKSAR has since 1997 been undergoing a turbulent path. The emergence of the Umbrella Movement from September to December 2014 illustrated a severe clash of two different political cultures between the central government in Beijing and many Hong Kong democrats, with Beijing being a paternalistic actor seeing Western-style democratic change as undesirable and threatening its national security, whereas the younger Hong Kong democrats envisioning a political system in which the ordinary people would be empowered to nominate and directly elect their Chief Executive candidates.

Development in Hong Kong nowadays is cold and ruthless. The execution of the capitalistic ideology is completely lacking any feeling or sense of social justice in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region. This kind of economic development is not for the wellbeing of Hong Kong citizens but for the monopolization of Hong Kong by authoritarian tycoons. We, of course, doubt whether such hegemony is sustainable.
Notes

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1. It is the Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the People’s Republic of China and serves as the constitutional document of Hong Kong under the China’s sovereignty.

2. Scholarism is a pro-democracy student activist group in Hong Kong. The students are very active in the fields of Hong Kong social movement. The group became famous due to the protest against the Moral and National Education curriculum in 2012.

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The Mobilization of Memory and Tradition:
Hong Kong’s Umbrella Movement and
Beijing’s 1989 Tiananmen Movement

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Abstract

The 2014 Umbrella Movement in Hong Kong has been the most important pro-democracy protest on Chinese soil since the rise and fall of the Tiananmen Movement of 1989. Moreover, the 1989 Beijing Massacre has politicized a generation of pro-democracy activists in Hong Kong that has shaped Hong Kong’s vibrant civil society. However, while this “Tiananmen generation” has been crucial for the preparation and initial stage of the Umbrella Movement, the actual occupation was dominated by a new generation that is almost exclusively concerned with local Hong Kong politics. In light of this background, this paper compares the two democracy movements. The external environment and the goals of the two movements are markedly different. However, our comparison demonstrates striking similarities between the two
movements, e.g. their internal structure and framing. Moreover, what we see as the “mobilization of memory” reflects both the continued importance of civil society structures that have been shaped by the “Tiananmen veterans” as well as the on-going renegotiation of the SAR’s relationship with the Mainland. Finally, these findings entail that the Chinese party-state will need to utilize different means to pacify the Umbrella Movement than what was done to placate democracy activists after the 1989 crackdown.

**Keywords:** Hong Kong, Umbrella Movement, Tiananmen Movement, social protest, collective memory, civil society, democratization

1. **Introduction**

Up to 2 million inhabitants\(^1\) joined the pro-democracy movement in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (SAR) occupying three districts of the city for two and a half months. It shocked the local Hong Kong government led by Chief Executive (CE) C.Y. Leung 梁振英，irritated the central government and China’s Communist Party (CCP) in Beijing, and surprised a world that has become accustomed to the notion that the people of Hong Kong only care about pecuniary matters – not politics.\(^2\) These street protests became widely known as the Umbrella Movement (UM) after protestors used umbrellas to protect themselves from pepper spray and teargas grenades fired by policemen into crowds in Admiralty (金鐘) on 28th September 2014. Although the former British colony has seen many political protests especially after 2003, this was the largest democratic protest against the ruling authorities since 28th May 1989 when about 25 per cent of Hong Kong’s population hit the streets in support of the pro-democracy movement at Beijing’s Tiananmen Square (天安門廣場) (de Silva, 2009).
Today, more than 25 years after the crackdown in Beijing, the memory of the broad social movement for democracy and equality is more alive in Hong Kong than in Mainland China where the party-state has done its utmost to erase the events from the collective memory. Whoever controls the construction of the social and collective memory of a nation inevitably has the upper hand in terms of public discourse and power. Since June Fourth the Communist Party has been engaged in an extraordinary erasing of the 1989 Tiananmen Movement from the collective Chinese memory through state media, school text books, historiography, and in social media (Lagerkvist, 2016: 180). The late leader Deng Xiaoping 邓小平 strongly emphasised the need to instil patriotic education in China’s youth, to prevent a similar movement from ever emerging again. The new leadership headed by Jiang Zemin 江泽民 in the 1990s woke the slumbering Japanese ghosts in order to bury their own. The people’s resentment needed an outlet; the government deftly directed it outward, towards the rest of the world. The aim of the Communist Party’s new nationalist programme was to sharpen the Chinese sense of humiliation at having been bullied and colonised by the West and Japan in the nineteenth century. Anti-imperialist nationalism under Chairman Mao 毛泽东 was exchanged for a new Chinese nationalism (Lagerkvist, 2016: 227). Moreover, the Chinese authorities made sure any suppressed energy was promptly channelled into the nascent market economy with its siren song of individual success and economic growth. People became thoroughly convinced of the value of focusing their efforts and energy on economic gain rather than politics or matters of human rights and freedoms (Lagerkvist, 2016:181).

In Hong Kong, however, ever since 1989 an annual commemoration is held in Victoria Park for the victims of the massacre. In some years, hundreds of thousands of people have been mobilized to light candles to remember the killed students and ordinary citizens of Beijing. Clearly,
the commemoration of the massacre contributed to the politicization of a
generation of pro-democratic activists in Hong Kong who have founded
civil society organizations such as the Hong Kong Alliance in Support of
Patriotic Democratic Movements in China ( 香港市民支援愛國民主運
動聯合會), and pan-democratic parties, most prominently Hong Kong’s
Democratic Party ( 民主黨). To maintain what in the field of memory
studies is called “memory work” (Fischer, 2015), these activists have
established a museum of the 1989 Tiananmen Movement (TM) in Hong
Kong. Apart from its commemorative activities, these groups of activists
have committed themselves to the promotion of democracy locally in
Hong Kong. Since many of these activists are Chinese patriots, the
democratization of Hong Kong’s local polity for them is part of a wider
hope for a democratized China.

1.1. Receding Influence of the “Tiananmen Generation” among Hong
Kong’s Democracy Activists

One of the most recent and prominent examples of local activities was
the foundation of the Occupy Central with Love and Peace ( 識愛與和
平佔領中環 / 和平佔中, OCLP) movement formally established in
May 2013 in reaction to a reform process of the Chief Executive
elections in Hong Kong: while the city’s most important political
representative had been selected by a so-called “Election Committee”
comprising only 1,200 members previously, the Hong Kong SAR
government started a reform process in 2013 to introduce elections by
universal suffrage in 2017 (J. Chan, 2014: 573). The activists of OCLP
aimed at constructively engaging with this reform process, raising the
people’s awareness of democratic principles in order to ensure that a true
democratization by international (meaning: Western) standards would be
achieved and – if necessary – organize public protests to press for the
pro-democratic movement’s demands (Kan, 2013). It is significant that

Contemporary Chinese Political Economy and Strategic Relations:
An International Journal 2(2) ◆ 2016
many of the leading figures of OCLP became politically engaged in the wake of the Beijing Massacre; but of crucial importance is also that the movement profited from various resources of established pro-democratic organizations and their civil society networks such as faith-based groupings and teachers’ unions etc.³ Hence, it is fair to say that civil society networks established in Hong Kong in the immediate aftermath of the Tiananmen crackdown significantly contributed to Hong Kong’s occupation in 2014.

For more than a year, OCLP was active and visible in Hong Kong organizing many events including three so-called “deliberation days” when the city’s population was invited to discuss the democratic reforms and the political future (Occupy Central with Love and Peace, 2014b). The result of the third deliberation day were three reform proposals that OCLP brought to an unofficial referendum turning out almost 800,000 votes in Hong Kong on 20th-29th June 2014 (Ip, 2014). Despite this impressive turnout, the Hong Kong SAR government refused to implement the decision of the referendum which led OCLP to call for a peaceful occupation of Hong Kong’s business district on 1 October, 2014 (J. Chan, 2014). Clearly, these preparations of OCLP were crucial for the emergence of the Umbrella Movement.

Yet the occupation itself showed marked differences from OCLP’s preparations: starting already in late-September and not occupying the business district of Central but the neighbourhoods of Admiralty, Causeway Bay (銅鑼灣) and Mong Kok (旺角), these protests resulted out of class boycotts of secondary and tertiary students. In other words, the protests were not led by the “Tiananmen-generation” of pro-democratic activists – but by young people, many of them students (Yuen and Cheng, 2015).

For most parts of the occupation, the young students and the “Tiananmen-generation” led by OCLP cooperated closely. However,
during the course of the demonstrations and even more in its aftermath, a marked generational difference became visible: in contrast to their predecessors, the young generation is less patriotic and less attracted to a party-state directed “Chinese-ness” (Hong Kong Transition Project, 2014a). These young people are primarily concerned with evolving political trends in the SAR since the handover of the former colony to the People’s Republic of China in 1997 and an underlying fear that the CCP leaders would inevitably intervene in the affairs of Hong Kong notwithstanding adherence to the formula of late leader Deng Xiaoping, i.e. “one country, two systems” (一國兩制). Such intervention has not been (openly) implemented, promises to accept political liberties in Hong Kong has not been broken. And yet a creeping sense of “Mainlandization” of society, politics, the media landscape, and the economy has propelled resistance among large segments of the young population in Hong Kong.⁴ Hence, while the older generation seems to mostly hope for a pan-Chinese democratization with Hong Kong taking the lead, the UM did address the local political development of Hong Kong from a different angle, emphasizing the need of the Hong Kong SAR’s autonomy from Mainland interference. Consequently, when student protests erupted in 2014 – ostensibly about democratic reform – social, cultural and identity-related issues and its interweaving with the PRC were also prominent in the discourse of the UM (Rühlig, 2015b).

In essence, while the legacy of pro-democracy movement which established itself in Hong Kong in the direct aftermath of the Tiananmen crackdown in 1989 did contribute to the UM, the 2014 occupation signalled also the emergence of a new generation of protesters which distinguished itself from Hong Kong’s “Tiananmen veterans” and followed its own agenda. This reflects not just a different strategy to achieve political change but mirrors the much more ambivalent relations of Hong Kong’s youth with the Mainland compared to previous
generation. In short, it is an expression of rising localism (Chen and Szeto, 2015; Cheung, 2014/2015).

1.2. The Problem of Intuition: The Tiananmen Movement and the Umbrella Movement in Media Observations

Regardless of this shift towards a more local focus, in the international news media comparisons of the TM and the UM were quickly made. Yet no authors of these news articles self-reflexively asked in-depth questions about the readiness to make comparisons between the two movements, regardless of if the arguments were to claim differences or highlight similarities. This was further fuelled by the fact that many demonstrators themselves referred to the TM, some drawing on the unarguable importance of the Tiananmen crackdown for the Hong Kong demonstrators’ identity, protest culture, discourse and framing: while essential for most of the older generation, Hong Kong’s young protesters remain divided with regards to their relations with both the Mainland in general and the pro-democratic protest tradition of the TM in particular. In essence, the TM and its support in Hong Kong remained a crucial though contested reference point of the 2014 UM and constitutes an ideal example of what Eyerman and Jamison (1998) have termed the “mobilization of tradition” – what we in this specific context conceptualize as a “mobilization of memory”.

This article’s purpose is twofold. First, we aim to shed light on the contested importance of the TM memory during the 2014 occupation in light of the generational divide. Second, given the widespread comparisons, albeit superficial, we attempt to fill a void in the research literature by contributing a grounded comparison between the two movements by asking what was different and what was similar regarding the background, build-up, goals, frames, protest culture, end of the movements, and the final outcomes. Strikingly, our comparison
demonstrates that similarities between the two movements concern their internal structure and framing. However, the external environment and the goals of the two movements are markedly different.

This finding leads us to three conclusions. First, while the internal structures of the pro-democratic movement in Hong Kong as well as its discursive form and framing are (still) shaped by the “Tiananmen veterans” who have massively contributed to the build-up of the city’s civil society, the goals are now being reshaped by the younger “Umbrella generation”.

Second, if the central government in Beijing aims to pacify the UM with similar means as it did back in the late 1980s with the pro-democratic spirit of the TM, it is likely to fail. Repressive means were deployed in the much more restrictive external environment of Beijing and Mainland China in 1989 compared to the current situation in Hong Kong where basic civil liberties are protected by a largely independent judiciary. These civil liberties, most prominently the freedoms of expression and the press, make it unlikely that the CCP succeeds in shaping the collective memory in Hong Kong to a similar extent as in post-1989 Mainland China. Furthermore, the central government’s economic means are limited as well since most economic stimuli go along with a closer economic integration of the SAR with the Mainland. This, however, is clearly rejected by most of the young Umbrella protesters.

Third, the ongoing generational change of Hong Kong’s protest movement unfolds an exciting and highly relevant societal re-negotiation of the SAR’s relationship with the Mainland. Hence, these debates do not only reflect contention around the role of the TM, but point to a wider discursive struggle on the role of Mainland China not only in Hong Kong but in Greater China more generally, most prominently in Taiwan.

_Contemporary Chinese Political Economy and Strategic Relations: An International Journal 2(2) ♦ 2016_
Hence, our comparison may shed light on actually existing legacies and connections between social protest movements in Greater China and their political opportunity structures – though they are separated by time, space, and context. Looming in the background are also the overarching issues and debates on “Western” liberal democracy and universal values in China, debates that have been stifled severely under the increasingly repressive rule of general secretary Xi Jinping. In connection to this background are also the ongoing and future structural and ideational changes in Greater China concerning the rise of individualism and self-expressive values of youth and manifestation of local identities in Taiwan, Hong Kong, Guangdong but also minority areas inside the People’s Republic (Yan, 2009; Welzer, 2013). In other words, we believe that whether protest movements in Greater China aim to mobilize by means of reference to the tradition of the Tiananmen student demonstrations is an important aspect of the contested interplay between Chinese traditions, universal values and emerging localism and identity struggles which aims to distinguish itself from the PRC and its political development – present and past.

In order to elaborate on these arguments further, we proceed in three steps. First, we summarize the mostly intuitive comparison of the TM and UM and outline our own more thorough approach. Second, we compare the two movements along three categories – goals, structures and frames. Third and finally, by way of conclusion we do not only summarize our comparison but aim to shed light on why the UM is so often linked to the Tiananmen protests and point to some consequences in terms of the mobilization of memory for future political developments, social movements in Hong Kong and Greater China.
2. From Sweeping Intuition to Grounded Comparison

Given the fact that the Tiananmen legacy remained a contentious focal point of the UM, the press often drew on comparison of the two movements. Some journalistic accounts of the UM argue that it shared many commonalities with the Tiananmen protest of 1989, most notably that both movements were started by students who demanded democracy and initiated class boycotts (BBC, 2014; Goldstone, 2014; Kowlowska, 2014; Lui, 2000). However, other observers emphasize that there were also differences between the two movements (Economy, 2014; Hui, 2014). Importantly, some argue that while the TM demanded something new, the UM aimed at protecting existing freedoms (Hui, 2014). Furthermore, some articles question whether the demonstrations of Tiananmen aimed at democracy in a “Western” sense but take this claim with regards to the UM for granted.

This article aims to compare the two protest movements along theories on social movement mobilization, i.e. what factors impact on political opportunity structures. In the cases of Hong Kong and Mainland China, changes in state-civil society relations, and particularly under what conditions activism and mobilization for political reform become possible (see e.g. Cohen and Arato, 1992; Burnell and Calvert, 2004) are important. In relation to perspectives of power structures and collective action we lean on Sidney Tarrow’s understanding of political opportunity structures as “consistent – but not necessarily formal or permanent – dimensions of the political environment that provide incentives for people to undertake collective action by affecting their expectations for success or failure” (Tarrow, 1998: 5). Drawing on theories of political opportunity structures (McAdam et al., 1996), we focus on how civil society (Cohen and Arato, 1992) intermeshes and produces social organization and mobilization – especially the mobilization of memory – aimed at restructuring social and political
systems. Through highlighting these two important case studies, situated within the protest traditions and cultural context of Greater China, and movements critical of, and challenging the CCP regime of the PRC, we hold the two cases to shed new light on the discussion of political opportunity structures in different socio-political contexts in Greater China, where political opportunity structures and potent collective memories may lie dormant, yet full of contained energy in longstanding authoritarian and post-colonial and pre-democratic contexts.

However, we do not limit our comparison to the political opportunity structures and collective memories but look at the goals of the TM and UM and their underlying discursive frames as well: we include discursive frames into our comparison because they are “schemata of interpretation” which “locate, perceive, identify, and label” (Goffman, 1974: 21) events in people’s life and in the whole world and hence provide a context and framework for understanding the world and given political decisions. Thus, discursive frames structure experiences and direct actions.

Such frameworks of interpretation and reasoning are not given but may be used strategically: tying in with cultural structures and norms as well as symbols and rites to define and reason a given political situation, actors can shape not only the peoples’ perception but motivate them to support certain political decisions (Benford and Snow, 2000: 613-614).

At the same time, however, framing theory does not only highlight the importance of discourses and their strategic usage but also the conditions of successful framing depending on many factors including the centrality of the frame, its narrative fidelity, empirical credibility and consistency as well as the credibility of the frame articulators (Benford and Snow, 2000; Rochford, Benford and Snow, 1986). The frame’s success largely depends on its congruence with actual decisions, conditions and developments. Thus discursive frames matter but they
have to be based on “real-word” conditions, developments and decisions.

Hence, while frames are closely interrelated with the structural conditions, they bear force in themselves. Drawing on tradition, rites, cultural representations and artefacts they offer interpretations and understandings of the protests as well as its environment including the political and economic system. This implies that the constant comparison with the TM whether it takes the uniqueness of the UM into account or not bears enormous political impact (Wasserstrom, 2014). Finally, such interpretive frames are not only re-produced by means of discourse but are inscribed into the protest culture. Therefore, we summarize how the UM’s protest culture tied in with the Tiananmen Movement below.

3. A Thorough Comparison between the Two Movements

Although structural factors and discursive frames are empirically interwoven, we analyse the goals, structures, and frames in the following paragraph separately for analytical reasons.

3.1. Goals of the Two Movements

Discussing the motivations and goals of social movements, a significant theoretical literature has emphasized rational utility calculations referring to both incentives resulting out of greed as well as grievances. From such a cost-benefit calculus perspective, the TM and UM share significant similarities. Both the population of China in the late 1980s as well as the inhabitants of Hong Kong in recent years faced severe economic challenges. In China the experimentation with market reform led to social problems that affected all Chinese citizens daily, such as rising inflation and corruption, and a growing discontent with state-
directed occupational choice and political control in the workplace. Tensions culminated in 1989, as further signs of economic crisis emerged, especially soaring food prices (Lagerkvist, 2016: 66). Hong Kong, in turn, is among the ten most expensive cities in the world with over-proportionally rising costs (The Economist, 2015). Especially housing is very expensive; depending on the location and size, Hong Kong’s properties rank among the fifteen most expensive ones in the world, being the most expensive in the whole of Asia (Numbeo, 2016). This left both populations in Beijing in the late-1980s and in Hong Kong in 2014 with a rising social insecurity which was in the case of Hong Kong further increased by a privatization of social welfare (E.W.Y. Lee, 2012). Furthermore, it has been argued that both students in Beijing as well as in Hong Kong aimed to protect their privileges, which is debatable. Hong Kong’s students face increasing performance pressure from highly qualified Mainland students coming to the SAR: the last decade has brought a ninefold rise in the enrolment of Mainland Chinese undergraduate students in Hong Kong (Xu, 2015: 16).

However, apart from these materialist incentives for social protest, the TM and the UM do not share a lot with regard to their goals and motivations: The TM aimed at reforming China’s political system to improve economic, social and ethical conditions in Mainland China plagued by official corruption which we may summarize as a demand for comprehensive national reforms to produce political equity and economic equality for the Chinese people (Lagerkvist, 2016). The UM, in contrast, was a largely localist protest aiming at more self-determination and autonomy from China. In some sense, it was not a national Chinese but at least partly an anti-Mainland Chinese movement. As has been argued elsewhere in more detail (Rühlig, 2015b), the UM’s call for democratization was embedded into a broader demand for more Hong Kong autonomy and self-determination comprising at least three
more fields: economic and welfare policies, identity politics and the overall institutional setting:

In the field of economic and welfare policies, large parts of the UM argued that the SAR’s integration with Mainland China caused economic and social challenges. For example, the relaxation of money flow controls from Mainland China was associated with speculation on Hong Kong’s property market. Furthermore, both migration from the Mainland as well as Chinese tourism and smuggling are seen as the cause of an increase of basic living costs by parts of the UM because they believe that Mainland Chinese citizens have more trust in the product quality in Hong Kong thus increasing the demand for basic everyday needs such as milk and milk powder in the SAR. Consequently, significant parts of the young “Umbrella protesters” favoured more economic autonomy from the PRC.

With regard to the young protesters’ identity, many perceive themselves as distinct from the Mainland: many term themselves “Hong Kong-Chinese” or simply “Hong Kong person” (Hong Kong Transition Project, 2014b: 58). Although ideational issues were not at stake during the UM, a significant personal overlap with the 2012 protest campaign against the “national and moral education plan” is eye-catching: Many young “Umbrella protesters” had hit the streets two years before demonstrating against a new curriculum that demanded Hong Kong schools to praise the CCP, its ideology and grade school students for showing emotions when the Mainland Chinese flag is raised (Bradsher, 2012).

Finally, the UM’s call for democratization is mostly concerned with the nomination procedure of candidates running for the post as Hong Kong’s Chief Executive: strikingly, by demanding civic nomination (i.e. that a certain number of Hong Kong voters’ signature would be enough for nomination) the UM wanted to ensure that the central government’s
influence on the CE nomination process would be limited. They feared that a Beijing-controlled nomination committee as the only institution able to nominate candidates would equal a politically motivated screening process and ensure that only pro-CCP candidates would be able to run for elections (see e.g. Occupy Central with Love and Peace, 2014a). While in the eyes of some UM protesters this violates the spirit of the “one country, two systems” formula, a small minority even favours outright independence from the Mainland.7

All in all, even if we do not argue that the UM aimed at full independence, the protesters’ goals have to be interpreted in a “secessionist spirit or mindset” which is very different from the TM being largely motivated by frustration over illnesses of the existing system, e.g. corruption. This “secessionist” spirit shares more commonalities with the Sunflower Movement in Taiwan, especially identity-wise, and the May Fourth Movement in 1919 (Hioe, 2015; Hui, 2014; Wasserstrom, 2014) than with the TM that was mostly concerned with national reform.

Hence, the widespread assumption that TM and UM are rather similar because both aim at democracy (The Economist, 2014; Kowloowska, 2014) takes both movements at face value without analysing the underlying agendas more closely. Furthermore, even if one reduces both movements to their claim for democracy, Lui (2000) and Goldstone (2014) have argued that the protesters at Tiananmen Square did not have “Western” democracy in mind or had only a very vague understanding of the term. The UM, in contrast, made it very clear that they demanded an electoral reform of the Chief Executive elections along international/“Western” standards that ensure an only very limited ability of the Mainland Chinese government to intervene in the nomination process. All in all, while the UM and the TM demonstrations may indeed share some motivations and goals, we should not overlook
marked differences: The fact that both movements drew on the same “headline” or “discursive frame”, namely democracy, does not make their goals identical.

3.2. Structures of the Two Movements

In this section we differentiate for analytical reasons between internal and external structural conditions with the former referring to characteristics of the protest movements themselves.

3.2.1. Internal structures

Apart from both movements being associated with their democracy advocacy, the close linkage of the UM and TM is the result of similarities of both movements’ composition: Both demonstrations were initiated by students before being broadened to other societal sectors including intellectuals as well as workers. However, both movements are mostly associated with the young academics.

Apart from that the literature on social movement has pointed to the importance of formal (McCarthy and Zald, 1977; Smith and Fetner, 2007: 30) and informal organizations as well as alliances with existing civil society (Della Porta, 2005; Diani, 1995, 2003; Escobar, 2004; Rucht, 2004) as structures for resource mobilization.

Empirically, there exist a lot of similarities in terms of the Umbrella and Tiananmen Movements’ organizational setting. Both movements were not only initiated by students but drew on the support of student organizations and successfully reached out to (labour and teacher) unions for support (Lui, 2000). However, the overall freer context in Hong Kong provided the UM with much more comprehensive possibilities of alliances.
Another similarity is that both protests though widely perceived as being spontaneous drew on significant preparations and predecessors (OCLP in Hong Kong and the “democracy salons” organized by Beijing University students in 1987 and 1988 (Lagerkvist, 2016: 102; BBC, 2014; Lui, 2000). However, the Internet and social media have eased the spontaneous mobilization dynamics in Hong Kong compared to the 1989 Beijing protests (Goldstone, 2014). As a result of these mixtures of spontaneity and prior preparations, both movements brought up well-known leaders that on the one hand were able to provide leadership that is crucial for any social movement such as to frame and articulate the respective demands, activate networks and mobilize supporters (Aminzade, Goldstone and Perry, 2001; Morris, 2004). On the other hand, these leaders never succeed to completely control the movements.

Finally, both movements were shaped by participants with a rather high education which is referred to as crucial in parts of the social movement literature as well (Florini, 2003; Sikkink, 2002; Verba, Schlozman and Brady, 1995) and were influenced by international developments and standards to some degree. While in the Hong Kong case many argue that the young people’s education (at school and in universities) of international standards is crucial for their world views, the TM was clearly less inspired by “cosmopolitan” discourses.9 Also that transnational ties (organizational, tactical etc.) being regarded as conducive to social movements in the conceptual literature (Meyer and Tarrow, 1998) have been much stronger in the UM due to lower transaction costs in times of Internet communication.

All in all, this thorough comparison of the internal structures of the two movements uncovers significant similarities.
3.2.2. External structures

Theoretical approaches to social movements have demonstrated the importance of the political context for a successful mobilization among social movements. Tilly, for example, has argued that social movements make use of “windows of opportunity” to access the polity. Such windows of opportunity emerge in times of major changes such as massive migration, fundamental economic reforms or crisis or reconfigurations of political institutions (McAdam, 1982; Piven and Cloward, 1977; Tarrow, 1998; Tilly, Tilly and Tilly, 1975). However, the conceptual literature distinguishes between positive opportunities and negative threats as different kinds of “windows of opportunity” for social movements (Francisco, 1995; Rasler, 1996; Staggenborg, 1986; Van Dyke, 2003). This distinction holds true in the cases of the TM and the UM empirically: while the Beijing massacre ended a phase of relative liberalization in China, the UM emerged in a context of increasing political control by the Beijing government. The Hong Kong demonstrators utilized the electoral reform of the Chief Executive selection to voice their concerns embedding the planned introduction of elections by universal suffrage and their call for true democracy (including the nomination process) into the broader campaign against increasing Mainland Chinese control over the SAR. Hence, the “windows of opportunity”, though in both cases existent, were rather different.

Another factor often mentioned by the social movement literature is the regime type in general and the openness of the regime in particular: Eisinger (1973) has found that the likelihood of protest is lower in closed as well as open regimes because closed regimes often react with repression while open regimes provide other forms of participation to the citizens.
Empirically, Hong Kong’s polity though in a process of “de-liberalization” and closure remains much more open compared to the Chinese one at the end of the 1980s. Hong Kong rated as “partly free” by Freedom House (2015) is characterised by multiparty competition, a relatively free press, an independent judiciary and pressure groups playing a vital and very influential role (Xi, 2014). The Tiananmen Movement, in turn, did emerge in a time when political freedoms in China, i.e. the 1980s, had improved significantly. It was the death of former CCP Secretary General Hu Yaobang 胡耀邦, who was a liberal reformer within the party, that ignited the Tiananmen Movement at a moment when further political reform hung in the balance as conservative and liberal factions within the CCP struggled about future policies.

Turning from the regime type to China’s overall position within the international community, the two movements emerged in a rather different context: in the last two and a half decades, China as a whole has moved more to the centre of the global economy and Hong Kong remains an important financial hub in Asia though losing ground to Shanghai. The consequences of these transnational economic conditions have been interpreted very differently. While some argue that it would be more costly for Xi Jinping 習近平 to react with violent force to the UM compared to Deng Xiaoping in 1989 because of China’s interdependence with the world economy (BBC, 2014), others have countered that the experiences of the TM have taught the Chinese the opposite: the fact that sanctions remained in place only rather shortly could equip Xi with the best argument not to hesitate to use force (Kowlowska, 2014). Furthermore, the Beijing massacre was followed by a massive economic boom which has made the PRC much more powerful today compared to 1989 (Lagerkvist, 2014a, 2014b). Hence, one could argue that China has even less to worry today compared to the late 1980s and early 1990s.
Whatever the reasons, the Beijing government did not replicate a horrible massacre similar to that in Beijing in Hong Kong twenty-five years later.

Apart from these differences, a few though limited similarities of the external structures faced by the TM and the UM can be identified as well: Most prominently, the state capacities – both repressive means available to the state authorities as well as a strong and efficient bureaucracy – were available in both 1989 and 2014. However, the experience of 1989 may have very well shaped the perceptions and calculus of both the UM and the central government in Beijing: Both wanted to prevent a violent crackdown from happening again. From a conceptual point of view, this is important since repression turns social movements into militant ones significantly reducing the likelihood of civil disobedience and peaceful protest (Zwerman and Steinhoff, 2005). A strong state bureaucracy in turn leads statistically to high degrees of mobilization (Amenta, Caren, Fetner and Young, 2002).

Another partial similarity is the (perceived) factions and splits within the regime that are often regarded as being decisive for the success or failure of social movements (Gamson and Meyer, 1996). In both 1989 and 2014, rumours on power struggles within the CCP were present but they were much more intense in the late-1980s and – in contrast to 2014 – concerned the dealing with the protest movement itself (Lagerkvist, 2014a). Another difference is the fact that the UM had allies in Hong Kong’s legislature that possessed a blocking minority enabling them to veto the electoral reform bill introduced by the government around six months after the end of the UM (Forsythe and Wong, 2015; Holden, 2014). Hence, while the UM had some formally influential allies in Hong Kong’s Legislative Council (立法會) but lacked the slightest support among CCP leaders, the TM gained some limited sympathy within the central government but did not possess any
formal political influences. Therefore, both movements had limited	hough very different allies within the ruling elite – a factor that has been
regarded as crucial in the comparative and conceptual social movement
literature (Lipsky, 1968; Orloff and Skocpol, 1984).

Finally, only limited similarities between the TM and the UM can be
observed with regard to allies among bystanders (Rucht, 2004): While
the general public remained divided in Hong Kong, the TM received
immense support from the local Beijing population (Calhoun, 1997;
Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2014). Furthermore, Hong Kong’s
powerful economic elite remained rather sceptical towards the UM
fearing similar “chaos” as in Beijing in 1989. At the same time, their
prior interest was not to see another massacre happening since this
would have seriously shaken the foundation of Hong Kong’s economy
(Kowlowska, 2014). Thus, the external structures that the TM and the
UM faced were rather different though some very limited similarities
existed as well.

3.3. Discursive Frames of the Protests

In contrast to the preceding section that largely drew on structural
settings, this section engages with perceptions, discourses, frames and
identity. Indeed, discursive references to the TM can be found on all
sides: Protesters, the regime as well as the press refer to the
demonstrations in 1989: one reason of the protesters’ discursive
engagement with the TM can be found in the roots of the pro-democratic
movement of Hong Kong (see above). Throughout the years, Hong
Kong remained the only city on Chinese soil commemorating the
massacre with an annual vigil on June 4th (Cheng, 2009). Although the
UM was dominated by the young generation and not the “Tiananmen
veterans” and significant parts of the young protesters seemed to
distance themselves from the older generation, the TM and its
commemoration remained a crucial references point. While some young protesters saw themselves in the tradition of the TM, many others sought to distinguish and distance themselves from any Mainland Chinese traditions, including the pro-democratic protests of 1989. Significantly though, all young people’s experiences of protest in Hong Kong are shaped by the annual Tiananmen commemoration contributing to their politicization since it remains a vital part of Hong Kong’s collective memory (Lee and Chan, 2013). Furthermore, the fear of violent crackdown is vital in the city and might have contributed to the rise of anti-Chinese sentiments and localist aims in the city’s youth.

Apart from many differences between the TM and the UM, many people in Hong Kong were reminded of 1989 and hit the streets to support and protect the students (Caitlin, 2014). Hence, the Tiananmen legacy mobilized people to support the young “Umbrella generation”. This is also reflected in the widespread fear among supporters of the UM, the overall citizenry regardless of political orientation, the media as well as former Tiananmen activists that the central government could violently suppress the demonstrations in Hong Kong (BBC, 2014; Beast, 2014; Delury, 2014; Focus, 2014; Holden, 2014; Keane, 2014; Kowlowska, 2014; Lam, 2014; Ma, 2014; McDonald, 2014; O’Connell, 2014; Yang, Teng and Hu, 2014). One example is an open letter by Hong Kong citizens to Chinese president Xi Jinping asking the leader not to replicate a violent crackdown (Wasserstrom and Ho, 2014). Many media reports termed the UM the most important pro-democratic demonstration on Chinese soil ever since 1989 (BBC, 2014; Delury, 2014; eunsollee, 2015; Kowlowska, 2014; Mullin, 2014; Phillips, 2014) and did not avoid making the comparison even if it argued that the TM and UM are rather different (Economy, 2014; Hui, 2014). Whether talking about the goals of the movement, referring to the UM’s protest culture, trivial things like the waste separation or references without real comparison, references to
the TM could be found all over the media coverage (Delury, 2014; He, 2014; Powell, 2014). Even pictures from Hong Kong were related to the famous “Tank Man” from Tiananmen Square (Lim, 2014). Clearly, this widespread vital memory of the Tiananmen crackdown and its mobilization in the Hong Kong SAR was crucial for all these references, comparisons and fears.

The central government, however, also contributed to these comparisons by using exactly the same vocabulary as in 1989 speaking of “riots” endangering the “social stability” and being induced by “hostile foreign forces”. Furthermore, the Mainland leaders made use of the word “chaos” which has to be interpreted as a clear warning from Beijing to Hong Kong (BBC, 2014; J. Chan, 2014: 579; Kowlowska, 2014; Pessin, 2014). With these terms, the Mainland government made clear that it perceived Hong Kong as a “counterrevolutionary” basis like in 1989 when 1.5 million out of the 6 million inhabitants hit the streets in support of Tiananmen protests (Cheng, 2009; Scoggins, 2014). Finally, pro-democratic forces within Hong Kong reported that Beijing used similar tactics compared to 1989 to deter citizens from taking part in protest activities commemorating the UM one year after it got started (Ng, 2015).

Given China’s similar rhetoric, it is no wonder that the perception of many UM protesters was influenced by how the central government in Beijing had dealt with the TM 25 years before. Especially disillusionment with the CCP reduced many protesters’ readiness to seek a dialogue since they knew that the largely loyal opposition of the TM was termed “counter-revolutionary” before being suppressed by force (He, 2014).

All these discursive frames may very well have contributed to the formation the UM’s protest culture displaying some crucial similarities to the demonstrations in Tiananmen Square: both demonstrations were
not only supported by artists, but culture (music in Hong Kong and poetry in Beijing) developed into one of the main protest tactics itself (Lui, 2000; Rühlig, 2015a). Furthermore, both the Beijing and Hong Kong protests gathered around a statue – the Goddess of Democracy in 1989 and the Umbrella Man in 2014 (Goldstone, 2014).

All these examples of discursive frames and cultural artefacts point to the significant influence of the TM commemoration for the protest tradition in the Hong Kong SAR. Until 2014 including the preparation of the occupation by OCLP, the “Tiananmen veterans” had shaped the city’s pro-democracy movement. Only the UM brought up a new generation that carefully sought to distinguish itself from the “Tiananmen tradition” being interrelated with the Mainland political development and the older generation of protesters who saw themselves as more “Chinese” than the more localist youth. While signs of this generational divide were visible during the UM, they become even more obvious after the end of the occupation. Especially the question whether Hong Kong’s pro-democracy movement should aim at political change ultimately affecting not only Hong Kong but the whole country or not became crucial (Bong, 2015; Ho, 2015; Risch, 2015; Steger, 2015). At the core of this debate was also the role and importance of the TM as well as its commemoration in Hong Kong: While for some, commemorating June 4th is a vital part of their struggle for democracy in China and Hong Kong others have started an alternative June 4th ceremony which is more a demonstration against China and not particularly devoted to the Tiananmen massacre (Ho, 2015; Law, 2015; Risch, 2015). At the same time, the June 4th vigil at Victoria Park 2015 in commemoration of the massacre in Beijing changed as well – though not fundamentally enough in the eyes of many “Umbrella activists”: in 2015, the organizers invited people to join the commemoration with a logo of a candle in the form of an umbrella. Furthermore, the Goddess of
Democracy statue had an umbrella; music from the UM was played alongside songs from the TM; and almost all speeches linked the Tiananmen protests to the UM (Ho, 2015; Law, 2015; Liu, 2014; Pomfret and Baldwin, 2015; Steger, 2015). Furthermore, Reuters reported that the conveners of the ceremony termed the UM a “mini-June 4” (Reuters, 2015).

All in all, the UM was largely perceived in light of and compared to the TM that took place 25 years before in Beijing. The TM and its commemoration in Hong Kong remained a crucial reference point of both the “Tiananmen veterans” and the “Umbrella generation” though the latter were divided on the question whether they wanted to break up with the tradition of the “Tiananmen spirit” in Hong Kong or not. This became even more visible after the end of the occupation when the pro-democracy movement turned to the June 4th commemoration again.

4. Concluding Remarks: “Mobilization of Memory” and Its Future

All the above comparisons of the TM and UM carry three implications. First, similarities can be identified with regard to the internal structures of the two movements and the framing of the UM in terms of the TM. This reflects the importance of Hong Kong’s “Tiananmen veterans” for the SAR’s pro-democracy movement in general and the impact of OCLP for the preparations of the UM in particular. Thus, a clear similarity is the “mobilization of memory” and lingering legacies of state versus people. This points to the most striking finding of our comparison: the discursive interrelatedness of the UM with the 1989 Beijing protests which has shaped the Hong Kong protesters’ identity but also the reaction of the Beijing government which on the one hand aimed to avoid a second massacre and on the other hand referred to the same language used in 1989 to construct a rhetorical threat to the UM.
At the same time, however, the similarities between the TM and the UM are mostly limited to internal structures and framing: striking differences remain most obviously with regard to the demonstrators’ demands, motivations and goals as well as the external structures of the movements.

In light of these major differences as well as the generational change among Hong Kong’s pro-democratic protest movement, a shift if not a decreasing importance of the TM’s legacy on Hong Kong seems to be very likely. For the Chinese central government in Beijing that has aimed to force back the memory of the Tiananmen Massacre, this development in Hong Kong is a double-edged sword:

On the one hand, a protest with a more “local” aim questions the CCP’s rule over China to a lower degree than the TM. This is also reflected in the mere locality of the protests in China’s periphery instead of Tiananmen Square which forms the heart of the PRC. This significance of the political symbolism of China’s capital became most obvious in 1989 when Mikhail Gorbachev paid a state visit to Beijing ending in a humiliation for the CCP leadership (Lagerkvist, 2014a). Furthermore, the localist protest of the “Umbrella generation” is less likely to spill-over to Mainland China compared to demonstrations demanding greater freedom for the whole country in a spirit of Chinese national pride: Why should Mainland Chinese support a movement that is to a significant degree directed against a perceived “Mainlandization”? Indeed, there were no widespread sympathies for the UM in Mainland China (BBC, 2014; Kuo, 2014).

On the other hand, the “secessionist spirit” of the “Umbrella generation” strengthens the centrifugal tendencies within the PRC (visible mainly in Tibet and Xinjiang) and ties in with scepticism towards the Mainland in Greater China, namely in Taiwan. Finally, Hong Kong’s development might also very well diffuse to the southern
Chinese province of Guangdong.

The second implication of our findings concerns the central government’s options for action. Given the marked differences between the two movements, it is very unlikely that the deployment of similar means taken after 1989 to pacify the young protesters of the Hong Kong SAR would be successful: Given the civil liberties in Hong Kong as well as the SAR’s largely independent judiciary, the Beijing government cannot easily adopt repressive means like it did back in 1989. In this context, the CCP has clearly learnt from the Beijing Massacre to be more patient and wait out the protests (Goldstone, 2014). Furthermore, it is much more difficult to suppress the collective memory in Hong Kong because the freedoms of speech, press and assembly as well as the free Internet in the SAR make such a strategy impossible.

Finally, even effective economic means to pacify the protests are hardly imaginable: in contrast to the PRC in the 1980s, Hong Kong is not in need of market-economic reforms since it is a capitalist entity for a long time. Furthermore, economic stimuli by the Mainland government are likely to increase tensions in the SAR because they would go along with a further economic integration of the city with the Mainland. This, however, would decrease Hong Kong’s self-determination and autonomy that is desired by the “Umbrella generation”. Consequently, the Hong Kong SAR as well as the Mainland Chinese government have to find new solutions to the challenges of the protest movement in the city.

The third and final implication of our findings is that the generational change of the protest movement in Hong Kong reflects an ongoing societal re-negotiation of the SAR’s relations with the Mainland. This comes at a time when Mainland China’s political and economic gravitational force is increasing in the whole region, which has increased anxiety not only in Hong Kong but in Taiwan and other East and Southeast Asian countries (e.g. Vietnam) as well. It would be
naïve to neglect that other societies and movements monitor how the PRC deals with the UM in Hong Kong. Most obviously, mutual exchanges between Hong Kong’s UM and Taiwan’s Sunflower movement illustrate such regional linkages.

In sum, how the “mobilization of the Tiananmen memory” in Hong Kong develops carries implications far beyond the internal and underlying generational change of the SAR’s protest movement. The Hong Kong youth’s turning away from the tradition and memory of the TM coincides with the rise of Hong Kong’s more recent “secessionist spirit”, a trend that is clearly detrimental to the interest of the central government in Beijing. This, in turn, illustrates how crucial the “mobilization of memory” is: to which traditions social protest movements in the Greater China region in general and Hong Kong in particular refer in the future will not be the only but a significant factor shaping their relations with Mainland China.

Notes

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1. Estimations vary; however, the most common numbers put the participation at a sixth of Hong Kong’s population with 1.2 million. This estimation is based on data published by the Chinese University of Hong Kong (Ong, 2014).

2. Conventional wisdom regards Hong Kong to be an apolitical city, when it is in fact a “city of protest”. Consider about 500,000 people who demonstrated against article 23 of the Basic Law (基本法) in 2003. Consider the ten thousand people who protested against the rail link to the Mainland in January 2010. Tens of thousands are demonstrating every year on 1st July, in some years as many as hundreds of thousands participated. Moreover, there are many small-scale protests in the city such as the protests against the demolition of the piers and many controversial urban development projects. The spectacular outburst that came to be known as the Umbrella Movement should be viewed against this background. Therefore future research should more carefully investigate Hong Kong’s protest history and the reasons for why the narrative of monetary-oriented Hong Kongers has gained such traction both regionally and internationally.
3. Author’s interview with two leading members of OCLP and the Hong Kong Alliance in Support of Patriotic Democratic Movements in China, Hong Kong, 18th July 2015.

4. This phenomenon is clearly illustrated by the huge box office success of the budget movie *The Ten Years*, which depicts the grim situation in Hong Kong in the year 2025.

5. Author’s interviews with protesters of the Umbrella Movement, June/July 2015 in Hong Kong.

6. Author’s interviews with protesters of the Umbrella Movement, June/July 2015 in Hong Kong.

7. Author’s interviews with protesters of the Umbrella Movement, June/July 2015 in Hong Kong.

8. For example, some observers argue that it was able to basically win the support of the Hong Kong University (HKU) (Economy, 2014), a perception that seems to be too general to be true. But indeed HKU became a stronghold of the UM with Benny Tai 戴耀廷 being the founder of OCLP. Additionally, the UM found support at least of some religious communities, most prominently Christian ones (Chan, 2015).

9. Many students of the Tiananmen movement were familiar with current reforms in the Soviet Union, the history of the Prague Spring, and the American and French revolutions. However, compared to the UM, cosmopolitan perspectives were less important in 1989.

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Occupation as Prefiguration?
The Emergence of a New Political Form in the Occupy Central Movement

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Abstract
Situated in Hong Kong’s specific context, this article attempts to illustrate the practices and implications of “prefigurative politics” during the Occupy Central Movement. We argue that the occupation not only demanded, but also prefigured, new forms of democracy. But such prefiguration should not be seen as a pure “ethics” of politics, but rather as a new way of “doing” politics, raising deep questions about representation and leadership in contemporary protest movements. From the outset of the movement, there had been ensuing struggles over leadership among different actors in the movement, while none of them were able to assume effective leadership. The undecidability of leadership ultimately provided the condition for various kinds of experiments by the crowds themselves. We argue that these prefigurative practices have set seeds of possibility for future political processes, and imply the emergence of “occupation as prefiguration” as a political form in Hong Kong.
Keywords: Hong Kong, leadership, occupation, prefiguration, representation

1. Introduction

The 2014 Occupy Central Movement (hereafter OCM) in Hong Kong not only demanded, but also demonstrated, new forms of democracy. The protestors set up camps in the occupied areas, built up autonomous communities, assigned volunteer task groups, designated zones for sleeping, studying and discussing, shared resources like food, water, and medicine, and took care of each other, presenting a new picture of alternative democratic society in Hong Kong. In other words, the occupation had created a site for prefigurative democracy. But what exactly is prefiguration? How do acts of occupation create a dynamic political process that opens up new possibilities for political engagement? What are the organizational problems that persisted throughout the OCM? All of these manifestations raise deep questions about representation and leadership in the occupation, as we will investigate in this paper.

2. What Is Prefiguration?

The term of “prefiguration” or “prefigurative politics”, coined by Carl Boggs (1977), was originally a “direct attack on statist Marxism”, and was subsequently used to describe the tensions within and between organizations and communities in the US New Left in the 1970s (Breines, 1989; Epstein, 1991), then was widely employed in the women’s movements, lifestyle movements, anarchist movements, counter-institution movements and alter-globalization movements during the 1970s and 1980s. It plays a significant role in discussing the so-
called “new social movements” (Yates, 2015). As a relatively new form of performing political action, prefiguration was first defined as “the embodiment, within the ongoing political practice of a movement, of those forms of social relations, decision-making, culture, and human experience that are the ultimate goal” (Boggs, 1977: 100). This “ultimate goal”, aligned closely with anarchism, indicates the participants’ attempts to “prefigure” utopic alternative by creating a limited scale but idealist type of world they envision in the present (Breines, 1989). Prefiguration, therefore, refers to a political movement, action, moment, development or practices in which the activists experimentally prefigure and actualize certain political ideals in the “here and now” rather than a distant future (van de Sander, 2013). Particular prefigurative practices are usually modes of social relationships and political forms that the activists strive to reflect the future society being sought by themselves, including creating alternative organization, communal living, and exercising participatory democracy, within the ongoing political practice of a movement (Cornell, 2009).

By these definitions, the central element that casts political actions as “prefiguration” is that it “mirrors means and ends” in the present (van de Sander, 2013); in other words, the means of the prefiguration in some way reflect the ends or are somehow equivalent to the ends, rather than ends justifying means (Calhoun, 1993: 404; Franks, 2003: 18; Maeckelbergh, 2009: 81, 89; Rucht, 1988: 320). The most typical example of “mirroring means and ends” is the “direct democratic” mechanisms of consensus-oriented decision-making procedures and horizontally organizational structures (Maeckelbergh, 2009, 2011). As David Graeber (2002) explained with the case of the protest against WTO in Seattle:
When protesters in Seattle chanted “this is what democracy looks like”, they meant to be taken literally. In the best tradition of direct action, they not only confronted a certain form of power, exposing its mechanisms and attempting literally to stop it in its tracks: they did it in a way which demonstrated why the kind of social relations on which it is based were unnecessary. This is why all the condescending remarks about the movement being dominated by a bunch of dumb kids with no coherent ideology completely missed the mark. The diversity was a function of the decentralized form of organization, and this organization was the movement’s ideology.

(Graeber, 2002: 84)

Prefigurative practice demands a non-hierarchical, decentralized form of participatory democracy and collective decision-making that prefigures a society that it seeks to create (Breines, 1989; Boggs, 1978; Baker, 2016; Maecckelbergh, 2011; Yates, 2015). It is argued that prefiguration is a political process rather than a political structure. In other words, prefiguration should be regarded as a “present-tense” politics and an ongoing process continuously subjected to evaluation and reformulation (van de Sander, 2013).

However, in actual prefigurative practices, such political process is far from self-evident – there have been “complex alignments between often overlapping forces” (Graeber and Hui, 2015) as well as tensions and contestations throughout the OCM. Moreover, Hong Kong has its particular context that needs to be taken into account.

3. Hong Kong’s Trajectories

The prefigurative politics is deeply rooted in Hong Kong’s political context. Since the handover, the political tensions have increasingly revolved around the representativeness of the political system which
privileges the elite class and has never been sufficiently representative of the population of Hong Kong. The OCM, with its intensified antagonism toward the restricted electoral arrangements, can be seen as the peak of this ongoing sequence vis-à-vis the elitist political system.

Hong Kong’s social movements have also been criticized for being co-opted into the establishment and losing autonomy since the 1990s. The majority of social movement groups are characterized by hierarchical organizations, centralized and elitist leadership. This problem has prompted some local social activists to search for a more decentralized organizational form that is more independent of conventional politics and relies more on popular participation and spontaneity of participants. These movements were usually issue-based and supported by ad hoc alliances formed according to different situations – for example, the anti-high speed rail movement, the Choi Yuen Village (菜園村) struggle, or the anti-national education campaign. These alliances tend to be loosely organized, without clear leadership and hierarchy, adopting a relatively decentralized decision-making model and direct democracy (Ng, 2013: 186-187, 197-198).

Although the performance of direct democracy in those social movements could not be strictly defined as “prefigurative politics”, it did pave the way for the following movements, notably the first Occupy Central action in 2011, when some activists occupied the HSBC headquarters for 11 months. Inspired by Occupy Wall Street, the participants deliberately employed prefigurative practices, such as direct democracy based on what they called “absolute consensus” that required all occupiers’ consent on all matters related to the occupied site, in an attempt to resist the undemocratic political system in Hong Kong. Their prefigurative practices made the instance of occupation “a genuine watershed” in Hong Kong’s social movement history, since it “set seeds of possibility, gave a sense of new modes of organizing, of direct
democratic expression” (Graeber and Hui, 2014). The non-hierarchical, cooperative form of self-organization was later succeeded by some of the participants in the second OCM in 2014, but with more complicated issues of leadership struggles within the movement.

4. Struggles over Leadership

The most recent OCM, originally known as “Occupy Central with Love and Peace” (讓愛與和平佔領中環／和平佔中, hereafter OCLP), had been carefully planned for about two years, but still had to deal with the problem of representation and leadership as it originally aimed at mobilizing middle-class citizens, lacking popular support at the grassroots level. Accordingly, the leaders of OCLP, known as OCLP Trio, launched a series of campaigns, struggling to reach out to a wider social base, and to legitimate their leadership of the movement. The ensuing struggles over representation and leadership, although did not deliberately employ the notion of prefiguration, did show some potential of fulfilling some of the objectives of prefiguration.

From the outset, the OCLP attempted to “convey the universal values such as democracy, universal and equal suffrage, justice and righteousness” (OCLP, 2013), an attempt to prefigure “tomorrow’s society” through “today’s social movement” (Farber, 2014). The relation between “today’s movement and tomorrow’s society” is illustrated in three aspects of prefigurative politics, namely a learning process for those involved, an instantiation of “tomorrow’s society”, and an exemplar of alternative forms of organization in “today’s movement” (McCowan, 2010). These three aspects were clearly manifested in the OCLP’s two major campaigns – “deliberation day” and “civil referendum”.

Contemporary Chinese Political Economy and Strategic Relations: An International Journal 2(2) ♦ 2016
Considering that the ideas of “deliberation”, “civil disobedience” and “non-violence” were unfamiliar to ordinary citizens, the OCLP launched three deliberative sections as a learning process and a “civic education” to promote these ideas (Lee, 2015). These sessions, which were intended to figure out the proposals for nominating the Chief Executive candidates as well as the working principles and methods for occupation, attracted thousands of people including representatives from social organizations, churches, social workers, students and opposition parties. The form and organization of the public deliberation, to some extent, became an instantiation and exemplar of alternative forms of democracy in the context of Hong Kong. In particular, the attempt to employ deliberation as a form of participatory democracy, and to mirror the “ends” of alternative democracy as opposed to the status quo of the “unrepresentative political system”, demonstrated the potentials of prefiguration. Moreover, with more people participating in these sessions, this kind of prefigurative practices not only bridged “tomorrow and today”, but had to tackle the problems of representation and leadership “here and now”. Although the three initiators of the OCLP were the recognizable “leaders” and “representatives” from the beginning of the campaign, they still needed some kinds of authorization by citizens to give more legitimacy to the movement and their leadership. The deliberative sessions, to some extent, increased the representation of different sections of society through the form of participatory democracy.

Therefore, although the “deliberation day” campaign did not directly employ the notion of prefiguration, the idea of public sphere and deliberative democracy, especially the work of Bruce Ackerman and James S. Fishkin (2005), did echo the theme of prefigurative democracy. But we should not overestimate the potentials of prefiguration and its mirrors of means and ends. In fact, there was still a big gap between the
ideal and the practice. For example, the campaign only attracted hundreds of participants from specific fields, especially political parties. The elite-dominated deliberation sessions became just yet another kind of “small-circle” politics, exactly the kind of political screening that they opposed (Chan, 2015). The problem of leadership was never settled either, since the entire negotiation process was split among the radical opposition parties and moderate democrats, challenging the OCLP’s leadership.

Despite the limitation, the OCLP’s effort still paved the way for further possible prefigurative practices – a civil referendum to achieve the authorization by citizens and to experience “universal suffrage”. Different to deliberation that only had limited potentials of prefiguration in “small-circle”, the form of referendum is deemed as “inherently prefigurative”, because it involved much more citizens to demonstrate its legitimacy of representative (Franks, 2003, 2006). The civil referendum initiated by the OCLP attracted a total of 730,000 residents to participate in the poll, about 10 percent of the total population of Hong Kong (Jonathan, 2014). Through the practice of civil referendum, the OCLP seemed to have created a “micro-utopia” on the universal suffrage, “acting as if one is already free” (Graeber, 2009: 210, 527). In this sense, it directly pointed to and projected the future “ends” of a “genuine universal suffrage”, through employing the “means” of civil referendum. It embodied a kind of prefigurative politics by which “the struggle for a different society must create that society through its forms of struggle” (Holloway, 2010: 45).

Despite the efforts, the OCLP’s leadership had never been stable and strong enough to hold control of the entire movement. Paradoxically, its prefigurative practices had brought severe challenges to its leadership status in the campaigning process, leading to subsequent struggles over leadership. With more and more social organizations, student groups and
political parties involved in the campaign, the OCLP had found it increasingly difficult to control how the event unfolded; the leaders of the OCLP was gradually marginalized while the student organizations became more influential.

The shift of movement leadership from the OCLP to the two student organizations, the Hong Kong Federation of Students (香港專上學生聯会, HKFS) and Scholarism (學民思潮), not only indicated the continuing internal struggles of leadership within the opposition camp, but also echoed the inherent tensions between strategy and prefiguration within the theory of prefigurative politics. On the one hand, the student organizations had split from the OCLP, while building a broader alliance with various social organizations and political parties, as Alex Chow 周永康, the leader of HKFS, put it, “We don’t believe in Tai and what he has done” (Xie, Jiang and Zhu, 2014), exposing the inner struggles over leadership. On the other hand, different from the OCLP’s “rational” approach, the student groups insisted on taking more radical and strategic actions, which can be seen as a kind of response to the strategic dilemmas of prefiguration (Breines, 1989; Kulick, 2014; Polletta, 2002). By contrast, the student groups enacted a set of strategic practices, notably the “July 1 rehearsal rally”, in spite of the OCLP’s objections. The meaning of “rehearsal” here may be distinguished from the notion of “prefiguration”: the former is more like a specific political strategy and performance. But if we regard the ultimate occupation as prefiguration, the rehearsal can be seen as a kind of “prefiguration of prefiguration”, with prefigurative potentials for further political actions. Since then, the student organizations had become one of the most recognizable leaders of the movement; the OCLP was further marginalized, losing its control of the campaign. When the decision on the electoral reform was announced by Beijing, the student groups staged a large-scale class boycott to express civil disobedience in their
own way. They escalated their action by breaking into the Civil Square, which was not expected by the OCLP. In the wake of the student actions, the OCLP intended to join the mass protest but was heavily criticized by student participants as trying to “kidnap” (qijie 騎劫) and “control” (choushui 抽水) the emerging occupy movement. From then on, HKFS and Scholarism had assumed a de facto leadership, although they refused the title of “leader” and preferred to be regarded as “initiators”, “conveners” and “advocates”. Some of our interviewees, especially the protesting students, told us that they would follow HKFS and Scholarism rather than the OCLP, because “Occupy Central is a failing campaign” that “only belonged to Tai Yiu-ting 戴耀廷”, and that “Occupy Central never happened”.

However, HKFS and Scholarism had been struggling with holding the leadership role in the movement composed of many factions and tactical differences. In the face of mounting tensions and divisions among the participants, the student leaders had to strategically formulate an “assembly” (dahui 大會) to incorporate differences, but even so, they had never effectively coordinated the assembly but faced constant resistance from the crowds in other occupied zones. The occupiers at the occupied site of Mong Kok (旺角) and Causeway Bay (銅鑼灣) had different agendas, priorities and tactics from those at Admiralty (金鐘) where the student groups and pan-democrats were concentrated. Organizations such as People Power (人民力量), Civic Passion (熱血公民), and Proletariat Political Institute (普羅政治學苑) not only adopted a more confrontational approach toward the police, but were hostile to the assembly at Admiralty, challenging the leadership of the student organizations, and struggling for leadership of their own. These more radical groups regarded their occupied areas as “battlefields conquered by the crowd”, and therefore refused to follow the advice given by the assembly. Although the Hong Kong government recognized

Contemporary Chinese Political Economy and Strategic Relations: An International Journal 2(2) ♦ 2016
HKFS as the representative of the movement, many participants we interviewed at Mong Kok and Causeway Bay expressed their disappointment at the student leadership and said the two student groups could not represent them. To seek authorization from the occupiers on their decisions, the student leaders had sought to hold a referendum at the occupied zones, which was called off abruptly due to strong resistance from some occupiers. A participant told us “the HKFS has never consulted the participants in Mong Kok on the referendum...They did not try to communicate with us. We have been waiting … Thus, we think that the HKFS and the assembly cannot represent us.” Some of them stated that “we don’t need to vote to come up with a decision. We have already voted with our feet here.” From then on, the movement became more divided among the student groups, democrat politicians and the radical nativist groups, with the “spontaneous crowds” coming to the center stage of the scenario. The leadership of the HKFS and the assembly only had a nominal existence.

By far, the prefigurative practices of the OCM mainly centered on the issues of representation and leadership. Moreover, these practices also revealed the strategic dilemmas of prefiguration theory. But none of these groups succeeded in assuming a stable leadership. As Gordon (2005) stated, prefiguration should develop “for its own sake”. In the case of the OCM, although new possibilities were opened up and triggered more struggles, the problem of leadership remained. At later stages, radical changes were envisioned and even put into practice through a series of experiments.

5. Experiments of Leaderlessness

The prefigurative practices provided more opportunities for the occupiers to experiment with prefigurative politics in terms of
organization and leadership. Some of them embraced the notion of leaderless, non-hierarchical, horizontal, cooperative and voluntary forms of democratic participation (Gordon, 2005; Yates, 2015). Instead of romanticizing the “leaderlessness” of the movement and celebrating it as “a spontaneous one without leaders and without the need of leaders” (Ma, 2014), we argue that it is necessary to pay attention to the inherent paradox and ambivalence of the democratic experiment.

Indeed, the specific context of the OCM had facilitated the condition for the “leaderless” and “spontaneous” practices in the movement. Just as one protestor interviewee stated, “many people were trapped [by the notion that the movement should have leaders]. Hong Kong people, during this umbrella movement, have shown to others that leaders are not necessary.” Another occupier added, “In this movement, we do not have representatives, we simply do not need them. The government can talk to the masses directly instead of choosing representatives. That’s why we often said, ‘The people picked up by the government [HKFS] did not represent us. They can’t represent us.’” Another interviewee further explained, “Why don’t we have a representative? Looking back at past rallies, such as ‘protecting the Choi Yuen Village action’, anti-high speed rail movement, and the anti-national education campaign, the participants at the time were often betrayed by the so-called representatives, who sang, encouraged the public, and raised money. At the peak of these movements, some councilors and activists would express passionate, but useless, opinions. They claimed that we had victory at the moment, but it was actually a failure.” Fearing for the betrayal by the representatives, most of the interviewees insisted that it should be the people, the masses at the occupied sites, “to decide the direction of the movement”, not a few “leaders”. Sometimes we witnessed the clash between student representatives and the participants in Mong Kok shouting “The HKFS...
cannot represent me”.

As the movement unfolded, there were more and more occupiers talking of the “autonomy of the masses” and the “spontaneity” of the movement. A student in Admiralty told us, “People listen to what they [HKFS and Scholarism] said. However, they are not the real controllers of this movement. They just act as a bridge for talks with the government. We, the occupiers, are the real character of the movement. We are independent individuals, and we try to figure out how to deal with problems and take responsibility by ourselves. This is the spirit of the masses.” One occupier in Mong Kok said that “in fact, we did not have specific leaders. They were just spokesmen. If they could convince us, we would follow them. It was simple as that ... everyone can be his (her) own leader, and they decide their stay or acceptance.” During the fieldwork, an open letter entitled “No nobility, be people! Let the government directly face the people”, signed by “a group of firm Hong Kong protesters” was widely spread throughout the occupied areas: “The Umbrella Movement is going well so far (26th October). The reason for success is that we insisted on the principle of ‘no leaders, no representatives’. Please believe in the wisdom, the will and the power of Hong Kong citizens because only the people have the capacity to force the government to make a series of concessions. When the government cannot find a counterpart ‘assembly’ other than the ordinary people, it has to face the people directly and negotiate with the people genuinely.” (Anonymous, 2014)

To some extent, the “no leader, no representative” principle had become a type of “political correctness” and gained legitimacy in the movement. However, we cannot conclude that the OCM was a typical “leaderless movement”, as Manuel Castells (2012) observed in various other uprisings worldwide; the issue of leadership and representation in the OCM was indeed ambiguous and ambivalent.
Firstly, some occupiers regarded themselves as ordinary participants in the movement, expecting some leaders to represent their interests and to negotiate with the government. As one interviewee said, “we need the representative to take the first step. Although the movement was largely self-organized, there must be a well-ordered procedure to reach a consensus. We can select some representatives to represent us to negotiate with the government.” Although the student leaders did not call themselves “leaders”, they actually performed the role of “soft leaders” in the movement (Gerbaudo, 2012).

Secondly, the occupiers not only relied on “soft leaders”, but also created their own “small leaders” in the occupied zones. When the movement was divided into three independent occupied areas, and even smaller “villages”, communities, or groups, the leadership did not disappear suddenly, but became more dispersed and fragmented. To some extent, the entire movement was reorganized and recentralized in every occupied area at the micro level, with some “small leaders” eventually emerging in these local ad hoc groupings. As one interviewee told us, “It is not necessary to have a top leader in the movement, but every division has their own small leaders, or at least someone in charge.” These small leaders were more inconspicuous, usually recognized based on the tacit agreement among the small groups. As another interviewee explained, “If a person has the capability and reputation, and is recognized by the other participants, then he or she assumes ‘invisible leadership.’” The small leaders had considerable influence on the members of their respective small groups, as one occupier further explained, “I usually follow the small leaders more than the HKFS and Scholarism because they talk to every participant in the small groups and know our opinions and appeals better.”

The above experiences seem to suggest that the notion of “leaderlessness” should not be over-interpreted and taken for granted.
Otherwise, we may oversimplify the concrete process of prefiguration and reduce it to mere spontaneity of the people. The existing scholarly literature tends to focus on the novelty and potentials of leaderless organizing, yet the experiments of leaderlessness during the OCM show that the prefigurative process involves complex forces and relations that continue to affect how prefiguration works.

6. Conclusion

This article tries to illustrate the practices and implications of prefiguration during the OCM, as situated in Hong Kong’s specific context. A prefigurative perspective on the OCM may have specific significance in the current research field. Because the mainstream literature tends to focus on either the “ends” (Chan, 2015; Yuen, 2015) or the political structure (Hui and Lau, 2015; Lee and Chan, 2015; Yin and Chow, 2015) of the occupy movements, the investigation of the “means” and practices of occupation may offer an alternative understanding of the OCM.

However, the experience of the OCM reminds us that the “means” in practice are much more complicated than in theory. Prefiguration’s mirroring of means and ends is not straightforward, since different actors in the movement will have their own priorities and interests, leading to different interpretation on the “ends” and different practices in the “means”. In this sense, we do not see prefiguration as a pure and final “ethic” of politics as some scholars argue (Luchies, 2015). Rather, we argue that it should be regarded as a new way of “doing” politics. By “doing”, we mean that we should not over-romanticize prefiguration, but pay more attention to the internal tensions, especially the strategic dilemma of prefigurative practices, in specific contexts of protest movements.
The undecidability of representation and leadership provided the condition for various kinds of experiments by the crowds themselves, which demonstrated how the political form of occupation can become the “laboratories of experience” (Melucci, 1996) for its participants. Its significance does not lie in the romanticizing notion of a “direct democracy” at once a goal and a practice (Maeckelbergh, 2009: 94), but its potential to generate “social laboratories for the production of alternative democratic values, discourse, and practices” (Juris, 2008: 3). These democratic practices set seeds of possibility for future political processes, and imply the emergence of “occupation as prefiguration” as a political form in Hong Kong. The new political form has opened up new possibilities – as well as challenges – for democratic practices.

Notes

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Citizen Camera-Witnessing: A Case Study of the Umbrella Movement

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Abstract
Citizen camera-witness is a new concept by which to describe using mobile camera phone to engage in civic expression. I argue that the meaning of this concept should not be limited to painful testimony; instead, it is a mode of civic camera-mediated mass self-testimony to brutality. The use of mobile phone recordings in Hong Kong’s Umbrella Movement is examined to understand how mobile cameras are employed as personal witnessing devices to provide recordings to indict unjust events and engage others in the civic movement. This study has examined the Facebook posts and You Tube videos of the Umbrella Movement between September 22, 2014 and December 22, 2014. The results suggest that the camera phone not only contributes to witnessing the brutal repression of the state, but also witnesses the beauty of the movement, and provides a testimony that allows for rituals to develop and semi-codes to be transformed.

Keywords: citizen journalism, media witnessing, social media, social movement, visual culture
1. Introduction

Mobile phone pictures and videos have now become important elements of global media’s witnessing of news events, with some mobile recordings produced by non-journalists and other normal citizens going viral and generating significant eyewitness imagery for a global audience (Andén-Papadopoulos and Pantti, 2011). Examples include the recordings of the 9/11 attacks, of the 7/7 London bombings, and of the protests of the Arab Spring (Andén-Papadopoulos, 2014).

The ability of citizens using mobile camera phones to connect with a global audience via digital networks has attracted academic discussion and studies (Allen, 2006; Barlow, 2007). Some herald the empowerment of ordinary people, as individuals now have an extraordinary network power that bypasses established censors and filters (Castells, 2009; Readings, 2008). It has become easy for them to show personal images and videos that they have made to a large global audience. This can produce an alternative voice to that of the mainstream media, which is always under the gaze of the state (Allen, 2006, Andén-Papadopoulos, 2014).

Frosh and Pinchevski (2014) argue that the emergence of this new powerful media testimony “marks the age of [the] post media event” (p. 594). The new technology positions audiences as witnesses to events, and as producers of media reports, as they can share these audiovisual records immediately around the world. This draws not only the attention of the local community but also the wider world. While this new media phenomenon has led to a number of scholastic studies, the meanings of media witnessing using mobile camera phones are still under-researched and under-theorized (Frosh and Pinchevski, 2014, Readings, 2009).

A number of scholars have criticized past studies of media witnessing for not having defined “witnessing” (such as Tait, 2011).
Andén-Papadopoulos (2014) argues that we should distinguish photographic and videographic recordings of everyday lives from citizen camera-witnessing. The former does not necessarily relate to civic expression and engagement, whereas the latter refers to camera-wielding political testimony that features moral engagement with the event. Political activists produce public recordings in the face of brutal state repression to fight against the unjust events, using mobile phone technology and global networking (Morozov, 2010). Andén-Papadopoulos (2014) believes that the citizen camera-witness resonates with the ideas of martyrdom, with dissidents using the pain and suffering shown in their video footage to indict the unjust power of the state. However, in this article I argue that Andén-Papadopoulos (2014) had not conducted any empirical research when she developed this new concept. The meaning of the citizen camera-witness should not be limited to painful testimony; instead, it is a mode of civic camera-mediated mass self-testimony to brutality. This self-publication connects the political activists and suffering others with the viewers. The meaning of the citizen camera-witness can be enlarged to different aspects of the diversity of social movements and civic engagement.

As a point of departure, the use of mobile phone recordings in Hong Kong’s Umbrella Movement is examined to understand how mobile cameras are employed as personal witnessing devices to provide recordings to indict unjust events and engage others in the civic movement. The Umbrella Movement, one of the largest pro-democracy demonstrations ever seen in Hong Kong, began on September 28, 2014 (Philips, 2015). The movement was originally initiated by a civil disobedience campaign that advocated genuine democratic reform, and was set up by Benny Tai 戴耀廷, a law professor at Hong Kong University. In January 2013, he argued in the *Hong Kong Economic Journal* ( 信報財經新聞 ), a Hong Kong élite-orientated newspaper, that
the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (SAR) government was not committed to undertaking reform to allow genuine universal suffrage. He proposed occupying the roads of Central, a financial district of Hong Kong, as a weapon of civil disobedience that would force the government to respond to the request for genuine democratic reform (Tai, 2013). He joined with sociologist Chan Kin Man 陳健民 and Reverend Chu Yiu Ming 朱耀明 to launch a campaign promoting the ideas of Occupy Central, “Occupy Central with Love and Peace” ( 讓愛與和平佔領中環 / 和平佔中 ). One-and-a-half years later, students initiated a demonstration at Hong Kong’s government headquarters, which quickly provoked the beginning of the Occupy movement, which later became a 79-day occupation known worldwide as the Umbrella Movement1 (Lee, 2015).

In the following section, I argue that the Umbrella Movement shared many of the characteristics of other recent social demonstrations that have taken place around the world. The Umbrella Movement therefore serves as a good case study to illustrate the role of mobile phone cameras in civic engagement and media witnessing. I then further discuss the importance of media witnessing and the limitations of this concept.

2. Literature Review

2.1. A New Form of “Self-Help” Social Movement

In recent decades, many social movements have sprung up in different regions and countries, including the United States, Spain, Mexico, and Chile (Bennett, 2012; Juris, 2012; Rovira Sancho, 2014; Valenzuela, Arriagada and Scherman, 2012). Lee, So and Leung (2015) suggest that the Umbrella Movement shares the common ethos of these other movements, which is the spirit of “self-actualization”. Participants in
these social movements considered themselves to be autonomous individuals, and believed that every protestor was equal and that they were not submitting themselves to any authority. Instead, their actions were facilitated via consensus. These social movements were very different from conventional social movements, which have formal organization and leaders. Bennett (2012) asserts that this new form of “self-help” movement allows room for individual creativity and diversified action.

At the same time, these social movements are characterized by the active participation of the young generation. Young people are born into, and live in, the digital environment, and are good at using online networks to maintain the momentum of a social movement. The distinctions between online and offline identities are blurred in their eyes (Palfrey and Gasser, 2008; Wilson, 2006). They like graphics, and they work best in the digital environment (Prensky, 2001). The rise of this new form of social movement, especially among the youth, has sprung up around the world, and is the result of a strong mistrust among the young people of mainstream media and political parties, as well as a decline in group loyalty in society (Beck, 2006; Bennett, 2008, 2012). As a result, alternative media, such as mobile phones and social network sites, serve as an important tool to establish alternative public forums and initiate collective action. The Umbrella Movement is no exception (Lee, So and Leung, 2015).

According to Hong Kong government statistics, the penetration rate of mobile subscription is 229.1% (OFCA, 2015). Another study, conducted by Google and Ipsos MediaCT, found that 96% of smartphone users go online on a daily basis. Hong Kong has the highest mobile Internet usage rate in the Asia-Pacific region (Kao, 2013), and also has the fastest Internet access in the world (Go-Globe, 2014). Facebook and WhatsApp on mobile phones and the Internet were the
major channels used to share information among participants during the Umbrella Movement (Li, Tam, Yeung, Yip and So, 2015; Wu, 2014). Given the high mobile Internet usage rate in Hong Kong, the Umbrella Movement serves as a good example through which to understand how the audio and visual devices of mobile cameras can bear witness to events, which in turn facilitates connectivity in this new form of social mobilization.

2.2. Global “Visual Economy” and Media Witnessing

Images and videos that bear witness to events have become more prevalent with the development of media technology. The availability of images extends from television, newspapers, magazines, and film to online networks. The quality of the images has also greatly improved (Mitchell, 2011). The new generation – the digital natives – now prefers images to text (Prensky, 2001). As a result, pictures and videos play a significant role in influencing public understanding of social events and political movements. Mitchell (2011) has named this phenomenon as “a war of images” (p. 2). This means of representation plays a significant part in political struggles and contestation of power.

Poole (2007) suggests that the idea of a visual economy is a better concept by which to describe the current situation than is the notion of a visual culture. Visual economy implies that the field of representation involves the struggle for power and the imbalance of social relationships. Campbell (2007) argues that visual images are not simply carriers of information, as they also have the power to shape the collective memory and affect geopolitical power distribution.

In recent years, the media has transferred the images of distant others to a mass audience. In other words, mass audiences can bear witness to the experience of distant others via new media technology. Frosh and Pinchevsk (2009) have called it “media witnessing”, which is
“the witnessing performed in, by and through the media” (p. 1). Jacques Derrida (2000) suggests that the nature of witnessing is two-fold. First, the event being witnessed is instant and singular. It is an unrepeatable incident in terms of time and space. However, the event can be repeated, reproduced, and recognized again through testimony. In the age of network societies, contemporary audiovisual media has reproduced the event through their mediation, even though the event is a singular incident. Media contributes to the collective memories of audiences around the world. Frosh (2006) asserts that media witnessing allows the audience to build social relations with distant others. It creates a condition for the moral participation of the audience in an event that is far from them in space and time. Media witnessing is not just the experience of that incident; it also creates a discourse that influences the actions of the audience (Peters, 2001).

2.3. Mobile Witnessing

In the past, mobile phones were used for communication only, but the invention of the smartphone and the global digital network has enabled audiences to use them to create digital memory and public testimony. As mobile phones are now becoming smaller, lighter, and more handy (Reading, 2009), Campbell and Park (2008) argue that the mobile phone is not only portable, but is also wearable. In other words, a mobile phone can be regarded as an extension of one’s hands. This handiness of the phone has had a transformative effect. Taking pictures or videos is becoming the standard and immediate response towards crises and important events. The mobile phone serves as a powerful tool to record the experience of a trauma (Andén-Papadopoulos, 2009; Zelizer, 2002).

At the same time, mobile phones are being widely adopted worldwide, including in developing countries, such as China, Myanmar, and India (Hopper, 2007; Readings, 2009). In recent years, mobile
camera phones have played an important part in generating eyewitness imagery of important events, such as the demonstrations in Myanmar (Andén-Papadopoulos, 2014). With mobile phones and global networking enabling the ordinary citizen to produce a public record of events, the differentiation between professional journalists and amateurs has become more difficult (e.g., Hoskins and O’Loughlin, 2010). Using the mobile phone as a personal witness to brutal reality becomes a common engagement of normal citizens. The personal experience turns into a public mediated record. It can be easily copied and shared with audiences worldwide through digital networks (Readings, 2009). The sharing of experience via visual images has become a common global phenomenon of a new generation (Van Dijck, 2007), with ordinary citizens now having an unprecedented networking power.

2.4. Citizen Camera-Witnessing

Some scholars argue that the term “witnessing” is not well defined, and that a distinction should be made between the recording of normal daily lives and the witnessing of brutal repression (e.g., Tait, 2011). The latter is different from the former in terms of the purposes of the recording, as it is purposefully performing an act of witnessing as a kind of resistance against the brutal repression. Andén-Papadopoulos (2009) further argues that this action is related to the political notion of citizenship. She has named this practice as “citizen camera-witnessing”: citizens use their camera phones as tools to create a personal testimony to persuade a public audience to support their political action.

True witnessing is not only a kind of testimony to those who are not present at the event, but it is also a kind of evidence of the evil and injustice at play (see Margalit, 2002). Some scholars suggest that true witnessing should involve self-sacrifice. This can be linked to the tradition of Christian martyrdom; the word “martyr” comes from the
Greek word “witness”. Individuals respond to the call to bear witness, and this results in their suffering pain and death. It provides irrefutable evidence of their moral motives and actions (Peters, 2001; Thomas, 2009). The camera phone provides a new powerful capital in creating a public witness to challenge the existing power and produce a counter-view of political forces (Andén-Papadopoulos, 2014). As Ashuri and Pinchevski (2009) argue, witnessing can be perceived as a field that needs to compete for the trust of the public audience. The field implies that the use of the camera phone is related to issues of power and politics.

Citizen videos have several characteristics that can highlight the authenticity of their stories. The “raw sound”, shaky images, and constantly shaping focus powerfully signify the realness of the video. The affective response of the victims, like desperate screaming and yelling, provides a powerful testimony to persuade the audience and evoke its sympathy (Hariman and Lucaites, 2007). However, the camera phone also provides citizens with a chance to participate in the event and to act beyond the role of mere spectator. Ordinary citizens become active participants who edit and actively shape the telling of an event (Mortensen, 2011a; Seaton, 2005). Those who are witnesses are not innocent of politics (Rentschler, 2004); they can document the event as part of a strategic plan of political action (Zelizer, 2002).

In her pioneering work, Andén-Papadopoulos (2014) establishes the notion of citizen camera-witnessing, and points out its importance in political struggles. However, she has not conducted any empirical research to support the development of this notion, and she focuses too much on testimony that involves pain and suffering. This makes the concept too narrowly defined, and ignores the diversity of social movements and witnessing. Instead, this study uses the Umbrella Movement as a case study to examine the role of the camera phone in
witnessing the events and demonstrations. This study has examined the Facebook posts and You Tube videos of the Umbrella Movement between September 22, 2014 and December 22, 2014. The results suggest that the camera phone not only contributes to witnessing the brutal repression of the state, but also witnesses the beauty of the movement, and provides a testimony that allows for rituals to develop and semi-codes to be transformed.

3. Results of the Findings

3.1. Witness to Brutal Repression

The first category is about being a witness to brutal repression. On September 28, 2014, the date when the Umbrella Movement began, the police used tear gas and pepper spray to disperse the demonstrators. Many citizens recorded this moment with their mobile phone cameras and shared it via the Internet. One video\(^2\) shows a demonstrator who is facing away from the police. When a policeman deliberately touches his shoulder to make him turn around, he turns, whereupon the policeman removes the man’s eye mask and pepper-sprays him at very close range. Netizens regarded this video as evidence of the abuse of police power.

The videos taken by protestors also testify to misbehavior and unjust incidents. For example, even though some videos captured footage of a gangster beating up protestors\(^3\), the police released the suspect\(^4\). Another video\(^5\) shows a young female protestors being sexually assaulted by government supporters. All of these videos were produced by ordinary citizens, not by professional journalists or cameramen. The images of these videos are shaky and full of noise, which in turn increases the sense of their realness. As Zelier (2002) argues, the recording marks the presence and participation of the citizen in the historical event. Protesters put their lives at risk to produce the record,
which provides inconvertible public evidence of the unjust event (Andén-Papadopoulos, 2014; Peters, 2001).

3.2. Witness to the Beauty of Human Nature

The second category is about recording the goodness of humankind, which previous studies about citizen camera-witnessing have ignored. Although mobile phone witnessing is usually of crises, disaster, and brutality (e.g., Frosh and Pinchevski, 2009), it is not necessarily related to pain and suffering. Instead, those who bear witness to the beauty of the demonstrators and victims highlight the imbalance of the political structure and the injustice of the event. As Thomas (2009) argues, photography is not just an imagery technology that records an event; it also has the power to transform the event for public discourse and make it a reality in the eyes of the public.

Videos and pictures that provide testimony of the beauty of the demonstrators shape the public images of them. There are plenty of examples during the Umbrella Movement. For example, one picture on Facebook\(^6\) shows a female student asking an 82-year-old lady to leave the protest site when police are clearing the barricades of protestors. However, the old lady refuses to go. The post says, “She (an old lady) said she doesn’t want to leave the student alone, and she wanted to stay with them. A female student asked her to leave, but she refused and it made this female student cry. The old lady said, ‘Why are you crying? You are no longer able to go to school if you are arrested. I am too old and do not need to do homework anymore, I am not afraid of arrest.’ ” The story of this old lady touched many netizens, with more than 2000 people sharing this post and more than 6000 liking the post. In addition, citizens also recorded images and videos showing citizens helping one another voluntarily, including clearing up the toilets\(^7\) and tidying up the rubbish.
3.3. **Witness to the Ritual of Performance**

Goffman (1956) regards rituals as worldly and informal activities to which symbolic meanings have been attached. Scholars therefore examine the meanings of ritual via the observation of daily lives. Collins (2004) believes that ritual is a system by which to share emotion and create a shared reality. Rituals also play a role in strengthening relationships and creating a shared memory. At the same time, rituals both create culture and consolidate the existing culture. For example, the music concert is one ritual in modern society (Lo, 2014). The crowd focuses on the same event and shares the same experience and feelings at the concert, which is an experience very different to listening to music at home. This study argues that many different forms of activities at a protest site can also be regarded as rituals. During the Umbrella Movement, the protestors sang the pop song *Under a Vast Sky* (海闊天空) by the rock band Beyond, and open lectures and public forums were held at the protest sites. All of these activities drew the focus of protestors and created a shared emotion, passion, and experience for them. This further strengthened their sense of common identity.

The demonstrators captured this moment of singing *Under a Vast Sky* with their camera phones and shared it via digital networking. Those who were not present at the event could thereby share the experience and emotion, and thus increase their sense of identification. This shared experience extended beyond time and space. For example, more than a thousand citizens gathered in Taipei to support the Umbrella Movement in Hong Kong. They, too, sang the pop song *Under a Vast Sky*, lit up by the flash lights on their phones, and recorded the event and shared the occasion via YouTube with Hong Kong and a global audience\(^8\).
3.4. **Witness to the Transformation of Semi-Codes**

Semi-codes are deep structures that determine the meaning of language. Semi-codes are rooted in cultural systems. A semi-code can be easily understood by ordinary people without anyone saying anything, which indicates how powerful a semi-code is (Swidler, 1986). When Theodore Caplow (1984) conducted a study about the giving of gifts at Christmas, he found that, while the middle class in the United States criticized the purchasing of gifts, believing it to be a waste of money and the result of commercial advertising, they were still willing to buy Christmas gifts for their friends and relatives. Caplow (1984) asserts that the giving of Christmas gifts has a semi-code, which represents the relationship between the parties. If a Christmas gift is not sent, it will be interpreted as a signal of neglect and indifference, and may probably hurt the relationship. Social movements can shape semi-codes inhibited in a culture. Subculture purposely transforms the notion of beauty (Hebidge, 1979), for example. The transformation of semi-codes shapes the values of individuals, and in turn influences how people interpret one another’s actions and behavior.

During the Umbrella Movement, there were many examples of semi-codes being created and transformed. The umbrella itself is one example. In the past, umbrellas were only used as tools to protect people from the sun and rain. However, on September 28, 2014, demonstrators used their umbrellas to protect themselves from pepper spray and tear gas. As discussed earlier, when this moment was captured by the foreign media, the movement was named the “Umbrella Revolution”. The umbrella has thus become a powerful semi-code of this social movement. For example, supporters recorded a video with their mobile phones to demonstrate how to make a paper umbrella\(^9\). In another example, university students used the yellow umbrella in their graduation ceremony to show their support of the movement, an incident
that was recorded by others with camera phones and shared via the Internet.

Citizen camera-witnessing can also transform the meaning of semi-codes. A number of hikers hung a pro-democracy banner reading “I want real universal suffrage” (我要真普選) at the top of Lion Rock mountain (獅子山). The whole process was recorded and then shared via YouTube\(^\text{10}\). The original semi-code of Lion Rock is praising the spirit of steadfastness and the preservation of the Hong Kong people. It comes from a 1970s TV series *Below the Lion Rock* (獅子山下), which features Hong Kong people working very hard and being willing to share their ups and downs with their neighbors, even though life was very difficult at that time. So when the supporters hung the pro-democracy banner on the mountain, they transformed the semi-codes of Lion Rock and added the pro-democracy element.

### 4. Discussion and Conclusion

To conclude, the citizen camera-witness should not be limited to the testimony that reveals brutal repression, but should also extend to that which reveals the beauty of human nature, the rituals of performance, and the transformation of semi-codes. Although the citizen camera-witness plays an important role in providing public evidence for a historical moment, and bypasses the traditional censor and filters, it is difficult to say whether it can change the news framework and public opinion. A past study showed that more than 60% of Hong Kong people read a newspaper every week, and 40% of respondents read the news via their mobile phone and the Internet. These findings suggest that a large proportion of Hong Kong people are still relying on legacy media to get information. Future studies should examine the influence of the citizen camera-witness on the legacy media and public opinion.

*Contemporary Chinese Political Economy and Strategic Relations: An International Journal* 2(2) • 2016
On the other hand, online media is an important platform for political struggles. The government, professional journalists, and citizens all want to make their voices heard on this platform. Future studies should examine the citizen camera-witness from the citizen’s perspective, and see how the ordinary citizen strategically makes use of the camera phone, and makes their videos go viral on the Internet. At the same time, online media is not a utopia – the censorship of the government and the digital divide still exist – and so future studies could examine how these factors influence the citizen camera-witness.

Notes

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1. This protest was called the Umbrella Revolution, or Umbrella Movement, by the foreign media. This name is based on images captured when the police fired tear gas and pepper spray to disperse the crowd, and the demonstrators had only umbrellas to protect themselves.

5. Please refer to <https://youtu.be/-00fypOWmU4>.

References


Democracy, Identity and the Road Ahead
Booing the National Anthem:
Hong Kong’s Identities through the Mirror of Sport

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Abstract
Since Hong Kong’s reversion to China in 1997, the Special Administrative Region's government and its people have been grappling with a dual-sided problem. Firstly, to adjust to being a “new” part of China and what that means in terms of national consciousness and local identities, particularly given the Beijing leaders’ expectations that Hongkongers should come to “love China”. Secondly, drawing at least in part on the past British colonial legacy, to maintain Hong Kong’s international role as a cosmopolitan and commercial city, not least through the aspiration to be “Asia’s world city”. In the past few years, however, typified most clearly in the discourse surrounding the Occupy Central movement, there has emerged a third trend, the so-called “localism”, which posits a separate and unique identity for Hong Kong. This article explores the ways in which these three competing narratives intersect in the sporting arena. Sport is frequently seen as a means to express or reflect nationalism or at the very least contribute to the formation of national identity. By using the case studies of the 2008 Beijing Olympics, the 2009 East Asian Games and recent post-Occupy
sporting fixtures, it will be shown that the mixed messages coming from these activities reflect the ambivalence felt by many Hongkongers themselves about their place in China and the world.

**Keywords:** sports policy, identity, patriotism, localism, Hong Kong

1. Introduction

Although Hongkongers may have nostalgic memories of the skills of the football teams of the 1950s and 1960s when Hong Kong was one of the top Asian footballing centres, Hong Kong has rarely figured highly in the minds of football enthusiasts in other parts of the world\(^1\). Hong Kong has never made it through to any World Cup Finals and its current ranking by FIFA (as of June 2016) is a lowly 143, on a par with the small island nations of Aruba and Mauritius. Nonetheless, at the same time, compared with some other parts of the world that have suffered from fan violence and other disruptions Hong Kong has also maintained a reputation as a relatively trouble-free if low-key environment for sporting activities. Yet, in early October 2015 the Hong Kong Football Association (HKFA) was hauled before the sport’s governing body, Federation Internationale de Football Association (FIFA), and fined HK$40,000 (US$5,160). The reason: Hong Kong fans booing the national anthem played at the beginning of a World Cup qualifying match with Qatar the previous month (Wong, 2015). Since the 1997 handover the Chinese national anthem, *March of the Volunteers* (義勇軍進行曲), has been played on all public occasions, including international sporting events, as the “national” anthem of Hong Kong. World Cup matches are no exception.

After the fine was imposed the HKFA reported that FIFA had warned it that “any further infringements will lead to more severe
sanctions” and called on fans to “refrain from such action at all future matches” to avoid additional punishment. However, some football fans repeated the booing when the national anthem was played at the start of a crucial Hong Kong versus China World Cup qualifier in November 2015. Other fans turned their backs or held up hand-written notices with the word “boo” on them, while during the match some fans chanted in English “We are Hong Kong”. FIFA formally opened disciplinary proceedings against the HKFA and raised a second fine, this time for twice the amount, in early January 2016 (Callick, 2015; Malay Mail, 14th January 2016). While only a minority of fans appear to be involved, the booing was clearly less a reflection on the performance (or expected performance) of the Hong Kong team and more a symbol of the state of mainland China-Hong Kong relations, particularly in the aftermath of the “Occupy Central” (佔領中環 / 佔中) movement of 2014.

Next year, 2017, will mark the twentieth anniversary of the handover of the former British colony to the People’s Republic of China (PRC). While the anniversary will no doubt be celebrated by the Hong Kong and Chinese governments with due pomp and circumstance, opinion amongst Hongkongers will surely be decidedly mixed. To a greater extent than at any time since 1997, opinion in Hong Kong is divided over whether the unique policy concept of “one country, two systems” is actually working in practice. But not just politically, perhaps more fundamentally at the social-cultural level, the nature of interpersonal relations between mainlanders and Hongkongers has also never been brought into such sharp focus. A series of incidents over the past few years involving what can best be described as “clashes of culture”, either individually or seemingly collectively between mainlanders and Hongkongers, has served to remind people in Hong Kong – and in China – that Hong Kong does have its own special identity.
The aim of this paper is to examine what sport can tell us about these identity clashes. After more than 150 years of British rule, Hong Kong in 1997 did not become independent but instead reverted back to Chinese sovereignty. Consequently, as in many other aspects of its international status, Hong Kong finds itself in a rather anomalous situation in terms of its global sporting status. Although now a part of China politically and administratively as a Special Administrative Region (SAR), Hong Kong has retained its separateness from China in a wide range of international organisations, including sporting recognition within the Olympic movement and international sporting federations, under the designation of Hong Kong, China. This is accepted under and is in compliance with both the 1984 Sino-British Joint Declaration and the Basic Law (基本法), Hong Kong’s mini-constitution, both of which enshrine the principle of “one country, two systems” and a “high degree of autonomy” for Hong Kong.

Under the “one country, two systems” (一国兩制) principle, Hong Kong and Hongkongers have been struggling to reconfigure their relationship to mainland China since the handover from Britain in 1997. While most Hongkongers accept that they are indeed part of China once again and draw pride – and quite often profit – from the economic growth record of the rising China, there have been nonetheless frequent debates within Hong Kong, particularly during the most recent years, about the evolving nature of the relationship, especially in socio-political terms. While government leaders and “pro-China” figures have stressed the importance of “patriotism” and the “one country” part of the formula (and the role that national education within Hong Kong should play in reinforcing that aspect of Hongkongers’ identity), they have found themselves butting up against growing concerns amongst Hongkongers that their own “local” identity and “system” is being swamped by the
“one country” concept. This has led other social and political groups to argue that the “two systems” part is vital to Hong Kong’s own especial identity. Initially, this implied sustaining Hong Kong’s unique role in the international system, of which the global sporting system is one important example. But, in recent years, this has become supplemented by efforts – frequently encapsulated in the controversial term “localism” – to preserve and sustain Hong Kong’s particular socio-cultural heritage, values and way of life in the face of mainland influence. The influx of mainland tourists and immigrants are seen as an existential threat to the established institutions and social customs of Hong Kong, while the mainland’s political authorities undermine efforts to promote greater democracy (Wong, 2004; Chan, 2014; Yew and Kwong, 2014; Cheung, 2015). Most crucially for Hong Kong’s future is the younger generation of Hongkongers – school and university students – who feel increasingly frustrated with the mainland authorities; “this sense of alienation from the mainland is prevalent among a substantial number of young people” in Hong Kong (Cheung, 2016).

Identity, both in its individual and collective senses, is a rather nebulous concept and certainly not an immutable one. Nonetheless, as has been widely identified in the literature, sport can be seen as contributing to the social and psychological processes involved in forging identities and as such sport has been frequently utilised by governments and politicians as a means of nation-building and identity-building (Jarvie, 1993; Lee, 2009; Ho and Bairner, 2013). In this context, international success by individual sportsmen/women or teams is seen as contributing, consciously or unconsciously, to the creation of a “community” or as Benedict Anderson argued, “a deep, horizontal comradeship” (Anderson, 1991: 7). At the same time as embracing this ideational objective governments also view sport in instrumental terms, as a means for minimising social divisions and inequalities, for
promoting healthier life styles (and thereby reducing medical costs), and contributing to the national economy.

However, Hong Kong has had a relatively under-developed sporting culture, despite the British predilection for taking their sports with them as their “chief spiritual export” wherever they conquered territories. Even in post-war Hong Kong long-standing constraints remained a factor: Hong Kong is a highly urbanized and modern city, with excellent infrastructure but limited space available for sporting facilities; the colonial authorities lacked the vision to create integrated policies for sports development; and continuing family and societal pressures in the local Chinese community to concentrate on study rather than sport (which offer few if any employment prospects) all played a part (Johns and Vertinsky, 2006:184-194; SF&OC, 2011: 60-175). Arguably it was the very fact that sport could be a stimulant for nationalism that contributed to making a colonial government, careful to avoid any semblance of nationalist expression, so cautious about promoting sport. As such sport played a very limited role in contributing to “community” feeling in colonial Hong Kong. Conversely, the post-1997 government became increasingly interested in harnessing sport for enhancing national identity and consolidating social cohesion. By using the case studies of Hong Kong’s partial involvement in the 2008 Beijing Olympics (hosting a torch relay and the equestrian events), its hosting of the 2009 East Asian Games, and recent sporting fixtures in the “post-Occupy” era the competing narratives about identity within Hong Kong are explored, while showing how the Hong Kong (and the Chinese) governments have sought to overcome the contradictions of Hong Kong’s multiple identities through sport.
2. The Dilemma of World City versus Chinese City

“Ours is a cosmopolitan city. Our ability to embrace the cultures of east and west is one of the secrets of our success, shaping a unique social culture of our own.”

(Tung Chee-hwa 董建華’s Policy Address, 9th October 1997, The Standard, 10th October 1997)

Despite the phraseology of the above quotation, it is fair to say that in the first post-handover policy address by the then HKSAR Chief Executive, Tung Chee-hwa, in 1997, he wanted to emphasize above all that Hongkongers should come to understand and love China better: “As we face the historic change of being reunited with China, for every individual there is a gradual process of getting to know Chinese history and culture, so as to achieve a sense of belonging” (The Standard, 10th October 1997). In the view of two social commentators, in the immediate post-handover years “Tung’s emphasis on national identity and Chinese values was the central element of his campaign to depoliticise Hong Kong” (Loh and Lai, 2007: 35).

However, Hong Kong’s postwar history in relation to China has been a convoluted one. In the first years after 1949, the colonial authorities deliberately tried to “de-nationalize” the local and incoming population; a tendency that was reinforced by the riots of 1967. However, by the 1970s a distinctive local identity began to emerge as the city’s social and economic development moved forward and by the 1980s this identity was frequently manifested through disparaging contrasts with mainland China. By the 1990s the attitudes of many in Hong Kong reflected a “self-understanding of being superior to their Mainland compatriots” (Lee, 2009: 196, 205). It was against this background that Tung and his officials tried to instil in Hongkongers a
new sense of pride in and identity with China. In effect this would become a “re-nationalization” project. But, the results have been rather mixed.

Since 1997 public opinion polls have fluctuated in displaying Hong Kong people’s identification with China. The University of Hong Kong’s now regular six-monthly polls provide ample evidence of these changes in mood, even though they often seem to reflect recent events or anniversaries in the proceeding weeks before the polls. Asked to choose between four categories – Hongkonger, Hongkonger in China, Chinese in Hong Kong and Chinese – the middle two self-designated categories seemed to change little over the years, but the Hongkonger and Chinese categories have been more variable. Up until around 2001 (when China joined the World Trade Organisation) Hongkongers outnumbered those who felt themselves to be Chinese citizens, but during the 2000s the balance began to swing the other way, culminating in the highest percentage (38.6%) for Chinese citizens on the eve of the Beijing Olympics in 2008 (only 18% of those interviewed then identified themselves as Hongkongers). But since then, the general trend has been for declining identification with China and greater identification as Hong Kong citizens. The latest poll, in December 2015, showed the sense of identity as Chinese citizens at one of its lowest levels since the handover (18.1%), while if the two categories of those who saw themselves as Hongkongers and as Hongkongers in China are added, 67.6% saw themselves as “Hong Kong people” (University of Hong Kong, People’s ethnic identity, public opinion programme). These opinion polls – and similar polls by other organisations and universities produce somewhat similar readings (see, for example, Mathews et al., 2008) – do not always make comfortable reading for the Hong Kong government and so-called “pro-China” circles.
So, one continuing policy headache for the HKSAR government over the past 19 years has been how to encourage and foster that greater sense of belonging that Tung advocated. Various socialization agents have been utilised. Undoubtedly, the mass media has had a role to play, with television in particular shifting to programming that emphasizes a “strong and powerful” Chinese nation (Mathews et al., 2008: 58-77), while the print media broadly seemingly has been exercising some degree of self-censorship regarding “sensitive” news stories from the mainland. However, the spreading of Internet news and social networking sites has made it much easier for Hongkongers to learn more about all aspects of what is happening on the mainland. Hongkongers are more engaged with the mainland, but that does not mean just travelling there more frequently for pleasure or business; it also implies wanting to do more to support the rule of law, environmental protection, or even democratization. Education in Hong Kong is also seen as important, with schools increasingly stressing Hong Kong’s Chineseness both through the formal curriculum and through flag-raising, school visits to the mainland, etc. (Mathews et al., 2008: 78-95). A new “national education” curriculum, with greater emphasis on civic education and “love” for the Motherland, had been planned to be introduced, but had to be aborted in 2012 as local opposition became too strong against what was widely perceived as “propaganda” and “brainwashing” (Yew and Kwong, 2014: 1102). As will be argued below, sport has also become another means by which the Hong Kong (and Chinese) governments try to inculcate patriotic identity.

The other problem for the new HKSAR leadership, however, was how to keep Hong Kong competitive, especially as the Asian financial crisis ravaged the Asian Pacific region, including Hong Kong, after 1997. Closer integration with the expanding Chinese economy, which
proved resilient both in the late 1990s and subsequently, was an inevitable part of that process, but so too was sustaining, and even strengthening, other external linkages through better branding of the city’s cosmopolitan characteristics. Despite Tung’s early usage the word “cosmopolitan” features only infrequently in the HKSAR government’s public pronouncements about the city; instead “world” is much more prominent. Since 1999 Hong Kong has been promoting itself as “Asia’s world city”; this positioning was designed both to highlight Hong Kong’s existing strengths in areas such as financial services, trade, tourism, transport, communications, and as a regional hub for international business and a major city in China as well as to be aspirational as a benchmark by which Hong Kong’s development as a society and an economy could be gauged and debated (Hong Kong Government, 2010). The HKSAR government’s official definition of a “world city” does not specifically mention sport (referring only to Hong Kong being a “cultural hub”), but trying to act as the host of international sporting events has come to be seen by policy-makers as chiming in well with the aspirations to be such a “world city”.

Hong Kong adopted a low profile in global sport during the colonial era. Although its athletes competed regularly in international competitions, Hong Kong achieved limited success in winning medals at the Olympics and other international sports mega-events, only gaining the first Olympic gold medal in 1996 (SF&OC, 2011: 204-205). Olympism as a concept was not widely understood. Despite being aware of (or perhaps even because of) Hong Kong’s relatively under-developed sporting culture, the post-1997 HKSAR government did, by contrast, begin to seek a more prominent role in global sport. Although funding was put into elite sport support, such as expanding the Sports Institute with its specialised sports training programmes, it was through bidding to host regional-level mega-events that the new government tried hardest
to make its mark in the global sporting world. These efforts to host such events were frequently cast in terms of improving sporting infrastructure, raising the standards of sporting performance and bringing economic benefits to Hong Kong. More altruistic aims, such as promoting Olympism, were rarely mentioned. Although a bid to host the 2006 Asian Games lost out to the financial clout of Doha (Qatar), in 2008 Hong Kong hosted the equestrian parts of the Beijing Olympics, in 2009 it hosted the East Asian Games, and in 2010-11 it actively debated whether to bid to host the 2023 Asian Games.

3. Olympic Equestrianism

Hong Kong was, of course, much interested in and enthused by the successful Beijing bid in 2001 to host the 2008 Olympic Games. Subsequently, senior Hong Kong government and sporting officials hinted to the Chinese authorities that Hong Kong would be willing to stage one or two events, even though the original Beijing bid document had not mentioned Hong Kong at all (South China Morning Post, 3rd September 2004). Finally, with the approval of the International Olympic Committee (IOC), Hong Kong was given the responsibility for hosting one of the sports, the equestrian events, that for animal health and other logistical reasons Beijing was unable to host. Although many Hongkongers have a strong interest in horse-racing (which garners a large income through betting, much of which is re-cycled for charitable purposes), it has to be admitted that very few had previously participated in or watched equestrian events, whether dressage, eventing or show-jumping (Ho, 2012: 26-28). Equestrianism is not a sport that has widespread popular appeal in Hong Kong, not least because facilities are both extremely limited and expensive.
As a part of China, Hong Kong in May 2008 also hosted the torch (flame) relay in the run-up to the Beijing Games. The local enthusiasm generated by the torch relay – and more broadly by the preparations for the Olympic Games hosting in Beijing – undoubtedly contributed to a rise in “Olympic nationalism” in Hong Kong in the run-up to and during the Olympics (Ho, 2012: 9-10; Lau et al., 2011). In the words of Choy So-yuk 蔡素玉, a leader of the pro-Beijing political party, the Democratic Alliance for the Betterment and Progress of Hong Kong, “the whole Olympics has raised Hong Kong people’s sense of being part of China and their sense of pride in being Chinese” (Bradsher, 2008). One of Chief Executive Tung’s closest advisers, Paul Yip 葉國華, later reflected on a related phenomenon: “Hongkongers used to look down at the mainlanders. But the watershed came in 2008 because of the success of the Olympic games in Beijing and then we suddenly found we should look up to them.” (So, 2012)

Speaking in advance of the Olympics, Home Affairs Secretary Tsang Tak-sing 曾德成 argued that the equestrian events “will help arouse Hong Kong people’s interest in sports, foster a stronger sense of national identity as well as promote Olympic spirit and the idea of healthy living” (South China Morning Post, 8th August 2007). So, although the approach of the Hong Kong government, the equestrian organising committee and even major advertisers tended to draw on both the Chinese patriotic and the “internationalist” Olympic dimensions, overall the emphasis fell more strongly on the “one country” side of the Hong Kong-China equation. The government’s Leisure and Cultural Service Department set up open air “cheering sites” with live broadcasts of events in Beijing on giant screens, but the motto was: “Go! Go! China! Go! Go! Hong Kong!” In addition, given that Hong Kong athletes failed to win a single Olympic medal, it was also understandable that Hongkongers became enthusiastic about mainland Chinese athletes’
medal successes.

In the aftermath of the Olympics, however, the HKSAR government and the local population may have drawn different lessons. Coverage in the local media of the controversy over the young girl’s fake singing may have only marginally marred Hongkongers’ pride in the dramatic opening ceremony, but the revelations of the tainted food scandals (which had been deliberately hushed up during the Olympic period) did cause Hongkongers to again wish to distance themselves from being Chinese. The SAR government, however, drew positive lessons, namely that through the equestrian events not only had Hong Kong demonstrated to the world its ability to host such an important sporting event but also that Hongkongers had shown their patriotism towards China (Ho and Bairner, 2013).

4. East Asian Games

The December 2009 East Asian Games (EAG) held in Hong Kong were more problematic than the Olympics in terms of public enthusiasm. Held regularly every 4 years since 1993, the EAG had nonetheless remained a fairly low profile multi-sports event in the region. Taipei had been the only rival bidder to Hong Kong and no doubt China’s lobbying behind the scenes had helped to ensure that Hong Kong won out as the host (Chu, 2016). The Hong Kong EAG was the largest ever, featuring over 2,100 athletes competing in 262 events in 22 sports (two of which were exhibition sports). The chosen slogan for the Hong Kong EAG was “Be the Legend”, implying that athletes could become a legend in their lifetime by performing well in the games. The opening ceremony adopted a unique approach, forswearing the traditional march of athletes into a stadium, and instead utilising nine large fishing boats, one for each team, rigged out with LED lights to sail across the Hong Kong harbour,
while strobe lights and laser beams swept the scene (Sunday Morning Post, 6th December 2009).

1st October 2009 marked the 60th anniversary of the founding of the PRC and that event was specifically tied in with the hosting of the EAG, at least in terms of the messages put out in the first three-quarters of 2009⁴. As could be seen during the 2008 Olympic torch relay, so too during the EAG preparations, the paradox of using a transnational event to promote national identity was clear (Ho and Bridges, 2014: 286). However, once the October anniversary date was passed the HKSAR government switched its emphasis to Hong Kong alone. The opening ceremony themes and the congratulatory messages given at that ceremony focused exclusively on the “beauty, efficiency and hospitality” of Hong Kong as a “perfect host city for this premier international event”, but within the context of the East Asian region.

Hong Kong’s unexpected victory in the final of the football competition before a packed stadium (the penalty shoot-out against Japan was a nerve-racking but ultimately euphoric occasion) was greeted with front-page banner headlines in the local press. Although the “legend” of the football team was a talking-point for a while, in reality the EAG brought only rather limited economic benefits to Hong Kong and significant changes in popular attitudes to sport, especially sports participation, have also been difficult to verify. Speaking soon after the EAG had finished, the Home Affairs Secretary Tsang Tak-sing said the legacy of the EAG would be “mainly about the achievement of Hong Kong athletes and the sporting culture it generated in the community” (Legislative Council Home Affairs Panel, 8th January 2010, cited in Bridges, 2012: 661). However, probably more important in reality was the extent to which hosting the EAG had promoted the image of Hong Kong as a city that could efficiently and successfully host such multi-sports events, at least within the Asian region.
4. Hong Kong Sport and Hong Kong Spirit

The follow-ups to the EAG were to be rather disappointing. Utilising the hosting experience, the Sports Federation and Olympic Committee (SF&OC) of Hong Kong persuaded the Hong Kong government to support a bid to host the much larger-scale Asian Games in 2023 (Sunday Morning Post, 1st August 2010). In setting out the arguments to support the 2023 bid, the Hong Kong government focused on three categories of benefits which could be expected: (1) promoting sports development; (2) enhancing social cohesion; and (3) stimulating economic activity. (Home Affairs Bureau, 2010: 4-7).

Out of these 3 anticipated outcomes, the desire to enhance social cohesion was the most problematic, not least in terms of Hong Kong identity. In the context of mainland China’s leadership’s advocacy at that time of a “harmonious society” as a way of dealing with the stresses and strains of socio-economic transformation, the Hong Kong officials seem to have been using the term “social cohesion” in a manner that suggested that sport could help to eradicate feelings of social exclusion and minimize social conflict. 2009-10 had been marked by some sharp social conflicts within Hong Kong, particularly highlighting the so-called “post-80s” generation’s dissatisfaction with both mega construction projects and the slow pace of democratization. In this situation, the government no doubt wished to promote an atmosphere in which society was less polarized and policy agendas could be promoted more smoothly.

However, by early 2011 the government was faced with the reality that public opinion was ambivalent at best, being especially concerned over the expected costs, while the local political parties gradually changed from lukewarm support to outright opposition to the hosting. Consequently, when the Legislative Council’s finance committee refused
to approve funding the SF&OC's dream was over (Bridges, 2012). Since Hong Kong never proceeded as far as a formal bid, it is difficult to anticipate how it would have been marketed, but the indications from government and SF&OC officials’ statements made during the domestic debates are that more emphasis would have been placed in public on the “cosmopolitan” and “international” aspects of Hong Kong rather than the China connection, but that is not to deny that there would have been an expectation that China would have been a powerful backer within the decision-making elites of the Olympic Council of Asia. Although some sports enthusiasts have continued to advocate Hong Kong putting in a future bid, and the incoming Chief Executive, Leung Chun-ying 梁振英, in 2012 did initially imply giving sporting activities greater prominence, the prospect of Hong Kong again bidding to host a major sporting event remains distant.

In his 2010 policy address, then SAR Chief Executive, Donald Tsang 曾蔭權, advocated better supporting of national and Hong Kong sports teams as part of his proposals for enhancing patriotic sentiments (Yew and Kwong, 2014: 1102). Nonetheless, generally through the 2011-2014 period sporting actions remained divorced from the political tensions. The “Occupy Central” movement also known as the “Umbrella Movement”, which peaked in October-November 2014, however, indirectly caused sporting activities to become more politicised. Despite the eventual collapse of the occupations, the mainland-Hong Kong tensions have simmered and with the approach of the Legislative Council elections (立法會選舉) set for September 2016 some of the young activists associated with the “Umbrella Movement” are preparing to enter the political battle for votes by creating new parties some of which, such as the National Party, advocate independence. The Chinese government’s opposition to such moves was made clear during the May 2016 visit to Hong Kong by senior Politburo member Zhang Dejiang 張...
德江，who, while admitting that localism in the sense of love for one’s hometown might be a natural sentiment, accused those advocating independence as promoting “separatism under the camouflage of localism” which could not be tolerated under the “one country, two systems” concept (South China Morning Post, 30th May 2016).

Chief Executive Leung, in his final policy address in January 2016 did at last establish a new post of Sports Commissioner, thereby belatedly fulfilling a promise to create a “sports minister” that he had made four years earlier in his election campaign (Loh, 2012; Sallay, 2013; Chan, 2016). This announcement was greeted with guarded optimism by the sporting community, not least because a bureaucrat rather than a proven sports administrator or retired athlete was appointed to the new post. Yet, drawing on the experiences of the colonial government after the 1967 Star Ferry riots when for the first time government-led initiatives in sport occurred, at least in part to encourage young people to partake of healthy and non-political activities, it is not implausible to link Leung’s sudden conversion to the need for sports promotion to a perception that sport might play a role in the social integration of what he sees as disaffected youth (Bridges, 2012: 654; Zheng, 2015: 2, 14).

5. Conclusion

Since the handover, the Hong Kong government and its citizens have been grappling with the dilemma of how to implement “one country, two systems” in practice and how to reconcile national identity with local identities (and with global citizenship). Backed up by the central Chinese government, the HKSAR government, without using the term nationalism, has tried to encourage its citizens to construct a new patriotic discourse and to feel pride in being part of China and so
celebrate its accomplishments, while simultaneously promoting “Asia’s world city”. But the results have not been altogether successful, since Hong Kong society has, if anything, become more polarized and divided over mainland China’s perceived political interventions and through personal interactions with individual mainland Chinese, even though so many Hongkongers have relied on and are relying on the economic benefits of closer integration. Recent events, such as the “disappearance” of dissident booksellers, certain academic appointments at Hong Kong universities, and the so-called “fishball revolution” in the Mongkok ( 旺角 ) district, have served only to reinforce these divisive perceptions.

Sport, therefore, has become one instrument through which the HKSAR government has tried to express and even strengthen this “official” dual identity under “one country, two systems”. To complement the case studies discussed earlier, the evolution of this sporting journey can perhaps be exemplified through a series of snapshots.

On 3rd July 1997, two days after the handover, I took my son to watch the HKSAR Reunification Cup match at the Hong Kong stadium. A team of FIFA World Stars defeated an AFC All-Stars Team 5-3. At the opening ceremony, the Chinese national anthem was played at what was surely the first time at a sporting occasion after the handover. There was an audible expression of surprise around the stadium, a very small amount of booing, and a few spectators refused to stand, but most did stand. Even though neither a Chinese team nor a Hong Kong team as such were playing, the authorities decided to utilise the occasion to “introduce” the custom of playing the “national” anthem at “international” sporting occasions. The spectators were certainly taken by surprise.

Five years later, in 2002, China made its first, and so far only, appearance in the football World Cup Finals. With Hong Kong knocked
out in the qualifying rounds, Hongkongers were only able to indulge their enthusiasm for top-class football action by watching through Cable TV or at sports bars – or travelling to neighbouring Macau where all World Cup games were shown live on the local terrestrial station. China’s games were not available on free-to-air terrestrial television in Hong Kong, but in response to rising demand amongst the Hong Kong population to watch them “live” the SAR government arranged for giant screens to be erected at the Hong Kong stadium and the Shatin 荃湾 racecourse for China’s final two games before elimination. Free to enter, these stadium broadcasts resulted in large crowds, patriotically hoping for Chinese successes, even if they were ultimately disappointed as China lost both games and failed to score even a single goal (Chow and Ho, 2002; Bruning, 2002).

In 2008 for the Beijing Olympics, Hongkongers watched the local torch relay with enthusiasm, then the opening ceremony in Beijing with great admiration and finally the achievements of the Chinese athletes with pride. Tickets for the post-Olympics exhibition tour of Hong Kong by Chinese Olympic gold medallists were snapped up very quickly. Undoubtedly, the Olympic torch relay and the equestrian events were utilised by the SAR government primarily as a means to foster patriotic feeling and pride towards China. Arguably, this was the peak of Hongkongers’ patriotic feeling for China.

In 2009 the EAG was initially closely linked to mainland China’s major patriotic anniversary, although it was later marketed as enhancing Hong Kong’s regional cosmopolitan image. Hongkongers were not as excited by these multi-sports games as they had been with the 2008 Olympics, but the football final against Japan, played in front of a capacity crowd and re-played subsequently through the media, did arouse strong feelings of support and pride for Hong Kong. At the start of the final, which I attended, the “national” anthem was played – with
no booing, though plenty of cheering afterwards – but the atmosphere was created by solidarity with “Hong Kong” not with China.

Finally, fast forward to 2015 and the series of qualifying football matches played by Hong Kong, including the vital World Cup qualifier in which they drew 0-0 with China, at which the national anthem was greeted with boos and demonstrations of varying size and ingenuity. The SAR government’s aspiration to use sport as a means of enhancing “social cohesion”, to use the phraseology adopted in the 2023 Asian Games Bid consultation document, clearly was no longer relevant in the polarized social and political atmosphere in the run up to and after “Occupy Central”.

The rise of localism within Hong Kong, however, shows that the complex nature of Hongkongers’ thinking – and sense of belonging – remains significant. Occupy Central and its socio-political aftermath demonstrate, therefore, that despite the efforts of the Hong Kong government to make use of sport in general and sporting mega-events in particular to advance certain agendas, the results have not been as clear-cut as officials might have hoped. Hongkongers continue to display and value their own particular brand of “identity” and, indeed, given the enthusiasm with which the younger generation is embracing localist thinking, such sentiments are only likely to get stronger.

Notes
+ This article draws in part on earlier versions presented at the Conference on the Olympics and Isms, Royal Holloway, University of London, July 2012, and Working Paper 5-2013 prepared for the Centre for Public Policy Studies, Lingnan University (嶺南大學), Hong Kong, May 2013.
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1. Hong Kong was one of 12 founding members of the Asian Football Confederation (AFC) in 1954; the first 4 AFC presidents were from Hong Kong. Hong Kong also launched the first professional football league in Asia in 1968 (Careem, 2016).

2. Examples include mainlanders’ excessive bulk purchases of baby milk powder and certain medicines, shops giving preference to mainland customers over locals, mainland women deliberately travelling to the SAR to give birth to babies in Hong Kong hospitals to secure residency rights, mainlanders talking loudly and refusing to queue, and mainlanders buying up Hong Kong property thereby pushing prices beyond the range of young would-be home-owners.

3. One well-known local commentator, Chris Yeung, noted after the torch relay that: “The Olympic flame has fuelled patriotism – and nationalism – in Hong Kong … a wave of nationalism is set to engulf the city.” (*Sunday Morning Post*, 4th May 2008)

4. At a prominent position in the Central district of Hong Kong island two large drums celebrated both the EAG hosting and the PRC anniversary; the official “Events Calendar” publication placed the PRC anniversary logo prominently on its cover; and all the August 2009 torch relay publicity materials gave equal billing to the Hong Kong EAG logo and the PRC anniversary logo.
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The Unfinished Experimentation of Political Parties in Hong Kong – Reflections from Theoretical and Experiential Perspectives

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Abstract

This article consists of 2 parts. The first part, from Section 1 to Section 3, by King Fai Chan aims at unravelling the inaugural ideology of Hong Kong’s political parties by going back to one of the founders of the Democratic Party, Yeung Sum, and examines his ideology of an idealistic thinking of political cooperation with the SAR government, with an aim of peaceful power-sharing. Yeung Sum’s idea of political parties is a new vision of a political subjectivity that caters to the whole, and this confirms with Giovanni Satori’s theory that an authentic party must be part-of-the-whole. In the end the idea of party as effective opposition was completely overlooked. The article then turns to the second part, from Section 4 to Section 6, by Sze Chi Chan, who aims at detailing the inauguration of an effective oppositional party after the Grand March of 2003. Thus was born the League of Social Democrats,
with the second author as one of its founding members. In the second author’s portrayal the League was off to a promising start that ushered in an effective oppositional party, that did pose a series of effective political opposition that readily catered to the need of the whole citizenry, especially the Five District de facto Referendum. Yet in the end the League met with a fate of internal split that tremendously dwindled the its oppositional thrust. As yet we still do not find any pan-democratic party or anti-establishment radical party that can really demonstrate Satori’s ideal of party acting as part-of-the-whole fighting for the benefit of the whole.

**Keywords:** Satori, party theory, Social Democrats, Democratic Party, factions, Hong Kong, Yeung Sum, stability and prosperity, political opposition, political struggle

1. **Introduction**

Hong Kong’s political scene, besides beset by the explicit or implicit intervention from the Chinese Communist Party apparatus from Beijing, is still very much in its infant stage of struggling for the establishment of truly modern political institutions, notably development of political parties. This article attempts to delineate the birth of the political party in Hong Kong right before the 1997 transition, and the subsequent development after 1997, especially after the massive socio-political mobilization of Hong Kong people after the 2003 July 1st Grand March. We shall look at the birth of the main party among the pan-Democrats camp, namely, the Democratic Party (民主黨), and its formative party ideology. Then we shall turn our attention to the rise of a new genre of political parties, namely, the “battling type” parties, primarily in its first example of the League of Social Democrats (社會民主連線, hereafter

*Contemporary Chinese Political Economy and Strategic Relations: An International Journal* 2(2) ◆ 2016
LSD). After a consideration of the primal party ideology formed before the 1997 transition, effort will be paid to detail the rise of the LSD, since one of our authors has been its founding member (who withdrew in 2009) and shall speak largely from personal reminiscence.¹

2. Development of the Democratic Party before the 1997 Transition  
   – Towards a Pro-Establishment Participation To Share Power


The central idea of the party is certainly the concept of *partir* from Old French which literally means “to divide”, so that the first and foremost philosophical political question that arises would be: How can a political party be an institution that is good for the whole body politic? According to the Italian scholar Giovanni Sartori, the birth of modern political party hinges on the successful clarification of “party” from “faction”,² since the later arose from the Latin verb *facere* which denotes “dire doings”, which denotes a political body that engages in disruptive and harmful doings. Thus it carries the senses of hubris, excessiveness, ruthlessness, and thereby harmful behaviour.³ Thus the formation of political parties in their early years was never far from political factional fighting, until Edmund Burke achieved the intellectual breakthrough and this became the turning point in the development of modern political parties.⁴

2.2. From Factions to Party

Thus the political factions truly become the parties that are able to transcend the very concept of the Italian *partire* that signifies that political parties would just be bogged down with defending the part rather than the whole. When political parties can really transcend this fate and become some kind of “analytic partition”⁵ that can really transcend such partisan spirit, and indeed link up the part with the whole,
to form a *part-of-the-whole*, then modern political parties can be born that can strive towards the goal of participating in the political process *for the sake of the whole*, that is, for the good of the larger society.

For Burke, the transition from faction to party rests on a process parallel to that of transition from intolerance to tolerance, and from tolerance to dissent, and lastly, from dissent to beliefs in diversity. Parties become subconsciously acceptable when diversity and dissent were accepted as part and parcel of political order. Parties are then seen in an ideal sense as correlative and dependent on the worldview (German, *Weltanschauung*) of liberalism. When parties completed this evolution from parties of faction *against* the whole to parties *of* the whole or even *for* the whole, and also transcended the trenchant individualism of the Enlightenment, then the idea of modern political parties as essential for the running of modern democracy was born.

3. Hong Kong’s Political Party Thinking in the 1980s and 90s

Similar to the birth of the modern political party, Hong Kong’s political scene was about to do the same, that with the transition to Chinese sovereignty, Hong Kong was granted a high level of autonomy that would usher in the political parties. Thus with the signing of the Sino-British Agreement and the decolonization of British rule, the British government in Hong Kong ushered in the era of political representation through all kinds of elections. In this context both the existent Chinese ruling elite and the civil society’s opposition force were in an urgent mood to meet this challenge. And came the political parties.

Thus we had the first district election in the 1980s, and into the 1990s right after the 1989 Tiananmen Incident, the first directly elected Legislative Council (立法會) was formed in 1991. The budding civil society that slowly evolved from the typical Chinese “folkrealm society”

*Contemporary Chinese Political Economy and Strategic Relations: An International Journal 2(2) ♦ 2016*
was thinking about how to respond to the grand new environment ushered in by the Sino-British Agreement. The first challenge that civil activists in the kin/clan-based *folklic (folk-public)* society faced was whether to transform the "pressure groups" into political parties, since such pressure groups would have to enter this new political game and face new competitors, namely, political parties that would very likely take away the causes and therefore, political bargaining power, from these pressure groups. Either they have to form political parties themselves or be relegated to the political backstage. So the founding members of such newly formed political bodies would come from such pressure groups like community workers, unionists and student activists. Moreover, this political transition needs to transform those pressure groups, which practiced mainly a "protest-advocacy" model in political bargaining, into mainline political parties in a parliamentary democracy.

### 3.1. Yeung Sum Straddled Two Types of Politics

At that time, a number of scholars have probed into this transformation, and not the least some activist-turned scholars, and Mr Yeung Sum 楊森 was the foremost among them. And the main line he took to this political transformation was to persuade pressure groups to pursue democratic politics by becoming political parties. In his opinion pressure groups at that time could not satisfy the demand of the times, thus it would be expedient that some members of pressure groups form political parties to participate in the parliamentary democracy process. His understanding of political parties centers on its nature as more organizational, as well as promoting wholistic city-wide policies that are geared towards the whole. Moreover, another goal for pressure groups to transform into political parties is to share in the power of governing, to gain positions in the establishment in order to be more effective in reforming the society.
3.2. Parties as the Answer to the Demand of Wholistic Politics

“Taking parties as method” was Yeung Sum’s proposed response to the new political situation, and the thinking was geared towards this “social whole” and the rise of political subjects in his political imagination, in order to respond to the new era of parliamentary democracy. Yeung Sum stressed that this new political instrument of parties must bear in mind city-wide vision, so as to match the “Hong Kong People Ruling Hong Kong” maxim with a new political subjectivity. This kind of political participation was markedly different from the pressure group politics that advocate the interest and well-being of special groups, and it demands political groups to embrace a wider horizon and bear a more inclusive vision.

Thus Yeung Sum’s idea of political parties is a new vision of a political subjectivity that caters to the whole, and this confirms with Satori’s theory that an authentic party must be part-of-the-whole. This new orientation should be formulated in response to the coming representational or parliamentary democracy.

3.3. The Unanswered Question: Where Comes an Effective Opposition?

However, Yeung Sum’s vision has also been too optimistic, in its eager awaiting for a portion of the political cake that would be ready to be cut in the future. Yet in such eager waiting would it not be played into the hands of the establishment? Indeed, we cannot find any discussions on controversies, conflicts or political struggles that would inevitably arise from party politics or parliamentary democracy. His vision of a party entering the establishment in an orderly fashion was so harmonious and orderly that there was little room left for dissent, reaction and contradictions.
Indeed we found that, though occupying the main opposition spectrum of post-1997 Hong Kong politics, the Democratic Party has been yet so weak, so meagre, and so conservative in its opposition, that it could not pose a serious challenge to the increasingly bad governance of the post-1997 Special Administrative Regional (hereafter SAR) Government. Its vision of the whole Hong Kong people was largely static and lacked fluidity, starkly failing to take into account the views and demands of the newer generations, firstly the post-80s and then the post-90s youths. And for other small pan-democratic parties that also arose from pressure groups, we also find a rarity of strong and effective opposition.

3.4. Political Parties Harmonized or Submerged by the Ideology of “Stability and Prosperity”

Thus we find that in the special case of Hong Kong, the rise of political parties that have taken care to gear themselves to the whole city, have been particularly ineffective in forging a credible political opposition. Professor Lui King-suen 雷競璇 has pinpointed one of the obvious reasons: that such political parties, even though broadly democratic in their colour, are basically bound by the establishment’s main ideology of “stability and prosperity” spelt out by the Chinese authorities in Beijing (hereafter Beijing). Yeung Sum 雅君深 naively took party politics as a synonym for harmonious politics, for the sake of keeping the “stability” of this complex city. Such wishful thinking of a post-colony is a symptom that this former colony is still submerged in the colonial myth and is still deeply nostalgic about its colonial past. According to Lui King-suen, this city is basically a colony not of an antagonistic but a compromising type.
4. Parties Taking Stance Against Establishment after 1997
   – Radical Parties Advocating Active Struggle for Democracy and People’s Livelihood

4.1. Pseudo-democratic Transition to Chinese Sovereignty

As delineated above, the mellowness of democratic parties that were born in the 1980s and 1990s was due to the over-deference of political parties towards the transition ideology of “stability and prosperity”. Yet after 1997 Hong Kong has suffered severely not only due to the Asian Financial Crisis, but also due to the increasing wealth gap resultant from every economic change, which points to a fundamental flaw in the colonial and post-colonial system governing Hong Kong, in that all political powers are still wielded by the government, the estate tycoons, local elites and multinational companies including increasingly Mainland China’s fast-growing state enterprises. Thus only political parties that mobilize and energize the people and is really part-of-the-whole would meet the challenge of the times.

Hong Kong’s post-1997 politics was severely circumscribed by a Basic Law (基本法) that was completed in 1991 after the 1989 Tiananman Incident. This has caused Beijing’s original promise on high degree of autonomy to be severely scaled back. Now that China has verged on a regime change during the 1989 Incident, Beijing would not tolerate a newly returned region to enjoy full-fledged democracy so as not to spur similar demand in comparable Mainland cities, notably Beijing and Shanghai. And with the tightly controlled small-circle selection of the Chief Executive of the SAR that does not belong to any political party, pan-democrat councillors are forever relegated to the camp of a defunct opposition. What they can at most do is to stall some bad government law bills from being passed into law. Yet the Democratic Party had put up merely a meagre fight when the SAR
Government wanted to pass the controversial National Security Law Bill (dubbed the 23 Article).

5. Founding a Radical Party that was Geared towards the Whole Society

Thus after the successful Grand March in 2003 summer against the 23 Article bill some marginal pan-democratic councillors newly elected in 2014 to the Legislative Council (hereafter LegCo) began to form a left-leaning new party called the League of Social Democrats (hereafter LSD). This was done in response to the new formation of the Civic Party (公民党) that was viewed as consisting of blue-blood elites, as well as to the Democratic Party’s obvious turning to the middle class to consolidate its people base.

The founding of LSD was not at all smooth or promising; nevertheless this party succeeded in its early days to position itself as a party of political struggle. Yet even with such comparatively radical characterization, this party has in fact positioned itself for the whole society as part-of-the-whole. This was partly due to its grassroots character, since its founding members consisted of a number of seasoned old social activist veterans. Its party ideology was in direct contrast both to the Civic Party and the Democratic Party, both of which has indeed exhibited some degree of factionalism: Civic Party in being too blue-blooded and can only be joined through member-recommendation, Democratic Party in turning towards the middle class. LSD readily exhibited a holistic approach to the general mass in struggling for the benefits of all, especially in livelihood policy issues.

Thus LSD in its ideological discourse and practice has strived to exhibit a kind of inclusiveness that exhibited part-for-the-whole character, that tried to promote city-wide all-citizen participation in the
political process. Due to the social activist credentials of many of its founding members, its announced orientation is to organize citizens especially those from the grassroots, to influence government policies so as to alleviate people’s livelihood problems and suffering. At the same time, it participated at all levels of elections in order to enter LegCo and district councils to represent citizens to influence government policies.\textsuperscript{19}

\textbf{5.1. The Climax Action of LSD – Five District de facto Referendum Advocating Democratization of Hong Kong Politics}

Yet LSD after its formation in 2006\textsuperscript{20} met with little success in pushing for election into district councils.\textsuperscript{21} Among the 40-plus candidates fielded, only the original 6 were re-elected, while none of the new candidates got a seat, nor did they gain a credible vote count that would merit another try in future. What it mostly did was to formulate a wide-ranging policy document.\textsuperscript{22} However, the 2008 election into LegCo was a different story. With the then chairman Wong Yuk-man 黄毓民’s (hereafter Wong) rapid rise in notoriety and fame during the summer election process of 2008, Wong was swept into the LegCo with the second highest number of votes in the West Kowloon Election District (九龍西選區). And right after his entry, together with the re-election of 2 other LegCo councillors who also benefited from Wong’s meteoric rise, these “LSD Triad”, as they have come to be nicknamed, started to act out their fighting style in their LegCo office. Such newfound militancy was largely welcomed by the city so much so that LSD became the star party during the first year of the 2008-2012 LegCo period.\textsuperscript{23}

Then came the defining moment for the LSD as well as for Hong Kong society. During the summer of 2009 Mr Tsang Kin-sing 曾健成 or “Bull” ( 阿牛 ), a veteran activists in LSD, floated the idea of getting one councillor in each of the 5 major LegCo election districts to resign, thus setting off a city-wide 5 district by-elections, which would then be
centered around the issue of whether Hong Kong SAR should be allowed full democratic elections both for its LegCo and its Chief Executive. This then would become a de facto Referendum, since Hong Kong has no referendum law, advocating full-fledged democracy for Hong Kong. The media took up the issue and immediately attributed it to Wong.24

5.2. The Running of the 5 District de facto Referendum and the Split-up of LSD – Promises and Problems of a Struggle-oriented Party

Here we cannot detail the intricate history of the course of the 5 District By-elections or de facto Referendum;25 suffice to remark that the de facto Referendum was not a success, although 17% of the voters did turn out to vote back the 5 LegCo councillors from the Civic-LSD alliance that inaugurated the de facto Referendum. However, the aftermath of the de facto Referendum was completely out of the expectation of the society and the LSD party itself. This was the split-up of LSD instigated by Wong and supported by another LegCo councillor in the party (Albert Chan Wai-yip 陳偉業) right after the de facto referendum, starting in the summer of 2010 and culminating in Wong leaving the party to found another political party, namely, People Power (人民力量), in early 2011.

Thus the de facto Referendum became the last star action of the LSD, and after the split-up LSD was reduced to an even smaller party with only one notable councillor, namely, Leung Kwok-hung 梁國雄 or “Long Hair” (長毛). Although LSD did retain its leftist stance, although it did put up consistent political and social struggles against the SAR government, participating militantly and fully in all major socio-political movements and march, especially in the 2014 Umbrella Movement, no other action initiated or joined by LSD can equal the master act of the de facto Referendum, which succeeded in using the
meagre manpower and resource of 2 minor parties to execute a city-wide referendum for the future democracy of Hong Kong. Thus in doing so LSD and Civic Party have really fulfilled the mandate of modern political party to act as *part-of-the-whole* and for the whole.

**6. Aftermath of the LSD Split-up**

After the split-up, Wong’s People Power became the star radical party in people’s attention, and was able to attract enthusiastic support especially from the radicalized youths who found themselves to be increasingly estranged from Beijing and the SAR government. Such radical support enabled Wong, again, to put up a good show in the 2012 LegCo election, not only securing the re-election of himself and Albert Chan Wai-yip, but also the surprise election of People Power’s candidate, Raymond Chan Chi-chuen 陳志全, to the LegCo, as well as the near success of another candidate, Wong Yeung-tat 黃洋達 26 (or junior Wong), whom Wong endorsed. The junior Wong’s near success has caused LSD dearly, for the other only hopeful of LSD candidates besides Long Hair, To Kwan-hang 陶君行, 27 was to lose the Kowloon East district due to junior Wong splitting away his radical votes.

Yet the political experimentation of political parties has been far from running its course. After such star performance, Wong again caused another partisan split, 28 while he himself was de facto ousted by the net media tycoon Shiu Yeuk-yuen 蕭若元 (hereafter Shiu), 29 who had been his supporter when he splitted LSD. Wong was left stuck with the Proletariat Political Institute (普羅政治學苑) that he founded. 30 Strangely, junior Wong, the protégé that he promoted, did not join his institute but went on to found his own political body called Civic Passion (熱血公民). 31
So the growth of radical political parties are very much at the mercy of themselves in the wake of such repeated splitting up. The promise of a radical party as part-of-the-whole fighting for the whole has been repeatedly thwarted by its own internal quarrel, which hurt these parties’ growth by giving an impression that they are no more than political factions seeking nothing more than political power. Recently, after the lacklustre performance in the 2015 district council election, Shiu again initiated a severe criticism against Tam Tak-chi, also known as “Fast Beat” (快必) (hereafter Tam), a major candidate in the People’s Power, and in the meantime the result of this attack has not been clear yet.

7. Conclusion

So the story of Hong Kong’s political parties goes on and on, and besides LSD and People’s Power, there is recently the rise of very new political parties due to the surge in localism and the quest for independence. Each one is vying for the attention of Hong Kong people especially the younger generation, but their success is yet to be seen, or whether they will quickly vaporize and fade out from the political scene, after the September LegCo election this year. As yet we still do not find any pan-democratic party or anti-establishment radical party that can really demonstrate Satori’s ideal of party acting as part-of-the-whole fighting for the benefit of the whole.

Notes

+ King Fai Chan participated as author of the first part of the Chinese version of the present article (from Section 1 to Section 3). The present English abbreviated version is solely the responsibility of Sze Chi Chan.
Dr Sze Chi Chan 陳士齊 is a Senior Lecturer at the Department of Religion and Philosophy, Hong Kong Baptist University, since his return from Britain in 1992. He holds a Ph.D. from King's College London, University of London, and has been a secondary school teacher and campus Christians' tutor. Author of *Trains of thought* (co-authored) and various social and current affairs articles and theological critique articles, Dr Chan helped found the League of Social Democrats (社會民主連線) in 2006, leading the party to formulate its overall party policy document in 2007, finalizing the draft of Wong Yuk-man 黃毓民's book of his first year in the Legislative Council office, 《毓民議壇事記錄》(*Anthology of Yuk Man's agitation*). Dr Chan also singly drafted the whole policy document of the Five District de facto Referendum proposal, which finally became the main body of 《社會民主連線 五區總辭 全民公決 2012 年雙普選政治訴諸》(*The League of Social Democrats ‘5 District Resignation, De facto Referendum’ political proposal address to the people*) in 2009. He withdrew from the party soon after this drafting, and remains as free political activist as well as renowned political commentator. <Email: scechan@hkbu.edu.hk, chrchan2@gmail.com>

King Fai Chan 陳景輝 is a renowned columnist and social activist. He became active after the 2003 July 1st Grand March, and had also tried to run for district council election in the autumn of 2003. He continued to be active during the 2006-07 Anti-Star Ferry Demolition (反拆遷天星皇后碼頭) and became one the 3 main leaders who led the grand Anti-High Speed Rail Campaign culminating in the 10000-people demonstration outside Legislative Council in early 2010. <Email: 413cseec@gmail.com>

1. Thus he speaks from primary experience that can find scant reference until now.
9. This is the local terms for the non-governmental organizations (NGOs) that pressurize the British-Hong Kong government to address social ills.
    Mr Yeung Sum was a student activist in the 1970s, then the founding member of the political body “Meeting Point” in the 1980s, and in the early 1990s he was the deputy chairman of the United Democrats of Hong Kong and later promoted the merging of Meeting Point with the United Democrats into the Democratic Party and finally became its chairman (2002-2004). He has retired from politics.
11. 楊森著，《香港政制改革》，香港：廣角鏡，1986；頁 12。 (Yeung Sum, *Hong Kong’s political reform*, Hong Kong: Panorama Press, 1986, p. 12.)
16. As one of the authors has actually been the founding member of the following radical party to be analyzed, factual materials would be provided by him with critical reflections following. Much of these materials from personal experience have not yet been published before, thus footnotes could not be provided for them.
17. Thus the Chief Executive was not to be directly elected by the people, and was disallowed to rise from any political party. Then the Legislative Council (hereafter LegCo) was to be formed under the Basic Law that prescribes half of its seats to derive from special interest sectors dubbed functional constituencies. This political fencing means that the idealistic wish to share governing power with the SAR Government would never be realized. With the powerful election machinery run by pro-China political camps which are heavily subsidized from Mainland-connected sources, the result is that the LegCo would only harbor less than half of its councilors from pan-democratic camps. This fact, coupled with the fact that LegCo councilors are not allowed to propose law bills with government funding implications, all councilors are severely curtailed in their ability to propose bills, not to say to pass them.

18. See note 16 above.

19. 《社會民主連線政策綱領 1.3.5) 社會民主連線的著重點》
(LSD’s Policy Document (2007) Section 1.3.5 The Emphasis of LSD)
<http://www.lsd.org.hk/oldpolicy.html>

20. I was one of the founding members and the only academic among them. I was invited to their preparation committee and then the first executive committee and acted as the one leading the party to formulate the overall party policy document in 2007. Yet I have made clear that I would not run for any election during my sojourn in the party, and vowed to leave once the party process has become normal.

21. Among more than 30 candidates that ran for district councilors only the 6 incumbents were re-elected.

22. The author was the coordinator and final drafter of this party socio-political policy document which was then submitted to a 2-day AGM to be rectified word-by-word and passed. <http://www.lsd.org.hk/oldpolicy.html>

23. So successful indeed was LSD in 2009 that a renowned newspaper publisher has asked Wong to produce an anthology of all his LegCo
speeches of the first year in office: 《毓民議壇搞事錄》，黃毓民，香港：明報出版有限公司，2009 年 7 月 (Anthology of Yuk Man’s agitation).

24. This detail has been provided personally to me by Tsang Kin-sing (‘Bull’). And the author volunteered to singly draft the whole policy document of the de facto Referendum proposal, which finally became the main body of LSD ‘5 District Resignation, De facto Referendum’ Political Proposal Address to the People (in Chinese,《社會民主連線 五區總辭 全民公決 2012 年雙普選 政治說帖》), minus the appendices. The unhappy proposal drafting also contributed to my refusal to help Wong and eventual withdrawal from the party in October 2009. Cf. <http://www.lsd.org.hk/doc/file/2009proposal.doc>

25. This happened at a time when the author ran into insurmountable moral clashes with Wong and withdrew from LSD, and became some sort of go-between during the Civic-LSD alliance for the 5 District de facto Referendum.


28. “On 20 May 2013, Wong Yuk-man announced his resignation from People Power along with Proletariat Political Institute. It was believed to be related to his earlier split with Stephen Shiu Yeuk-yuen, the owner of the Hong Kong Reporter and People Power’s financial supporters over the Occupy Central plan.” (<https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/People_Power_(Hong_Kong)> downloaded on March 28, 2016)

29. Shiu was the owner of net media Myradio and then after splitting up with Wong founded another net media which is nearly the same one as Myradio and is called Meme. Please see <http://www.memehk.com/#>.


32. Some actually attribute these splitting-up to the Internet media. <https://www.facebook.com/groups/370178503169110/permalink/512888478898111/>

“陸陸仁：阿拉伯之春的網絡推手，2011《時代》雜誌選為全球最有影響力100個人物之一，戈寧 (Wael Ghonim) 最近在TED演講中公開承認，後悔使用臉書發起「阿拉伯之春」，因為他發覺，網絡掀起的革命推翻了獨裁的埃及政府，但未能建立一個開放包容的社會。社會媒體只能令社會陷入分裂、懷疑的漩渦。”

33. The major reason was purported by Shiu Yeuk-yuen as Tam Tak-chi’s unbridled attack on other pan-democrats rather than the establishment. Yet netizens also pointed to Shiu’s own attack on famous columnist and Tam in this instance. Shiu has refrained himself from unbridled attack on other pan-democrats after he has seen the bad example of Wong.

我對快必的立場〈蕭若元：最新蕭析〉2016-03-29.<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=40WtFFsacyM>

34. At the present moment People’s Power has announced a public meeting to choose “regional leader” but ostensibly also to settle the recent split between Shiu and Tam: <https://www.facebook.com/peoplespower/posts/1061041960624624?pnref=story>. Please see Tam’s attempt to reconcile with Shiu: <https://www.facebook.com/jaiszechi.chan/posts/10153364891827187:37>. Please also see another People’s Power leader Erica Yuen Ming 袁彌明’s support of Tam: <https://www.facebook.com/ericayuen/posts/10153688201821051?pnref=story>.

National Party, while the second one obviously harks back to the Democratic Progressive Party of Taiwan, which is seen as at heart advocating for Taiwan’s independence. And the third one has become the most spectacular since the New Year Day’s police-people clash in 2016 that was headed by it, and its LegCo by-election candidate Edward Leung Tin-kei 梁天琦 has been able to garnered a large number of votes, nearly causing Civic Party’s candidate dearly in failing to be elected.

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Scholarism and Hong Kong Federation of Students: 
Comparative Analysis of Their Developments after 
the Umbrella Movement

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Abstract

This article aims to examine the features of, and difficulties in, the development of Scholarism and Hong Kong Federation of Students after the Umbrella Movement (2014). This article first introduces the emergence of both organizations, aiming to provide the necessary background to their features, notably student activism, politicization, and issue-based reasons in launching campaigns. This is followed by an analysis of the difficulties faced by both organizations with reference to leadership, orientation, organizational capacity and networking, as reflected in the disappointment and disillusionment of a significant number of participants during the movement. The article then moves on to investigate the possible methods adopted by both organizations to consolidate their strengths in light of the above weaknesses, focusing on
the buttressing of accountability and reform. In conclusion, the reorganization of student power is of key concern during the process in face of the increasing political intervention of the Beijing authorities and political decay of the Hong Kong government.

**Keywords**: Scholarism, Hong Kong Federation of Students, Umbrella Movement, anti-national education campaign, student activism, leftists, non-violent resistance

1. Introduction

Without doubt, student activism in Hong Kong has played an important role in making the Umbrella Movement of 2014 possible. In retrospect, student activism has constituted the political developments, which can be traced back to the early 1970s due to the protection of the Diaoyu Islands (釣魚台列嶼), and then the Sino-British talks about Hong Kong’s future in the 1980s, as well as the outbreak of the student movements in the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in 1989, student activism manifested in promoting “Hong Kong people ruling Hong Kong” with self-determination, and then criticizing the Beijing authorities’ military suppression to terminate the democratic movement. However, student activism was at a low ebb from the 1990s to 2003 with the approach of the Hong Kong returning to China in 1997 and the heyday of Tung Chee-hwa 董建華’s administration. After the July 1st rally in 2003, social protests were reactivated but student activism was not virtually impactful until the anti-national education’s movement in 2012.

In relation to the Umbrella Movement, Hong Kong’s political future, notably democratization and the defense of civic rights, are two major concerns. Two leading student organizations, namely Hong Kong
Federation of Students (香港專上學生聯會) and Scholarism (學民思潮), have made their active engagement during the course by making a proposal of introducing civil nomination of candidates on the selection of the Chief Executive in 2017 in order to challenge Beijing’s manipulation of the entire nomination process, organizing campaigns to promote the ideas and gain popular support, assisting in the referendum on June 22, 2014, and involving themselves in the occupation of Chater Road after the July 1st rally.

This article begins with the introduction to Hong Kong Federation of Students (HKFS) and Scholarism, aiming to provide the background information on their growth and development during the critical period between 2014 and 2015 when the government put forward the proposal for the selection of the Chief Executive in 2017 under Beijing’s domination and orchestration. Secondly, this article is intended to compare the development of both organizations during and after the Umbrella Movement in order to evaluate the changing strength in terms of leadership, organization, mobilization and networking in connection with the government’s suppression and challenges by other social forces in the name of localism. Thirdly, prospects of both organizations in face of post-Umbrella Movement’s period will be analyzed in light of orientation, organizational strengths and development in face of the unforeseeable political developments.

2. Scholarism: From Anti-National Education Movement to Political Reforms

The formation of Scholarism, under the leadership of Joshua Chi-fung Wong 黃之鋒, can be attributed to the emergence of new social movements in Hong Kong since 2007, including the demolition of the Queen Pier (皇后碼頭), the construction of the high-speed rail between
Hong Kong and Shenzhen in 2010-11, and the introduction to national education curriculum in 2011, in which the government deliberately ignored the public outcry and distorted the public opinion using the mainstream media. As Wong said:

When I was fourteen, there was a campaign in Hong Kong against building a high-speed rail link to China. That was in 2009–10, and caught my attention. I read the news about it, and followed the arguments on the internet but as an observer, not a participant. The turning point for me was the announcement in the spring of 2011 that a compulsory course in ‘Moral and National Education’ would be introduced into the school curriculum over the next two years. In May, I founded an organization with a few friends that we were soon calling Scholarism, to fight against this. We began in a very amateur way, handing out leaflets against it at train stations. But quite soon there was a response, and opposition built up. This was the first time in Hong Kong’s history that secondary-school pupils had become actively involved in politics. We opposed the new curriculum because it was a blatant attempt at indoctrination: the draft course hailed the Communist Party of China as a ‘progressive, selfless and united organization’. Secondary-school students didn’t want this kind of brainwashing. But they also didn’t want an additional subject of any kind, on top of their already heavy course loads, so even those who didn’t care much about the content of Moral and National Education were against it, and came out in large numbers on the demonstrations we organized.

(Wong, 2015)

Two points should be noted in examining the formation of Scholarism. First, the establishment of Scholarism can be identified to be issue-
oriented; in other words, the primary goals are (1) the abolition of the official curriculum with indoctrination and hegemony in understanding Mainland China, and (2) to recall and reiterate the importance of the youth in caring about and even engaging in the introduction to the curriculum, instead of holding passive, indifferent and submissive mentality. In other words, Scholarism has gone beyond a purely interest group caring about educational affairs, but a political group aiming to recall the importance of civic empowerment in shaping policymaking and consultation using direct actions. Second, targets of the anti-national education campaign are not only students and teachers, but the general public, as the dominating curriculum can be understood as the symbol of indoctrination and domination through the institutional and policy channels, and as a step toward the mainlandization of Hong Kong: an official imposition of values, beliefs and judgments of Mainland China on the Hong Kong people, especially the young generation. The launching of hunger strike in August 2014 can be seen as the height of the movement, arousing public sympathy and support. As a result, the government decided to shelve, but not abolish, the curriculum. This campaign has therefore achieved a partial success.

After the anti-national education curriculum, Scholarism decided to actively engage in the political consultation in relation to the selection of the Chief Executive in 2017, including the organization of signature campaigns near the exits of major MTR (metro) stations, writing and publishing commentaries, and collaborating with other civil society and political groups such as League of Social Democrats (社會民主連線), Neo Democrats (新民主同盟), People Power (人民力量). When the PRC issued a declaration on August 31 emphasizing that the PRC has an unconditional and full domination in determining the political future of Hong Kong, Scholarism intended to further the action by launching the class boycotting with HKFS.
3. Hong Kong Federation of Students: From Pro-Beijing to Defending Local Interests

Established in 1958, the Hong Kong Federation of Students is originally a pro-Communist organization organized by university and college students. Before the 1980s, most of the members were advocating the idealistic and utopian approach of the Communist movement in China under the influence of Beijing’s propaganda. However, the end of the Cultural Revolution in 1976 followed by the death of Mao Zedong 毛澤東 led to political disillusionment. During that period, they supported the nationalist movements, such as the protection of Diaoyu Islands, and the commemoration of May Fourth Movement (1919), and September 18th Incident (1931) due to Japanese aggression. In the 1980s, they actively organized themselves and expressed the assertive ideas on Hong Kong’s future after 1997. They also supported the Tiananmen Square students’ protests in 1989. During the 1990s, they were mainly engaging in challenging the official violation of civil rights under the Public Order Ordinance. After the handover in 1997, they were active in organizing protests at some of the key scandals in relation to the government, including the official intervention of public opinion programme at the University of Hong Kong in 2000, and the engagement of the July 1st rally in 2003. Since the 2010s, they have been involved in the campaign defending social and political rights, including the support of the labor strike in the container port of Kwai Chung (葵涌貨櫃碼頭) in 2013. During the campaign of the consultation of the Chief Executive Election Method in 2017 from 2013 to 2015, HKFS supported the Occupy Central as the political expression against the undemocratic and illiberal proposal put forward by the Beijing authorities. At the same time, it joined other civil society groups so as to buttress the societal and political force in connection with pan-democratic parties in the
Legislative Council (立法會). The HKFS has regarded the Occupy Central as an echo, of which Hong Kong people should determinate their own destinies, as Alex Chow 周永康, the chairperson of the HKFS, said:

Class boycotting and the possible occurrence of civil disobedience are the manifestation of “resisting the order (from Beijing) but not accepting the destiny”. In face of the National People’s Congress resolution, our future will be manipulated because the governments are endorsing their own proposal. We must realize that we should pay a cost by capturing and determining our future.

Class boycotting is made because the youth is discontented with the current situations of society. Class boycotting is a moral calling, anticipating that different people and generations of the society can stand up for achieving self-determination of destinies, and are willing to pay the cost. It is not possible to expect that the appeal to the dictatorship is working …

Occupy Central, it is definitely; however, the next step of Hong Kong is still being pended. Class boycotting provides us the opportunity to reflect upon the future of Hong Kong.

(Chow, September 18, 2014)

The above view has shown the determination of the HKFS in framing the movement as an important move to redefine our own destinies, meaning that whether Hong Kong people can determinate their own future, own destinies, or unduly being dependent on mainland China under the unfounded promise of “One Country, Two Systems” (一國兩制) without fulfilment in a faithful and thorough manner.

Overall, Scholarism and HKFS are two student organizations emerged in two different generations, but this does not mean that they
share the political aspiration, goals and then take actions divergently. As mentioned above, both of them support the practice of genuine democracy by advocating that the selection process of the Chief Executive should be accountable to the public, open and reject the political screening based on loyalty, affirmation and stance.

4. Student Activism after the Umbrella Movement

During the Umbrella Movement, both organizations were involved in the occupation, assisting in the organization of activities in order to arouse the public concern. For example, they were invited regularly in the occupation area of Admiralty to share their views on the attitudes toward the Beijing authorities, SAR government and pro-government media. Some of the HKFS leaders were invited to join the debate with the government officers in October; however, it turned out to be fruitless in terms of pushing the government to address the demands of the protestors, including the termination of the pseudo-consultation, the removal of undemocratic political programs with political screening and discrimination, and the re-launching of a genuine consultation. At the same time, Scholarism and HKFS members went to the occupation areas in Mong Kok (旺角) in order to collect the views of participants on the developments and prospect of the occupation. However, members of HKFS were criticized as being incompetent in leading and radicalizing the movement. In relation to Scholarism, they were responsible for campaigning on streets and online platforms. When they realized that the occupation achieved so little in pressurizing the government, they decided to terminate the occupation in December by withdrawing from the occupation area in Admiralty (金鐘), while the police was successful in restoring order and terminate the occupation in Mong Kok in late November.
After the end of the occupation period in December 2014, both student organizations are facing different problems in terms of orientation, networking and organizational capacity. In Scholarism, the orientation and prospect in face of the post-Umbrella Movement era is of concern. In other words, it would remain as a student organization, or transform into a de facto political organization. In the case of HKFS, it has faced the problem of maintaining the networking with student unions, given the fact that some radical activists in the name of localism, criticizing the incompetent and unrepresentativeness of HKFS in leading the movement, launched a campaign intending to delink HKFS with student unions at different tertiary institutions. As a result, student union at the University of Hong Kong, City University of Hong Kong and Hong Kong Baptist University have delinked with HKFS after the referendum. It is undoubtedly that the solidarity of HKFS has been affected adversely, as it becomes difficult to organize, lead and mobilize large-scale and sustainable action on campus.

Hence, a comparison between the HKFS and Scholarism after the Umbrella Movement shows that while the former has faced the delinking crisis with student unions in local tertiary institutions, the latter seems to be able to preserve its organizational solidarity and political influence despite the emergence of other professional groups defending democracy.

5. Differences in Positioning during the Umbrella Movement

First of all, during Umbrella Movement, despite the fact that the Umbrella Movement was not an outcome expected by both the HKFS and Scholarism, due to their decisive efforts before the Movement, they were in the leading role in the whole Movement. After the Decision of Standing Committee of the National People's Congress on 31st August
2014 about the Political Reform of Hong Kong (the August 31st Decision), from the preparation of student strike in late September and the action of regaining the Civic Square at the end of the strike assembly, the HKFS and Scholarism gained reputation and influence for leading the Umbrella Movement by rallying the social power before the whole Movement. Though they were not influential in other occupied areas outside Admiralty – Mong Kok and Causeway Bay (銅鑼灣) – they were regarded as the only two organizations which were accountable enough to mobilize large number of people and bargain with the government.

If we compare the role of the two student organizations in detail, we could see that the HKFS indeed performed to be more important in the leadership throughout the whole Movement. During the student strike, the HKFS had performed as a more influential organization than Scholarism as there were more responses from university students than those from secondary school students. After the outbreak of the Umbrella Movement, the members of Scholarism generally got less media exposure than the members of the HKFS. For example, in the television live negotiation with government officers on 21st October 2014, only the members of HKFS was invited to negotiate with the government but not the Scholarism.

The sharp leading role of HKFS throughout the whole movement brought more criticism to the HKFS about the failure of Umbrella Movement, especially for their fatal mistake made in the Escalation Action in the night of 31st November 2014. They were blamed that their incomprehensive planning and irresponsible leadership of Escalation Action put all the protesters on frontline in danger. The failure of Escalation Action finally became the turning point of Umbrella Movement that popular morale was almost drained after so. The whole movement ended without any achieved demands. This finally became
one of the motivations of the wave of quitting HKFS.

However, the differences in the role during the Umbrella Movement could not fully explain why the HKFS and Scholarism would be different in development after the Umbrella Movement. It could not explain why the HKFS was seriously destroyed while Scholarism could still survive and not be discredited much after the Umbrella Movement when both of them were supposed to be responsible for the failure of leadership in the Umbrella Movement. Their differences in accountability and response towards reforms also shaped the variety of their development after the end of the Umbrella Movement.

6. Differences in Accountability of HKFS and Scholarism

The impacts of the structural differences of the two organizations can be analyzed in terms of accountability. Despite their similarity as a student organization, the most fundamental difference between the HKFS and Scholarism was that, the HKFS was financially and institutionally accountable to university students, while Scholarism was just a spontaneous organization founded by a group of students. Financially speaking, HKFS’s sources of funding are from the membership fees from members of the Students’ Unions of universities. Institutionally speaking, treating themselves as a platform representing universities in Hong Kong, all the committee members of the HKFS, whether they be the representative committee, standing committee or the secretariat committee, are indirectly elected from the members of the Students’ Unions of universities. On the contrary, Scholarism is not accountable to any specific groups, and it is not going to represent any groups of people. Its sources of funding are also mostly from donations. Therefore, during the wave of quitting HKFS, “The HKFS does not represent me!” became the most symbolic slogan, as the HKFS kept saying that it was
representing the college students, while its members from the Students’ Unions of University are not involved (or not realized that they can be involved) in either its decision-making process or its election of the committees.

Though both the HKFS and Scholarism are institutionally exclusive and lack transparency towards the public, their differences in accountability shaped their fate after the Umbrella Movement. The advocates of the referendums of quitting HKFS argued that the whole election system in HKFS lacks transparency, as the election of committees in HKFS does not involve the massive university students but only by the representatives in the Annual General Meetings of HKFS, while those representatives are mostly selected from volunteers, but not elected from members of each university. After the Umbrella Movement, the failure of the Umbrella Movement led to the realization of these problems within the election system of the HKFS. Despite HKFS’s claim that it represents its university members, its election system went the other way round. Though core members in Scholarism also worked as a coterie that they are mutually elected only by their own members, due to their differences in accountability, the members of HKFS could trace the responsibility of the failure of the Umbrella Movement through the institution of HKFS, while Scholarism only had to be responsible to its members.

7. Differences in Their Responses towards Reform

Besides their differences in accountability, facing the criticism of the failure of the Umbrella Movement, because of their structures, they had different response towards possible reform. For the HKFS, during the wave of quitting HKFS, many of the committee members of HKFS promised that there would be reforms for the HKFS in order to persuade
members of student unions at different tertiary institutions to vote against the motion of referendum about quitting HKFS. However, due to the diversified wills in reform among different representatives and the requirement of full consensus in every main decision, the reform did not have much progress until this moment despite the setup of a chapter review panel among the HKFS just after the wave of quitting the HKFS. But in the case of Scholarism, the whole structure was changed after the General Meeting of Scholarism in May 2015. After the change, members of Scholarism were much easier to become the executive members, as all the committees are mutually elected without any threshold in nomination.

Having reforms in the HKFS is much more difficult than in Scholarism due to their functions. As a platform of all Students’ Unions of tertiary schools in Hong Kong, the HKFS insisted on full consensus in main decision-making due to its principle of non-interference with all university members, while Scholarism did not work as a platform representing any groups of people but a student organization targeting secondary school students. Therefore, the HKFS was much more difficult than Scholarism to make immediate response to criticisms after the failure of the Umbrella Movement.

8. Differences in Relationship with Different Non-Conservative Blocs

Both Scholarism and the HKFS had close relationship with different non-conservative blocs. Traditionally speaking, the HKFS has great linkage with social activist groups as well as traditional pan-democratic parties, notably the Democratic Party (民主黨), Civic Party (公民黨) and Labour Party (工黨). Also, the HKFS has a long history in cooperating with civil society groups and social activist organizations.
Of course, the cooperation tends to be issue-based, of which autonomy of such groups are understood and respected, thereby maintaining mutual collaboration and cooperation when it is necessary to call for direct action. Also, after completing the undergraduate education, some of HKFS ex-committee members have worked in such pan-democratic parties as Democratic Party, Civic Party and Labour Party or leftist political groups like the League of Social Democrats as well as the Neighbourhood and Workers Services Centre (街坊工友服務處). Therefore, the localists have accused that HKFS is under the manipulation of the pan-democratic parties through personal networking and influence of such ex-committee members. However, such an assertion is purely speculative without substantial evidence, with the purpose of demoralizing and discrediting HKFS. In addition, HKFS also had strong institutional linkage within the social activist groups. Through the exemption of rent and daily expenses, HKFS financially supported the Social Movement Resource Centre (SMRC) run by the “autonomous 8a” (自治八樓), an autonomous unit which was previously subordinated to HKFS but declared to be delinked with HKFS after its unilateral declaration of autonomy in 2006 (Inmedia, Hong Kong, 9th March 2006). In retrospect, the “autonomous 8a” aims at preserving the materials of social movements collected and kept by the previous sessions of the HKFS committee. With many ex-committee members of HKFS being its members, the “autonomous 8a”, in an attempt to collaborate with the university students and the society, uses the SMRC as an arena to organize various activities to promote human rights and anti-globalization objectives, as well as against official manipulation of city planning (Apple Daily, Hong Kong, 2nd April 2016). The institutional relationship between HKFS and the “autonomous 8a” reflects why HKFS has been chronically regarded as a hotbed of the traditional social activist bloc. But for Scholarism, as a
new student organization emerged after the anti-national education curriculum campaign, despite its cooperative relationship with the traditional social activist power, it is also quite inclusive towards the new social activist power. Members of Scholarism consist of supporters of different non-conservative political blocs, not only the traditional social activist bloc, but also the new localist activist bloc upholding the idea of “bravery resistance” and Hong Kong independence. However, it should be noted that “bravery resistance”, to a certain extent, is only a political myth and illusion circulated in the online platform in order to attract those who regard themselves as losers of the Umbrella Movement, and it is unable to derive a concrete and substantial proposal to engage in contentious politics in face of political dominance and intervention of the Beijing authorities and local pro-Beijing social and political force, such as the Liaison Office of the Central People’s Government in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (中央人民政府驻香港特别行政区联络办公室) which is the de facto powerholder in Hong Kong, Democratic Alliance for the Betterment of Hong Kong (民主建港協進聯盟), and the Hong Kong Federation of Trade Unions (香港工會聯合會). For example, whether and in what ways violence and even terrorism should be considered and adopted to demonstrate its “bravery” and resist the Beijing authorities in a workable and sustainable manner.

After the Umbrella Movement, their relationship with different blocs also determined others’ attitude towards these organizations. One of the criticisms of the HKFS, especially coming from such a new localist activist bloc who distrusts, and is hostile toward, the pan-democratic force and civil society organizations, was that, they are “getting too close” to the pan-democratic parties and civil society organizations, who have been labelled deliberately and discriminatorily as “conservative” social activists who “blindly” upheld the ideas of non-
violent resistance. Additionally, they do not focus on the discussion of sovereignty as well as identity issues in Hong Kong, which seems to be a groundless prosecution as the previous discussion of these two issues are swept under the carpet by the localists (Malte, 2015). Critics in the wave of quitting HKFS, mainly coming from the localists, argued that the HKFS could neither represent and make prompt response to the dissent among the basic student members of different tertiary institutions because of its inefficient representation and executive system nor adopt so-called “new” ideas in social movement because of its close relationship with “traditional” activists. This reflected that their tight linkages with traditional activists had become the burden of the HKFS in carrying out reform as well as responding to the criticisms from new activists, notably the localists, after the Umbrella Movement. From a critical analysis, the emergence of the localists challenging the HKFS, to a certain extent, aims to dismantle the HKFS, and then capture the political discourse and networking of the youth by establishing their own groups and promoting such aspirations as “bravery resistance”, making constitution by the people, and separation of China and Hong Kong. However, its fatal blow is that such localists cannot make a concrete proposal in achieving the above aspirations. Most importantly, they are regarded to be opportunists and pseudo-pragmatists, deploying the online media to insult the democrats and their supporters using hate language and personal attacks, and to promote affective politics which is discriminatory toward the new immigrants and tourists from mainland China.

9. Future of the HKFS and Scholarism

After the Umbrella Movement, both the HKFS as well as Scholarism had their own difficulties in their development. For the HKFS, instead of
the questioning of creditability (especially among the frontline activists) after the Umbrella Movement and members of the tertiary institutions after the wave of quitting the HKFS in early 2015, it also needs an organizational reform in the executive structure as well as the election system. The HKFS has to not only look for a more efficient decision-making process and mobilization, apart from the strengthening of the communication with members, but also a new orientation of HKFS – that it needs to rethink how to further the engagement in the future social movement with other social and political parties based on its original role: as a platform of tertiary institutions in Hong Kong. The current system seems to be bureaucratic and bulky as a platform for all tertiary institutions in Hong Kong and irresponsible towards the students as a student organization. There should be a groundbreaking way to reorganize the HKFS, student unions and university students so that power can be acknowledged and exercised definitely. Ideally, university students can mobilize themselves and can be mobilized, through the coordination of student unions, and then HKFS as a leading force that aims to challenge the authorities. There is a quotation about the HKFS during the wave of quitting HKFS:

“When the HKFS exists, the bound of tertiary college will exist; but even when the HKFS disappears, the bound of tertiary college will also still exist.”

– Chan Ho-tin 陳浩天, the advocate of quitting HKFS campaign at the Polytechnic University of Hong Kong

This quotation reminded all Hong Kong student activists in universities that, despite the previous importance of the HKFS in many social movement and tertiary education issues, the ultimate goal of reform is not to keep the wholeness of the HKFS, but to reorganize student power.
However, Chan does not define how such a bound can be problematic and seems to be incompetent to initiate proposal on how student power can be rejuvenated and recaptured without HKFS after the Umbrella Movement. In other words, he is only attentive to dismantle the linkage with, and the disappearance of, HKFS only. However, he may not understand that the dismantling of the HKFS without alternatives only leads to the fragmentation and powerlessness of student movements. Indeed, the assertion of initializing reform discussion under the wave of quitting the HKFS seems to be illusionary, and the demoralization and powerlessness of university students remain. During this period of ups and downs, the intra- and inter-institutional networking and solidarity and the rejuvenation of political activism of the youth in face of political intervention and decay under the Beijing authorities deserve the attention and take the initiative.

For Scholarism, though it does not have to worry about the problems of accountability and over-bureaucratized system that the HKFS is facing, it still has to face the problem of its sustainability. Its popularity relies quite heavily on Joshua Wong, the founder and convenor of Scholarism. This makes it so hard for Scholarism to sustain its reputation without Joshua Wong. Besides, it is also facing a problem of sustainability in manpower and succession, as joining Scholarism is no longer an attractive and main way for new students to participate in political issues. Secondary and tertiary students of the new generation can participate in social movements as individuals or they can join some other organizations with specific topics to follow, for instance the Hong Kong Language Studies (HKlangstudies) concerning the issue of Putonghua as the Medium of Instruction (PMI) in teaching Chinese, or new localist political groups, such as Hong Kong Indigenous (本土民主前線) as well as Youngspiration (青年新政). Hence, Scholarism has to find a way to sustain itself and make choice between continuing to be an
issue-based student organization without any sharp political ideology or transforming into another kind of political activist group. In this connection, Scholarism has announced the suspension of its operations on March 20, 2016, making way for the formation of a new student group and a political party, as its statement said: “A highly political Scholarism made us hard to get into schools to educate and organise secondary school students; as a student group it is hard for Scholarism to handle a self-determination movement which will last for dozens of years.” (Hong Kong Free Press, 20th March 2016)

Notes

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Post-Umbrella Movement:
Localism and Radicalness of the
Hong Kong Student Movement

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Abstract
Hong Kong student movements before the Umbrella Movement showed a political outlook of voicing within norm of the establishment, using “peaceful, rational and non-violent” approaches, acknowledging the authorities of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (HKSAR) and mainland Chinese governments and recognizing attachment to the motherland China. Today’s new emerging political outlook of the Hong Kong student movement has a profile of anti-establishment, using more assertive means and not excluding radical behaviour, distrust of the HKSAR and mainland authorities and assertion of radical localism. In the last two years, Hong Kong students have undergone a rapid change in their orientation, resulting in today’s outlook. This paper argues that the Umbrella Movement is the key for the turnaround and it testifies to the birth of a new social and political consciousness amongst Hong Kong students.
**Keywords:** post-Umbrella Movement, student movement, localism, radicalness

1. Introduction

Student movement is commonly defined as students’ collective engagement in social or political activities throughout a certain time-span. Across the world, participants in most student movements are primarily university students and occasionally secondary school students. The nature of student movement is usually but not necessarily anti-establishment and based on a concern for local society or politics. Student movement, in essence, is a manifestation of idealism. Students are in pursuit of justice, people’s general interests, welfare for disadvantaged groups or other imperatives based on idealistic values.

Student movement has a long history in Hong Kong. In the post-WWII colonial years, Hong Kong students and youth had been generally characterized as a generation of political indifference. Other age cohorts were actually much the same in their political indifferent orientation. The colonial Hong Kong was thus described as a politically apathetic society. However, small changes and political awakenings occurred in the 1970s. When China tore down its own “bamboo curtain” and entered into the global system by joining the United Nations and establishing diplomatic relationships with the West, Hong Kong students also showed their concern for their motherland with a show of nationalism (towards China) and anti-colonialism (towards their sovereign state, Britain). In the 1970s and 1980s (until the 1989 Tiananmen massacre), several student movements occurred on university campuses and in selected secondary schools. With the anticipation that the sovereignty of Hong Kong would be returned to China in 1997, student movements such as the Chinese Language movement, anti-corruption movement, Defending
the Diaoyu Islands movement, Knowing More about Our Motherland movement and others showed growing sentiments of Chinese nationalism and anti-colonialism.

The 1989 movement was a student movement in mainland China, but the outcome of the movement had a huge impact on Hong Kong society. On 21st May 1989, Hong Kong held a rally with 1.5 million protestors (one out of four of the whole population) on the streets in support of the Beijing Tiananmen students and on June Fourth every year since 1989 tens of thousands of Hong Kong people gathered to memorialise the deaths in the Beijing tragedy. The year 1989 is a turning point for Hong Kong people of all ages including students attending schools. The long existing political apathy in Hong Kong has changed to political awareness and concern since 1989. Even the young Hong Kong students have learned the lesson that the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) authorities could act cruelly to young students and the Chinese regime could hardly be trusted. The June Fourth massacre laid a seed of erosion of contemporary Hong Kong youth’s Chinese identity.

After the handover and in the early years of the new millennium, Hong Kong’s young activists (with many from universities) became upset by the HKSAR government’s massive demolition of old neighbourhoods and communities under the excuse of urban development. They participated in successive smaller-in-scales but increasingly prominent local heritage protection movements. These protection targets include the Star Ferry Pier (天星碼頭), the Queen’s Pier (皇后碼頭), buildings on Wan Chai 灣仔 Lee Tung Street (利東街, known as “Wedding Card Street” / 喜帖街) and other cultural heritages associated with Hong Kong people’s collective memories. In 2009 and 2010, a larger-in-scale localist movement carried out a sequence of protests against the construction of the Hong Kong section of the Express Rail Link connecting to the mainland (Law, 2014).
One large-scale social movement was the 2012 Anti-National Education Movement. Hong Kong’s secondary school students were afraid that their existing liberal civil education would be replaced by the mainland-style ideological indoctrination. Beijing viewed that movement to be a resistance to identifying with China as the motherland. Scholarism ( 學民思潮 ), a joint-secondary-schools student organization, under the leadership of the then 16-year-old secondary school student Joshua Wong Chi-fung 黃之鋒, emerged in the 2012 movement as a chief organizer; Wong became a well-known figure remaining prominent in subsequent social and political movements. Many issues raised in the new millennium social movements are related to Hong Kong young people’s perceptions of China, their new sovereign state, Hong Kong’s self-identity and the new relationship between Hong Kong and China.

Previously, Hong Kong youth had been generally voicing their concerns within the norms of the establishment, using a “peaceful, rational and non-violent” approach, acknowledging authorities of the HKSAR and Chinese governments and recognizing attachment with the motherland. By contrast, today’s new emerging political outlook of Hong Kong youth is a profile of anti-establishment, using more assertive means and not excluding radical behaviour, distrust of the HKSAR and Chinese authorities and an assertion of local identity. In the last few years, Hong Kong youth have experienced a rapid change in their orientation, resulting in today’s outlook. The Umbrella Movement is the key for this turnaround and it testifies to the birth of Hong Kong students’ new social and political consciousness.
2. Hong Kong Students’ New Experience in the Umbrella Movement

The Umbrella Movement, lasted from September to December 2014, in terms of its size, intensity and duration of participation, could be regarded as the largest-scale social movement in modern Hong Kong history. Only less than two years after the ending of the movement, it is perhaps too early to evaluate the movement’s definitive impact and consequences; nevertheless, the movement’s impact on and consequence for the political outlook of Hong Kong’s younger generation so far are obvious.

The movement started from an initial preparation in 2013 by three founding leaders, two university professors and one reverend, who had planned the Occupy Central (佔領中環 / 佔中) movement with the hope of getting more middle-aged participants to join in. Out of their expectation, in the process, the Occupy Central movement was transformed into the Umbrella Movement with mainly student participants. Student leaders, in their early twenties from universities, were from the joint-universities student organization, the Hong Kong Federation of Students (香港專上學生聯會, HKFS), accompanied by teenage secondary school students from Scholarism. A less prominent group of adult participants was from the pan-democrat camp who claimed that since 1980s they have been fighting for Hong Kong democracy.

Occupy Central was publicly announced to begin on 1st October 2014. Adult leaders anticipated that students would play a minor role in the movement. A week before 1st October, to support their adult counterparts and to publicise the movement, the HKFS and Scholarism organised a one-week class boycott and demonstration at the Government Headquarters near Admiralty (金鐘), adjacent to Central on Hong Kong island. On 26th September, students’ peaceful sit-in turned into a swift fervent climbing over the fences and breaking into the
fortified area. Such developments propelled Occupy Central organisers to accelerate the date of commencement of their movement to capitalize on the presence of these masses. The site of peaceful sit-in also changed from Central to Admiralty and later expanded to Mong Kok (旺角), Causeway Bay (銅鑼灣) and Tsim Sha Tsui 尖沙嘴. Thereafter, students replaced adults and became prominent characters in the movement.

Since the students took over and were in charge, adult leaders of the Occupy Central movement had surprisingly played a minor role; they mainly offered consultation to the student leaders and helped with management affairs. The students had played the major role and steered the course of the movement all along. They negotiated with officials of the HKSAR government, proposed terms of negotiation and asked for a direct dialogue with Beijing. It is from this perspective that the Umbrella Movement essentially is a student movement (Chan, 2014).

Both the Occupy Central and Umbrella movements had fought for the same aim: a “genuine universal suffrage” for the 2017 Hong Kong Chief Executive election. As previous Chief Executives had been elected by small-circle electorates, the major plea was asking the Chinese government not to set rules to pre-screen the 2017 Chief Executive election candidates and to allow Hong Kong people to have a real choice of their Chief Executive through universal suffrage. Students in the movement also asked for more democratic elements to be infused into future Hong Kong elections in order to make those genuine democratic elections. The movement has been perceived as a failure by its participants since both the Chinese and HKSAR authorities made no concession to the plea.

Yellow umbrella is the symbol of the Umbrella Movement. Umbrellas had been astutely used for blocking police’s pepper spray and tear gas as a defense. Thus, umbrella also stands for civil disobedience
and passive resistance of the movement. The Umbrella Movement was pronounced as a civil disobedience movement at the beginning and in the process we witnessed the emergence of elements of radicalness and violence. These elements varied in degrees among different groups participating in the movement and grew stronger as time passed by. Those participants in the movement based at Mong Kok were more radical, militant and localism-oriented than those Admiralty participants who were led by the HKFS and Scholarism. The Mong Kok participants at the time had blamed the Admiralty participants for being too soft and pacific and they have taken the failure of the protest as a result of this mellowness.

3. Post-Umbrella Movement

Students learn the lesson from the Umbrella Movement that they could not put any hope on the Beijing authorities and the HKSAR government anymore, particularly on the Chun-ying (CY) Leung 梁振英 administration. Resistance with moderation and peaceful means could not reach their goal of democracy.

After the Umbrella Movement, the approach of utilizing street action and militancy have gradually become a norm accepted by some Hong Kong youth. At the time being, they are preparing themselves ideologically (going to the direction of radical localism) and strategically (inclination to adopt a militant and conflictual approach). They are waiting for another major opportunity to arise and be involved in a forthcoming social resistance movement.

During and after the Umbrella Movement, different opinions among student leaders representing different university student unions led to a split of the HKFS. By the end of 2015, four of the eight university student unions had separated from the joint organization. The split
indicates the loss of dominant power of the group focused on “negotiating with China” and adoption of peaceful means; and simultaneously the growing strength of the group focused on localism and radical orientation. Since the Umbrella Movement, students on university campuses have become more and more radical and localism-oriented (SCMP, 3rd March 2016). Conflicts occurred within various universities between student activists and university council members who have been known for their pro-CY Leung administration and pro-Beijing stance (SCMP, 2nd February 2016; SCMP, 22nd February 2016).

Localism and radicalness are the two major elements emerged in the post-Umbrella Movement period among the Hong Kong youth. Both elements could be found in various incidents and one prominent one was the “riot” at the 2016 Chinese New Year. Street hawkers selling local food is considered as a distinctive Hong Kong local culture; yet under urban development in the last decade, street hawking has been mostly banned by authorities. As a tradition, only during the Chinese New Year (without blocking the traffic), street hawking would be leniently handled by authorities. In this past year’s Chinese New Year, a localist political group, Hong Kong Indigenous called for a gathering at Mong Kok to protect street hawkers from harassment by legal enforcers. The gathering ended as a violent confrontation between police and protesters. The police was attacked with glass bottles, bricks, flower pots and trash bins. Fires were set and police cars were damaged by protestors. Police used pepper sprays and fired warning shots in return. The western media, with their sympathies on the side of protesters, accused the police of reacting in a heavy-handed manner. They called this incident the “Fishball Revolution”. Instead, the HKSAR and mainland Chinese authorities called it a “riot” and in addition, the mainland authorities criticized it as “a riot plotted mainly by local radical separatist organization” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, PRC, 11th February 2016).
In the last three months of 2015, five booksellers (owners and staff) of a bookstore, the Causeway Bay Books, went missing and their later reappearance indicated that they were being detained by mainland Chinese authorities. Two of these booksellers were suspected of having been kidnapped to mainland, one from Hong Kong and the other from Thailand. This bookstore published and sold books on mainland political gossip and scandals, with much about mainland officials including Xi Jinping. These are considered as “banned books” censured by mainland authorities, yet popular with both Hong Kong and mainland general public (SCMP, 6th January 2016; 17th June 2016). From Hong Kong people’s perspective, particularly youth’s perspective, the incident stands for Chinese authorities’ serious violation of adherence to the “one country, two systems” (一国两制) principle (respect for the Hong Kong legal system) and respect for Hong Kong’s core values (freedom of speech and press). This incident would only alienate more Hong Kong youth away from the mainland, develop more distrust of the Chinese authorities and cultivate a stronger sense of localism.

4. Localism and Radicalness

4.1. Localism

Localism in Hong Kong refers to social and political movements aimed at the preservation of the city’s autonomy and local culture. Localism, in recent years, has been mainly a reaction to mainland China’s cultural and political dominance in Hong Kong affairs. This dominance is perceived as a threat to Hong Kong autonomy. The mainland dominance has been more evident since CY Leung became the Chief Executive in 2012, complemented with his obvious disposition to follow the “needs” and “inclinations” of the mainland Chinese authorities. Hong Kong students generally perceive Leung as a “cunning wolf”. As early as when he
contended for the position of Chief Executive, he was suspected of being a secret CCP member and that he would serve the CCP interests in his governing of Hong Kong (SCMP, 19th March 2012).

Some Hong Kong people are afraid that Hong Kong sooner or later would lose its “one country, two systems” and turn into just another major city of China under its unitary system, with no difference from Beijing and Shanghai. With these perceptions, Hong Kong students have an increasing urge for greater Hong Kong autonomy. The development of Hong Kong localism also has become more and more radical and turned into a movement of “excluding the outsiders”. In the contemporary Hong Kong context, the “outsiders” refer mainly to mainland Chinese authorities and mainlanders.

Political localism refers to ideas of different degrees of Hong Kong’s staying away from the control of mainland authorities. These ideas could range from demands for more Hong Kong “self-determination” to affiliation back with the British to outright Hong Kong independence. There is a growing trend in past years, particularly after the Umbrella Movement, that among the younger generation, when compared with other older age-cohorts, their self-identities as “Hong Konger” are much stronger than as “Chinese” (Centre for Communication and Public Opinion Survey, The Chinese University of Hong Kong, November 2014). The younger generation is the group most attuned to political localism.

Hong Kong students’ sense of localism has grown as they perceive that Hong Kong’s development in recent years, under the HKSAR administration, has turned into a process of “mainlandisation”. Therefore, the localism in the society is also a reaction to this “mainlandisation”. In the colonial years, Hong Kong maintained much Cantonese culture and its distinct features on one hand while being governed under British colonial influence on the other. Dissatisfied in
recent years with this “mainlandisation”, a group of Hong Kong’s younger generation has reacted with nostalgia. The British colonial flag has been waved in young people’s participated protests as a sign of showing anger and discontent towards both the HKSAR and Beijing authorities. To this group of Hong Kong youth, Hong Kong has gone downhill since the handover. Increased mainland immigrants, tourists and parallel traders have brought high housing prices and overcrowding all over the territory. Mainlanders compete with Hong Kong people on all local resources. For several years until 2013, local pregnant women when they gave births had no place in hospitals while mainland pregnant women came over to take their places; and baby powdered milk was in serious shortage when mainland parallel traders came to buy in large quantities. The Hong Kong youth are disillusioned that the CY Leung administration has not stopped the influx of mainlanders and on the contrary has carried out policies of “mainlandisation”. On the other hand, the mainland authorities are perceived as carrying out their pledged “one country, two systems” policy based on their own values and ignoring Hong Kong’s inherited core values. In the eyes of some youths, cutting ties with the mainland is the only unambiguous way to uphold a bright political future for Hong Kong. Today’s student movements are much more critical of China in contrast to the early student movements of the 1970s and even 1980s which posited support for China in a “patriotic” way.

4.2. Radicalness

In Hong Kong, people divide the pan-democrats camp into moderate democrats and radical democrats. Moderate democrats are comprised of older political parties and organizations such as the Democratic Party (民主黨), Civic Party (公民黨), Labour Party (工黨), some independent Legislative Council (立法會, LegCo) members and others.
Radical democrats, who have mostly emerged in the last few years, are comprised of political parties and organizations such as People Power (人民力量, with its former leader Raymond Wong Yuk-man 黃毓民 as the LegCo member) and League of Social Democrats (社會民主連線, with its leader “Long Hair” (長毛) Leung Kwok-hung 梁國雄 as the LegCo member); and they have adopted offensive means such as shouting dirty-words, throwing objects and staging weeks-long filibusters during LegCo meetings. The moderate-democrats have adopted a “peaceful, rational, non-violent and no dirty-words” approach in pursuing Hong Kong democracy. Seeing this moderate approach as ineffective in challenging the system and in achieving the goal of democracy, Hong Kong students in the last few years have dissociated themselves from the moderate democrats and rather allied with radical democrats and engaged more and more in fighting through radical means.

Hong Kong students also learned from their experience in the Umbrella Movement to give up moderate means and engage in radical strategies. They first learned from the Sunflower Movement which happened in Taiwan just months before the Umbrella Movement. Images of Taiwan students using shock tactics to break into the legislature main building and then occupying the legislative floor have been vivid in Hong Kong people’s minds. Hong Kong students started the Umbrella Movement by using the same strategy in their own operation and successfully occupied some open areas of the Government Headquarters. But more than two months of peaceful sit-in and negotiation with the HKSAR government resulted in nothing.

During the movement, we already could witness the argument between the radical and moderate group of students. Failure of the Umbrella Movement has frustrated students and this makes some moderate students change their orientations to become radical; on the
other hand, the same frustration reinforces the radical students’ desire to continue to be, and even more, radical. An orientation of political radicalness has grown up among the Hong Kong youth and today they believe in “resistance with courage and militancy” (yongwu kangzheng 勇武抗争).

4.3. Radical Localism

Horace Chin Wan-kan 陈云根 is recognised by Hong Kong youth as the mentor pointing the way to Hong Kong self-rule and autonomy. Chin indicated that Hong Kong should be more detached from the mainland and exist as a “city-state”. He asserted that since 1997, the CCP has carried out an “assimilation” policy towards Hong Kong: opening more travel and immigration quota for mainlanders coming to Hong Kong, pushing for national education movement in Hong Kong schools, encouraging the erosion of Hong Kong’s core values (such as criticizing the checks and balances among Hong Kong’s executive, legislature and judiciary, harming Hong Kong’s judicial independence, blaming on Hong Kong’s human rights assertion, etc.) as well as the erosion of Hong Kong’s distinctive culture (such as encouraging the learning of Putonghua 普通话, i.e. Mandarin, in place of Cantonese and encouraging simplified Chinese characters in Hong Kong’s daily use and schools). Chin described the mainland’s policies to Hong Kong as “neo-imperialist” policies. Mainlanders’ immigration to Hong Kong is part of mainland’s “colonisation” plan. According to Chin, “one country, two systems” is not a permanent promise but only a transitional arrangement for Hong Kong from the CCP perspective and the CCP aims for a final “one country, one system”. Although Chin has not directly advocated Hong Kong independence, his conception of Hong Kong’s relationship with China under the alleged “one country, two systems” is very much different from the Hong Kong Basic Law (基本法)’s formulation.
According to Chin, Hong Kong should be a polity with total autonomy and only affiliates with China in name. China should not exercise any control or influence on Hong Kong. To strive for the “city-state” status, Hong Kong people should “resist with courage and militancy” (Chin, 2011). The radical Hong Kong youth today are deeply influenced by Chin’s assertions and see Chin’s words as their guidance in fighting against the CCP and the HKSAR regimes.

Even before the Umbrella Movement, some university students have already shown an orientation of radical localism. The official publication of the University of Hong Kong (HKU) Student Union, Undergrad (學苑), in February 2014 published a few articles on the subject of a Hong Kong nation, with articles entitled “The Hong Kong Nation Deciding Its Own Fate” and “Democracy and Independence for Hong Kong”, which were later put into a book, Hong Kong Nationalism, which became a bestseller (Undergrad, HKU Student Union, 2014). Chief Executive CY Leung, in his 2015 policy address in the LegCo, openly and harshly denounced the HKU students for promoting Hong Kong independence. His act fanned more debates and sympathies for university students within the LegCo and in the society (SCMP, 15th January 2015). The Undergrad in March 2016 went further, in a published article entitled “Hong Kong Youth’s Declaration”, providing a blueprint that, upon expiry of the Sino-British Joint Declaration in 2047, Hong Kong should become independent. In 2047, Hong Kong should be a full democracy and its constitution should be drawn and approved by the Hong Kong people only. The article also accused the current HKSAR government of being a “puppet” of the CCP, weakening the city’s autonomy (SCMP, 15th March 2016).

In the post-Umbrella Movement period, there is a growth of radical localist political parties such as Youngspiration (青年新政), Hong Kong Indigenous (本土民主前線), Hong Kong Independence Party
(香港獨立黨) and Hong Kong National Party (香港民族黨). Leaders and members of all these organizations are mostly youngsters (and mostly in-school university students) who previously participated in the Umbrella Movement. These parties are so far the most radical groups in their assertions and behavior.

Formation of the Hong Kong National Party was publicly announced on March 2016 with the party platform advocating Hong Kong independence and denying the Chinese sovereignty and legitimacy of the Hong Kong Basic Law. The Party clearly states that China is Hong Kong’s enemy and China at the moment carries out a “colonisation” policy in Hong Kong featured with suppression and deprivation. HKSAR government is only a “colonial government” set up and used by China. The Party urges Hong Kong people to rebel against China’s “colonisation” towards Hong Kong (Hong Kong National Party, 21st March 2016). The party has a membership of 50 odd young activists, mostly in-school university students. The party leader and spokesman, Chan Ho-tin 陳浩天, a former Umbrella Movement activist, said that the party would use “whatever effective means” including violence to push for independence. To them, “staging marches or shouting slogans is obviously useless now.” The party intends also to place candidates to run for the September 2016 Legislative Council election (SCMP, 28th March 2016). The emergence of this party with its advocacy for forthright independence stands for the extreme end of Hong Kong youth’s localist movement.

5. A Case Study: Commemoration of the June Fourth

A case study of Hong Kong youth’s participation in the annual Hong Kong commemoration of the June Fourth could illustrate the change of Hong Kong youth’s ideological orientation from Chinese nationalism to
Hong Kong localism. Holding any memorial activity for the killed students in the 1989 Chinese June Fourth military crackdown has been a taboo in mainland China. Hong Kong is the only Chinese territory that allows public memorial activities. The world-known annual event, organised by the Hong Kong Alliance in Support of Patriotic Democratic Movements of China (香港市民支援愛國民主運動聯合會, “the Alliance”), is the candlelight vigil on June Fourth evening in the Hong Kong Victoria Park, the biggest assembly of this commemoration in the world with number of participants ranging from 35,000 to 180,000 since 1990 and this year with 125,000 people attending (明報/Ming Pao, 5th June 2016, p. A2). Participants are predominantly Hong Kong citizens, with also some low-profile mainlanders coming to Hong Kong for this commemoration purpose. Many Hong Kong youngsters said that starting from this year, they would stop going to the annual candlelight vigil (明報/Ming Pao, 5th June 2016, p. A5).

In terms of spirit and value, the Umbrella Movement has learned and inherited from the 1989 Chinese democracy movement. In the years before the Umbrella Movement, the number of Hong Kong youth and students attending the candlelight vigils had grown significantly. The HKFS and Scholarism were deliberately included as organisers. Their role, obviously, was mainly to mobilize participation of the secondary school and university students and to advance the cause for Chinese democracy. It was argued that Hong Kong youngsters would pass the legacy to future generations until the demands of the commemoration could be achieved.

Although before the Umbrella Movement, all university student unions and the HKFS were active participants in the annual candlelight vigil, since 2015, however, influenced by radical localism, some students have questioned the significance of holding the annual candlelight vigil.
Both the HKFS and student unions of several universities started boycotting the annual candlelight vigil from last year (2015) and this year the remaining university student unions also quit. The HKFS cut its final connection this year by discontinuing to be a member of the Alliance, which it co-founded 27 years ago. Alternative seminars were held on June Fourth evening by students on different university campuses. These seminars focused on discussion of the prospect for democracy in Hong Kong and the original memorial element – about democracy in mainland China – has been wiped out. A student leader of the University of Hong Kong even suggested the ending of any commemoration of the June Fourth (SCMP, 28th May 2016; 3rd June 2016). The Hong Kong students’ general attitudes and acts towards the June Fourth commemoration show that a growing detachment from mainland Chinese politics is prevalent among the Hong Kong’s younger generation today.

Paul Liu Chun-sing 廖俊升, currently a university student and an executive member of the HKFS, has changed his orientation to extreme localism after his participation in the Umbrella Movement. He explained why he does not want to join the commemoration of the June Fourth anymore after the Umbrella Movement: “It’s the sense of helplessness. We sat there for 79 days, and we achieved nothing. After the Umbrella Movement, I completely gave up my identity as a Chinese. I don’t think we need to fight for the ‘political fruits’ for a different race that always invades us.” (SCMP, 3rd June 2016). Liu’s sentiment represents a typical post-Umbrella Movement mentality of a large group of the 2014 movement participants.

Nathan Law Kwun Chung 羅冠聰, a university student leader, who was also one of the prominent student leaders in the Umbrella Movement, in April 2016 set up a new political party, Demosistō (香港眾志), as one of the new political parties standing on the position
between moderate and radical localism. Hong Kong independence, to this group, is a “choice among alternatives” to be decided in the future by a Hong Kong referendum. Law commented that the June Fourth incident should be memorialised from the localism perspective. The incident’s significance is more on Hong Kong people’s resistance to the Chinese authorities and on Hong Kong people’s continuous pursue for democracy (Law, 2016).

From the radical localist student perspective, one critique is that as a social movement to push for Chinese and Hong Kong democracy, the annual June Fourth assembly has turned into a regular ritual which has not offered any meaningful idea and activity in pushing for democracy. Every year in the past, the candlelight vigil had been held at the same place and same time, used the same format and shouted the same slogans.

“Building a democratic China” has been a regularly chanted slogan in the annual vigil. From radical localism perspective, some Hong Kong students interpret the nature of the June Fourth movement as a “neighbouring country’s resistance movement” and Hong Kong people should not be involved in it. Since the radicalised Hong Kong student leaders today deny their “Chinese” identity, they question why Hong Kong people should be concerned about any development in mainland China, including its democratic development. All they perceive is the fact that the CCP today wants to be in control of Hong Kong. To these students, how to escape from this control is their major concern. They criticise that Hong Kong people have indulged too much in seeing themselves as part of the “Greater China”. Today, they aim to distance themselves from China and the Chinese authorities and ask for the ending of commemoration or at least a major change of format of the June Fourth activities.
Some Hong Kong students also criticise the Alliance’s motto of “rehabilitation of the June Fourth” (平反六四). The significance of this “rehabilitation” (平反) is asking the ruling CCP to confess to the massacre and persecution committed in 1989, offering an apology and acknowledging the 1989 movement as a patriotic and democratic one. To some Hong Kong students, this position only reflects an acknowledgement of legitimacy of the CCP and simply forgives its inexcusable wrongdoing in 1989. They perceive the Alliance’s act more as a plea than a demand. To these students, the June Fourth movement has already been generally acknowledged as a patriotic and democratic movement in civil societies across the globe and there is no need for the ruling CCP to approve it. Worse in nature, from these students’ perspective, the underlying agenda of the Alliance’s organisation of the June Fourth commemoration is a promotion of Hong Kong people’s patriotism towards China and acknowledgement of the CCP’s authority over Hong Kong. Between unification with and separation from the mainland, the Alliance wrongly stands on the side of unification (明報/Ming Pao, 3rd June 2016, p. A31).

6. Conclusion

In February 2016, among six candidates, a Hong Kong Indigenous-nominated candidate and a suspected Mong Kok “rioter”, Leung Tin-kei 梁天琦, finished in third place of the vote in a LegCo by-election for the vacant New Territories East seat. Though he failed in being elected, Leung claimed that localism has gained a strong foothold as the third largest political force in Hong Kong, after traditional pan-democrats and the pro-Beijing camp. This has boosted their morale to stick to the belief of Hong Kong independence and their ambition to run in the coming September LegCo general election (DWnews.com, 1st March 2016).
Since various radical localist political parties have already announced their intention to place candidates running in the coming September 2016 LegCo general election and this is also the first LegCo general election after the Umbrella Movement, it is true that the election itself will provide a good indicator whether radical localism is widely accepted in the Hong Kong society and whether candidates and political parties with radical localism orientation would become the third major political force in Hong Kong. On the other hand, the election will also be a test of popularity of the traditional pan-democrats and pro-Beijing camps.

The development of the radical localist movement among Hong Kong students shows that the movement is mainly a strong reaction to the mainland Chinese authorities’ interference in Hong Kong affairs and the HKSAR government’s compliance to such an interference. When we carefully examine its development in Hong Kong in the last two years, we could understand that radical localism is not a suddenly pop-up movement. Frustration out of the failure of the Umbrella Movement has led Hong Kong youth on their way to radical localism. Since this movement in nature is a student movement and radical localism might not be that popular among other age cohorts in Hong Kong, one argument points out that student movements across the world usually only last a short while and perish with those students’ graduation from school and that might also be the case for Hong Kong. Nevertheless, in Hong Kong, students have formed different new radical localist political parties and they have the intention to continue fighting for their political causes both inside and outside the establishment. We could hardly say that the phenomenon of prevailing radical localism among students is a temporary one and it will perish soon. Perhaps success or failure in the coming September LegCo election will encourage or discourage its
continuation and its expansion. We still need time to ascertain the development of radical localism in Hong Kong.

Note

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Migrants and Democratization:  
The Political Economy of Chinese Immigrants in Hong Kong†

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Abstract

In this article, we argue that immigrants can serve as staunch support of the conservative incumbents of a regime, due to a self-selection effect; immigrants are more likely to accept the political status quo and be less sympathetic to the opposition who might demand progressive changes. Based on Asian Barometer survey data in Hong Kong, we showed that Chinese immigrants in Hong Kong are more pro-establishment and supportive of pro-government parties. With China’s huge population, this implies a strategic importance of Chinese migrants, whose inflow to other Asian states can significantly skew the politics of neighbouring states in destined directions.
Keywords: Hong Kong politics, Chinese immigrants, internal migration, democratization

1. Introduction

As a key political power in East Asia, China has been well noted for its impact and influence because of its economic, military, and diplomatic strength. A lot of that strength of course lies in China being the most populous country in the world, with a formidable population of 1.3 billion people. For the most part, this gigantic population is considered as a resource when it is used as a market to entice investors, a basis for labor power, and a source of military strength. Yet a country with an enormous population can also make major geopolitical impacts in the region, in more than one way, if the people in that country migrate to other neighboring states.

In the age of globalization, migration is a sensitive political and diplomatic issue. Because of this, if possible, sovereign states try to impose controls on immigrants. In the case of an inability of preventing the entry of illegal immigrants (ranging from war, famines, unrests, or just the physical inability to control all the borders), governments would try to impose tight limitations on immigrants getting citizen rights, including voting rights and all the other entitled social benefits. Much has been made of the social impacts of immigrants on the social and economic resources of the host countries. Studies on the political impacts of immigrants as voters on the host countries receive far fewer scholarly attention.

This paper discusses the case of the political impact of Chinese immigrants in Hong Kong. The central argument is that by self-selection, the Chinese immigrants are politically more conservative, more content with the status quo, and less supportive of progressive
political change (i.e. fast democratization) than the native population in Hong Kong. Survey results show that immigrants from China have become reliable supporters of the pro-Beijing coalition in the elections in Hong Kong. This means that a continual influx of immigrants from China after 1997 will help to strengthen electoral support for the conservative ruling coalition in Hong Kong. Immigrants, and hence the immense population base of China, can become a very powerful tool by which China can influence or manipulate the politics of her neighbors.

2. Literature: Political Orientations of Immigrants

A common finding of the literature on the political role of immigrants is that immigrants tend to have lower political participation than natives (Ramakrishnan and Espenshade, 2001; W. K. Cho, 1999; Junn, 1999). The level of participation varies with personal characteristics and the external environment of immigrants. For example, Leal (2002) showed that political participation of Latino immigrants in the United States would increase when they become more informed about politics. Black et al. (1987) showed that the older Canadian immigrants tend to be more politically active than the younger ones. Finifter and Finifter (1989) studied American migrants in Australia, and found that immigrants who are less ideologically committed to a US party tended to relinquish former party identification more easily.

Recent studies on immigrants’ attitudes focus on the political effects of migration on the sending countries. By analyzing election data from Mexico, Pfutze (2012) shows that migration promotes democratization by increasing the electoral support for opposition parties. Careja and Emmenegger (2012) showed that in Central and Eastern Europe, people who had experience of migration to the West tend to have more positive attitudes towards democracy.
Historically, many people migrated out of economic incentives. The improvement of material well-being after migration can make migrants more resourceful and politically active. The improvement of status can also bring about expression of more liberal views and other political aspirations (Mishler and Rose, 2001; Careja and Emmenegger, 2012). The political ideology of the migrants prior to migration should be an important factor for determining the urge to participate after migration. Those who came from an autocratic regime have less exposure to democratic ideas. As a result, some argue that immigrants from non-democracies are less capable of participating in politics even if they move to democratic countries (White et al., 2008; Black et al., 1987). Others contend that migrants socialized in a politically repressive environment tend to distrust politicians and government officials (Portes and Rumbaut, 2006; Bueker, 2005; Ramakrishnan, 2005; Fennema and Tillie, 1999), which may hinder their political integration in the host society. In contrast, DeSipio (1996) and De la Garza et al. (1996) believe that migrants from authoritarian states would have a stronger urge to participate in politics because they lacked such opportunities prior to migration.

The above studies discussed the relations between migrant status and propensity of political participation. There is less attention on the impact or orientations of migrants, after they acquire voting rights in host countries. Malaysia’s experience was instructive. In the 2013 elections, Barisan Nasional (BN), the ruling coalition in Malaysia, had its worst electoral performance in history, but managed to keep the parliamentary majority. The opposition had complained of numerous reported electoral malpractices. One was, as accused by the opposition campaign, to mobilize tens of thousands of foreign workers from less developed countries such as Bangladesh, Indonesia, and Myanmar to vote with faked identity cards (The New York Times, 2013). Sadiq (2005)
also argues that the influx of immigrants from the Philippines has strengthened BN's electoral support. There are cases where authoritarian regimes such as Singapore can allow foreign workers, with a certain salary level, to get citizen status and voting rights as soon as residing for two years. It shows that regime incumbents can manipulate the voter base by including or excluding immigrants. The key question is: is the political orientation of the immigrants always beneficial to the regime incumbents?

We argue that immigrants can be inherently more supportive of the host government, which means a conservative or competitive authoritarian government has an incentive to include more immigrants into the voter base. The first reason is that immigrants often lack political knowledge about the past performance of the ruling elite in the host country. As a result, they are less likely to be dissatisfied with the regime and supportive of the opposition. Immigrants as new comers also need extra information to make an informed choice during the elections. This information requirement may pose a difficulty for them to become “critical citizens”. Secondly, the fact that these immigrants choose to come to the host country in the first place suggests that they find its political status quo acceptable. Political information may play a far less important role in determining the political choice of immigrants in authoritarian regimes, because those who have self-selected to migrate to an authoritarian host country at least should find the regime form acceptable.

3. Chinese Immigrants in Hong Kong

We picked post-1997 Hong Kong as a case analysis for the above thesis. Since post-WWII years, Hong Kong has been a “refugee society” (Lau, 1984; Hughes, 1968). Since 1949, hundreds of thousands fled the
economic hardship and political turmoil in mainland China to come to Hong Kong. Before 1980, the Hong Kong government adopted the so-called “touch base policy”: Chinese and British soldiers on both sides of the border would try to stop illegal immigrants, sending them back to China upon arrest. If the illegal immigrants managed to get past the border without getting caught, they would be given identity cards and allowed to stay for good as legal residents.

These immigrants risked arrest and/or death to come to Hong Kong for both political and economic reasons. Before 1980s Hong Kong had no democracy, but personal freedom was largely respected, and had much better living standards than mainland China. The “touch-base” policy, however, was scrapped in 1980. From then on even if illegal immigrants managed to get to the city center, they would not be allowed to stay but would be sent back to China. This largely stopped the regular influx of Chinese migrants after 1980. The Hong-Kong-born took up a larger and larger portion of the Hong Kong population. A separate Hong Kong identity began to develop since the 1970s, as Hong Kong has a culture quite distinct from that of the mainland. Decolonization since the 1980s brought gradual democratization and the rise of a domestic democracy movement. Repeated opinion polls showed that the Hong Kong people were largely supportive of a faster transition to full democracy. The pro-democracy parties steadily obtained 55 to 64 percent of the popular vote share since 1991.

The 1989 Tiananmen crackdown shocked many Hong Kong people and firmly pit the Hong Kong democrats against the Beijing government. Since many of the Hong Kong democrats were actively in support of the democracy movement in China, the Chinese government was wary that full democracy would allow these “anti-China” elements take control of Hong Kong after 1997. The Basic Law (基本法), or the mini-constitution of Hong Kong after 1997, promised election of the
Chief Executive and the whole legislature by universal suffrage, but did not specify when this would be delivered. By 2016, only half of the legislature is elected by universal suffrage. The other half is elected from “functional constituencies” with a very narrow franchise, largely controlled by conservative and pro-Beijing business and professional groups. The Chief Executive has never been popularly elected, but was elected from an Election Committee representing largely the same groups as in the functional constituencies.

For studying the impact of immigrants on domestic elections, post-1997 Hong Kong is special in several respects. Post-1997 Hong Kong is a hybrid regime and a Special Administrative Region with a certain degree of autonomy. There are partial elections, and the popular elections for half of the legislature have been conducted in largely a free and fair manner. Civil liberties and rule of law in Hong Kong are constitutionally protected and maintains at a high level after 1997. This means that although Beijing wanted to control politics in Hong Kong, they have a few constraints. Basic freedom, including freedom to criticize the Hong Kong and Chinese governments, must be respected. The limited elections, as a venue to channel public opinion, need to be conducted in a free and fair manner, or regime legitimacy will be further damaged. Yet Beijing wants to guarantee that the democrats cannot extend or seize power through these limited elections.

Beijing used various means to influence electoral politics in Hong Kong, including subsidizing pro-Beijing parties and groups by monetary and other resources. For decades, pro-democracy supporters in Hong Kong knew that they were voting against Beijing, as the latter claimed unequivocally that the democrats were anti-China. However, the democrats managed to hold a majority vote share in the popular election part of the Legislative Council (立法會). In recent years, there were more discussions that new immigrants from China were more
conservative and were solid supporters of the government and the pro-Beijing parties. In this light, Beijing could weaken the democrats by inundating Hong Kong with immigrants from mainland China, gradually transforming the composition of the voter population of Hong Kong. Brought up and socialized in mainland China, the political knowledge and ideology of the mainland immigrants were different from that of the Hong Kongers’. They could be more “nationalistic” or “patriotic”, and less supportive of the westernized values of democracy and rule of law.

As far as immigration from mainland China is concerned, Hong Kong is special in more than one way. Unlike most sovereign states, Hong Kong as a Special Administrative Region cannot totally decide on its own to allow or disallow immigration. On the other hand, although Hong Kong is under Chinese sovereignty, migration from other parts of China to Hong Kong is not as easy as movement between cities in the mainland. Under Article 22 of the Basic Law, mainland Chinese who wish to migrate to Hong Kong have to apply through the mainland authorities. After 1997, on each day 150 mainland residents got the “one-way permit” and get the right to come to Hong Kong, but the power of selection lies with the mainland authorities and not the Hong Kong government. This adds up to about 55,000 mainlanders immigrating to Hong Kong each year. From 1997 to 2014, 800,000 mainland citizens have obtained the One-way Permits to settle in Hong Kong. They would get permanent residence after seven years, which means they can enjoy voting rights and other welfare benefits. This is a sizeable mass of immigrants in a city with population of seven million, with the proportion likely to increase over time.

After 1997, there are other routes by which mainlanders can come and get residence in Hong Kong. Mainland students who studied in Hong Kong universities can work after graduation to stay long enough (usually seven years) to qualify for permanent residence. Since 2006, the
Hong Kong government has introduced the Quality Migrant Admission Scheme to attract mainland Chinese with high technical or professional skills. In the first half of 2013, there were about 2,500 successful applications, of which about 80 percent were mainland Chinese. The Admission Scheme for Mainland Talents and Professionals, implemented since 2003, include owners of companies based in Hong Kong. Between 2003 and 2013, about 67,000 mainlander migrated to Hong Kong through this scheme. During the same period, around 19,000 entered Hong Kong through the Capital Investment Entrant Scheme, which attracts people with considerable investment assets, with 87 percent of the successful applicants being mainland Chinese.

Despite all these channels of immigration, the influx of mainland Chinese immigrants would not have occurred had these mainland Chinese not wanted to migrate into Hong Kong. There were multiple reasons for their interest in coming to Hong Kong. First and foremost, the standard of living of Hong Kong is still significantly higher than most parts of mainland China. It is not surprising that many mainland Chinese would see the cosmopolitan city as a land of opportunity. Second, Hong Kong citizens under the “one country, two systems” principle enjoy far more civil liberties and political rights than residents on the mainland. Facebook and YouTube are not censored, while “one child policy” has never been applied. Hong Kong should appeal to those who value political and social freedoms. Third, many mainland Chinese immigrants are actually spouses of Hong Kong citizens. Family reunion provides them with a strong incentive to settle in Hong Kong.

4. Empirical Analysis

Based on the above discussion, one can see that self-selection plays a crucial role in the migration decision of mainland Chinese. They self-
select to come to Hong Kong because the city provides an environment that helps them achieve different goals in life. We argue that this self-selection mechanism has important political repercussions. Precisely because these immigrants value Hong Kong’s status quo, which motivated them to settle in the city, they have little incentive to support political forces that attempt to disrupt this status quo. In the context of Hong Kong’s democratization, we would expect to see the mainland Chinese immigrants are less likely to be sympathetic with the cause of pro-democracy parties, who have struggled for years to dismantle the existing political order.

In this section, we make an empirical investigation into the political attitudes of these mainland Chinese immigrants. In particular, we are primarily interested in three questions:

(1) Does the selection effect matter?
(2) If the selection effect matters, what kind of selection is it, political or economic?
(3) Do mainland Chinese immigrants identify themselves less with pro-democracy parties?

To answer these questions, we use data from the Asian Barometer Survey (ABS) Wave III, a survey of about 1,200 household interviews, where respondents were asked an extensive set of questions concerning their political values, party identification, and attitude toward democracy and political institutions. The respondents were selected using a stratified random sampling design. The survey was conducted between August and November of 2012. There were 1,207 individuals successfully interviewed. The Asian Barometer Survey provides important information to answer the above questions. For a list of ABS questions we used in the following empirical analysis, see the Appendix Table.
4.1. Hypotheses

We derive several testable hypotheses related to the above questions. As discussed, there are two potentially crucial factors that motivate mainland Chinese to seek migration into Hong Kong. The first is that the Chinese immigrants were mainly driven by economic concerns. Compared with most regions in the mainland, the living standard of Hong Kong, especially the wage level, is significantly higher. The Chinese immigrants may choose to move to Hong Kong in search for a better living and more economic opportunities.

The second reason is political consideration. Although the political system of Hong Kong is not fully democratic, Hong Kong people do enjoy substantially greater political freedom than mainland citizens. In fact, Hong Kong people are able to elect at least half of the legislative seats every four years. In this respect, the political system of Hong Kong is more democratic than that of other mainland cities. Hong Kong, therefore, may appeal to those who despise the stifling political climate of the mainland and those who value greater political freedom.

To find out whether the economic or political concerns play a more important role in shaping the Chinese immigrants’ decision of migration, we derive three testable hypotheses.

Hypothesis 1. Immigrants would view the economic situation of Hong Kong more favorably than natives.

If the Chinese immigrants in Hong Kong are mainly economic migrants, they would naturally view Hong Kong’s economic situation in a more positive light. This is not to say that all Chinese immigrants are able to improve their lot in the city. Some may become disillusioned after arriving in Hong Kong. However, those who failed to improve their relative economic status may well return to their hometown. Suffice it to
say, those who continue to stay – hence entering the survey sample – are probably the ones who could not have achieved the same economic standing back home. To these people, their background has conditioned their evaluation of Hong Kong’s economic situation. In contrast, if their migration motive is not economic, we would then not be able to see any systematic difference between immigrants and natives with respect to their economic evaluation, as many immigrants who fail to improve their economic status would still choose to stay in Hong Kong for other reason.

**Hypothesis 2. Immigrants show a lower degree of trust in the Chinese government than natives.**

If the Chinese immigrants in Hong Kong are driven by a desire for political freedom, their view of the Chinese government is likely negative. To put it another way, had they approved of the political status quo of the Chinese authoritarian state, they would not have had an incentive to emigrate in search for greater political freedom.

**Hypothesis 3. Immigrants are less proud of their identity as Chinese nationals than natives.**

Mainland Chinese have been socialized in a political environment, where information controls and state propaganda have a ubiquitous presence. The official media in China tend to discourage the discussion of ideas such as political freedom and Western-style liberal democracy. In contrast, concepts such as patriotism, national pride, or a more recent variant, the China Dream, are given more emphasis. If the political selection is at work, this suggests that these immigrants hold political freedom in high regard. For these people, who are willing to venture into

*Contemporary Chinese Political Economy and Strategic Relations: An International Journal 2(2) • 2016*
uncharted territory in pursuit of political freedom, the political indoctrination of the Chinese government seems to have little impact on them. We, therefore, have reason to believe that these immigrants would have a lower level of national pride.

Regardless of whether mainland Chinese immigrants are motivated by economic or political concerns, our theory predicts that they would be more inclined to identify themselves with the pro-establishment camp than the pro-democracy camp due to their satisfaction with the status quo compared with the natives. Hence, we have the next hypothesis:

Hypothesis 4. Immigrants are more likely to identify themselves with the pro-establishment camp.

4.2. Results

Our key variable of interest in the regression specifications is Immigrant, a dummy variable that takes a value of “1” if a respondent was not born in Hong Kong, and “0” otherwise. Because only Chinese immigrants were sampled in the survey, all immigrants in the data refer to Chinese immigrants.

As mentioned, mainland Chinese immigrants came to Hong Kong in different waves. Earlier settlers may share greater attitudinal similarities with the natives due to socialization over a longer period of time. For this reason, we include a variable Years after Immigration to control for this socialization effect.

We also add a number of control variables to reduce omitted variable biases. These variables include gender, education, income level, age, and age squared. The squared term of age is intended to capture potential non-linearity effect between age and the attitudinal constructs. All specifications contain religion and district fixed effects.
4.2.1. Economic or political selection?

The dependent variables for *Trust in Chinese Government* and *National Pride* are ordinal variables on a 4-point scale (Strongly disagree, disagree, agree, and strongly agree). We dichotomize these dependent variables, with the value “0” indicating disagreement and “1” agreement. The variable for *Economic Evaluation* is on a 5-point scale. For each of these dependent variables, we run two specifications using different estimation strategies. The results are presented in Table 1.

**Table 1 Mainland Chinese Immigrants: Political or Economic Selection?**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dependent Variable</th>
<th>Economic Evaluation</th>
<th>Trust in Chinese Government</th>
<th>National Pride</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>OLS</td>
<td>Ordered Logit</td>
<td>Ordered Logit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estimation Strategy</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Immigrant</td>
<td>0.311***</td>
<td>(0.086)</td>
<td>0.743***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Years after Immigration</td>
<td>-0.007***</td>
<td>(0.003)</td>
<td>-0.014**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>-0.164***</td>
<td>(0.054)</td>
<td>-0.445***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primary School</td>
<td>0.028</td>
<td>(0.078)</td>
<td>0.099</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secondary School</td>
<td>0.098</td>
<td>(0.082)</td>
<td>0.263</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>College</td>
<td>0.183*</td>
<td>(0.106)</td>
<td>0.484*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Married</td>
<td>0.092</td>
<td>(0.069)</td>
<td>0.255</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dependent Variable</td>
<td>Economic Evaluation</td>
<td>Trust in Chinese Government</td>
<td>National Pride</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------------</td>
<td>----------------------</td>
<td>----------------------------</td>
<td>----------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>OLS</td>
<td>Ordered Logit</td>
<td>Ordered Logit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income 8 - 15 K</td>
<td>-0.116</td>
<td>-0.337</td>
<td>-0.065</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.088)</td>
<td>(0.221)</td>
<td>(0.233)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income 15 - 25 K</td>
<td>0.010</td>
<td>-0.026</td>
<td>0.158</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.089)</td>
<td>(0.223)</td>
<td>(0.243)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income 25 - 40 K</td>
<td>0.089</td>
<td>0.132</td>
<td>0.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.100)</td>
<td>(0.246)</td>
<td>(0.279)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income above 40 K</td>
<td>-0.100</td>
<td>-0.317</td>
<td>-0.076</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.135)</td>
<td>(0.333)</td>
<td>(0.390)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>-0.022**</td>
<td>-0.042</td>
<td>0.021</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.010)</td>
<td>(0.026)</td>
<td>(0.025)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age Squared</td>
<td>0.000**</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.000)</td>
<td>(0.000)</td>
<td>(0.000)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>3.329***</td>
<td>-0.028</td>
<td>-2.910**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.359)</td>
<td>(1.597)</td>
<td>(1.457)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cut-off 1</td>
<td>-1.786*</td>
<td>-2.062</td>
<td>0.622</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.929)</td>
<td>(1.575)</td>
<td>(1.078)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cut-off 2</td>
<td>0.527</td>
<td>-0.066</td>
<td>1.808*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.926)</td>
<td>(1.559)</td>
<td>(1.088)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cut-off 3</td>
<td>3.109**</td>
<td>5.176***</td>
<td>0.622</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.556)</td>
<td>(1.112)</td>
<td>(1.078)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Observations</td>
<td>983</td>
<td>983</td>
<td>916</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>915</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>906</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>904</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
As may be seen from Table 1, our variable of interest is statistically significant in all specifications, suggesting that they hold attitudes fairly different from the natives, the baseline group. First, consider economic evaluation. The coefficient on the variable of interest, Immigrant, is statistically significant regardless of the estimation strategy, indicating that the Chinese immigrants in Hong Kong view the city’s economy more favorably than natives. The results suggest that many immigrants are able to improve their economic well-being after migrating to Hong Kong. The substantive significance of the variable of interest is modest. The OLS estimate is 0.311, which is about 40 percent of a standard deviation of the dependent variable.

Next, consider the possibility of political selection. Contrary to our expectation, these immigrants actually have more trust in the Chinese government and greater national pride than the natives. The coefficient on Immigrant is statistically significant in all specifications related to national pride and trust in Chinese government, suggesting that the difference between the immigrants and the natives is unlikely due to chance alone.

It is also important to note that the variable Years after Immigration is also statistically significant across specifications. The sign of this variable is negative, suggesting that the differences between immigrants and natives will gradually narrow. The rate of convergence, however, seems quite low. Take Trust in Chinese Government as an example. It takes roughly 40 years for an immigrant’s trust to decrease to the level of a native. The weak substantive significance suggests the limits of socialization.

As for other control variables, we only report those with statistically significant coefficients. Female respondents tend to have less positive evaluation of Hong Kong’s economic situation and lower national pride.
Married people tend to have greater trust in the Chinese government. Interestingly, they also have lower national pride. Respondents with a college degree tend to view the economic situation more positively than those without any education. Age also matters when it comes to national pride. Older respondents are more likely to feel proud of their national identity.

The results of Table 1 show strong support for the economic-selection thesis. The mainland Chinese immigrants in Hong Kong seem to be motivated by economic concerns, rather than political ones, when they choose to settle in the city.

4.2.2. Party identification: Natives vs immigrants

A cursory examination of the data reveals that immigrants and natives differ significantly with respect to their party identification. The most important political cleavage in Hong Kong is that between the pro-democracy groups and the pro-Beijing groups. As can be seen from Table 2, two-thirds of the self-identified pan-democratic supporters are native Hong Kong people. On the other hand, of the pro-Beijing supporters, 56 percent are immigrants. The division is quite clear: natives tend to support the pro-democracy opposition, while immigrants the pro-Beijing camp.

Not everyone has a clear party identification. It is noteworthy that immigrants are 28 percent more likely to be unsure about which camp to support. For those who identify themselves as politically neutral, there is no significant difference between natives and immigrants.

The data shown in Table 2 are aggregate statistics that take no account of individual differences in characteristics. To ensure that the divergent political preferences are not driven by other personal qualities than immigrant status, we regress political identification on immigrant status and a set of control variables, including gender, education,
Table 2 Political Identification: Natives v. Immigrants

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Political Identification</th>
<th>Natives</th>
<th>Immigrants</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pro-establishment</td>
<td>0.445</td>
<td>0.555</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.043)</td>
<td>(0.043)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pan-democrat</td>
<td>0.665</td>
<td>0.335</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.035)</td>
<td>(0.035)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neutral</td>
<td>0.499</td>
<td>0.501</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.022)</td>
<td>(0.022)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unsure</td>
<td>0.363</td>
<td>0.637</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.036)</td>
<td>(0.036)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: Row proportions are reported. Standard errors of row proportions are in parentheses.

income, marital status, age, age squared, religion, and district fixed effects. We include age squared to capture the potential nonlinear effect of age on political identification. Table 3 contains the result of the multinomial logistic regression.

The dependent variable, political identification, has four categories: pan-democrat, pro-establishment, neutral, and unsure. We use “pan-democrat” as the baseline comparison group. As can be seen from Table 3, immigrants are more likely to identify as pro-establishment. Concretely, being an immigrant is associated with a 0.62 decrease in the relative log odds of identifying oneself as pro-establishment versus as pan-democrat. Expressing the effect in probability, immigrants are about 6 percent more likely than natives to identify with the pro-establishment camp than with the pan-democratic one. The difference is statistically significant at 5 percent.
### Table 3 Effect of Immigration Status on Political Identification: Multinomial Logistic Regression

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Pro-establishment</th>
<th>Neutral</th>
<th>Unsure</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Immigrant</td>
<td>0.621** (0.278)</td>
<td>0.282 (0.216)</td>
<td>0.690*** (0.256)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>0.214 (0.261)</td>
<td>0.296 (0.209)</td>
<td>0.518** (0.253)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primary School</td>
<td>0.491 (0.472)</td>
<td>0.149 (0.370)</td>
<td>-0.476 (0.410)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle School</td>
<td>0.531 (0.502)</td>
<td>-0.189 (0.402)</td>
<td>-0.930** (0.463)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>College</td>
<td>1.170** (0.567)</td>
<td>-0.099 (0.465)</td>
<td>-0.999* (0.576)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Married</td>
<td>0.178 (0.329)</td>
<td>0.273 (0.249)</td>
<td>-0.053 (0.290)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income (8 - 15K)</td>
<td>0.316 (0.449)</td>
<td>0.484 (0.357)</td>
<td>0.015 (0.416)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income (15 - 25K)</td>
<td>0.110 (0.429)</td>
<td>0.119 (0.347)</td>
<td>-0.401 (0.404)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income (25 - 40K)</td>
<td>-0.369 (0.484)</td>
<td>0.127 (0.381)</td>
<td>-0.775* (0.469)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income above 40K</td>
<td>-0.905 (0.556)</td>
<td>-1.060** (0.458)</td>
<td>-1.223** (0.575)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 3 (continued)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Pro-establishment</th>
<th>Neutral</th>
<th>Unsure</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>0.127***</td>
<td>0.068*</td>
<td>0.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.049)</td>
<td>(0.035)</td>
<td>(0.039)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age Squared</td>
<td>-0.001**</td>
<td>-0.001*</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.000)</td>
<td>(0.000)</td>
<td>(0.000)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-4.079*</td>
<td>-0.380</td>
<td>-13.603***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(2.149)</td>
<td>(1.631)</td>
<td>(1.724)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>993</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As for the control variables, only college degrees and age have significant effects on one’s identification with the pro-establishment camp. One is more likely to identify oneself as a pro-establishment supporter, as one grows older. But the rate of decline also decreases over time, as shown by the negative and significant coefficient on age squared. Compared with respondents with no formal education, those with a college degree are more likely to identify themselves as pro-establishment.

4.2.3. Robustness checks

Our argument is concerned mainly with the immigration policies of post-colonial Hong Kong. Yet, as mentioned in the previous section, Hong Kong experienced multiple waves of a massive influx of Chinese immigrants in the postwar period. Early Chinese immigrants may differ
from those who arrived in Hong Kong after 1997 in two important respects. First, many of the early comers fled China to escape political unrest such as the Cultural Revolution, whereas the latecomers may be too young to have any memory of such upheaval. Second, those who came to Hong Kong after 1997 have never encountered many draconian colonial policies that the early comers endured before the 1980s. These experiences are likely to leave mixed impacts on the early comers; while the political unrest in the mainland may undermine their trust in the CCP, the oppressive colonial rule may increase their nationalism. To ensure that the effect of economic selection is robust to the inclusion of the early comers, who have life experiences markedly different from the latecomers, we reran the regressions by excluding all the early comers. The results are presented in Table 4.

Table 4 Robustness Checks: Excluding Early Comers

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dependent Variable</th>
<th>Economic Evaluation</th>
<th>Trust in Chinese Government</th>
<th>National Pride</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>OLS</td>
<td>Ordered Logit</td>
<td>Logit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estimation Strategy</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post 1997 Immigrant</td>
<td>0.358*** (0.084)</td>
<td>0.834*** (0.232)</td>
<td>0.613*** (0.216)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Years After Immigration</td>
<td>-0.184*** (0.069)</td>
<td>-0.501*** (0.184)</td>
<td>-0.001 (0.194)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>0.014 (0.112)</td>
<td>0.027 (0.281)</td>
<td>-0.442 (0.335)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primary School</td>
<td>0.162 (0.112)</td>
<td>0.361 (0.289)</td>
<td>-0.054 (0.337)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*CCPS Vol. 2 No. 2 (August/September 2016)*
Table 4 (continued)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dependent Variable</th>
<th>Economic Evaluation</th>
<th>Trust in Chinese Government</th>
<th>National Pride</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>OLS</td>
<td>Ordered Logit</td>
<td>Ordered Logit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estimation Strategy</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secondary School</td>
<td>0.237* (0.130)</td>
<td>0.526 (0.335)</td>
<td>-0.685* (0.406)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>College</td>
<td>0.153* (0.091)</td>
<td>0.384 (0.239)</td>
<td>0.360 (0.251)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Married</td>
<td>-0.176 (0.125)</td>
<td>-0.521 (0.325)</td>
<td>0.007 (0.362)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income 8 - 15 K</td>
<td>-0.021 (0.131)</td>
<td>-0.165 (0.348)</td>
<td>0.078 (0.384)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income 15 - 25 K</td>
<td>0.068 (0.136)</td>
<td>0.055 (0.349)</td>
<td>0.203 (0.410)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income 25 - 40 K</td>
<td>-0.232 (0.174)</td>
<td>-0.564 (0.447)</td>
<td>0.434 (0.536)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income above 40 K</td>
<td>-0.010 (0.014)</td>
<td>-0.022 (0.036)</td>
<td>0.022 (0.039)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>0.000 (0.000)</td>
<td>0.000 (0.000)</td>
<td>0.000 (0.000)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age Squared</td>
<td>3.414*** (0.379)</td>
<td>13.630*** (1.120)</td>
<td>10.104*** (1.072)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-2.310** (1.034)</td>
<td>-4.332*** (1.506)</td>
<td>-0.722 (1.473)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Cut-off 1
Table 4 (continued)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dependent Variable</th>
<th>Economic Evaluation</th>
<th>Trust in Chinese Government</th>
<th>National Pride</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>OLS</td>
<td>Ordered Logit</td>
<td>Ordered Logit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estimation Strategy</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cut-off 2</td>
<td>0.038</td>
<td>-2.106</td>
<td>0.483</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.037)</td>
<td>(1.498)</td>
<td>(1.476)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cut-off 3</td>
<td></td>
<td>1.084</td>
<td>3.925***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(1.504)</td>
<td>(1.493)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Observations</td>
<td>592</td>
<td>552</td>
<td>545</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As may be seen from Table 4, the main results are nearly identical to those in Table 1. The latecomers view the economic situation more positively than the natives, and have a higher level of trust in the Chinese government and stronger national pride. As for the support for democracy, there is no significant difference between the latecomers and the natives. The results suggest that the results of Table 1 are not driven solely by the early comers.

Given the importance of economic selection, it is instructive to put it through a more severe test. Central to economic selection is the idea that migrating into Hong Kong can improve one’s economic well-being. “Improvement” is a dynamic process that involves changes, whereas the variable Economic Evaluation that we examine in Table 1 is essentially a static measurement. Fortunately, the Asian Barometer Survey contains additional questions that help us explore the concept of “improvement” more rigorously.
Theoretically, “improvement” may refer to two distinctive processes. The first is *realized* improvement; immigrants decide to stay in Hong Kong because their economic conditions have actually improved. The second is *prospective* improvement; immigrants decide to stay because they expect that their economic conditions will eventually improve. We operationalize the concepts of realized and prospective improvement by using two questions in the Asian Barometer Survey. The first question asks the respondents to evaluate the current economic situation of their family compared with five years ago, while the second question asks the respondents to predict the economic conditions of their family five years later. We compare the average scores of these questions between natives and immigrants. To precisely identify the effect of realized improvement, we confine our immigration sample only to those who arrived in Hong Kong in less than five years. For these immigrants, their answers to the realized improvement question would give us a clear-cut comparison between their life in Hong Kong and the one back in the mainland.

As may be seen from Table 5, immigrants give a higher rating than natives on average, no matter whether we examine realized improvement or prospective improvement. For realized improvement, the difference between the two groups is statistically significant at about 10 percent. But for prospective improvement, the difference is significantly different from zero, suggesting that immigrants’ outlook for their family economic conditions is far more positive than natives’. The results of Table 5 provide strong support for the argument of economic selection: the Chinese immigrants come to Hong Kong in anticipation of an improvement of their economic standing.
Table 5 Robustness Checks: Economic Selection for Immigrants with Length of Residence < 5 years

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>(a) Immigrant Average</th>
<th>(b) Native Average</th>
<th>(a) - (b)</th>
<th>P-value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Family economic conditions compared with 5 years ago</td>
<td>3.133 (0.142) [30]</td>
<td>2.903 (0.033) [535]</td>
<td>0.231</td>
<td>0.1061</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Expected family economic conditions 5 years later</td>
<td>3.548 (0.121) [31]</td>
<td>3.084 (0.028) [533]</td>
<td>0.464</td>
<td>0.0001</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

5. Conclusion

This study postulates that immigrants may be in general more supportive of the government in a hybrid regime, because of a self-selection process. Migrants usually find it easier to accept the political status quo of the host country and have less urge for progressive change, hence less likely to support the opposition. The case of Hong Kong shows that the immigrants from China are in general more politically conservative and more supportive of the pro-Beijing ruling coalition in elections. Our study shows a strong selection effect in the case of Hong Kong. In particular, the migration decision of the Chinese immigrants is based more on economic, rather than political, considerations. In the presence of these pro-establishment immigrants, also with their rising numbers, the pro-democracy movement in Hong Kong is likely to meet resistance in years to come. As Wong (2015) points out, post-colonial Hong Kong experiences two concurrent, yet seemingly contradictory, political
trends. On the one hand, the civil society has become more vocal in its demand for democratization, as witnessed in the 2014 Occupy Movement. On the other hand, the pro-establishment camp has received an increasing electoral support. The pro-establishment camp’s aggressive cultivation of grassroots political machine may have contributed to their electoral success (Wong, 2014). Yet, the findings in this paper provide another explanation for these anomalous political developments: the establishment may take advantage of the influx of mainland Chinese immigrants, who are pro-status quo, to increase its electoral support to counter-balance the rising democratization demands of the natives.

Our findings have profound implications in the analysis of the geopolitics and strategy of the Asian region, in particular concerning the role of the huge population of China. If China is able to “export” its population to its neighboring (democratic) states, as its people are politically more conservative and have more sympathy to the “China model”, it can have substantial impact on the electoral politics of other Asian states. With investors and labor from China making their marks all over the world, and with China’s huge population, this political impact cannot be overlooked. Hong Kong is special in that it is not an autonomous state capable of resisting this trend. The democrats in Hong Kong suspected that the Hong Kong government collaborated with Beijing to let in more immigrants in order to consolidate its rule. Other states in the region should take into account the possible strategic implications and political impacts of Chinese immigrants in their domestic politics.

Notes

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References


### Appendix Table

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Hypothesis</th>
<th>Concept</th>
<th>Question Number</th>
<th>Question Asked</th>
<th>Answers</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Political Identification</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>Many people think that Hong Kong politics is competition between the “pan-democratic” and the “pro-establishment” camps. Some feel that they support the former camp, while others think they support the latter. In your case, do you support the “pan-democratic” or the “pro-establishment” camp?</td>
<td>1. Pan-democrat</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>2. Pro-establishment</td>
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<td>3. Neutral/</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Neither</td>
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<td></td>
<td>8. Unsure</td>
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<td></td>
<td>9. Decline to answer</td>
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### Appendix Table (continued)

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<th>Hypothesis</th>
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<th>Question Number</th>
<th>Question Asked</th>
<th>Answers</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Trust in Chinese Government</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>Please tell me how much trust do you have in the National Government? Is it a great deal of trust, quite a lot of trust, not very much trust, or none at all?</td>
<td>1. A great deal of trust&lt;br&gt;2. Quite a lot of trust&lt;br&gt;3. Not very much trust&lt;br&gt;4. None at all&lt;br&gt;8. Can't choose&lt;br&gt;9. Decline to answer</td>
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### Appendix Table (continued)

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<tr>
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<th>Concept</th>
<th>Question Number</th>
<th>Question Asked</th>
<th>Answers</th>
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</thead>
</table>
| Family                          | Economic Conditions                           | 5               | How would you compare the current economic condition of your family with what it was a few years ago? Is it ...? | 1. Much better now  
2. A little better now  
3. About the same  
4. A little worse now  
5. Much worse now  
8. Can’t choose  
9. Decline to answer |
|                                 | Compared with Five Years Ago                  |                 |                                                                                |                                                  |
| Expected                        | Family Economic Conditions Five Years Later   | 6               | What do you think the economic situation of your family will be a few years from now? Will it be ...? | 1. Much better  
2. A little better  
3. About the same  
4. A little worse  
5. Much worse  
8. Can’t choose  
9. Decline to answer |
|                                 |                                              |                 |                                                                                |                                                  |
The Rise of Civic Nationalism:
Shifting Identities in Hong Kong and Taiwan

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University of British Columbia

Abstract
The rise of civic nationalism in both Hong Kong and Taiwan indicates a prominence of democratic liberal values which are contributing to the further rejection of an ethnonational Chinese identity imposed by Beijing. Using the 2014 Umbrella Movement in Hong Kong and the Sunflower Movement in Taiwan as case studies, this paper examines how the rise of civic nationalism is furthering the nation-building project of Hong Kong and Taiwanese identities. Following a comparison between the Umbrella Movement and the Sunflower Movement in terms of the sequence of events, the paper identifies the impact of the movements on both societies through an examination of the successes and failures of each movement, the rise of new political forces and party politics, as well as political institutions. The paper concludes by discussing the implications of the widening identity gap of Hong Kong and Taiwan from China.
Keywords: Hong Kong, Umbrella Movement, Taiwan, Sunflower Movement, political identities, civic nationalism, social movements

1. Introduction

Identity politics in Hong Kong and Taiwan have become inherently more complex over the last decade due increasing threats and changes to both of these societies. Despite being largely ethnic Chinese societies, Hong Kong and Taiwan are very different from China due to their differentiated histories which have been influenced by multiple factors including foreign colonial rule, their separate independent governments and experiences with democratization. As a result, Hong Kong and Taiwan have developed their own unique local and national identities, both of which are attempting to defend themselves against China’s increasingly powerful presence in today’s globalized world.

As Malte Philipp Kaeding argues, Hong Kong and Taiwan are an excellent comparative case study due to their “similar socio-economic background and development, and an authoritarian past that de-emphasized political participation through a strong emphasis on traditional Chinese (political) culture” (Kaeding, 2011: 258). Most recently, another similarity has appeared with the occurrence of Hong Kong’s Umbrella Movement (香港雨伞運動) and Taiwan’s Sunflower Movement (臺灣太陽花學運). Both movements shared similar ideas, upholding ideas of democracy, self-determination of the people and peaceful protest. Student participants protested on the streets and occupied key areas where law enforcement attempted to disperse the protestors. They both focused on not only addressing their respective governments about their concerns but also the institutions in question which risked being influenced by China and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). In both places, the rise of civic nationalism has been rooted
in the ideas of universal values including freedom, democracy as well as clean and transparent institutions, forces which are opposing the “China factor” as external threats to both societies. This paper seeks to further examine the relationship between civic nationalism and the rise of student activism through a further analysis of both movements. In this process, the paper will identify keys similarities and differences in the ways civic nationalism has manifested itself in both places through an examination of the successes and failures of each movement, the rise of new political forces and party politics, as well as political institutions.

2. Nationalism as an Analytical Framework

Research on national identity has produced several theories that address different conceptions of identity formation. On one hand, political scientists such as Donald Horowitz and his work in *Ethnic Groups in Conflict* examine “ethnicity” as an umbrella concept that “easily embraces groups differentiated by color, language, and religion; it covers ‘tribes,’ ‘races,’ ‘nationalities,’ and castes.” (Chandra, 2006: 398). Such an analysis suggests that the nation is a community which can be defined through the ethnicity or blood connections between people. On the other hand, Benedict Anderson’s theory of *Imagined Communities* argues against this discourse and looks at the ways in which the imagined collective experience can form communities constructed by a common social experience, since nations are “imagined political communities” which are “imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign” (Anderson, 1991: 6). This conception of a civic nation is based upon the principle that the nation is formed through the choice of individuals. These viewpoints have shaped the debate as to whether nations are based upon ascriptive or acquired characteristics.
Nationalism, a social movement on behalf of the nation, can be further split along these two lines, divided along principles of ethnic nationalism and civic nationalism. While other scholars have used various definitions, the main difference between these two terms is how membership within the collective community is defined. Ethnic nationalism is based upon a “given” criteria of ethnicity presented as a form of “ascriptive identity” which is in turn based upon variously defined elements ranging from a myth of common decent or other “given” criteria such as language or religion to demark ethnic differentiation (Keating, 2001: 4). The main premise is that this type of identity is “given” rather than “chosen” by the individual. In contrast, civic nationalism is a type of nation-building which is formed by “a collective enterprise of [...] members [...] rooted in an acquired rather than ascriptive identity” (Keating, 2001: 6). The acquired identity is based upon common values and patterns of social interaction which are demonstrated through institutions and historical memory. Therefore, an individual “irrespective of birth or ethnic origins” can become a member of the community through adaptation of a certain set of political and social interactions that are defined by common values and a sense of common identity (ibid.).

In the context of Hong Kong and Taiwan, the emergence of civic nations has occurred through the rejection of a Beijing-centred ethno-Chinese nationalism and the valuing of democracy and freedom under the norms of a largely democratic international system. As scholar Shirley Lin notes, although people from these two regions may “acknowledge their Chinese roots… this does not translate easily into a common national identity” (Lin, 2014: 116). Given the agenda of the student protestors in the Sunflower Movement and the Umbrella Movement and the rejection of the notion of a “political China” in both
scenarios, an analysis of the ways in which civic nationalism has operated in both regions will shed more light on the future prospects for identity formation in both regions.2 Since identity is fluid and consistently changing concept, a variety of factors must also be considered including “cultural norms, political priorities, social expectations, national economic development aspirations, geopolitical contexts and historical antecedents” (Lien, 2014: 26).

3. Hong Kong and the Umbrella Movement

The return of Hong Kong to the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in 1997 created a series of events which produced great dissatisfaction in the post-colonial era. On the political front, the protests on the 1st July 2003, the sixth anniversary of the handover became some of the earliest signs of the Hong Kong’s people de-identification with China when the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (HKSAR) Government led by the first Chief Executive Tung-Chee Wah 董建華 attempted to pass legislation which would enact a security law based upon Article 23 of the Hong Kong Basic Law (基本法), which “prohibit[s] any act of treason, secession, sedition, subversion against the Central People's Government” (Hong Kong Basic Law, 1997). Such a policy, which was eventually repealed, brought fears to the Hong Kong people that the government would attempt to limit the freedom of expression as it occurs in China. Meanwhile, on the economic front, the HKSAR Government and the Central Government in Beijing signed the Closer Economic Partnership Arrangement (CEPA) which acted as a free trade agreement that “offered a timely economic boost by providing preferential access to Mainland markets in 18 services areas and eliminating tariffs on 374 Mainland product codes” (HKSAR Information Services Department, 2013). The “immediate and visible
impact” of CEPA however came in the form of relaxed restriction on cross-boundary travel between Hong Kong and China (HKSAR Information Services Department, 2013). The results of the new scheme resulted in boosting Hong Kong’s economy to pre-SARS levels through the estimated 800,000 to 900,000 Mainland visitors who travelled to Hong Kong monthly between 2003 and 2004 (Ngok, 2011: 692). Despite the initial positive effects of this agreement, CEPA made Hong Kong's economy increasingly more dependent on China's economy.

Growing tensions further escalated through a series of people-to-people events including the January 2012 Dolce & Gabbana incident in which local news reports stated that the company had prevented Hong Kong locals from taking pictures outside the store, while Chinese tourists were allowed (Krupnick, 2012). That same month, Kong Qingdong 孔慶東, a Peking University professor, had stated that Hong Kong people were disloyal to China and continued to maintain a colonial mentality and labelled them as “dogs” after an incident with a Chinese tourist eating on the MTR went viral on social media.3

The HKSAR Government also attempted to implement a more vigorous vision of citizenship which attempted to bridge the identity gap by trying to foster feelings of a National Chinese identity that emphasized a “shared ethnocultural heritage” with China through the Moral and National Education (MNE) Curriculum (Han, 2015: 244). However the rise of student groups such as Scholarism ( 學民思潮 ), led by student leader Joshua Wong 黃之鋒, resisted the reforms through protests, sit-ins and the mobilization of Hong Kong youth. The students successfully delayed the implementation of the curriculum described as “ethnocentric language calling for national unity based on geography, blood, and ethnic commonalities” (Lin, 2014: 123).

The culmination of dissatisfaction by the Hong Kong people led to the eventual Umbrella Movement in Hong Kong after the Standing
Committee of the National People's Congress (NPCSC) came to a
decision on the 31st August 2014 that the 2017 election for the Chief
Executive would allow for the quasi-democratic election of the Chief
Executive with only candidates pre-approved by Beijing allowed on the
ballot. This decision however was met with intense opposition from
Hong Kong Pan-Democrats since Article 45 of the Hong Kong Basic
Law states that “the aim is the selection of the Chief Executive by
Universal Suffrage upon nomination by a broadly represented
nomination committee with democratic procedures” (Hong Kong Basic
Law, 1997). Thus the characterization of Hong Kong’s current political
dilemma as the Umbrella Movement demonstrated is centred around the
“Hong Kong people[’s] demand [for] genuine universal suffrage in the
2017 election for the next Chief Executive (CE)” for what locals
describe as “true democracy’ in the sense that people will have real
choices of candidates, not simply among those pre-selected by Beijing”
(Yeung, 2014). This decision by Beijing was seen as the violation of the
Hong Kong Basic Law and the guarantee of Hong Kong’s autonomy
under “One Country, Two Systems” (一國兩制，OCTS). The
subsequent sit-in protests between the 26th September 2014 and the 14th
December 2014 became colloquially known as the Umbrella Movement,
which became a sign of opposition against these reforms and the
rejection of Beijing politics. The movement had reverberating effects on
society, further polarizing pan-democratic (泛民主派 / 泛民) 
supporters and those who support the pro-establishment (建制派) 
policies.

The Umbrella Movement came about through the formation of
different groups fighting for the universal suffrage of Hong Kong’s
Chief Executive, with each group however attempting to use different
means to achieve this goal.⁴ On one hand, the Occupy Central
Movement (OCM) led by University of Hong Kong law professor
Benny Tai 戴耀廷 was inspired by his January 2014 piece in the *Hong Kong Economic Journal* (信報財經新聞) arguing that civil disobedience was necessary to generate pressure on the PRC Government to reform the system. The OCM was further supported by Chan Kin-man 陳健民, an Associate Professor of Sociology at Chinese University of Hong Kong (CUHK) and Chu Yiu-ming 朱耀明, a local Baptist church minister, who were both recruited by Tai. Through the mantra of “Occupy Central with Love and Peace” ( 識愛與和平佔領中環 / 和平佔中 ), the OCM had only intended to occupy Chater Garden for a few days, and after being arrested would return back to work since Tai had worked with the pan-democrats to used OCM as a bargaining chip with Beijing in order to reform the Universal Suffrage package (Ng, 2016: 136). The OCM group was met with tensions from the Umbrella Movement student coalition who was led by Joshua Wong from Scholarism and Alex Chow 周永康 and Lester Shum 岑敖暉 from the Hong Kong Federation of Students ( 香港專上學生聯會，HKFS). Wong, in response to the OCM’s peaceful demonstration proposal stated that it was not “meaningful or adequate” in “send[ing] a message to the government” or having Beijing listen to the concerns of the students (Wong, 2015: 43-52). Instead, Wong proposed and successfully worked with the Hong Kong Federation of Students to take control of Civic Square, an action at the time seen as “radical” in comparison to all of the previous actions the students had taken, and thus created limited cooperation between the Student Coalition and those OCM supporters who were backed by pan-democrats (*ibid*).

A faction of radical localists contrasted themselves with the peaceful and non-violent method that Benny Tai advocated and the student coalition by suggesting that a more aggressive militant approach was needed instead of the strict principles of non-violence advocated by the three promoters of Occupy Central (Fung, 2015: 9). These localists
believed the mild confrontation tactics of pan-democrats had not been successful in democratizing Hong Kong since the 1997 handover. Therefore, these localists supported a more militant use of violence to force Beijing to accept the demand of Hong Kongers.

The OCM mantra of peaceful protest was already broken by the second day of the movement when police attempted to remove the students from the Civic Square by force and used tear gas to dispel the protesters (Ng, 2016: 64-75, 92-105). The student coalition quickly became the dominant force of the movement who later on met with Carrie Lam 林鄭月娥, Hong Kong’s Chief Secretary, on the 21st October 2014. The meeting however was not successful due to the refusal of the government to concede to the demands of protestors. Such a conflict created a situation whereby it was deemed both parties had no “exit strategy”, further dragging out the movement longer than was initially anticipated. When students attempted to make a final push to mobilize and take over the government buildings on the 19th November 2014, the police deployed water cannons and used force to stop the protestors. The movement finally ended on the 15th December 2014 after 79 days of protest when the police forcibly cleared protestors after court injunctions were put in place by pro-Beijing groups, effectively ending the movement (Lin, 2015).

Although the Umbrella Movement was unable to achieve its goal of universal suffrage, the event had reverberating effects on society which fundamentally changed Hong Kong’s political atmosphere. While Beijing may have secured its political control over Hong Kong, it resulted in the rapid rise of localism and the new political awakening among a generation of Hong Kong youth to defend their home. In January 2015, only months after the end of the Umbrella Movement, two new political parties, Youngspiration (青年新政) and Hong Kong Indigenous (本土民主前線) rose out of the conflicts between different
pro-democracy protestors and the rise of Hong Kong localism. Their entrance in Hong Kong’s political scene suggests that the failure of the Umbrella Movement to achieve its goals drove many students to shift their affiliation towards localists camps who would use more militant means to achieve their goals. The manifestos of both parties reveal their sentiments towards student leadership and traditional pan-democrats.

Hong Kong Indigenous (HKI) became a party known for advocating the use of more aggressive means of violence, arguing that “the old resistance methods have failed against the authorities” (Hong Kong Indigenous, n.d.). Furthermore, HKI expressed discontent for the Communist Party stating not only that “One Country, Two Systems is just a scam under the Communist Party rule” but that pan-democratic legislators have failed the Hong Kong people, stating that “[d]ay after day we local Hong Kong people lose our rights and indigenous values to the Chinese Communist Party, while the pan-democratic legislators indulge in their own ‘China Dream’” (Hong Kong Indigenous, n.d.).

Likewise, the rise of another youth-based group Youngspiration, also demonstrates the failure of the mainstream student movement and the principles of non-violence in attempting to enact democratic reforms. They argue that “after 79 days of fruitless Umbrella Revolution”, Hong Kong continues to be suppressed by both the HKSAR government and the government in Beijing, declaring that the latter has “accelerated on a daily basis its unscrupulous invasion into Hong Kong in terms of population, economy and culture, etc.” (Youngspiration, n.d.). Similar to HKI, Youngspiration also maintains the principles of a democratic localism, which advocates the idea of a bottom-up approach that gives “just and fair, priority to Hong Kongers” (ibid). Localists argue that the principles of incorporating a democratic China into the future of Hong Kong diminishes the ability of Hong Kongers to represent the interests of the city. Such actions can be seen in the student union referendums at
multiple universities (e.g. Hong Kong University, Hong Kong Polytechnic University, Hong Kong Baptist University and City University of Hong Kong) to leave the Hong Kong Federation of Students due to its political belief in “building a Democratic China” into its platform (Fung and Ng, 2015). In addition, localists have also suggested that the June 4th protests should also move away from commemorating an event that occurred in China, and not Hong Kong. ⁶

The inability of the largely peaceful Umbrella Movement to secure universal suffrage also encouraged the emergence of more radical localist groups to seek greater use of violence during the 2016 Lunar New Year demonstrations in Mong Kok, which raised concerns from other Hong Kong activists and intellectuals who see such tactics as unacceptable and not reflecting the values of the majority (Kwan, 2016). The protests simultaneously occurred with an important by-election in the New Territories East Constituency which further showed the political polarization between pro-Beijing, pan-democrat and localist groups, with one candidate, Edward Leung 梁天琦 from Hong Kong Indigenous (HKI), also participating and subsequently arrested for his participation in the Lunar New Year demonstrations. As conflict between government and protesters is intensified, the collateral damage will likely be that everyday life will become hijacked by political battles, with many ordinary citizens caught in the middle (*ibid.*).

4. Taiwan and the Sunflower Movement

In contrast to Hong Kong, where the 1997 handover directly altered Hong Kong’s political scene, the politics of Taiwan has been typically cast as the divide along strong ideological divisions between a KMT (Kuomintang, 國民黨) Chinese nationalism and a DPP (Democratic Progressive Party, 民主進步黨) Taiwanese independence. Beijing’s
conception of the Chinese nation (中華民族) emerges as another external threat to Taiwan as China seeks to reunify with the island, as Xi Jinping 習近平 stated during the 2015 Ma-Xi Meeting that, “we [China and Taiwan] are brothers connected by flesh even if our bones are broken, we are a family whose blood is thicker than water” (Wen, 2015). Despite Taiwan’s historical and cultural distinctiveness, China attempts to argue that the Chinese nation is ethnically homogeneous, attempting to group Taiwan with the Han Chinese majority in China.

The Taiwanese people however have a long differentiated history of civic action, especially through the Tangwai 黨外 Movement in the 1970s and 1980s whereby the DPP emerged as an opposition force representing a local Taiwanese identity. Protests have been a long and large part of Taiwanese expression but took special prominence in the period after martial law was lifted. Student movements have been extremely popular within the last few decades, with youth organizing important social movements including the 1990 Wild Lily Student Movement (野百合學運), which sought direct elections of Taiwan's President and Vice-President and popular elections for all representatives in the Legislative Yuan (立法院) as well as the Wild Strawberries Movement (野草莓運動) in 2008 which protested the visit of Chen Yunlin 陳雲林, the chairman of the Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Straits (ARATS) to Taiwan.

The election of President Ma Ying-jeou 馬英九 from 2008 to 2016 also saw the warming of cross-Strait relations and close economic and political ties between China and Taiwan under his administration. The beginning of Ma’s presidency also coincided with the Wild Strawberries Movement, marking the beginning of a string of further conflicts between the government and protestors who disagreed with Taiwan’s closer relationship with China. On the economic front, the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA), which was presented as a
preferential trade agreement between Taiwan and China became a highly debated topic. A major point of concern raised was the quick passing of ECFA without the proper preliminary and secondary legislative review process, which would allow transparency and oversight. Combined with the concerns that ECFA would create economic overreliance on China, a transparent review process was also desired due to the lack of transparency of the Chinese government. Despite these concerns, ECFA was passed and came into effect on September 12, 2010.  

Meanwhile, the question of free speech also came into question when Jimmy Lai 黎智英, the Hong Kongese owner of Next Media ( 壹傳媒 ), sold the Taiwan Division of the company to Want Want China Times (旺旺中時媒體集團) and its pro-China Taiwanese Chairman Tsai Eng-meng 蔡衍明. The purchase raised concerns about media transparency as the deal would give Tsai control of approximately 45% of Taiwan’s media market (Cole, 2015: 22). This event has been regarded as the beginning of civic activism among Taiwanese youth, who, through the “Alliance Against Media Monsters” launched two protests in November 2012 to protect the diversity of voices within Taiwanese media (ibid.). As J. Michael Cole argues, the events of Next Media buyout became linked to several other issues in Taiwanese society including the demolition of Losheng Sanatorium (樂生療養院), the production of unsafe nuclear energy, nuclear waste storage on Aboriginal land in Lanyu 蘭嶼, forced evictions in several Taipei 臺北 districts (Shilin 士林, Huaguang 華光, Taoyuan 桃園) and Dapu 大埔 in Miaoli County (苗栗縣), Aboriginal land expropriation, as well as Anti-Black Box Curriculum Movement (反黒箱課綱運動) which sought to implement controversial changes to textbook education (Cole, 2015: 288). Eventual leaders of the Sunflower Movement, such as Lin Fei-fan 林飛帆, were active participants in many of these preceding events such as the 2008 Wild Strawberry Movement, the protests
opposing acquisition of Next Media by Tsai Eng-meng and the protests against the bulldozing of Huaguang community near Chiang Kai-Shek Memorial Hall (中正紀念堂) (ibid). The commonality between these events derives itself from the overlapping leadership who would eventually come together to protest against the KMT government.

The Sunflower Movement occurred from March 18 to April 10, 2014 after the Cross-Strait Service Trade Agreement (CSSTA) was unilaterally approved by the KMT government. Taiwanese students and other civic groups protested against the CSSTA, raising concerns of closed-door negotiations and “the passing of the Cross-Strait Service Trade Agreement (CSSTA) by the ruling party Kuomintang (KMT) at the legislature without a clause-by-clause review” (Cole, 2014). With the KMT holding a majority in the legislature (65 out of the 113 seats), the agreement was approved regardless of the voices amounting from the opposition. The CSSTA was seen as the controversial follow-up agreement to ECFA which raised further concerns of the negative impact that economic integration could have on Taiwan’s economy as well as other concerns of freedom of speech and the compromised position of democracy on the island. Although issues of democratic governance, accountability and public trust were at the forefront of the Sunflower protests, other observers also suggested that the CSSTA would also create several issues which would exacerbate the problems of rising unemployment and inequality and further risks of opening Taiwan to further economic dependence on China and its larger economy (Fan, 2014). As such, the issue of procedural democracy became a main concern and the relationship with China took an important secondary focus. The combination of academics, students and other civic organizations protested the hasty approval of the CSSTA which resulted in the eventual occupation of Taiwan’s Legislative Yuan. Despite the media’s portrayal of the “undemocratic” seizure of the legislature,
Taiwan’s civil society remained peaceful and democratic, asking authorities to not only implement a monitoring mechanism to oversee future bilateral negotiations with China but also to meet them on their demands for the government’s transparency in negotiating with Beijing due to the undemocratic and under-the-table “black box” negotiations which occurred (Cole, 2014).

Student activist Lin Fei-fan, a student at National Taiwan University; Chen Wei-ting 陳為廷, a student activist at National Tsinghua University, and legal scholar Huang Kuo-chang 黃國昌 from Academia Sinica became the most visible leaders to emerge from the Sunflower Movement. Notably, both student activists and over 50 civic organizations rallied against the CSSTA, eventually leading to the occupation of the Legislative Yuan (Cole, 2015: 260). The students were most prominently known for their organized and peaceful occupation which saw not only the organization of cleanups around the legislature, but also the order from the organizing leaders to not vandalize or destroy any property. Despite the media’s portrayal of the “illegal” seizure of the legislature, public support was on the side of the students who favoured both the re-review of the CSSTA and the disapproval of the government’s conduct towards students (Cole, 2015: 265). Furthermore, internal strife between Premier Jiang Yi-huah 江宜樺 and speaker of the Legislative Yuan Wang Jin-Pyng 王金平 represented further conflicts within the KMT. While Jiang ordered to send the riot police in to dispel the protestors, Wang ignored this request, creating further conflict between him and President Ma (Cole, 2015: 265-267). Throughout the movement, both Premier Jiang and President Ma attempted to discuss with the students, asking unsuccessfully for the students to return home.

By March 30th, both Lin Fei-fan and Chen Wei-ting organized a major rally outside the Legislative Yuan with an estimated 350,000 people who joined in solidarity (Cole, 2015: 296). Despite initial
agreements by the students to meet with President Ma, the students later rebuffed their former request asking for a further open and transparent public meeting. The movement did not finally end until Legislative Speaker Wang Jin-Pyng announced that the CSSTA would not be passed without a proper review and a proper regulatory mechanism that would guarantee more transparency. Despite the KMT’s displeasure with Wang’s statement which had not been approved by the party, the Sunflower Movement saw Wang’s declaration as an “act of goodwill” and began the process of vacating the legislature (Cole, 2015: 321-323). Despite some radical perspectives from splinter groups who argued that the government should not be trusted and the occupations should last longer, the students after 24 days of occupation left on 10th April 2014, not only cleaning the Legislature Yuan before leaving but were met with thousands of people outside holding sunflowers, with several stories shared by the activists, during a two-hour ceremony outside (Cole, 2015: 321-323).

Despite discussions as to whether or not Wang Jin-pyng’s promise would be kept, questions remained as to how various parts of the pre-existing oversight bill would be addressed, including the review process and how relevant citizens or other professionals could contribute their thoughts and opinions. In that sense, the Sunflower Movement was successful in generating this issue as a national discussion for the people of the island to decide. These issues have subsequently passed into the current Tsai Ing-wen 蔡英文 administration, which as of April 2016 continues to draft an oversight bill regarding cross-Strait relations (Hioe, 2016).

In the aftermath of the Sunflower Movement, there were other demonstrations against the Ma administration, such as the July 2015 textbook controversy that saw the sinicization of history books to promote further ideas of reunification and appeasement of Beijing.10 The
subsequent Nine-in-One Local Elections for municipal and county level officials also saw the substantial defeat of the KMT. The DPP was successful in winning 13 out of 22 cities and counties while the KMT control dropped from 15 seats to 6 seats after the election. Notable losses for the KMT included both Taichung 台中 and Taipei where former KMT mayors Jason Hu 胡志強 and Sean Lien 連勝文 were defeated by DPP’s Lin Chia-lung 林佳龍 and independent Ko Wen-je 柯文哲 (who was subsequently backed by the DPP) (Huang, 2015).

The outgrowth of the Sunflower Movement most importantly led to the subsequent creation of the New Power Party (時代力量, NPP) by key players including the lead singer of the heavy metal band Chthonic (閃靈), Freddy Lim 林昶佐, lawyer Lin Feng-jeng 林峯正 and Sunflower Movement activist Huang Kuo-chang (Chen, 2015). The creation of NPP also marked the entrance of a new political force created by social activism in Taiwanese politics, with the new party representing the “Third Force” (第三勢力) in Taiwanese politics. The party’s platform called on the people to “embrace the same dream of creating a proud and desirable Taiwan” and promised to organize the party around the idea of transparent mechanisms to allow all citizens to participate in the decision making through open debate to continuously better and improve society (New Power Party, 2015). Their successful campaign during the 2016 Taiwanese presidential election also resulted in their success in securing five seats, making them the third largest party in the Legislative Yuan (Gerber, 2016). Overall, the long-term effects of the political activism during the Sunflower Movement has transformed into political participation with the formal electoral system, bringing about new voices in Taiwan which seek to represent the youth voices in Taiwan.
5. Hong Kong and Taiwan in Comparative Perspectives

The most striking commonality between Hong Kong and Taiwan is the prevalence of “civic values [which] are more important than ethnicity in creating a common Chinese identity, especially among the younger generations.” (Lin, 2014: 128). Comparisons of these two places have been frequently made especially after the Umbrella Movement and Sunflower Movement in these respective places. The rise of civic nationalism indicates a prominence for free and democratic liberal values which are permeating both regions and are contributing to the further rejection of an ethnonational Chinese identity, which is back dropped against questions of increased economic interdependence on Mainland China, an increase in the number of Chinese tourists which have strained local infrastructures, as well as features of increasing pro-China media bias. However, the unique pillar of distinct identities in both Hong Kong and Taiwan can be described through the civic realm of national identity (Kaeding, 2011: 272). While this is a key similarity that both share, it should be noted that there are three interesting distinctions to be made about the respective movements in both regions and their future directions.

6. Successes and Failures of the Movements

First, a comparison of the outcomes of the Umbrella Movement and Sunflower Movements reveals the divergence between the two movements. Although both movements attempted to make demands on their respective governments, Taiwan’s situation comparatively speaking was more successful in asking the government to respond. In Hong Kong, student protestors asked Chief Executive C.Y. Leung 梁振英 to meet the demands of implementing true universal suffrage for the SAR. However, Leung as well as Carrie Lam did not give in to the student
demands. The Umbrella Movement ultimately lasted longer due to the inability of the student protestors to secure their goals which contributed to the declining public support over the 79-day protest and the movement was only dispersed in the final weeks after the failure of the November 19th attempt to occupy the central government buildings resulting in pro-government groups obtaining court injunctions to clear some of the roads. The different factions of protestors ranging from the Occupy Central group, the student coalition of HKFS and Scholarism as well as fringe localists contributed to the internal strife between the organizers, leaving the leadership of the movement in question. In particular, the conflict between pan-democrats and the student coalition was clear due to the more “radical” opinion of students to push for further action. There were no government leaders in Hong Kong who supported the students, a result of the fact that Hong Kong’s government must still directly adhere to the demands of Beijing, despite the implementation of OCTS. Ultimately, while the Umbrella Movement was successful in generating a conversation about the direct election of the Chief Executive, the movement was unable to accomplish its goal of democratizing Hong Kong, resulting in Beijing trying to politically integrate the SAR at a more rapid pace than previously seen.

On the other hand, Taiwanese students had gained more public support for what was viewed as not only the violation of procedural democracy by the KMT government but due to the increasing issue of cross-Strait integration. Since the movement only lasted 24 days, events escalated quickly and only garnered more support as time went on, especially with the March 30th rally which further united citizens and activists. Furthermore, the Sunflower Movement was not only a student movement but also encompassed over 50 civic organizations as well as some support from the DPP opposition at the time. Thus, the coordination in Taiwan by the demonstrators was much more organized
and due to the shorter occupation was better received by various segments of society. Although police did used force against the protesters in Taiwan, it was not near the levels of force used by police in Hong Kong where tear gas and water cannons were used to dispel the protesters at various stages of the movement.11 In addition, Taiwan’s longer history with democratic struggle allowed for more experienced protesters compared to the relatively inexperienced protesters in Hong Kong whose only prior experience were the MNE demonstrations. Although the promise of Wang Jin-Pyng was never guaranteed to ensure the implementation of an oversight mechanism in Taiwan, the majority of the Sunflower demonstrators were in a position to peacefully leave the Legislative Yuan, thus contributing further to the success of the movement in securing at the very least, its short term goals.

7. The Rise of “Third Force” Politics

Secondly, in the aftermath of both movements, new political forces emerged in society – the rise of localism in Hong Kong and the entrance of the “Third Force” in Taiwan. Although both have seen massive student support, localism in Hong Kong has created further conflicts between the pan-democrats and the localist camp while more succinct coordination has occurred between the DPP and the New Power Party.

As the previous discussion of the manifestos of Hong Kong Indigenous and Youngspiration suggests, localists oppose the pan-democrats for situating a Democratic China within Hong Kong’s democratic future. They also argue that the pan-democratic principles of “Peace, Rationality, Non-violence and Non-profanity” (和平、理性、非暴力、非粗口) are not effective and have revealed little results nearly two decades after the 1997 handover. Localists have differed from the pan-democrats by focusing their discourse on putting local Hong
Kongers’ priorities first thereby giving the basis for their disagreement with the pan-democrats on the future of Hong Kong. Although there have been some political successes, such as the election of a few Umbrella Soldiers in the 2015 district council elections and the third-place finish of Edward Leung from Hong Kong Indigenous in the 2016 New Territories East by-election, the rise of localist forces will not be truly tested until the September 2016 Legislative Council (立法會, LegCo) elections. However, there are already talks that two localist groups, Hong Kong Resurgence Order (香港復興會) and Hong Kong Indigenous will field two well-known candidates, localist author Chin Wan (陳雲, pen name of Horace Chin Wan-kan 陳云根, founder of HKRO) and HKU student Edward Leung, in the same electoral district during the September election (Hui, 2016). Although the nature of Hong Kong’s proportional representation system allows more than one candidate to be elected from a single district, the diverging principles between localist factions means that localist parties must learn to cooperate with each other in addition to the more difficult collaboration that is needed between pan-democrats and pan-localists.

Taiwan saw similar concerns from its student movement that the opposition had failed to protect Taiwanese society against the KMT government. This lack of trust from the students led them to independently organize the Sunflower Movement without the help of any political parties (Cole, 2015: 260). Like Hong Kong, Taiwan’s mainstream political parties (e.g. DPP) were visible at certain times during the movement, but their role was peripheral to the main student movement. The difference however is the more pronounced role of the “Third Force” during the 2016 presidential election whereby the “DPP has pursued a similar approach to cooperation with candidates from other groupings, yielding several other seats to small parties” (Templeman, 2015). This included three candidates from the New Power
Party during the 2016 presidential election: Freddy Lim, Huang Kuo-
chang and Hung Tzu-yung 洪慈庸. The success of NPP during the 2016
presidential election has been seen in part due to Tsai’s endorsement of
electoral cooperation between the DPP and the NPP. Despite the idea
that such a “cooperative but competitive” relationship may cause further
strain, this type of political cooperation is more prone to long-term
cooperation across political camps (Read, 2016). Such political
cooperation is only beginning to occur in Hong Kong and is still
opposed by factional group interests of the various localist parties.

8. Institutional Design and Autonomy

Third, Hong Kong’s shrinking autonomy in the post-1997 period has led
to citizens’ attempt to defend “their civic identity against real and
perceived threats from the government” (Kaeding, 2011: 271). Kaeding argues that key elements of the civic identity that Hong Kong
citizens cherish and pride themselves on are concepts of the “rule of law,
civil liberties, human rights, a free and vibrant press”, which are being
threatened by their own government due to the “One Country, Two
Systems” (OCTS) arrangement that allows Hong Kong to be controlled
centrally by the government in Beijing (Kaeding, 2011: 271). In part, a
large institutional problem within Hong Kong, and the core issue of the
Umbrella Movement is the inability to elect their own Chief Executive.
While Hong Kong people were unable to previously elect their Governor
under British colonial rule, what should be emphasized is the
“exceptional status of the rule of law as established by the British”
(Kaeding, 2011: 271). However, Hong Kong and its current
configuration under OCTS may never see such a democratic transition
although the idea of an independent Hong Kong state, at the current
moment, appears to be a growing discourse among localists. However,
for the people of Hong Kong, British colonial administration dominates the history of the city-state before the 1997 handover. While the 1980s also provided an avenue for new civic action, Hong Kong citizens have hardly had a voice in their own politics especially after the Sino-British Joint Declaration negotiations began. This still remains true in the post-colonial era under the PRC as Hong Kong citizens still have no say in their own future. The institutional framework left by the colonial government, which although never experienced public legitimacy, was controlled by a democratic Britain accountable to its people. As such, these problems are also further rooted in the problem of institutional design, whereby the political discontent which generated the Umbrella Movement stems directly from the lack of election of the Chief Executive in Hong Kong. Given such a situation, Hong Kong is limited in its ability to use elections as a sign of approval or disapproval of its Chief Executive. Despite having geographical constituencies where citizens are able to elect lawmakers, the functional constituencies create an imbalance, favouring special interest groups which have traditionally supported pro-establishment candidates. Therefore, Hong Kong’s LegCo does not accurately reflect the voter demographics and is unable to represent the interests of the people.

Taiwan by contrast has its de facto independence which is directly out of China’s sphere of control. Its democratic system allows for the people of Taiwan to elect their own President and therefore their own choices about their government. Taiwan during the Ma Administration was indirectly threatened by economic integration which the people argue was created by the KMT government’s quick passing of the CSSTA through the legislature without proper review. To the Taiwanese, this is a breach of the civil principles that have been instilled in its society. Since civic nationalism in Taiwan was formed through the “struggle of the opposition movement for representation and the
democratic transformation of the KMT government” (Kaeding, 2011: 271), Taiwanese identity and the creation of democracy on the island are interconnected. As Shelly Rigger recognizes, Taiwanese nationalists “have come a very long way from their original belief that Taiwan is a distinct nation in the ethno-cultural sense” (Song, 2009: 70). Due to the longer history of Taiwan’s democratic movement, Taiwanese identity is much more layered and complex than Hong Kong identity. What citizens in Taiwan do embrace however, regardless of their political affiliations, is a pride in the successful and peaceful democratic transition that occurred on the island. In this, we see that the Taiwanese take great pride in protecting common civic values, especially during the Sunflower Movement when students felt that the government did not abide by the principles of a transparent and elected democratic government. The clear responses by the people of Taiwan in the subsequent nine-in-one elections and the 2016 presidential election saw the defeat of the KMT and the installation of a new DPP government. Taiwan’s democratic system allows for the people to be given free and independent choices to vote for their leaders and hold them accountable. This mechanism allows citizens to replace governments, such as the Ma Administration, which was unable to meet the expectations of the people. Although Taiwan’s democracy is still relatively young, it functions more effectively than Hong Kong’s quasi-democratic system which is unable to truly represent the demands of the people. Therefore, the institutional problem in Hong Kong creates more difficulty in creating desired political change which is further polarizing the society. For both cases, however, key institutions are ingrained in society through their historical experiences with support for the concepts of the rule of law and democracy. What fundamentally sets Taiwan apart from Hong Kong is the island’s past historical struggle with democracy and nationhood, something Hong Kong has yet to fully experience.
9. Conclusion

This paper examines the rise of civic nationalism in both Hong Kong and Taiwan to compare the similarities and differences which shaped the respective Umbrella Movement and Sunflower Movement. The political identity of the people from both regions encompasses a component of civic nationalism which demonstrates the people’s conception of freedom and open and transparent societies as part of the fundamental core of the people.

In the case of Hong Kong, the people’s collective memory seems to be entrenched firmly in the characteristics of a civic identity which embraces democratic institutional values that are strong enough “to resist patriotic education [and] nationalistic propaganda” (Kaeding, 2011: 272). Conversely, the growth of the Hong Kong identity developed in comparison to a Chinese identity, whereby Hong Kong citizens identify themselves with the former colony’s economic achievements, Cantonese cultural distinctiveness and democratic values. The Umbrella Movement reaffirmed the civic character of the people to resist both the political and economic integration with China by attempting to reassert the values of universal suffrage and self-determination of the Hong Kong people. However, since Hong Kong autonomy is not even a debatable question for the PRC and Hong Kong is legally a Special Administrative Region of the PRC, the real question for its citizens will be to examine what they will do with such little room for negotiation in the future. The polarization of Hong Kong’s political spectrum indicates further discontent as the year 2047, the year in which the guarantee of 50 years of unchanged life in Hong Kong under the Basic Law expires, quickly approaches.

Likewise, Taiwan faces similar questions of economic integration with Mainland China, mostly through the decision-making led by the Ma Ying-jeou government and its decisions in 2008 which predominantly
began with the ratification of the ECFA treaty. Rapid economic interdependence between the two places has been seen as a decision too fast and too soon for the people on the island to find comfortable. In part, we can see this through the massive protests that occurred when CSSTA was rapidly passed through the Legislative Yuan without a proper clause-by-clause examination. As Kaeding explains, there is a “feeling [amongst the people of Taiwan] that the [Ma] government is threatening Taiwan’s identity, particularly its civic components of democracy and Taiwan sovereignty” (Kaeding, 2011: 272). The election of Tsai Ing-wen however has marked the improved status of Taiwan’s domestic political situation, with the beginning of Tsai’s presidency representing more stability in cross-party negotiation with the NPP, and the more ideal situation in which student leaders of Hong Kong desire. As such, the institutional design of democracy has allowed for the necessary systems to replace governments through an open and transparent electoral system.

Although this analysis has focused predominately on the comparison between civic nationalism in Hong Kong and Taiwan, the rise of Hong Konger and Taiwanese identities are rooted in both important ethno-cultural and civic components which adds layers of multi-complexity to these identities. From Beijing’s perspective, these unique local identities in Hong Kong and Taiwan reveal that the project of creating a National Chinese Identity is fragmented. Moreover, the growing identity gap between these places are increasing unless, as Shirley Lin suggests, “China may have to propose a new identity based on common civic value rather than ethnicity, and develop a formula for governance that guarantees even greater autonomy to Hong Kong and Taiwan” (Lin, 2014: 128). What this comparative case study suggests is that as autonomy continues to shrink in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, OCTS will not be a viable solution for Taiwan.
and the people will not accept any form of these arrangements. Likewise, Hong Kong will continue to look towards Taiwan for guidance as it seeks to find common allies that also oppose CCP politics. Unless Beijing is will to propose a new Chinese identity based on civic principles, people from both Hong Kong and Taiwan will continue to fight for the politics of representation in order to achieve their ultimate goals of self-determination.

Notes

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1. Anthony Smith lists four important characteristics of nationalism, which he defines as (1) the growth of nations, (2) the consciousness of belonging to the nation, (3) a language and/or symbol of the nation and (4) a social/political movement on behalf of the nation. See: Anthony Smith (2001). Nationalism: Theory, ideology, history. Malden MA: Polity Press.

2. “Political China” in this context simply refers to the politics associated with the People’s Republic of China (PRC).


4. This section provides a summary of events from the Umbrella Movement. Full details of the sequence of events can be found in: Jason Ng (2016). Umbrellas in bloom: Hong Kong’s Occupy Movement uncovered. Hong Kong: Blacksmith Books.


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Book Review


When Sir Donald Tsang Yam-kuen 曾蔭權 was charged with two counts of misconduct in public office on 5th October 2015 by Hong Kong’s Independent Commission Against Corruption (ICAC, 廉政公署), it has been three years since he ended his second term as the Chief Executive of Hong Kong under the cloud of ICAC investigation on allegations of corruption including receiving preferential allocation of a luxury apartment post-retirement in exchange for the granting of a broadcasting licence, and the final outcome of this investigation will represent a closing chapter of what Audrey Eu Yuet-mee 余若薇, founding leader of the Civic Party and a former member of the Legislative Council of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (LegCo, 香港特別行政區立法會), details as “how the civil servant of over 40 years ended his career mired in the embarrassing array of lavish entertainment in private yacht, jet, posh hotels and questionable arrangement for his retirement penthouse” in her foreword, “Donald Tsang’s greatest debt to Hong Kong”, to Professor Joseph Yu-shek Cheng 鄭宇碩’s 2013 edited volume, *The second Chief Executive of Hong Kong SAR: Evaluating the Tsang years 2005-2012*. From Eu’s flashbacks thus begins this voluminous evaluation of over 500 pages on the performance of the
administration of the second Chief Executive of Hong Kong since the “Handover”. While without breaking down into two sections, the book apparently consists of a first segment, after Professor Cheng’s introductory overview in Chapter 1, from Chapter 2 to Chapter 8 focusing on the Tsang administration’s mode of governance from the overall perspective of politics, public policy and policy of economic development, and a second, from Chapter 9 to Chapter 16 giving more detailed coverage of various specific sectors of public policy implementation – health system, urban planning and renewal, housing policy, transport system, environmental protection, and labour, employment and social welfare. A final chapter, Chapter 17, on Hong Kong’s external relations completes this book’s critical evaluation of the Tsang administration, followed by an epilogue by the editor.

Whether seen in the context of general mode of governance or from the perspective of different aspects of public policy implementation, this book paints a grim picture of the seven years of a Hong Kong under Tsang. Standing out from this grim picture is Tsang’s almost single-handed destruction of the post-1997 Accountability System for Hong Kong’s civil service – his honouring of the new post-colonial principle of political accountability “in breach rather than in practice” – as analysed in Chapter 2. There is the “absence of economic policies” which continued under the Tsang government after what Professor Joseph Cheng referred to as “a lost decade”, i.e. the first ten years after “Handover”, attributed in Chapter 8 to various factors such as policy inertia stemming from dogmatic adherence to economic non-interventionism, the inability of the civil bureaucracy to lead R&D-based development initiative partly due to the bifurcation between political appointees and career civil servants, the failure of the executive-legislature and government-society interfaces to aggregate divergent interests. The last one was aggravated by blatant government-business
collusion as witnessed in the last months of the Tsang administration (cases including Tsang’s Shenzhen apartment, and corruption charge against former Chief Secretary Rafael Hui Si-yan 許仕仁 who was later convicted in December 2014 for misconduct in public office and bribery) that throws doubt on, given the strong vested interests of government officials, the will of the government administration to formulate long-term strategic development policy that would potentially threaten the hegemony of Hong Kong’s big real estate developers who are more concerned with short-term interests and returns to their investments. A change in the political system is necessary, as Chapter 8 posits, “to accommodate strong civil society surveillance of the government-business collusion” which stands to thwart any government attempt to plan for developmental transformation.

Similarly Professor Joseph Cheng in his editorial foreword highlights that an evaluation of the performance of the Chief Executive is “complicated and many factors have to be taken into consideration, including the Chinese leadership’s Hong Kong policy and the global economic environment”, and yet in his epilogue (Chapter 18) the readers are reminded that the “challenges facing Hong Kong at this stage require a paradigm shift in policy making” but the “absence of democracy and the exacerbating social and political polarisation deprive the administration of the legitimacy to push for reforms.” Looking back at the volatile sociopolitical conflicts in Hong Kong in recent years till 2014’s Occupy campaign / Umbrella Movement and 2016’s “Fishball Revolution”, it is not difficult to see how true this observation is not only concerning the Tsang years but also today, and the continued severity of the effect of such “legitimacy deficit” on the effectiveness of governance in an environment where discontent and grievances continue to be accumulating at the community level despite the composite efforts of the United Front (統戰) work at economic integration, political cooptation,
and legal and constitutional containment. Such discontent and grievances at the community level stems from various sources, as observed in this book on the Tsang administration, including the lack of major progress in health system reform especially in financing and care structure (Chapter 9) and the docility in addressing the issue of trade union recognition and collective bargaining rights (Chapter 14), urban renewal presenting itself as a major policy problem (considered “political and social rather than physical and financial” in Chapter 10) amidst continued planning controversies (Chapter 12) coupled with a lack of long-term strategies and commitments for a sustainable transport policy (Chapter 13), the failure in implementing environmental policies (Chapter 16), and the extreme inertia in housing policy during the earlier years of the Tsang administration that may have aggravated later efforts in solving the problem amidst heightened “social and political awareness among intellectuals and at the grassroots [that] has fuelled growing antagonism against the ostensible land powers” – the real estate interests towards whom the administration’s housing policy was skewed (Chapter 11). On the social welfare front, as Tsang admitted in a LegCo question-and-answer session on 14th June 2012 towards the end of his seven years of governance, his administration “had failed to narrow the wealth gap and was not decisive enough in tackling high property prices to curb the rise in the private housing market” while Hong Kong’s poverty rate had soared from 17.3 per cent in 2005 to 18.1 per cent in 2010 with the poverty figure, defined as having half of the median monthly domestic household income, standing at 1.26 million (Chapter 15).

Such dismal performance record indeed has wider implications further than just seven years of misrule, and concomitantly this weighty edited monograph carries a far wider significance beyond an evaluation of one of the Chief Executives of post-1997 Hong Kong. As Professor Joseph Cheng sums up in the editorial epilogue, while the British
administration in colonial Hong Kong could claim to have secured legitimacy by performance results, both the Tung Chee-hwa (C.H. Tung) and Donald Tsang administrations “have gradually squandered that legitimacy and the HKSAR government now suffers a legitimacy deficit” as being leaders unelected by the people, they did not have a clear mandate and essential support from the people and hence the political will for policy implementation. So would future leaders so-called “elected” through a fake democratic electoral system that denies genuine competition with an entire candidate list undergoing screening by an ensured pro-Beijing elites-controlled Nomination Committee. Like the recent disappearances of the five Mighty Current Media Company Limited (巨流傳媒有限公司) / Causeway Bay Books (鴨脷灣書店) owners and staff (including the kidnapping of Gui Minhai 桂民海 in Pattaya, Thailand, and Paul Lee 李波 in Hong Kong), that would be a mighty mockery of “One Country, Two Systems”. The writing is on the wall and the telling signs have already been evident during the seven-year rule of the Tsang administration, as Professor Cheng’s edited monograph conveys to us through the early chapters on Tsang’s years of governance, leadership, legitimacy, party politics and the nature of the HKSAR regime (Chapters 3-7).

The crux of the problem probably lies in the question whether Hong Kong’s Chief Executive should “be a political leader, in its full sense” who is sworn to play the leadership role in upholding and defending the Hong Kong values – the “soft power of Hong Kong in areas such as freedom, democratic rights and openness” – or just an administrator and loyal servant taking orders from his “laoban” (老板, boss) in Beijing (Chapter 6). The latter is a scenario so ominously reflected in an incident narrated in Chapter 6 regarding “a resident, who was wearing a T-shirt emblazoned with ‘June 4’ message, being taken away by police officers when he took a walk in a residential estate” where Li Keqiang 李克強
(then vice-premier of China), who was visiting Hong Kong, was paying a home visit in August 2011, leading to the ridicule that the Hong Kong police force, once described as Asia’s finest, have become more like Mainland China’s gong’an 公安 (public security officers) dutifully at the political behest of the ruling party. At the end of the day, as Audrey Eu sums up her foreword to the monograph, admittedly Hong Kong is just part of the “One Country”, but if the region’s Chief Executive is not there to defend Hong Kong’s systems and Hong Kong’s values under “One Country, Two Systems”, “we the people, have to take up the fight.”

Published just after Donald Tsang left office, replaced by Leung Chun-ying 梁振英 (C.Y. Leung), Professor Joseph Cheng’s voluminous edited monograph represents the results of the effort of a team of academics formed to offer an initial evaluation of the performance of the Tsang administration. As Professor Cheng cautions in the editorial foreword, given the complexity of interrelated factors surrounding the deep-seated problems of Hong Kong, one “should not just blame the Chief Executive” and later retrospective studies will likely provide a more comprehensive and balanced evaluation of the Tsang years. Nevertheless, as observed earlier, while focusing on the Tsang administration as a case in point, the significance of this weighty volume extends far beyond into a multi-faceted critical analysis of the socioeconomic and sociopolitical challenges Hong Kong is facing since the 1997 “Handover”. Readers who have been following closely Hong Kong’s social, political and economic developments since 1997 and her intricate relationship with Mainland China will definitely find this engrossing book an indispensable reference and compelling read.

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China amidst Competing Dynamics in the Asia-Pacific: National Identity, Economic Integration and Political Governance
Special Issue Editors: Samuel C.Y. Ku, Emile K.K. Yeoh and Titus C. Chen

Introduction

Political Governance and Strategic Relations: Domestic-Foreign Policy 1
Nexus and China’s Rise in the Global System
Emile Kok-Kheng Yeoh

Prologue

China, Southeast Asia, and the United States 111
Lowell Dittmer

China, Asia-Pacific Regional Economic Integration and Cross-Strait Relations

Asia-Pacific Regional Economic Integration: Coopetition vs. Conflict 141
Yu Jane Chen

Economic Integration and National Identity in Northeast Asia: 173
A European Perspective
Wolfgang Pape

Integration and Disintegration: European Theories and Experiences in the Light of China-Taiwan Relations
István Csaba Moldicz

Crimean Crisis and Military Balance in Asia 239
Yongshu Li

Political Governance, Identity and Nationalism: China, Taiwan and the East Asian Experiences

Nationalism, Nationalistic Demos and Democracy: East Asian Experiences 275
Jungmin Seo

(Continued on next page)
Identity and Integration as Conflicting Forces Stimulating the Sunflower Movement and the Kuomintang’s Loss in the 2014 Elections  
*Cal Clark and Alexander C. Tan*

Development of Democratic Processes in the People’s Republic of China: Prospects of Transformation of the Political Regime  
*Alexey Alexandrovich Semenov*

**Special Features**

Literators of the *Feng Xia*  
*Hara Fujio*

Population Change during China’s “Three Years of Hardship” (1959-1961)  
*Sun Jingxian*

**Policy Comments**

The Legal Basis of the People’s Republic of China’s East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone  
*Ching Chang*

The Writing on the Wall: National and Global Implications of the Ruling Chinese Communist Party’s Domestic and Foreign Policies  
*Emile Kok-Kheng Yeoh*

**Book Review**

*reviewed by Si-Ning Yeoh*