The Unfinished Experimentation of Political Parties in Hong Kong – Reflections from Theoretical and Experiential Perspectives

Sze Chi Chan*  
*Hong Kong Baptist University

King Fai Chan**  
**Independent Scholar, Hong Kong

Abstract

This article consists of 2 parts. The first part, from Section 1 to Section 3, by King Fai Chan aims at unravelling the inaugural ideology of Hong Kong’s political parties by going back to one of the founders of the Democratic Party, Yeung Sum, and examines his ideology of an idealistic thinking of political cooperation with the SAR government, with an aim of peaceful power-sharing. Yeung Sum’s idea of political parties is a new vision of a political subjectivity that caters to the whole, and this confirms with Giovanni Satori’s theory that an authentic party must be part-of-the-whole. In the end the idea of party as effective opposition was completely overlooked. The article then turns to the second part, from Section 4 to Section 6, by Sze Chi Chan, who aims at detailing the inauguration of an effective oppositional party after the Grand March of 2003. Thus was born the League of Social Democrats,
with the second author as one of its founding members. In the second author’s portrayal the League was off to a promising start that ushered in an effective oppositional party, that did pose a series of effective political opposition that readily catered to the need of the whole citizenry, especially the Five District de facto Referendum. Yet in the end the League met with a fate of internal split that tremendously dwindled the its oppositional thrust. As yet we still do not find any pan-democratic party or anti-establishment radical party that can really demonstrate Satori’s ideal of party acting as part-of-the-whole fighting for the benefit of the whole.

**Keywords:** Satori, party theory, Social Democrats, Democratic Party, factions, Hong Kong, Yeung Sum, stability and prosperity, political opposition, political struggle

1. Introduction

Hong Kong’s political scene, besides beset by the explicit or implicit intervention from the Chinese Communist Party apparatus from Beijing, is still very much in its infant stage of struggling for the establishment of truly modern political institutions, notably development of political parties. This article attempts to delineate the birth of the political party in Hong Kong right before the 1997 transition, and the subsequent development after 1997, especially after the massive socio-political mobilization of Hong Kong people after the 2003 July 1st Grand March. We shall look at the birth of the main party among the pan-Democrats camp, namely, the Democratic Party (民主黨), and its formative party ideology. Then we shall turn our attention to the rise of a new genre of political parties, namely, the “battling type” parties, primarily in its first example of the League of Social Democrats (社會民主連線, hereafter...
LSD). After a consideration of the primal party ideology formed before the 1997 transition, effort will be paid to detail the rise of the LSD, since one of our authors has been its founding member (who withdrew in 2009) and shall speak largely from personal reminiscence.¹

2. Development of the Democratic Party before the 1997 Transition
   – Towards a Pro-Establishment Participation To Share Power


The central idea of the party is certainly the concept of *partir* from Old French which literally means “to divide”, so that the first and foremost philosophical political question that arises would be: How can a political party be an institution that is good for the whole body politic? According to the Italian scholar Giovanni Sartori, the birth of modern political party hinges on the successful clarification of “party” from “faction”,² since the later arose from the Latin verb *facere* which denotes “dire doings”, which denotes a political body that engages in disruptive and harmful doings. Thus it carries the senses of hubris, excessiveness, ruthlessness, and thereby harmful behaviour.³ Thus the formation of political parties in their early years was never far from political factional fighting, until Edmund Burke achieved the intellectual breakthrough and this became the turning point in the development of modern political parties.⁴

2.2. From Factions to Party

Thus the political factions truly become the parties that are able to transcend the very concept of the Italian *partire* that signifies that political parties would just be bogged down with defending the part rather than the whole. When political parties can really transcend this fate and become some kind of “analytic partition”⁵ that can really transcend such partisan spirit, and indeed link up the part with the whole,
to form a *part-of-the-whole*, then modern political parties can be born that can strive towards the goal of participating in the political process *for the sake of the whole*, that is, for the good of the larger society.

For Burke, the transition from faction to party rests on a process parallel to that of transition from intolerance to tolerance, and from tolerance to dissent, and lastly, from dissent to beliefs in diversity. Parties become subconsciously acceptable when diversity and dissent were accepted as part and parcel of political order. Parties are then seen in an ideal sense as correlative and dependent on the worldview (German, *Weltanschauung*) of liberalism. When parties completed this evolution from parties of faction *against* the whole to parties *of* the whole or even *for* the whole, and also transcended the trenchant individualism of the Enlightenment, then the idea of modern political parties as essential for the running of modern democracy was born.

### 3. Hong Kong’s Political Party Thinking in the 1980s and 90s

Similar to the birth of the modern political party, Hong Kong’s political scene was about to do the same, that with the transition to Chinese sovereignty, Hong Kong was granted a high level of autonomy that would usher in the political parties. Thus with the signing of the Sino-British Agreement and the decolonization of British rule, the British government in Hong Kong ushered in the era of political representation through all kinds of elections. In this context both the existent Chinese ruling elite and the civil society’s opposition force were in an urgent mood to meet this challenge. And came the political parties.

Thus we had the first district election in the 1980s, and into the 1990s right after the 1989 Tiananman Incident, the first directly elected Legislative Council (立法會) was formed in 1991. The budding civil society that slowly evolved from the typical Chinese “*folkrealm* society”

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*Contemporary Chinese Political Economy and Strategic Relations: An International Journal 2(2) ♦ 2016*
was thinking about how to respond to the grand new environment ushered in by the Sino-British Agreement. The first challenge that civil activists in the kin/clan-based *folklic (folk-public)* society faced was whether to transform the “pressure groups” into political parties, since such pressure groups would have to enter this new political game and face new competitors, namely, political parties that would very likely take away the causes and therefore, political bargaining power, from these pressure groups. Either they have to form political parties themselves or be relegated to the political backstage. So the founding members of such newly formed political bodies would come from such pressure groups like community workers, unionists and student activists. Moreover, this political transition needs to transform those pressure groups, which practiced mainly a “protest-advocacy” model in political bargaining, into mainline political parties in a parliamentary democracy.

**3.1. Yeung Sum Straddled Two Types of Politics**

At that time, a number of scholars have probed into this transformation, and not the least some activist-turned scholars, and Mr Yeung Sum 楊森 was the foremost among them. And the main line he took to this political transformation was to persuade pressure groups to pursue democratic politics by becoming political parties. In his opinion pressure groups at that time could not satisfy the demand of the times, thus it would be expedient that some members of pressure groups form political parties to participate in the parliamentary democracy process. His understanding of political parties centers on its nature as more organizational, as well as promoting wholistic city-wide policies that are geared towards the whole. Moreover, another goal for pressure groups to transform into political parties is to share in the power of governing, to gain positions in the establishment in order to be more effective in reforming the society.
3.2. Parties as the Answer to the Demand of Wholistic Politics

“Taking parties as method” was Yeung Sum’s proposed response to the new political situation, and the thinking was geared towards this “social whole” and the rise of political subjects in his political imagination, in order to respond to the new era of parliamentary democracy. Yeung Sum stressed that this new political instrument of parties must bear in mind city-wide vision, so as to match the “Hong Kong People Ruling Hong Kong” maxim with a new political subjectivity. This kind of political participation was markedly different from the pressure group politics that advocate the interest and well-being of special groups, and it demands political groups to embrace a wider horizon and bear a more inclusive vision.

Thus Yeung Sum’s idea of political parties is a new vision of a political subjectivity that caters to the whole, and this confirms with Satori’s theory that an authentic party must be part-of-the-whole. This new orientation should be formulated in response to the coming representational or parliamentary democracy.

3.3. The Unanswered Question: Where Comes an Effective Opposition?

However, Yeung Sum’s vision has also been too optimistic, in its eager awaiting for a portion of the political cake that would be ready to be cut in the future. Yet in such eager waiting would it not be played into the hands of the establishment? Indeed, we cannot find any discussions on controversies, conflicts or political struggles that would inevitably arise from party politics or parliamentary democracy. His vision of a party entering the establishment in an orderly fashion was so harmonious and orderly that there was little room left for dissent, reaction and contradictions.
Indeed we found that, though occupying the main opposition spectrum of post-1997 Hong Kong politics, the Democratic Party has been yet so weak, so meagre, and so conservative in its opposition, that it could not pose a serious challenge to the increasingly bad governance of the post-1997 Special Administrative Regional (hereafter SAR) Government. Its vision of the whole Hong Kong people was largely static and lacked fluidity, starkly failing to take into account the views and demands of the newer generations, firstly the post-80s and then the post-90s youths. And for other small pan-democratic parties that also arose from pressure groups, we also find a rarity of strong and effective opposition.

3.4. Political Parties Harmonized or Submerged by the Ideology of “Stability and Prosperity”

Thus we find that in the special case of Hong Kong, the rise of political parties that have taken care to gear themselves to the whole city, have been particularly ineffective in forging a credible political opposition. Professor Lui King-suen 雷競旋 has pinpointed one of the obvious reasons: that such political parties, even though broadly democratic in their colour, are basically bound by the establishment’s main ideology of “stability and prosperity” spelt out by the Chinese authorities in Beijing (hereafter Beijing). Yeung Sum naively took party politics as a synonym for harmonious politics, for the sake of keeping the “stability” of this complex city. Such wishful thinking of a post-colony is a symptom that this former colony is still submerged in the colonial myth and is still deeply nostalgic about its colonial past. According to Lui King-suen, this city is basically a colony not of an antagonistic but a compromising type.
4. Parties Taking Stance Against Establishment after 1997
   – Radical Parties Advocating Active Struggle for Democracy and People’s Livelihood

4.1. Pseudo-democratic Transition to Chinese Sovereignty

As delineated above, the mellowness of democratic parties that were born in the 1980s and 1990s was due to the over-deference of political parties towards the transition ideology of “stability and prosperity”. Yet after 1997 Hong Kong has suffered severely not only due to the Asian Financial Crisis, but also due to the increasing wealth gap resultant from every economic change, which points to a fundamental flaw in the colonial and post-colonial system governing Hong Kong, in that all political powers are still wielded by the government, the estate tycoons, local elites and multinational companies including increasingly Mainland China’s fast-growing state enterprises. Thus only political parties that mobilize and energize the people and is really part-of-the-whole would meet the challenge of the times.

Hong Kong’s post-1997 politics was severely circumscribed by a Basic Law (基本法) that was completed in 1991 after the 1989 Tiananman Incident. This has caused Beijing’s original promise on high degree of autonomy to be severely scaled back. Now that China has verged on a regime change during the 1989 Incident, Beijing would not tolerate a newly returned region to enjoy full-fledged democracy so as not to spur similar demand in comparable Mainland cities, notably Beijing and Shanghai. And with the tightly controlled small-circle selection of the Chief Executive of the SAR that does not belong to any political party, pan-democrat councillors are forever relegated to the camp of a defunct opposition. What they can at most do is to stall some bad government law bills from being passed into law. Yet the Democratic Party had put up merely a meagre fight when the SAR
Government wanted to pass the controversial National Security Law Bill (dubbed the 23 Article).

5. Founding a Radical Party that was Geared towards the Whole Society\textsuperscript{18}

Thus after the successful Grand March in 2003 summer against the 23 Article bill some marginal pan-democratic councillors newly elected in 2014 to the Legislative Council (hereafter LegCo) began to form a left-leaning new party called the League of Social Democrats (hereafter LSD). This was done in response to the new formation of the Civic Party (公民黨) that was viewed as consisting of blue-blood elites, as well as to the Democratic Party’s obvious turning to the middle class to consolidate its people base.

The founding of LSD was not at all smooth or promising; nevertheless this party succeeded in its early days to position itself as a party of political struggle. Yet even with such comparatively radical characterization, this party has in fact positioned itself for the whole society as part-of-the-whole. This was partly due to its grassroots character, since its founding members consisted of a number of seasoned old social activist veterans. Its party ideology was in direct contrast both to the Civic Party and the Democratic Party, both of which has indeed exhibited some degree of factionalism: Civic Party in being too blue-blooded and can only be joined through member-recommendation, Democratic Party in turning towards the middle class. LSD readily exhibited a holistic approach to the general mass in struggling for the benefits of all, especially in livelihood policy issues.

Thus LSD in its ideological discourse and practice has strived to exhibit a kind of inclusiveness that exhibited *part-for-the-whole* character, that tried to promote city-wide all-citizen participation in the
political process. Due to the social activist credentials of many of its founding members, its announced orientation is to organize citizens especially those from the grassroots, to influence government policies so as to alleviate people’s livelihood problems and suffering. At the same time, it participated at all levels of elections in order to enter LegCo and district councils to represent citizens to influence government policies.19

5.1. The Climax Action of LSD – Five District de facto Referendum Advocating Democratization of Hong Kong Politics

Yet LSD after its formation in 200620 met with little success in pushing for election into district councils.21 Among the 40-plus candidates fielded, only the original 6 were re-elected, while none of the new candidates got a seat, nor did they gain a credible vote count that would merit another try in future. What it mostly did was to formulate a wide-ranging policy document.22 However, the 2008 election into LegCo was a different story. With the then chairman Wong Yuk-man 黃毓民’s (hereafter Wong) rapid rise in notoriety and fame during the summer election process of 2008, Wong was swept into the LegCo with the second highest number of votes in the West Kowloon Election District (九龍西選區). And right after his entry, together with the re-election of 2 other LegCo councillors who also benefited from Wong’s meteoric rise, these “LSD Triad”, as they have come to be nicknamed, started to act out their fighting style in their LegCo office. Such newfound militancy was largely welcomed by the city so much so that LSD became the star party during the first year of the 2008-2012 LegCo period.23

Then came the defining moment for the LSD as well as for Hong Kong society. During the summer of 2009 Mr Tsang Kin-sing 曾健成 or “Bull” (阿牛), a veteran activists in LSD, floated the idea of getting one councillor in each of the 5 major LegCo election districts to resign, thus setting off a city-wide 5 district by-elections, which would then be
centered around the issue of whether Hong Kong SAR should be allowed full democratic elections both for its LegCo and its Chief Executive. This then would become a de facto Referendum, since Hong Kong has no referendum law, advocating full-fledged democracy for Hong Kong. The media took up the issue and immediately attributed it to Wong.24

5.2. The Running of the 5 District de facto Referendum and the Split-up of LSD – Promises and Problems of a Struggle-oriented Party

Here we cannot detail the intricate history of the course of the 5 District By-elections or de facto Referendum;25 suffice to remark that the de facto Referendum was not a success, although 17% of the voters did turn out to vote back the 5 LegCo councillors from the Civic-LSD alliance that inaugurated the de facto Referendum. However, the aftermath of the de facto Referendum was completely out of the expectation of the society and the LSD party itself. This was the split-up of LSD instigated by Wong and supported by another LegCo councillor in the party (Albert Chan Wai-yip 陳偉業) right after the de facto referendum, starting in the summer of 2010 and culminating in Wong leaving the party to found another political party, namely, People Power (人民力量), in early 2011.

Thus the de facto Referendum became the last star action of the LSD, and after the split-up LSD was reduced to an even smaller party with only one notable councillor, namely, Leung Kwok-hung 梁國雄 or “Long Hair” ( 長毛). Although LSD did retain its leftist stance, although it did put up consistent political and social struggles against the SAR government, participating militantly and fully in all major socio-political movements and march, especially in the 2014 Umbrella Movement, no other action initiated or joined by LSD can equal the master act of the de facto Referendum, which succeeded in using the
meagre manpower and resource of 2 minor parties to execute a city-wide referendum for the future democracy of Hong Kong. Thus in doing so LSD and Civic Party have really fulfilled the mandate of modern political party to act as part-of-the-whole and for the whole.

6. Aftermath of the LSD Split-up

After the split-up, Wong’s People Power became the star radical party in people’s attention, and was able to attract enthusiastic support especially from the radicalized youths who found themselves to be increasingly estranged from Beijing and the SAR government. Such radical support enabled Wong, again, to put up a good show in the 2012 LegCo election, not only securing the re-election of himself and Albert Chan Wai-yip, but also the surprise election of People Power’s candidate, Raymond Chan Chi-chuen 陳志全, to the LegCo, as well as the near success of another candidate, Wong Yeung-tat 黃洋達 26 (or junior Wong), whom Wong endorsed. The junior Wong’s near success has caused LSD dearly, for the other only hopeful of LSD candidates besides Long Hair, To Kwan-hang 陶君行,27 was to lose the Kowloon East district due to junior Wong splitting away his radical votes.

Yet the political experimentation of political parties has been far from running its course. After such star performance, Wong again caused another partisan split,28 while he himself was de facto ousted by the net media tycoon Shiu Yeuk-yuen 蕭若元 (hereafter Shiu),29 who had been his supporter when he splitted LSD. Wong was left stuck with the Proletariat Political Institute（普羅政治學苑）that he founded.30 Strangely, junior Wong, the protégé that he promoted, did not join his institute but went on to found his own political body called Civic Passion (熱血公民).31
So the growth of radical political parties are very much at the mercy of themselves in the wake of such repeated splitting up. The promise of a radical party as part-of-the-whole fighting for the whole has been repeatedly thwarted by its own internal quarrel, which hurt these parties’ growth by giving an impression that they are no more than political factions seeking nothing more than political power. Recently, after the lacklustre performance in the 2015 district council election, Shiu again initiated a severe criticism against Tam Tak-chi 譚得志, also known as “Fast Beat” (快必) (hereafter Tam), a major candidate in the People’s Power, and in the meantime the result of this attack has not been clear yet.

7. Conclusion

So the story of Hong Kong’s political parties goes on and on, and besides LSD and People’s Power, there is recently the rise of very new political parties due to the surge in localism and the quest for independence. Each one is vying for the attention of Hong Kong people especially the younger generation, but their success is yet to be seen, or whether they will quickly vaporize and fade out from the political scene, after the September LegCo election this year. As yet we still do not find any pan-democratic party or anti-establishment radical party that can really demonstrate Satori’s ideal of party acting as part-of-the-whole fighting for the benefit of the whole.

Notes

+ King Fai Chan participated as author of the first part of the Chinese version of the present article (from Section 1 to Section 3). The present English abbreviated version is solely the responsibility of Sze Chi Chan.
* Dr Sze Chi Chan 陳士齊 is a Senior Lecturer at the Department of Religion and Philosophy, Hong Kong Baptist University, since his return from Britain in 1992. He holds a Ph.D. from King’s College London, University of London, and has been a secondary school teacher and campus Christians’ tutor. Author of Trains of thought (co-authored) and various social and current affairs articles and theological critique articles, Dr Chan helped found the League of Social Democrats (社會民主連線) in 2006, leading the party to formulate its overall party policy document in 2007, finalizing the draft of Wong Yuk-man 黃毓民’s book of his first year in the Legislative Council office, 《毓民議壇搞事錄》(Anthology of Yuk Man’s agitation). Dr Chan also singly drafted the whole policy document of the Five District de facto Referendum proposal, which finally became the main body of 《社會民主連線 五區總辭 全民公決 2012年度普選政治宣言》(The League of Social Democrats ‘5 District Resignation, De facto Referendum’ political proposal address to the people) in 2009. He withdrew from the party soon after this drafting, and remains as free political activist as well as renowned political commentator. <Email: scchan@hkuslive.hk, chrchan2@gmail.com>

** King Fai Chan 陳景輝 is a renowned columnist and social activist. He became active after the 2003 July 1st Grand March, and had also tried to run for district council election in the autumn of 2003. He continued to be active during the 2006-07 Anti-Star Ferry Demolition (反拆遷天星皇后碼頭) and became one the 3 main leaders who led the grand Anti-High Speed Rail Campaign culminating in the 10000-people demonstration outside Legislative Council in early 2010. <Email: 413cseec@gmail.com>

1. Thus he speaks from primary experience that can find scant reference until now.
3. Sartori, ibid., p. 4.
9. This is the local terms for the non-governmental organizations (NGOs) that pressurize the British-Hong Kong government to address social ills.
Mr Yeung Sum was a student activist in the 1970s, then the founding member of the political body “Meeting Point” in the 1980s, and in the early 1990s he was the deputy chairman of the United Democrats of Hong Kong and later promoted the merging of Meeting Point with the United Democrats into the Democratic Party and finally became its chairman (2002-2004). He has retired from politics.
16. As one of the authors has actually been the founding member of the following radical party to be analyzed, factual materials would be provided by him with critical reflections following. Much of these materials from personal experience have not yet been published before, thus footnotes could not be provided for them.
17. Thus the Chief Executive was not to be directly elected by the people, and was disallowed to rise from any political party. Then the Legislative Council (hereafter LegCo) was to be formed under the Basic Law that prescribes half of its seats to derive from special interest sectors dubbed functional constituencies. This political fencing means that the idealistic wish to share governing power with the SAR Government would never be realized. With the powerful election machinery run by pro-China political camps which are heavily subsidized from Mainland-connected sources, the result is that the LegCo would only harbor less than half of its councilors from pan-democratic camps. This fact, coupled with the fact that LegCo councilors are not allowed to propose law bills with government funding implications, all councilors are severely curtailed in their ability to propose bills, not to say to pass them.

18. See note 16 above.

19. 《社會民主連線政策綱領 1.3.5》社會民主連線的著重點》
(LSD’s Policy Document (2007) Section 1.3.5 The Emphasis of LSD)
<http://www.lsd.org.hk/oldpolicy.html>

20. I was one of the founding members and the only academic among them. I was invited to their preparation committee and then the first executive committee and acted as the one leading the party to formulate the overall party policy document in 2007. Yet I have made clear that I would not run for any election during my sojourn in the party, and vowed to leave once the party process has become normal.

21. Among more than 30 candidates that ran for district councilors only the 6 incumbents were re-elected.

22. The author was the coordinator and final drafter of this party socio-political policy document which was then submitted to a 2-day AGM to be rectified word-by-word and passed. <http://www.lsd.org.hk/oldpolicy.html>

23. So successful indeed was LSD in 2009 that a renowned newspaper publisher has asked Wong to produce an anthology of all his LegCo
speeches of the first year in office: 《毓民議壇搞事錄》，黃毓民，香港：明報出版有限公司，2009 年 7 月（Anthology of Yuk Man’s agitation）。

24. This detail has been provided personally to me by Tsang Kin-sing ("Bull"). And the author volunteered to singly draft the whole policy document of the de facto Referendum proposal, which finally became the main body of LSD ‘5 District Resignation, De facto Referendum’ Political Proposal Address to the People (in Chinese,《社會民主連線 五區總辭 全民公決 2012 年雙普選 政治說帖》), minus the appendices. The unhappy proposal drafting also contributed to my refusal to help Wong and eventual withdrawal from the party in October 2009. Cf. <http://www.lsd.org.hk/doc/file/2009proposal.doc>

25. This happened at a time when the author ran into insurmountable moral clashes with Wong and withdrew from LSD, and became some sort of go-between during the Civic-LSD alliance for the 5 District de facto Referendum.


28. “On 20 May 2013, Wong Yuk-man announced his resignation from People Power along with Proletariat Political Institute. It was believed to be related to his earlier split with Stephen Shiu Yeuk-yuen, the owner of the Hong Kong Reporter and People Power’s financial supporters over the Occupy Central plan.” (<https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/People_Power_(Hong_Kong)> downloaded on March 28, 2016)

29. Shiu was the owner of net media Myradio and then after splitting up with Wong founded another net media which is nearly the same one as Myradio and is called Meme. Please see <http://www.memehk.com/#>.


32. Some actually attribute these splitting-up to the Internet media. <https://www.facebook.com/groups/370178503169110/permalink/512888478898111/>

“陸伍仁：阿拉伯之春的網絡推手，2011《時代》雜誌選為全球最有影響力100個人物之一，戈寧(Wael Ghonim)最近在TED演講中公開承認，後悔使用臉書發起「阿拉伯之春」，因為他發覺，網絡掀起的革命推翻了獨裁的埃及政府，但未能建立一個開放包容的社會。社交媒體只能令社會陷入分裂、懷疑的漩渦。”

33. The major reason was purported by Shiu Yeuk-yuen as Tam Tak-chi’s unbridled attack on other pan-democrats rather than the establishment. Yet netizens also pointed to Shiu’s own attack on famous columnist and Tam in this instance. Shiu has refrained himself from unbridled attack on other pan-democrats after he has seen the bad example of Wong. 我對快必的立場〈蕭若元：最新蕭析〉2016-03-29. <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=40WtFFsacyM>

34. At the present moment People’s Power has announced a public meeting to choose “regional leader” but ostensibly also to settle the recent split between Shiu and Tam: <https://www.facebook.com/peoplespower/posts/1061041960624624?pnref=story>. Please see Tam’s attempt to reconcile with Shiu: <https://www.facebook.com/jaiszechi.chan/posts/10153364891827187:37>. Please also see another People’s Power leader Erica Yuen Miming 袁彌明’s support of Tam: <https://www.facebook.com/ericayuen/posts/10153688201821051?pnref=story>.

National Party, while the second one obviously harks back to the Democratic Progressive Party of Taiwan, which is seen as at heart advocating for Taiwan’s independence. And the third one has become the most spectacular since the New Year Day’s police-people clash in 2016 that was headed by it, and its LegCo by-election candidate Edward Leung Tin-kei 梁天琦 has been able to garnered a large number of votes, nearly causing Civic Party’s candidate dearly in failing to be elected.

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