_____

The Growing Digital Presence of China:
China in the Hungarian Digital Space

Richard **Mohr***
University of Szeged, Hungary

Abstract

This study addresses China's digital presence in Hungary from the
perspective of the Chinese diaspora in Hungary and the role of state and
non-state actors. The emergence of the Chinese diaspora in Hungary
began in the early 1990s, and its presence and influence on local society
became an important factor in shaping Hungarian opinion about China.
During the last two decades, when Hungary has had a China-friendly
political climate, digital channels have not only organically become a
part of everyday life, but also an important medium for China's
presence. This paper hypothesizes that the Chinese diaspora in Hungary
and China-related actors have contributed greatly to China's digital
presence, but without keeping pace with the growth of country's
economic power. It is an interesting question whether the Chinese
diaspora and China-related non-state actors follow the Chinese
government's political strategy and thus serve the PRC's digital soft
power, or whether they have their own voice. This paper will examine
the digital presence of the Chinese community and China-related actors

in Hungary and try to find out the nature and extent of their contribution in this particular field.

1. Preface: China in the Information Age

If we examine the change in China's economic importance in the world during the last two thousand years, we can see a tremendous decline in importance after eight hundred years of apparent dominance. In the nineteenth century, China quickly became a poor, backward country as we knew it during most of the twentieth century. After 1978, however, an amazing transformation took place. This change led to China regaining the status it had for centuries: one of the world's major superpowers. The success of Chinese reforms inevitably led to the growth of all three sources of power – economic, military, and soft power (Nye, 2004: 31). Since humanity's experience of incubating superpowers is related to conquest, China's rise has therefore often been accompanied by concerns about its military power. China has traditionally defined itself as a non-conquering power and regularly expresses this opinion (Hao, 2019). Today however, fears in the Western world about China are shifting from conquering lands to conquering minds (*The Economist*, 14th December 2017).

This rapid growth period of China coincided with the cataclysmic change triggered by the proliferation of the Internet. China successfully capitalized on this development with the production and export of digital devices, that made China popular to a certain extent. On the other hand, we hypothesize that China's international acceptance in the digital space has not kept pace with the growth of its economic power. Moreover,

China faces enormous challenges in making itself attractive to the Western world due to its independent and nearly isolated Internet ecosystem, its unique cultural and political characteristics, and its regularly misunderstood and misinterpreted values.

The information age and the Internet brought a new era for communication, marketing and even politics. People's opinions can be influenced and often manipulated in a very direct way. The overwhelming amount of information makes it difficult to be heard and even more difficult to distinguish between reality and fake news. Therefore, it is essential for a country to create an attractive image and shape public opinion in the realm of the Internet. This endeavor can be referred to as Soft Power 2.0 (Nye, 2019).

The aim of this research was to examine China's digital presence with a brief look at its Hungarian appearance and to find out whether this manifestation of Chinese soft power is able to convince local people to recognize or accept China's leading role in the world. However, during this research, we had to deal with the increasingly controversial opinion about the Chinese presence. According to Gifford (2010), outsiders' views of China have traditionally been characterized by two extreme positions: panda-huggers and dragon-slayers. Both positions overlook the complexity of the relationship between China and the Western world. Therefore, I agree with Ben Lowsen that it is better to use an appropriate approach so that if "you are neither too eager nor too cynical can you find the happy medium in which personal issues give way to the common public good. Do that and you will stand tall among those explorers, missionaries, statesmen and students who came seeking the open door to China." (Lowsen, 2017)

2. A General Outlook on the Digital Presence of China

2.1. Soft power

When we examine China's digital presence, we must start from its soft power. The term "soft power" in politics comes from Joseph S. Nye, Jr. as a contrast to the hard power of military and economic influence. Soft power aims to gain control by networking, communicating strong narratives, creating international influence, and thus making the country attractive to the world. Soft power consists of many aspects such as culture, achievements, political values and foreign policy. Obviously, not every culture can serve as a source of soft power, but the United States as an example benefits greatly from its universalistic culture (Nye, 2004: 11).

Based on the theory of soft power, new terms have been created, such as "smart power", which means learning to better combine hard and soft power (*ibid.*: 32). Another term is "sharp power", which was used in 2017 by the National Endowment for Democracy, a Washington-based foundation and think tank. Unlike soft power, which uses the pull of culture and values to increase a country's strength, sharp power is a tool for authoritarian regimes to exert coercion and manipulate opinion abroad, often used to describe the practice of China and Russia (Walker and Ludwig, 2017).

When it comes to digital presence, the term "Soft Power 2.0" seems quite apt. The digital revolution has upgraded the importance of soft power, allowing for a wider and faster flow of information than ever before. Influencing public opinion through digital means is a key element of Soft Power 2.0. A century and a half ago, the telegraph sped up communication and lowered barriers to the flow of information between countries. Today, speed is no longer the issue, but the explosion of information has created a "paradox of plenty" as plenty of

information leads to a scarcity of information. Therefore, reputation and credibility are more important than ever, further increasing the importance of soft power (Nye, 2019).

Consequently, creating credible communication and attractive content is the method that can be used as soft power. In terms of South-East Asian Confucianist countries, South Korea is a good example of how pop culture – the Korean Wave – has become popular worldwide in recent decades with the support of the government, only by creating the right environment for the film, television, and music industries to thrive (Gibson, 2020).

In the case of China, popular culture seems far less compelling to the Western world. In our information age, victory is often not in winning with one's army, but with one's story. But when the story appears to be propaganda, it can undermine credibility and become overproductive (Nye, 2019). When a government's policies appear "hypocritical, arrogant, indifferent to the opinion of others, or based on a narrow approach to national interest", it can easily squander a country's soft power (Nye, 2004: 14). In China, the production and export of all kinds of cultural products are still subject to control, and this process is obviously detrimental to achieve the same success as South Korea (Salát, 2021).

2.2. The Soft Power of China

In the context of China, soft power reflects a broader idea than Nye's definition. For China, soft power includes everything outside the military, more than popular culture or public diplomacy; it also includes harsh economic and diplomatic instruments, investment, aid, and participation in multilateral organizations, mirroring Nye's carrots and sticks. This is the "charm of a lion, not of a mouse: it can threaten other

nations with these sticks if they do not help China achieve its goals, but it can offer sizable carrots if they do" (Kurlantzick, 2007: 6).

China's soft power policies "remain largely ad hoc and primarily reactive, aiming to counter the China-threat theory and improve China's image abroad" (Glaser and Murphy, 2009: 10). Since the Reform and Opening Policy in 1978, China has been searching for an alternative unifying ideology that can replace Marxism-Maoism and provide an alternative to Western influence. Chinese cultural values – including the rehabilitation of the once reviled Confucianism or Taoism – have been discovered as a source of value for a national ideology and soft power (*ibid.*).

China's soft power repertoire consists of several elements. Obviously, the result of economic expansion is a strong source of the country's charm, so the Chinese leadership is also eager to showcase these achievements by hosting gigantic international events, such as the Beijing Olympic Games in 2008 and the Shanghai World Expo in 2010 (Salát, 2010), or the Winter Olympic Games in 2022. As for cultural expansion, China's greatest endeavor is undoubtedly the Confucius Institutes' global network, which has reached 541 institutes and 1170 Confucius Classrooms in 162 countries by the end of 2019 (Hanban, n.d.). Coupled with a generous scholarship system, it provides a very attractive learning opportunity to the international students who wish to study the Chinese language.

Other elements contributing to the strengthening of soft power include the development of education through the creation of world-class universities, scientific and technological developments such as the space program, athletic achievements, international branding of Chinese products, and mass media products, namely blockbuster movies and soap operas. The constant repetition of the term "peaceful development", which has replaced the ominous sounding earlier term "peaceful rise", is

meant to reassure the world about China's peaceful intentions and thus also serves as an instrument of soft power (Salát, 2010). It is also important to note that after the outbreak of the coronavirus epidemic in 2020, China provided protective medical equipment to many countries around the world. This "mask diplomacy" was also an attempt to create the impression that China is not the cause of the problem, but part of the solution. "Vaccine diplomacy" seems to be a natural extension of this method (Karásková and Blablová, 2021).

2.3. Public Diplomacy of China

The term "public diplomacy" was coined in 1965 by Edmund Gullion, Dean of the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy Tufts University. According to a summary of Gullion's concept from an early Murrow Center brochure, "public diplomacy... deals with the influence of public attitudes on the formation and execution of foreign policies. It encompasses dimensions of international relations beyond traditional diplomacy; the cultivation by governments of public opinion in other countries; the interaction of private groups and interests in one country with another; the reporting of foreign affairs and its impact on policy; communication between those whose job is communication, as diplomats and foreign correspondents; and the process of intercultural communications." (Cull, 2006). Although the term has been used for at least a hundred years, it was first used as a definition for Public Diplomacy Studies by Gullion (*ibid.*).

Public diplomacy, often used as an alternative term for soft power, has two basic types. Cultural communication or branding is a long-term tool for governments to improve their image in the world, create goodwill and promote cooperation, also to support alliance relations and counter hostile propaganda. Political advocacy, on the other hand, aims at short-term, quick results to build foreign support for immediate policy

objectives (*Encyclopaedia Britannica*, n.d.). According to Henrikson (2005), "public diplomacy may be defined, simply, as the conduct of international relations by governments through public communications media and through dealings with a wide range of nongovernmental entities (political parties, corporations, trade associations, labor unions, educational institutions, religious organizations, ethnic groups, and so on including influential individuals) for the purpose of influencing the politics and actions of other governments".

The term has evolved considerably since its emergence in the 1960s. For a long time, public diplomacy was the term for overt diplomacy, as a counterpart to "private diplomacy". It was not until the 1950s that the term shifted towards the "realm of international information and propaganda", as important diplomatic events were increasingly practiced and understood as public appearances. Since then, the term "public diplomacy" has been widely used to replace the malignant term "propaganda", and create a new, more benign term (Cull, 2006).

It is an important distinction that the United States recognized the need to replace the term propaganda with "public diplomacy" as early as the 1960s, but this term was not introduced and redefined in China until after 2000. According to Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi (楊潔篪), the implementation of public diplomacy was first proposed by General Secretary Hu Jintao (胡錦濤) in July 2009 in his speech at the 11th Foreign Ambassadors Conference, officially placing public diplomacy on the government's agenda (Yang, 2011). One of the most important definitions for China comes from Zhao Qizheng (趙啟政) (2011), the former director of the Information Office of the State Council:

> "There are many publics, but who are the subjects? First of all, the institutions and individuals who have close contacts with foreign countries, businessmen, professors, leaders of women's associations

and trade unions, religious leaders, and so on. These people are not government officials, but they are very influential, some of them are famous members of the social elite. Social organizations, mass organizations and other NGOs play an important role in public diplomacy, which is carried out by the public.

The relationship between the government of a country and the public is communication. In the traditional sense of the media environment, they often rely on press conferences, reports from private research institutions and the Internet to communicate... The basic task of China's public diplomacy is to explain China to the world and promote foreign public awareness of the real China, including China's traditional culture, social development, economic situation, political system, domestic and foreign policies." (author's translation)

2.4. Digital Diplomacy of China

The concept of "digital diplomacy" is part of public diplomacy. It is commonly described as the implementation of diplomatic goals through the Internet, especially through social media. According to Holmes (2015), it can be seen as a revolution in the practice of diplomacy. However, the start of this revolution was somewhat overdue as digital technology has already changed the ways of business management, individual social relations, and states' governance.

The United States began shaping its digital diplomacy policy as early as 1996, when the U.S. Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy published a report titled "A New Diplomacy for the Information Age". Although China was a latecomer to digital diplomacy, it has developed rapidly. In December 2003, Foreign Minister Li Zhaoxing (李肇星) communicated with the public online through the ministry's website Foreign Affairs at "China Foreign Affairs

Forum" and "Xinhuanet Development Forum", with more than 20,000 people participating. This was the first time that the Chinese Foreign Minister interacted with the public online (Wang, 2016).

In 2011, China's Ministry of Foreign Affairs set up a Weibo page called "Handheld Diplomacy" (*waijiao xiaolingtong* ／外交小靈通) to publish China's diplomatic information in a timely manner and explain the basic concepts, strategies and policies of Chinese diplomacy. Later, WeChat (a multipurpose messaging, social media and mobile payment app, *Weixin* ／微信), WeiShi (Chinese video sharing app, 微視) and Facebook pages were also added to the platform. Dozens of Chinese embassies and consulates abroad have gradually opened official WeChat pages to provide timely information on important events and offer convenient services to Chinese citizens abroad (*ibid.*).

Since 2017, the beginning of Xi Jinping government's second term, China's foreign policy has clearly moved away from the former "keep a low profile and bide our time" (*taoguang yanghui* ／韜光養晦) and "by no means should China take the lead" legacy of Deng Xiaoping (鄧小平). China has bided enough time to participate more actively with a louder voice in international society. According to the new policy, China aspires to become a "constructor of global peace, a contributor to the development of global governance, and a protector of international order." (Son, 2017).

The Trump administration's tough China policy and the China-US trade war have been the breeding ground for harsher Chinese foreign diplomacy. Since late 2019, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokespeople and Chinese diplomats in the EU and other countries have become much more assertive than ever before. The "wolf warrior diplomacy" (*zhanlang waijiao* ／戰狼外交) phase refers to the "new approach among the Chinese diplomatic corps to more aggressively defend their home country online" and comes from a Chinese action series that has

boosted national pride and patriotism among Chinese viewers (Brandt and Schafer, 2020).

2.5. The Rise of Digital China

For several decades, since the reform and opening-up policy initiated in 1978, China has expanded its economic influence on a large scale. The "Go Global" (literally "go out", *zouchuqu* ／走出去) policy was launched in 1999 to encourage Chinese companies to invest abroad. In the digital age, Chinese companies are also competing globally in the ICT sector with great success, and the country is striving to take a leading role in shaping international standards for new technologies. In 2006, the Chinese State Council launched a plan to strengthen China's science and technology sector. Since then, the motto has been "convergence of technology and creativity". As culture has been recognized as an industry (*chanye* ／産業), the focus has shifted to digital technologies and platforms (Keane and Yu, 2019: 4627).

The creation of the "Digital Silk Road" is based on the National Informatization Strategy (2016-2020) as well as other policy initiatives such as "Made in China 2025" and "Internet+" to promote domestic innovation in the digital and industrial sectors. Europe is increasingly concerned about the loss of competitiveness in emerging ICT technologies and the observation that Chinese high-tech companies are gradually capturing markets and expanding their influence in fintech, e-commerce, and telecom structures (Shi-Kupfer and Ohlberg, 2019: 8).

The Chinese government's comprehensive policy called Internet+ was also described in Premier Li Keqiang (李克強)'s government work report in 2015. According to the report, Internet+ aimed to "integrate mobile Internet, cloud computing, big data, and the Internet of Things with modern manufacturing, to encourage the healthy development of e-commerce, industrial networks, and Internet banking, and to guide

Internet-based companies to increase their presence in the international market" (Li, 2015: 20). The May 2020 government work report states that "the Internet+ policy as a whole will be pushed forward and the new advantage of the digital economy will be built" (Li, 2020).

Supported by the government's industrial polices, the IT sector "leveraging the country's fast-growing markets to build market power and drive innovations with global reach" (Lee, 2017). China's Internet economy has become the world's most dynamic startup incubator, but there are also several corporate giants that can compete in size with similar U.S. tech companies. The triumvirate of Baidu (search engine), Alibaba Group (e-commerce), and Tencent (social media) – often referred to as BAT – each has a market capitalization of over US$250 billion and is "funding and buying out start-ups even more aggressively than the titans of Silicon Valley" (*ibid.*). These Internet giants are beginning to revitalize tech innovation in the private sector. MIT's Technology Review has selected five Chinese ICT companies, including BAT, DiDi (a vehicle rental company) and Huawei for its 2016 global "50 Smartest Companies" list (*ibid.*).

China has one of the largest Internet user communities in the world, with the number of online shoppers in China already larger than the entire population of Europe (*Statista*, n.d.). The size of the digital economy has grown from 15 percent of GDP in 2008 to 33 percent in 2017 (Zhang and Chen, 2019). However, the Chinese online ecosystem is completely different from that of the Western world in terms of service or content marketing, so China's digital community is also quite different from that of the West. Obviously, it is also difficult for China to fully understand and use the Western style and tools of digital marketing and content.

2.6. China's Digital Community

Internet cafes (*wangba* ／ 網吧) became popular in the 1990s, so the Internet was quite developed in China by that time. The first phase of growth occurred in the late 1990s and early 2000s when Bulletin Board Systems (BBS) and blogs were introduced. BBS was popular among young students on campus, and blogs were successfully promoted by private web portals such as Sina and Tencent. During this period, Chinese Internet service providers only copied the successful Western services such as Google and Facebook. It was not until the second period between 2008 and 2011 that the Chinese Internet industry began to create innovative services to compete with those of Silicon Valley (Negro, 2017: 143-144). This period is characterized not only by the success of microblog platforms, especially Weibo (微博), but also by the beginning of the blocking of Western Internet services and websites, such as Facebook or Twitter. The first blocking of western Internet websites occurred in July 2009, after the riots in Xinjiang Province (Bamman *et al.*, 2012).

The current growth phase starts from 2012 and is represented by the dominance of mobile Internet and related services (Negro, 2017: 143-144). By the end of 2019, the number of mobile Internet users in China has exceeded 1.3 billion, reaching almost one-third of the global users (Xinhua, 24th July 2020). Restrictions on foreign companies operating on the Internet or social media in China, as well as banned Western websites, have led to a flourishing of local Internet companies, social media platforms, and apps. As a result, Chinese people predominantly use domestically developed services. Mobile users dominate the Chinese Internet market, as the country has one of the highest smartphone penetration rates in the world. Mobile Internet penetration has accelerated the separate development of China's unique Internet ecosystem (Verkasalo, 2016).

For Chinese users accessing only domestic websites and services, the Internet may seem fantastic at an incredible speed. But foreign businesses and users who want to access non-domestic websites experience slow connections with high latency and packet loss due to low network bandwidth between China and foreign countries (Zhang, 2016). Not to mention the censorship of the Internet, commonly referred to as the Great Firewall of China, which is also part of the reason for the slow connection. However, behind the Great Firewall, which is mainly occupied by local technology solution providers, the Chinese Internet ecosystem is becoming the "Galápagos of the Internet". The Chinese Internet is also unique because of its very app-centric users and the convenience of mobile solutions. It is worth noting that China has become the number one mobile payment market in the world, both in terms of transaction volume and penetration rate (*Time*, 11th June 2015).

Mobile payment services – especially Alipay and WeChat Pay – have become and integral part of Chinese people's daily lives. Both companies have built a huge network around payment solutions, and people now use them to buy goods, order food, pay their bills, book taxis, buy tickets, make donations, transfer money, and even make financial investments. When a payment is required, almost everyone, even street vendors or beggars, accepts mobile payment with QR codes. According to the People's Bank of China, the mobile payment service reached a total of 60.5 billion transactions in 2018, 61.2 percent more than the previous year (Huang *et al.*, 2020). With the extensive use of WeChat Pay and AliPay, China is already moving towards a cashless society. In 2019, mobile transactions reached RMB 347 trillion (US$49 trillion), accounting for four out of five payments (Zhang, 2020).

2.7. Western Concerns about Chinese Digital Power

There is great concern among European policymakers about the rise of China's digital power, given the heavy involvement of Chinese ICT companies in Europe's critical digital infrastructure and the challenges they could pose to the European regulatory framework Digital Single Market Strategy. In a fragmented EU, the biggest challenge could be a "digitally aggressive China competing with the US in a fragmented global digital economy" (Shi-Kupfer and Ohlberg, 2019: 11). Transatlantic relations could face another challenge in this context. It could become a crucial question how different European governments deal with the economic opportunities associated with China's digital rise if the US considers this as a strategic field in its competition with China (*ibid.*).

Certainly, China's cyber power also appears as a direct threat. This narrative surfaces regularly in the US, along with several reasons why cyberspace is and will be a part of China's strategy. These reasons include deterrence through infiltration of critical infrastructure, military espionage to gain military knowledge, and industrial espionage to gain economic advantage (Hjortdal, 2011). However, from the Chinese perspective, China supports the peaceful use of cyberspace and takes the position of "no first use" of cyber weapons and no attacks on civilian targets. Moreover, the interconnected nature of the Internet makes it difficult to distinguish between civilian and military networks (Zhang, 2012). This may suggest that a cyberattack originating from China does not necessarily represent government behaviour.

3. China and the Chinese Diaspora in the Hungarian Digital Space

3.1. Diaspora Diplomacy of China

The term "Chinese diaspora" refers to "Chinese descendants of any citizenship residing outside mainland China, Hong Kong, and Taiwan. Members of this complex group represent different generations, places of origin, tenures outside China, and political and ideological stances […] The Chinese diaspora consists of Chinese nationals working and residing overseas (*huaqiao*), ethnic Chinese with foreign citizenships (*huaren* or *huayi*), and students (*liuxuesheng*)." (Hongmei Li, 2012: 2249) The diaspora population plays an important mediating role between their country of origin and the host country, including in the field of politics and foreign policy (*ibid.*).

China has always paid attention to Chinese people living in other countries since the founding of the People's Republic of China (PRC), by the two main organizations being the All-China Federation of Returned Overseas Chinese (*Qiaolian* ／僑聯) and the Overseas Chinese Affairs Office under the State Council (*Guowuyuan Qiaoban* ／ 國務院僑辦). The latter was merged into the United Front Work Department of Chinese Communist Party (Zhong Gong Zhongyang Tongyi Zhanxian Gongzuo Bu ／中共中央統一戰線工作部) in 2018 (Joske, 2019). From the provincial level onwards, diaspora offices try to track down the associations and important figures of Chinese migrants from the area under their jurisdiction, and some are also given nominal official positions. In 2000, at least two Chinese living in Hungary held provincial-level positions (Nyíri, 2000).

According to Li Minghuan, members of the Chinese diaspora often live in "two worlds" as they try to convert their achievements in one society into capital in another, which greatly affects the relationship between Chinese emigrants and the region in China from which they

emigrated (*qiaoxiang／僑鄉*). However, until the end of Cold War, Chinese immigrants in Europe remained mainly a silent group, leading their social lives apart from European society. Since the reform and opening-up policy, Chinese immigrants became more visible by establishing associations, organizing activities and integrating themselves into local politics. The citizenship status of overseas Chinese is a controversial issue, as dual citizenship is still not recognized by the PRC (Li Minghuan, 2012).

In 2008, just before the Beijing Olympic Games, pro-Tibet demonstrators rioted in several cities during the Olympic Torch Relay. The West was surprised to see that various Chinese communities living outside China, who apparently have no ideological ties to the motherland, united in expressing their support for China and strong opposition to the Western pro-Tibet standpoint. Western journalists have failed to understand the phenomenon of the Chinese diaspora – voluntarily and without Chinese pressure – supporting Beijing Olympics and thus indirectly supporting the Chinese government's project of soft power diplomacy. These pro-China demonstrations show the growing awareness of diaspora Chinese, but at the same time they also project that the diaspora is willing to take a more active role in the growing presence of the PRC's nationalist agenda (Sun, 2012).

3.2. The Chinese Diaspora in Hungary

In order to better understand the Chinese presence and the role of the local Chinese diaspora in the Hungarian digital space, we should briefly examine how the Chinese diaspora emerged in Hungary. After the introduction of reform and opening-up policies in China, relations with Hungary and other Eastern Bloc countries began to warm up. In the 1980s, the exchange of students, researchers and engineers resumed (Nyíri, 2007: 49). In 1989, several factors led to the Chinese migration

flood to Eastern Europe: the Tiananmen crackdown shook the private sector with the fear of possible reversal of economic reforms by the government, also many of the intelligentsia were affected by the possible or actual arrests after Tiananmen. In addition, Chinese state-owned enterprises that could not sell their stock were severely affected by the economic recession around 1990. Hungary was an ideal target country, as Chinese nationals enjoyed visa-free entry between 1988 and 1992 (*ibid.*: 52-53).

At this time, stories of getting rich in Eastern Europe encouraged tens of thousands of people to try their luck in trade. During this short period, Hungarian officials and local Chinese estimated that about 40,000 Chinese citizens came to Hungary. The reason for this large number was not only the visa-free entry policy, but also the success of the first traders, the relatively high standard of living and also the most open economy in Eastern Europe. This favorable business and social climate was passed on by the local Chinese population to friends and relatives back home, leading to a further influx (*ibid.*: 52-54).

"Shuttle trade" has been a feature of East European scarcity since the 1960s, but the Chinese traders who came to Hungary filled the vacuum left by the declining retail chains of cheap clothing. Dozens of "Chinese markets" were established, even in smaller towns (Nyíri, 2007). But the measures taken by the Hungarian authorities in 1992 to curb migration, as well as deteriorating market conditions, forced many Chinese in Hungary to relocate to other East- or West-European countries. After a gradual decline in numbers, the estimated number of Chinese living in Hungary stabilized around the turn of the millennium at about 15,000 people (Nyíri, 1999).

After 2010, the Chinese diaspora increased again to 20-25,000 people due to the Residency Bond Scheme immigration policy of the second Orbán government (*Index.hu*, 16th September 2018). The

Hungarian Residence Bond Program was introduced in 2013 and discontinued in 2017 (*About Hungary*, 13th January 2017). As a result, Hungary has the largest Chinese diaspora among the Central-European countries, although many of the new immigrants do not stay in Hungary permanently or at all (*Index.hu*, 16th September 2018). The diaspora has emerged into a well-developed community, with several religious congregations, newspapers, schools, and an extensive service sector covering almost all needs of the Chinese community, including legal services, hairdressers, massages or real estate agencies (Mohr *et al.*, 2019: 166).

3.3. Digital Presence of China in Hungary

People's opinions about China are often polarised, which poses a major challenge for China in shaping its image abroad. Negative opinions are mainly directed against the Chinese political establishment, and are fueled by stereotypes and distorted news. Seemingly China's former image of a poor Third World country is now being replaced by a ruthless communist state with a strong desire for power. The handling of the coronavirus pandemic, trade disputes, conflicts with minorities – all contribute to deteriorating Western public opinion of China. Prejudices about the unfamiliar Chinese political system and its impact on foreign relations also raise eyebrows, such as recent news about the espionage allegations of Fudan University and its planned campus establishment in Hungary (*Daily News Hungary*, 7th April 2021).

The local community – both Hungarian and Chinese – seems to be active only in a relatively small circle to spread China's cultural and educational values, and these activities are not enough to influence the general population. Again, China has yet to find its distinctive contemporary cultural voice, but political issues often cast a shadow

over cultural or other values, even among those Westerners who are open to Eastern cultures.

From China's perspective, however, the situation in Hungary is still better than in other Western European countries. A broad study of public opinion in 13 European countries about China from the second half of 2020 shows that only Eastern Europe holds positive views, while Western and Northern European countries have significantly negative views. Central Europe is somewhere in between, but still overwhelmingly negative (Turcsányi *et al.*, 2020).

When we examine China's digital presence in Hungary, we need to understand that there are many different levels of this presence. There is a big difference whether the source of information is a state actor or a nonstate actor, whether the target audience is the Chinese community or the local population. The differences may be evident not only in terms of content but also in terms of channels. However, according to this research, there seems to be no evidence or pattern of implementing an expert-based strategic communication plan for China image at the country level, although there has benn a significant increase in the frequency of communication and the amount of content.

3.4. State Actors

The real goal of China's digital presence in Hungary, or the use of soft power, would be to address the local population in their native language and provide attractive information about China. There is also a large Chinese community in Hungary, and after several years of rigid and dismissive policies towards the Chinese community right after the 1989 Tiananmen events, overseas Chinese became an important factor in facilitating China's foreign relations, so the local Chinese community is also an important target for the Chinese government and media.

The Embassy of the People's Republic of China in Hungary maintains a relatively extensive Chinese-language website, which mainly publishes official announcements and notices. The English- or Hungarian-language website is quite outdated and far less comprehensive, and there is no information on cultural events, China-related education, or scholarships. However, the embassy also runs a Facebook page and a Twitter page. The official Facebook page is mainly in English and was created in October 2019. Both the Facebook and Twitter pages show fairly regular activity, and the amount of Hungarian content is also growing. The China Cultural Center in Budapest is the official cultural institute of China in Hungary with a very active Facebook page, posting regularly in Hungarian and Chinese.

Interestingly, it is only recently that there are official Chinese government WeChat accounts targeting the Chinese diaspora in Hungary. The China Cultural Center in Budapest established its official WeChat account in September 2020, while the Embassy did not set up its WeChat account until April 2021.

China Radio International (CRI) is another active Facebook page in Hungarian with a 74,000 followers. Just like its international counterparts, BBC and VOA, CRI has also established various channels to cover China internationally (Chen *et al.*, 2010). In Hungary, there is another tourism-related CRI offshoot page on Facebook called China's Charm (*Kína csábereje*), which has 23,000 followers.

The five Confucius Institutes (CIs) in Hungary are located in five different cities. All of the institutes in Hungary offer very colorful cultural and educational activities, often far beyond the mandatory programs attributed to CIs, as their programs are based on cooperation between the Chinese staff and local Sinologists. All CIs have Hungarian, English and Chinese websites, all of them have a presence on Facebook,

four of them have a YouTube channel and two of them also run an Instagram profile. However, the YouTube channels of the institutes have only about 35,000 views. In Budapest, there is a Hungarian–Chinese bilingual school – also operates as a Confucius Classroom – with a 15-year history, but its digital presence is also very limited.

Over the past nearly two decades, all Hungarian governments have taken a pro-China stance, and despite fierce controversies in domestic politics, this seemed to be an issue that was commonly supported by all major political parties. In the last decade, the policy of "opening to the East" and China-friendly communication have even been reinforced. In 2015, Hungary was the first country to sign an agreement with China related to the One Belt One Road plan (Reuters, 7th June 2015). In 2019, Hungary signed an agreement with China in connection with the Digital Silk Road (*Daily News Hungary*, 25th April 2019).

Hungary's national central television has been broadcasting Daily News in Chinese since January 2016 (*Hungary Today*, 5th January 2016). The videos are also available on the dedicated YouTube channel of the public media. We do not have data on the number of views of the live news; YouTube access figures are roughly in the range of 100-400 views per broadcast. The Hungarian Tax Authority also operates a Chinese website. According to Tax Authority, their Chinese homepage has 3000 readers (*Hvg.hu*, 25th February 2014).

ChinafluenCE's Media Analysis about Hungary is a statistics-based study of 3,921 Hungarian media articles between 2010-2017 about China in terms of politics or economics. According to the analysis, the image of China in Hungary is mainly shaped by individual politicians, and a positive image of China comes mostly from government politicians. The topics of the articles mainly focused on political, economic and bilateral relations; sensitive issues such as human rights, Tibet or the protection of intellectual property rights were hardly

mentioned. Most articles were pragmatic and neutral, but the proportion of articles with a negative tone showed a growing trend, from 6 percent in 2010 to 15 percent in 2017 (Matura, 2018). Fewer than seventy people spoke out on the issue more than three times during the entire period.

Among the seventy opinion leaders were eleven government politicians, who accounted for 38 percent of all posts. Government members and politicians made the most positive statements, without any negative tone. On the other hand, journalists proved to be the most critical. This group accounted for two-thirds of the opinion leaders. 19 percent of their articles had a negative tone and only 5 percent had a positive tone. The so-called "pro-government" media and journalists were less critical of China than other media and journalists. Experts and researchers play a very modest role in shaping public opinion on China issues (*ibid.*).

3.5. Nonstate Actors

The Chinese diaspora in Hungary communicates mainly through WeChat. When we search for the Chinese word for "Hungary" – " 匈牙利 " (*Xiongyali*) – in the official WeChat channels, we can find that 131 results include "Hungary" in their name. Some of these channels are maintained by Hungary or Hungarians, such as Hungarian diplomatic missions in China or the Hungarian Tourism Agency. There are also some companies, tourism agencies, consultants, real estate companies, investment opportunities, language groups and schools, study abroad channels and blogs. We can also find some civil organizations, such as Mutual Assistance Association of Chinese Parents in Hungary (*Xiongyali Jiazhang Huzhu Liangmeng ╱* 匈牙利家長互助聯盟), or the Clansmen Association of Qingtian County (*Xiongyali Qingtian Tongxianghui ╱* 匈牙利青田同鄉會).

Not only has there been a longstanding China-friendly political climate in Hungary, but there is also a long-standing interest in China. Having a common understanding of Eastern ancestry, Hungarians began scholarly exploration of China as early as the 19th century (Salát, 2009). The Chinese community in Hungary is well accepted by locals, and many second-generation Chinese children who grew up locally remain in Hungary despite rapidly growing xenophobia; their online socialization targets international networking sites, such as Facebook (Nyíri, 2014).

3.6. Business Sector

In 2005, the Hungarian Chamber of Commerce and Industry established the Hungarian–Chinese Relations Committee to promote and support bilateral business relations. The committee does not have a Facebook or other social media page, but provides detailed information about online events in its regular newsletter. ChinaCham Hungary Hungarian–Chinese Chamber of Economy was founded in 2003 to support Hungarian businesses in the form of a non-profit association. ChinaCham organizes regular events for its member companies, such as conferences, business seminars and a monthly ChinaCham Business Club. It has a website in Hungarian, English and Chinese, and also runs an active Facebook page.

E-shopping for Chinese products is a particularly popular aspect of China in Hungary. There are several Hungarian web shops that offer a direct shopping option, and there are also many test sites in Hungarian, with introductions, tests, news, reviews and direct links to product pages in Chinese web shops. One of the most popular pages is *RendeljKínait* (OrderChinese) with more than 23,000 followers on Facebook, but there are also many other Facebook groups for people shopping from China,

and we can even find thematic groups, such as "Fishing from Aliexpress" or "Page of Chinese private label knives". This phenomenon shows that cheap Chinese products and easy availability through Chinese web shops are very attractive.

The two main Chinese-language newspapers in Hungary are published online, but the print version is still available for free in most Chinese supermarkets or restaurants (*Index.hu*, 16th September 2018). In addition to the online edition on its website, the *New Review* (*Xin Daobao* / 新導報) has a Facebook page and a Weibo page, also runs a mobile application and a YouTube channel. Its Facebook page is a personal page, not an institutional one, with nearly 3000 friends. In addition to its Facebook page, *Hungarian United News* (*Xiongyali Lianhe Bao* / 匈牙利聯合報) operates a Twitter page and a YouTube channel. In addition, there is another relatively small but active media channel called *Chinese Headline New Media* (*Huaren Toutiao* / 華人頭條), which is associated with one person but has a notable web presence on Facebook, Twitter, WeChat and YouTube.

3.7. Civil Sector

Among the more than 100 results for the Chinese word for "Hungary" on Facebook, there are several place or organization pages from Hungary, such as the Hungarian Central Television, Hungarian Central Bank, some museums, football clubs, church districts, health care providers, and geographic locations, which probably contain only the string "匈牙利" (*Xiongyali*) in their names or description tags. Worth mentioning are the Hungarian Chinese Christian Church, the Hungarian Chan Buddhist Church, the Puji Temple Budapest and the Hungarian–Chinese Cultural Association, each of which has about 500-1,000 followers.

The Hungarian–Chinese Friendship Society was founded in 1959 and is the earliest civil organization in Hungary promoting Hungarian–Chinese friendship and cultural exchange. Their colorful events also takes place in the virtual space. They have a website and run an active Facebook page and Instagram profile. The Great Wall Hungarian–Chinese Friendship Association is another organization with similar goals, their Facebook page shows regular online activity.

The Chinese Art Center (formerly known as the Center of Chinese Culture and Arts) was founded in 1995. It is the best known non-profit organization in Hungary in the field of China-related arts and culture, organizing or actively participating in many China-related arts and cultural programs in Hungary. The Chinese Art Center has several affiliated schools that popularize various aspects of Chinese art, such as music, calligraphy, and martial arts. The center and the individual schools also have their own Facebook pages or websites.

The Hungarian–Chinese Cultural Association organizes events and cultural exchange activities, it has 1,100 followers on Facebook and is directly connected to the *New Review* newspaper. The association targets both the Chinese and Hungarian communities.

Cinema Hungarian–Chinese Art and Cultural Association is a cooperation between Chinese and Hungarian filmmakers, the association has a Hungarian website and a Facebook page.

Throughout Hungary there are several associations for wushu, Kung-Fu, and various branches of Chinese Martial Art. Their digital presence is not too strong, but their contribution to the local presence and recognition of China is undeniable. There are also some other local representatives of lesser-known Chinese sports, such as Mediball Association with more than 2,500 followers on its Facebook page, or Hungarian Shuttlecock Association with 1,300 followers on Facebook.

Some popular public Facebook groups provide a general discussion and information sharing platform to talk about China, such as Hungarian-Chinese Meeting, the Chinese-Hungarian Community Page, or Daily Chinese, all of which have a few thousand members.

In the last decade, several universities in Hungary have established a Chinese department or China-related research (Mohr *at al.*, 2019.: 179). These research centers regularly publish their work online. During the coronavirus epidemics, online teaching boomed, and since many Chinese teachers could not come to Hungary or return, lessons were conducted online directly from China. Pre-recorded lessons, lectures and other China-related study events also became popular. The number of Chinese students in Hungary has also grown steadily. At the beginning of 2020, there were 2,772 Chinese students studying in Hungarian universities (*Alon*, 2nd February 2020). Online organizations of Chinese students are widespread, but mostly they are closed groups, although the "Chinese Student in Budapest" is a public Facebook group with about 1,500 members.

The online presence of Chinese cuisine is quite general and popular. The Facebook group "Foodies Guide Chinatown Budapest" has nearly 3,000 members, and there are several other pages promoting Chinese food and restaurants. The public Facebook group "Traditional Chinese Medicine (TCM)" has more than 5,000 members and another private group called "Everyday Chinese Medicine" has 4,700 members. Chinese Astrology and Fengshui, as part of mystical esotericism, are distorted from their original Chinese meaning and background, but are still quite popular and serve as a positive addition to China's digital image.

3.8. Influencers and Other Individuals

According to Nye (2009), "private sources of soft power are likely to become increasingly important in the global information age". Looking

at this statement today, in the age of new social media, it proves to be extremely true. Due to the three-decade history of the Chinese community in Hungary, there are already several second-generation Chinese-born influencers on various social media platforms, such as short-track speedskaters Liu Shaolin Sándor and his brother Liu Shaoang. They play an important role in forming a positive China image among locals (Mohr *at al.*, 2019: 172).

There are few vlogs and YouTube channels of Chinese people targeting Hungarians. Lu Zhao Luca's vlog has 33,800 subscribers, and her videos are about Chinese culture and behavior. Her most popular video about the coronavirus reached 645,000 views. Master Wang is a well-known chef who runs popular Chinese restaurants in Budapest. His Facebook page has 17,000 followers and his YouTube channel has more than 3,000 subscribers. One of his videos has been viewed more than 111,000 times, but a video by popular Hungarian gastroblogger Fördős Zé featuring Master Wang and Chinese gastronomy reached 846,000 views.

There are many other blogs and vlogs about China, including those by travelers, students, photographers and people living in China. However, the popularity and number of views of blogs are difficult to confirm. It is much easier to find out the real influencers based on the number of views of vlogs. Csaba Magyarósi's travel-related vlog (380,000 subscribers) contains videos about traveling in China and Chinese gastronomy with 100-300,000 views. Lilla's vlog (35,000 subscribers) describes Lilla Horváth's life in China, and the most popular video is her self-introduction with 138,000 views. Rita Vizer (19,000 subscribers), who lives in China, runs her YouTube channel from there, and her video about the coronavirus in China has been viewed by nearly 500,000 viewers. There are also a few other vlogs with several thousand views.

4. Conclusion

The results of the research have confirmed the preliminary assumptions that the image of China in Hungarian society is based on rather limited information. The Chinese diaspora in Hungary, as well as the individuals and groups interested in various aspects of Chinese culture, can only establish a very limited online presence and interact with a relatively small number of people. Chinese cuisine, travel, food, kung-fu can generate some interest, but we could not find any other part of Chinese popular culture that resonates with the general public.

On the other hand, the perception of China seems to be directly linked to politics. The ruling parties have demonstrably adopted a friendly attitude towards China over the past two decades, and the Eastern ancestry of Hungarians has also created a generally China-friendly atmosphere. However, the growing negative attitude of Western Europe and the US towards China and the recent negative news in Hungary about the Chinese vaccine or Fudan University dominate public opinion and increase the distrust towards China. Apparently, China has not yet developed a visible, successful strategy to support the introduction of China's traditional and modern cultural values into people's minds against the considerable headwind of negative judgments and to make the Western community appreciate China without political overtones.

From the perspective of bilateral relations between Hungary and China, it is encouraging that China's cultural values are increasingly present in Hungarian education and that these values are also reflected in the digital space. Interpersonal relations that foster mutual knowledge and appreciation of each other's culture can be the most important key to understanding China and promoting peaceful common development.

Note

References

About Hungary (13th January 2017). Hungary halts residency bond scheme.
     *<http://abouthungary.hu/news-in-brief/hungary-halts-residency-bond-
     scheme/>*
Alon (2nd February 2020). Koronavírus – Az egyetemek felkészültek: 2772
     kínai hallgató tanul Magyarországon [coronavirus – the Universities are
     ready: 2772 Chinese students study in Hungary]. *<https://www.alon.hu/*

aktualis/2020/02/koronavirus-a-magyar-felsooktatas-felkeszult-2772-kinai-hallgato-tanul-a-magyar-felsooktatasi-intezmenyekben>

Bamman, David, Brendan O'Connor and Noah A. Smith (2012). Censorship and deletion practices in Chinese social media. *First Monday*, Vol. 17, No. 3. *<https://firstmonday.org/ojs/index.php/fm/article/download/3943/3169>*

Brandt, Jessica and Bret Schafer (2020). How China's 'wolf warrior' diplomats use and abuse Twitter. *Tech Stream*, 28th October 2020. Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution. *<https://www.brookings.edu/techstream/how-chinas-wolf-warrior-diplomats-use-and-abuse-twitter/>*

Chen, Chwen Chwen, Cinzia Colapinto and Qing Luo (2010). China Radio International in the digital age: Propagating China on the global scenario. *Global Media Journal*, Vol. 9, No. 16. *<https://www.globalmediajournal.com/open-access/china-radio-international-in-the-digital-age-propagating-china-on-the-global-scenario.pdf>*

Cull, Nicholas J. (2006). "Public diplomacy" before Gullion: The evolution of a phrase. *CPD Blog*, 18th April 2006. Los Angeles, CA: USC Center on Public Diplomacy, (CPD), University of Southern California. *<https://usc publicdiplomacy.org/blog/public-diplomacy-gullion-evolution-phrase>*

Daily News Hungary (25th April 2019). Orbán: One belt, one road initiative in line with Hungary's interests. *<https://dailynewshungary.com/orban-one-belt-one-road-initiative-in-line-with-hungarys-interests/>*

Daily News Hungary (7th April 2021). Fudan University's Budapest campus to be constructed by a Chinese company involved in spying scandals? *<https://dailynewshungary.com/fudan-universitys-budapest-campus-to-be-constructed-by-chinese-company-with-chinese-loan/>*

Encyclopaedia Britannica (n.d.). Public diplomacy. *<https://www.britannica.com/topic/public-diplomacy>*

Gibson, Jenna (2020). How South Korean pop culture can be a source of soft power. In: Chung Min Lee and Kathryn Botto (eds.), *The case for South Korean soft power*. Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for

International Peace. <*https://carnegieendowment.org/2020/12/15/how-sou th-korean-pop-culture-can-be-source-of-soft-power-pub-83411*>

Gifford, Rob (2010). Panda-huggers and dragon-slayers: How to view modern China today. *Social Education*, Vol. 74, No. 1, pp. 9-11. <*https://www. socialstudies.org/social-education/74/1/panda-huggers-and-dragon-slayers-how-view-modern-china-today*>

Glaser, Bonnie S. and Melissa E. Murphy (2009). Soft power with Chinese characteristics: The ongoing debate (pp. 10-26). In: Carola McGiffert (ed.), *Chinese soft power and its implications for the United States: Competition and cooperation in the developing world*. Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS).

Hanban (漢辦) (n.d.). 關於孔子學院／課堂 [about Confucius Institutes and Classrooms]. <*https://web.archive.org/web/20210113044953/http://www. hanban.org/confuciousinstitutes/node_10961.htm*>

Hao Sisi (郝思斯) (2019). 新聞背後│中國為甚麼絕不會走上＂國強必霸＂的道路 [behind the news: why will China never embark on the path of "a strong country must exercise hegemony"]. 中央紀委國家監委網站 [website of China Commission of Discipline Inspection]. 12th November 2019. <*http://www.ccdi.gov.cn/yaowen/201911/t20191112_204238.html*>

Henrikson, Alan K. (April 2005). "Public diplomacy may be defined, simply, as…". In: Definitions of public diplomacy. (Medford and Somerville, MA: The Edward R. Murrow Center of Public Diplomacy, The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University.) <*https://web.archive.org/web/ 20100617004930/http://fletcher.tufts.edu/murrow/pd/definitions.html*>

Hjortdal, Magnus (2011). China's use of cyber warfare: Espionage meets strategic deterrence. *Journal of Strategic Security*, Vol. 4, No. 2, pp. 1-24. <*https://scholarcommons.usf.edu/jss/vol4/iss2/2*>

Holmes, Marcus (2015). Digital diplomacy and international change management (pp. 13-33). In: Corneliu Bjola and Marcus Holmes (eds.), *Digital diplomacy: Theory and practice*. New York, NY: Routledge.

Huang, Yiping, Xue Wang and Xun Wang (2020). Mobile payment in China: Practice and its effects. *Asian Economic Papers*, Vol. 19, No. 3. pp. 1-18. <*https://econpapers.repec.org/article/tprasiaec/v_3a19_3ay_3a2020_3ai_ 3a3_3ap_3a1-18.htm*>

Hungary Today (5th January 2016). Hungarian public TV launches Chinese-language news programme. <*https://hungarytoday.hu/hungarian-public-tv-launches-chinese-language-news-programme-46747*>

Hvg.hu (25th February 2014). Csak a magyar adóhatóság honlapja tud kínaiul [only the Hungarian tax authority's webpage speaks Chinese]. <*https:// hvg.hu/kkv/2014025_ Haromezer_kinai_bongeszi_a_NAV_honlapjat*>

Index.hu (16th September 2018). Bejártuk a budapesti kínaiak zárt világát [we have explored the closed world of Chinese people in Budapest]. <*https:// index.hu/gazdasag/2018/09/16/tarsadalom_kinaiak_budapesten_longform _kinai_negyed/*>

Joske, Alex (2019). Reorganizing the United Front Work Department: New structures for a new era of diaspora and religious affairs work. *China Brief*, Vol. 19, No. 9. Washington DC: The Jamestown Foundation. <*https:// jamestown.org/program/reorganizing-the-united-front-work-department-new-structures-for-a-new-era-of-diaspora-and-religious-affairs-work/*>

Karásková, Ivana and Veronika Blablová (2021). The logic of China's vaccine diplomacy: An in-depth look at where China's vaccines are going hints at the motivations behind the campaign. *The Diplomat*, 24th March 2021 (*China Power* blog). <*https://thediplomat.com/2021/03/the-logic-of-chinas -vaccine-diplomacy/*>

Keane, Michael and Haiqing Yu (2019). A digital empire in the making: China's outbound digital platforms. *International Journal of Communication*, Vol. 13, pp. 4624-4641.

Kurlantzick, Joshua (2007). *Charm offensive: How China's soft power is transforming the world*. New Haven and London: Yale University Press.

Lee, John (2017). The rise of China's tech sector: The making of an internet empire. *The Interpreter*, 4th May 2017. Sydney: Lowy Institute. *<https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/rise-china-s-tech-sector-making-internet-empire>*

Li, Hongmei (2012). The Chinese diaspora and China's public diplomacy: Contentious politics for the Beijing Olympic float in the Pasadena Rose Parade. *International Journal of Communication*, Vol. 6, pp. 2245-2279. *<https://ijoc.org/index.php/ijoc/article/ viewFile/718/792>*

Li Keqiang (2015). Report on the work of the government – delivered at the Third Session of the 12th National People's Congress on March 5, 2015. *China Daily*, 5th March 2015. *<https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2015 twosession/2015-03/05/content_19729663.htm>*

Li Keqiang（李克強）(2020).2020年政府工作報告—2020年5月22日在第十三屆全國人民代表大會第三次會議上 [report on the work of the government – delivered at the Third Session of the 13th National People's Congress on May 22, 2020]. *<http://www.gov.cn/guowuyuan/2020zfgzbg.htm>*

Li Minghuan (2012). The Chinese in Europe: population, economy and links with qiaoxiang in the early twenty-first century (pp. 261-274). In: Tan Chee-Beng (ed.), *Routledge handbook of the Chinese diaspora*. London and New York: Routledge.

Lowsen, Ben (2017). The four types of China Engager: Which are you? – Dragon slayer, diplomat, Sinologist, or panda hugger, where do you fit in? *The Diplomat*, 28th January 2017 (*China Power* blog). *<https://the diplomat.com/2017/01/the-four-types-of-china-engager-which-are-you/>*

Matura Tamás (2018). A kínai jelenlét Magyarországon [the Chinese presence in Hungary]. (Promoting Understanding and Awareness of Chinese Influence in Central Europe, ChinfluenCE project.) *<https://www.amo. cz/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/AMO_A-k%C3%ADnai-jelenlét-Magyarországon.pdf>*

Mohr Richárd, Osváth Gábor, Sato Noriko and Székács Anna (2019). *Japán, kínai és koreai üzleti kultúra. Távol-keleti menedzsment interkulturális és gyakorlati nézőpontból* [Japanese, Chinese and Korean business culture: Far-Eastern management from an intercultural and practical viewpoint]. Budapest: Budapest Business School, Oriental and Business Innovation Centre.

Negro, Gianluigi (2017). *The Internet in China: From infrastructure to a nascent civil society*. Lugano: Palgrave Macmillan.

Nye, Joseph S., Jr. (2004). *Soft power: The means to success in world politics*. New York: PublicAffairs.

Nye, Joseph S. (2019). Soft power 2.0: The future of power in the digital age. *Dubai Policy Review*, January 2019, pp. 11-15. <*https://dubaipolicyreview. ae/soft-power-2-0/*>

Nyíri Pál (1999). Új ázsiai migráció Kelet-Európába: a magyarországi kínaiak [new Asian migration to Eastern Europe: the Chinese people in Hungary]. *Regio*, Vol. 10. No. 3-4, pp. 93-104.

Nyíri Pál (2000). Kivándorolni hazafias? – Peking szerepe a kínai diaszpóra identitásépítésében [to emigrate is patriotic? – Beijing's role in building the identity of the Chinese diaspora]. In: Sík Endre and Tóth Judit (eds.), *Diskurzusok a kivándorlásról* [discourses on emigration]. Budapest: Institute for Minority Studies, Centre for Social Sciences, Hungarian Aceademy of Sciences.

Nyíri, Pál (2007). *Chinese in Eastern Europe and Russia: A middleman minority in a transnational era*. London and New York: Routledge.

Nyíri, Pál (2014). Training for transnationalism: Chinese children in Hungary. *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, Vol. 37, No. 7, pp. 1253-1263.

Reuters (7th June 2015). Hungary first European country to sign up for China Silk Road plan. <*https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-hungary-idUSK BN0ON01W20150607*>

Salát Gergely (2009). Budapesttől Pekingig, a magyar–kínai kapcsolatok múltja [from Budapest to Beijing, history of the Hungarian–Chinese relations]. *Konfuciusz Krónika* [Confucius chronicle], Vol 3. No. 2, pp. 8-11. <*http://www.konfuciuszintezet.hu/index.php?menu=muveltseg&almenu=7&cikkszam=49*>

Salát Gergely (2010). Kína puha ereje [the soft power of China]. *Kommentár*, 2010, Vol. 6, pp. 100-113.

Salát Gergely (2021). Mind meghalunk egy amerikai-kínai háborúban – podcast Salát Gergellyel [we all die in an American–Chinese war – podcast with Gergely Salát]. *Reaktor.* <*https://reaktor.hu/2021/01/25/mind_meghalunk_amerika_kina_haboru_podcast_salat_gergellyel*>

Shi-Kupfer, Kristin and Mareike Ohlberg (2019). China's digital rise: Challenges for Europe. *MERICS Papers on China*, No. 7 | April 2019. Berlin: Mercator Institute for China Studies. <*https://merics.org/sites/default/files/2020-06/MPOC_No.7_ChinasDigitalRise_web_final_2.pdf*>

Son Daekwon (2017). Xi Jinping thought vs. Deng Xiaoping theory: Xi's "new era" will see some of Deng's famous maxims altered, if not discarded altogether. *The Diplomat*, 25th October 2017 (*China Power* blog). <*https://thediplomat.com/2017/10/xi-jinping-thought-vs-deng-xiaoping-theory/*>

Statista (n.d.). Number of online shoppers in China from 2009 to 2020. <*https://www.statista.com/statistics/277391/number-of-online-buyers-in-china/*>

Sun, Wanning (2012). China's rise and (trans)national connections: the global diasporic Chinese mediasphere (pp. 433-446). In: Tan Chee-Beng (ed.), *Routledge handbook of the Chinese diaspora*. London and New York: Routledge.

The Economist (14th December 2017). What to do about China's "sharp power": China is manipulating decision-makers in Western democracies. The best defence is transparency. <*https://www.economist.com/leaders/2017/12/14/what-to-do-about-chinas-sharp-power*>

Time (11th June 2015). The other side of the Great Firewall. <*https://time. com/magazine/south-pacific/3917933/june-22th-2015-vol-185-no-23-asia- europe-middle-east-and-africa-south-pacific/*>

Turcsányi, Richard Q. *et al.* (2020). *European public opinion on China in the age of COVID-19: Differences and common ground across the continent.* Olomouc, Czechia: Palacký University Olomouc, and Bratislava, Slovakia: Central European Institute of Asian Studies. <*https://ceias.eu/wp-content/ uploads/2020/11/COMP-poll-report_3.pdf*>

Verkasalo, Hannu (2016). Why the mobile industry needs to watch China's unique ecosystem. *Verto Analytics*, 24th May 2016. <*https://web.archive .org/web/20210304073658/https://vertoanalytics.com/mobile-industry- needs-watch-chinas-unique-ecosystem/*>

Walker, Christopher and Jessica Ludwig (2017). The meaning of sharp power: How authoritarian states project influence. *Foreign Affairs*, 16th November 2017. <*https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2017-11-16/meaning -sharp-power*>

Wang Cungang (王存剛) (2016). 數字外交的歷史考察與未來趨勢 [historical investigation and future trends of digital diplomacy]. 中國社會科學網－中國社會科學報 (*Chinese Social Sciences Today*), 11th August 2016. <*http://www.cssn.cn/sjs/sjs_ycsf/201608/t20160830_318140 0.shtml*>

Xinhua News Agency (China) (24th July 2020). China has over 1.3B mobile internet users. <*http://www.china.org.cn/business/2020-07/24/content_763 07123.htm*>

Yang Jiechi (楊潔篪) (2011). 努力開拓中國特色公共外交新局面 [efforts to open up a new situation in public diplomacy with Chinese characteristics]. 求是 (*Qiushi* Journal – CPC Central Committee Bimonthly / *QSTHEORY. CN*), Vol. 4, pp. 43.

Zhang, Li (2012). A Chinese perspective on cyber war. *International Review of the Red Cross*, Vol. 94, No. 886. <*https://international-review.icrc.org/sit*

es/default/files/irrc-886-zhang.pdf>

Zhang, Longmei and Sally Chen (2019). China's digital economy: Opportunities and risks. *IMF Working Paper* (WP/19/16), January 2019. *<https://www.imf.org/-/media/Files/Publications/ WP/2019/wp1916.ashx>*

Zhang, Thomas (2016). Common internet challenges in China: An overview. *China Briefing*, 4th February 2016. Hong Kong: Dezan Shira & Associates. *<https://www.china-briefing.com/news/common-internet-chall enges-china-overview/>*

Zhang, Zoey (2020). China's digital yuan: Development status and possible impact for businesses. *China Briefing*, 2nd December 2020. Hong Kong: Dezan Shira & Associates. *<https://www.china-briefing.com/news/chinas-digital-yuan-status-roll-out-impact-businesses/>*

Zhao Qizheng (趙啟政) (2011). 公共外交與跨文化交流 [public diplomacy and intercultural communication]. Beijing: 中國人民大學出版社 (China Renmin University Press).