

POSTSCRIPT

From Pandemic Diplomacy, Mainlandisation of Hong Kong to the Embattled Belt and Road Initiative: The Enigma of Communist China's Superpower March

This special focus issue, *Communist China's Superpower March, Party-State's Entrenchment, and the Remaking of the Global Order*, represents the final issue of the seventh volume of *Contemporary Chinese Political Economy and Strategic Relations: An International Journal*. The twenty articles in this issue are organised into four sections. The first three sections, *Geopolitics, geoeconomics and geogovernance, From SCO, BRI to SARS-CoV-2: Cooperation or leverage?* and *From economy to education: Soft power or smart power?* each contains six papers, and the issue closes with two more papers in a fourth section, *Further on sustainable development: From ecological to cultural capital*. The first section, ***Geopolitics, geoeconomics and geogovernance***, represents a critical exploration of various aspects of the geopolitical, geoeconomic and geogovernance approaches of Communist China – the “People’s Republic of China” under the non-electoral one-party rule of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP,

中國共產黨, officially “Communist Party of China” / CPC) – posing sharp questions and attempting critical answers at the motives and overt and covert agendas of the CCP regime. It begins with a paper by Joseph Yu-shek Cheng, formerly a professor at the City University of Hong Kong and founding president of the Asian Studies Association of Hong Kong, and currently a non-resident senior research fellow of the Swedish Institute for Security and Development Policy, “The Hong Kong Policy of the Communist Party of China – Reflections on Its Nature, Priorities and Strategies”, that studies the nature of the CCP regime’s Hong Kong policy and the priorities and strategies of the Party leadership through the various stages of development of this policy. In his article, Cheng, a Justice of Peace who was also chairman of the Hong Kong Observers, convener of Power for Democracy and of the Alliance for True Democracy in Hong Kong, formerly secretary-general of the Civic Party, and presently the honorary president of the New School for Democracy, brings to light the continuing lack of transparency in China’s policy-making processes concerning Hong Kong, and damningly questions the rationale and efficacy of the Xi Jinping (習近平) administration’s hard-line authoritarian approach towards the Hong Kong people’s aspirations for rights-defending, freedom of expression and democracy. The worrying Hong Kong situation will be picked up again later in this section by Jason Ho Ching Cheung, a Hong Kong barrister-at-law and a research scholar at Waseda University, Japan, in his article “Gang Up with the Right Gangs – A Comparative Study on the Law of Unlawful Assembly in Hong Kong and Japan”. In the wake of Hong Kong’s 2019 anti-extradition bill protest movement and the advent of the new National Security Law for Hong Kong, Cheung’s comparative study of Hong Kong’s and Japanese public order offences and laws of unlawful assemblies, using cases related to the protest movement, NSL-related cases and Japanese cases in comparison,

is timely to serve to throw light upon the concern raised regarding the law enforcement on unlawful assembly and its relationship with the severity of the offence itself.

Next, moving from CCP’s Hong Kong geogovernance issue – which also involves direct policy impacts on its Taiwan policy, cross-Strait relations as well as domestic ruthlessly suppressed civil society’s rights-defending and pro-democracy movement – to international geoeconomic and regional geopolitical calculus, Tiago Luís Carvalho and Carla Guapo da Costa’s article, “China’s Geoeconomic Strategy: The Case of State Grid’s European Investments”, and Khadijah Md Khalid and Muhammad Danial Azman’s “In the Dragon’s Tight Embrace? A Neo-Gramscian Perspective on Malaysia’s Foreign Policy towards China” respectively analyse how China’s State Grid, a transnational State-owned enterprise, can be an instrument of the Chinese geoeconomic strategy, and the hegemonic forces at play in the business-ruling elite nexus, resistance to Malaysia’s attempted foreign policy recalibration towards China after the Southeast Asian nation’s game-changing 2018 election, the interplay between domestic and international distinctions, as well as the formal and informal individual agency in various dimensions of bilateral ties. While Carvalho and da Costa from Universidade de Lisboa (University of Lisbon), Portugal, draw our attention to the fact that despite the important economic gains that can be capitalised from SG’s investments, such investments entail geopolitical effects that might collide with host countries’ political and economic security, Khadijah and Danial from the University of Malaya, Malaysia, based on their investigations into various Belt and Road projects in Malaysia and scrutiny on the China policy of the Najib administration, urge for the need to probe the dimensions and diffusions of power in state-society relations, variations between authoritarian regimes, and concealed business deals among policymakers in studying

Malaysia-China relations, while acknowledging the significant impact of the interplay between domestic forces on foreign policy. Like Khadijah and Danial's article, reassessing conventional approach towards analysing Communist China's current foreign policy is also the focus of the next paper, "Intention and Objective of Chinese Foreign Policy: A Perspective of Chinese Culture and History" by Jinghao Zhou from the Hobart and William Smith Colleges in New York, United States. But unlike the previous article, Zhou's paper chooses to employ a cultural perspective to critically evaluate the way Chinese culture and historical memory have translated into Chinese foreign policy and how the CCP regime uses historical narratives to mobilize nationalism to serve its assertive foreign policy. While arguing that the CCP regime's foreign policy aims not only to maintain the one-party system, but also to replace the U.S. in the Asia-Pacific region's power configuration and ultimately to become the world's top superpower, Zhou doubts whether the PRC would be successful in this endeavour as the CCP regime's global ambitions conflict with the mainstream of the international order and PRC's global economic and political expansion has already raised a serious alarm to the international society triggering strong backlashes from the global community. The CCP regime's global ambitions are again the subject of investigation after the next paper on Hong Kong by Jason Cheung that has been discussed above – this time in a country case study "China-Pakistan Economic Corridor Energy Projects: China's Strategy and Implications for Pakistan" by Hidayatullah Khan from Balochistan University of Information Technology, Engineering, and Management Sciences (BUIITEMS), Balochistan, Pakistan, and the University of Malaya's Geetha Govindasamy, member of the Malaysian Association of Japanese Studies (MAJAS) and the Malaysian Scholars on Korea (MASK) Network, and Korea Foundation and Sumitomo Foundation grant recipient, and Md Nasrudin Md Akhir, founder of

the Malaysia-Japan Research Centre, co-founder of the Malaysian Association of Japanese Studies and the Japanese Studies Association in ASEAN, and recipient of the Emperor of Japan’s Order of the Rising Sun. Contrary to the claim of the Chinese government that the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) – a flagship project of the Belt and Road Initiative – represents a win-win opportunity for both countries, Hidayat, Geetha and Nasrudin’s study, drawing on David Harvey’s concept of spatial fix, finds that the CPEC power projects while constituting a means for China to diversify surplus capital in order to mitigate its domestic economic crises, serve to add to Pakistan’s debt burden and threaten its national sovereignty. For China’s coal industry suffering from overproduction as well as those state-owned enterprises that were lacking demand at home, the CPEC, especially its energy projects, definitely represents a vital vent, but while the CPEC is expected to help Pakistan address its energy crisis, this inevitably comes at the cost of increasing sovereign debt and circular debt, losing sovereignty over Pakistan’s energy infrastructure, damaging established procedures of procurement due to non-competitive bidding, long-term dependency on China for project management, and degradation in Pakistan’s environment.

The second section of this focus issue, *From SCO, BRI to SARS-CoV-2: Cooperation or leverage?*, covers the PRC’s engagement with strategic and trade partners through the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation – the Eurasian political, economic, and security alliance established in 2001 whose membership consists of China and Russia plus four Central Asian post-USSR republics (thus earning the rather unflattering description of “The League of Authoritarian Gentlemen”¹ from some observer) with India and Pakistan joining later in 2017 – and Xi Jinping’s signature Belt and Road Initiative, and traces the CCP regime’s attempt to shrewdly capitalise for diplomatic gain on a deadly

global novel coronavirus pneumonia pandemic that was ironically caused by its mishandling of the original Wuhan outbreak through its usual suppression of information flow, persecution of whistle-blowers and citizen-reporters, and manipulating world bodies – in this case the World Health Organization – with its newfound strong global influence. The first article of this section, “Cybersecurity Cooperation between Russia and China: Prospects and Problems” by Elizaveta S. Sokolova and Elnur T. Mekhdiev from the Financial University under the Government of the Russian Federation (Финансовый университет при Правительстве Российской Федерации), and Kanan K. Dadashov and Kamilla K. Dadashova from the Moscow State Institute of International Relations (MGIMO University, Московский государственный институт международных отношений (МГИМО)), looks at the cooperation between Russia and China in the field of cybersecurity within the structure of the SCO, introduces an index allowing the evaluation of the financial efficiency of State policy on cybersecurity and proposes a differentiated approach to cybersecurity, dividing it into three basic levels and offering a broader understanding of it. While long-run partnership between the two countries is not completely without risk given the difference in political governance systems with the PRC’s being a non-electoral one-party dictatorship *vis-à-vis* the Russian multi-party electoral though at the moment non-liberal democracy leaving more room for future transformation, the authors still see a good future for fruitful cooperation in the main spheres like defeating terrorism and drug trafficking, and providing protection against infringement of intellectual property rights. However, the caveat is that, as the authors care to emphasise, while ensuring cyber sovereignty the state authorities should at the same time balance their actions so that the violation of human rights can be reduced, as the present tactical actions of Russia and China against cybercrimes are seen to be too strict, including

restrictive measures on information flows in their national Internet segments, and violating individual freedom of their citizens. This is a model that has no future and therefore needs to be changed.

From SCO, the next few papers move to one of the most, or even the most, heatedly talked about and debated international relations topic in recent years, the Xi Jinping administration’s signature Belt and Road Initiative (一帶一路, earlier translated as “One Belt, One Road”, a name later discouraged by the regime apparently for its perceived hegemonic connotation) that has also been the focus of Hidayat, Geetha and Nasrudin’s paper earlier on CPEC, here beginning with Reinhard Biedermann from Tamkang University (淡江大學), Taiwan, investigating how BRI with its sea-route component the “21st Century Maritime Silk Road” (MSR, 21世紀海上絲綢之路) shapes China-ASEAN relations in his paper “How Does the Belt and Road Initiative Shape ASEAN? – China’s Dual-Track Approach under Strategic Interdependence”. The BRI is also a two-track process, posits Biedermann, comparable to the CCP regime’s two-track approach in the South China Sea on conflict and cooperation, with the second track really executing the PRC’s priority interests which are not identical with the first-track proclamations that tend to emphasise issues of commonality, shared values and coordination, thus making the BRI remain increasingly a Chinese rather than a public good from the financial point of view. And like the other PRC initiative – the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) – that still remains relatively marginal in this context, despite the PRC-projected “internationalised” image of the BRI’s sustainability, the control over the BRI remains *de facto* in the hands of the Communist Party of China, thus putting the PRC in a stronger position in terms of debt relations which are still predominantly bilateral even if independent from the debt trap discourse. The first track in this case is vital for the second track where deciding

issues and strategic moves are really occurring at the bilateral level, acting to smooth the conflictual transactions – which besides the Communist navy (“People’s Liberation” Army Navy (PLAN))’s aggressive, assertive hegemonic bullying of the Southeast Asian claimants of energy and fishing rights in almost the whole of South China Sea the rejection of which Khadijah and Danial’s article earlier in the first section of this focus issue argues to be underlining Malaysia’s foreign policy today as she seeks to express “nonconformity” with the China-led order of East, including Southeast, Asia (p. 1085)² – on the second track mainly related to increasing mistrust concerning BRI’s environmental, financial and social sustainability, including the notoriously monstrous environmental impact of its energy projects on the second track notwithstanding the CCP regime’s portrayal of the BRI on the first track as sustainable and “green” in recent years.

The subsequent articles in this section further explore the impact and implications of BRI beyond the Southeast Asian region with “China and Israel: Strategic Economic Ties under American Pressure” by Ibrahim S.I. Rabaia from Birzeit University, Palestine, and Hend E.M. Sultan from the Egyptian Chinese University, Egypt – the first paper in this focus issue that investigates China’s growing influence in the MENA (Middle East and North Africa) region, and “Unpacking the Trend of the Belt and Road Initiative Narratives in Australian Media from 2013 to 2020” by Yuan Jiang, a research scholar at the Queensland University of Technology, Australia. These are followed by the second article on China in MENA in this issue – “China’s Interdependent Relations with the Middle East: Prospects for Reconciliation and Peace” by Syed Fraz Hussain Naqvi from the Institute of Regional Studies, Islamabad, Pakistan, and Roy Anthony Rogers from the University of Malaya, which will in turn be followed later by a third paper on China in MENA, “China-centric Economic Order in Asia: Growing Chinese

Presence in the Middle East” by Meszár Tárík from the Eurasia Center of Neumann János Egyetem (John von Neumann University), Hungary, in the next section after this second section closes with an article by Amit Ranjan from the Institute of South Asian Studies, National University of Singapore, “Chinese Aid to the South Asian Countries during the COVID-19 Pandemic: Norm or for Political Gains?”, that questions the CCP regime’s ulterior motives behind its shrewd foreign-aid “pandemic diplomacy” towards the South Asian countries devastated by the SARS-CoV-2 virus-induced pandemic spread globally since its initial large-scale outbreak in China’s Wuhan due in the main to the Party-State signature repressive governance model.

After the third paper on China in MENA by Meszár Tárík mentioned above, the third section of this focus issue – ***From economy to education: Soft power or smart power?*** – continues with an article “Parsing the Evolution of China’s Intellectual Property Governance and Protection Using a Mixed-Methods Approach” by Ramnath Reghunadhan and Joe Thomas Karackattu from the Indian Institute of Technology Madras, Tamil Nadu, India, that finds improvement in the effectiveness and efficiency of intellectual property governance and protection (IPG&P) in PRC since the latter half of the 20th century, although unlike the expert agencies that deal with IP, the judiciary could be relatively lacking in skill sets, and at most times bureaucratic institutions seem to have acted without due consideration of all factors when looking at the increasing number of disputes between domestic and foreign-based companies resulted from instances of theft and/or imitation, with the inherent State bias towards technological adoption of domestic companies being backed by policy directives. From economy we move to look at the field of education with the next article by Johannes Caesario Martin and Rangga Aditya Elias from Bina Nusantara University, Jakarta, Indonesia, “China’s Educational Soft Power through

Confucius Institutes: A Case Study of South Africa”. Acknowledging the worldwide debate over the true nature of Confucius Institutes that are completely State-orchestrated institutions – hence the doubt whether they could be correctly considered as “soft power” tools – often seen as agents of cultural invasion or merely instruments of propaganda for China’s CCP regime to expand its influence over other countries, an unflattering perception not helped by China’s international image nowadays with its appalling human rights records and atrocious policies towards the Tibetans and Uyghurs, Johanes and Ranga’s paper sets out to analyse China’s using Confucius Institutes as educational agents of soft power with a case study of South Africa which is one of China’s biggest trade partners and home of the largest number of Confucius Institutes on the African continent. After this foray into the field of education, this section moves on with three further article on economics, with “BRICS and Industrial Cooperation: China’s Role and Lesson from ASEAN” by Siti Rahyla Rahmat from Universiti Sains Malaysia (Science University of Malaysia) and Mohamed Aslam Gulam Hassan from the University of Malaya, “The Distinctiveness of Chinese Multinational Enterprises – Chinese Technology Enterprises in Malaysia as Case Studies” by Ren Yu and Cheong Kee Cheok from the University of Malaya and Wang Qianyi from Shandong Technology and Business University (山東工商學院), Shandong Province, China, and “Valuation Analysis of Convertible Bonds in China: Does Theoretical Value Deviate from Actual Market Price?” by Peipei Wang, Wee-Yeap Lau and Lim-Thye Goh from the University of Malaya. While China’s foreign economic relations form the focus of Rahyla and Aslam’s paper that investigates industrial cooperation among BRICS countries (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) and China’s role in it, Ren, Cheong and Wang’s paper that studies China’s enterprises locating in

Malaysia, domestic economy is the subject of study in Wang, Lau and Goh’s paper on China’s capital market.

This focus issue then closes with a fourth section, ***Further on sustainable development: From ecological to cultural capital***, with the articles “Environmental Policy in China: Forest Management and Development in Heilongjiang Province” by Zhang Yemo from Huaqiao University (華僑大學), Fujian Province, China, and “Endogenous Power of Rural Economic Development in China: A Case Study of Cultural Capital of Dong Brocade” by Youchun Jiang from Jishou University (吉首大學) and Yunyi Yang from Xiangtan University (湘潭大學), both in Hunan Province, China. While Zhang examines ecological capital in the context of Northeast China, Jiang and Yang study the subject of cultural capital in the context of an ethnic minority in South Central China.

Seven years have passed since the launching of this triannual academic journal in 2015, and twenty-one issues, including this one, have since been published, Scopus-indexed since Vol. 1, No. 1, April 2015. It began with the original international board of our predecessor journal lending their strong support to the launching of this supersessive journal to continue upholding the original principle and mission since the beginning of the earlier journal, also triannual and Scopus-indexed since Vol. 1, No. 1, January 2010. Hence, after Volume 5 of the earlier journal including the last special focus issues of Vol. 5, No. 1, April 2014 (*Taiwan: Democracy, Cross-Strait Relations and Regional Security*) and Vol. 5, No. 2, June/August 2014 (*June Fourth at 25: The Quarter-Century Legacy of Tiananmen*), and Vol. 5, No. 3, December 2014,³ institutional changes had led to the original international board moving over to support the launching of this supersessive journal, with the first issues published in 2015, including a first special issue, Vol. 1, No. 2, August 2015 (*Crossing the Chinese Frontier: Nation, Community,*

Identity and Mobility) consisting of revised selected papers from the International Conference on Asia-Pacific Studies of the National Sun Yat-sen University's Institute of China and Asia-Pacific Studies whose then director, Professor Samuel C.Y. Ku (顧長永), had offered his warm support to the launching of this journal that has since been hosted there by ICAPS, NSYSU, Taiwan. We have been immensely grateful to the international board members of the earlier journal who crossed over to offer their warmest support at the testing time of this journal's launching in 2015, including Gregor Benton (Cardiff University), Brian Bridges (Lingnan University), Joseph Y.S. Cheng (City University of Hong Kong), Arif Dirlik (University of Oregon/Duke University (Ret.)), Pío García (Universidad Externado de Colombia), Merle Goldman (Harvard University/Boston University), Fujio Hara (Nanzan University (Ret.)), Samuel C.Y. Ku (National Sun Yat-sen University), David McMullen (University of Cambridge), Uziel Nogueira (IDB-INTAL (Ret.)), Juan José Ramírez Bonilla (El Colegio de México), Carlyle Thayer (University of New South Wales at ADFA) and Im-Soo Yoo (Ewha Womans University) of the *International Advisory Board*, Wendy Beekes (University of Lancaster), Jonathan Benney (Macquarie University), Gerald Chan (University of Auckland), John Donaldson (Singapore Management University), Michael Jakobsen (Copenhagen Business School), Kamaruding Abdulsomad (University of Gothenburg), Juliette Koning (Oxford Brookes University), Mutahir Ahmed (University of Karachi), Can-Seng Ooi (Copenhagen Business School), Kwok-Tong Soo (University of Lancaster) and Andreas Susanto (Atma Jaya Yogyakarta University) of the *International Editorial Board*, and several newer members who later joined the boards over the past seven years.

Days marched on, months flew by, and a year marked by turbulence has soon again reached its closing when we are preparing this special focus issue, ***Communist China’s Superpower March, Party-State’s Entrenchment, and the Remaking of the Global Order*** (Vol. 7, No. 3, December 2021, pp. 969-1880, 912 pp. + xxv). By December 2021 a world ravaged by the SARS-CoV-2 virus, since the first explosive macabre pneumonia outbreak it induced in the Wuhan City of China, has seen infection cases reaching a shocking three hundred and fifty million with five and a half million dead after its spread from China – through a combination of conventional CCP suppression of information flow, persecution of whistle-blowers and citizen-reporters and influencing the World Health Organization to play down the initial crisis. Amidst the continued unfolding of that global tragedy, political repression in Hong Kong under the draconian Beijing-imposed National Security Law for Hong Kong SAR has also in tandem been on a steep crescendo with the mass jailing of pro-democracy activists on charges including illegal assemblies whether for having organized or participating in pro-democracy rallies or June Fourth Beijing Massacre vigils, crackdowns on pro-democracy news agencies, and large-scale disqualifying of popularly elected district councillors in a move to purify Hong Kong’s district councils and Legislative Council (LegCo) into “patriots”-only governance bodies – a no-go zone for anyone who expresses disagreement with the Chinese Communist Party’s one-party dictatorship governance model. All these PRC-related global upheavals fittingly mark the closing of another year of world discourse in which the CCP regime and its rule of mainland China have never left the limelight. But these are not all. Amidst these shocking developments, there is also the brewing of another political fallout from the CCP’s dragging of at least a million Uyghur people in the Xinjiang region into brainwashing internment camps euphemistically termed by the State as

“vocational education and training centres”, with calls from the Western democracies for a “diplomatic boycott” of the 2022 Beijing Winter Olympics in condemning CCP’s crimes against humanity, and the CCP’s raising of tension over the Taiwan Strait and the more and more imminent threat of invasion of Taiwan – the island state that is Asia’s most vibrant liberal democracy – with the incursions of Communist air force (“People’s Liberation” Army Air Force (PLAAF)) warplanes into Taiwan’s air defence zone continuing to escalate in both size and frequency in a remarkable year of historically highest number of such incursions – as high as 56 forays in a single day of 4th October. Undaunted, Taiwan’s democratically-, popularly-elected President Tsai Ing-wen (蔡英文) has vowed to hold fast to the island nation’s sovereignty, warned the CCP against its adventurism in the Taiwan Strait, and condemned the Beijing dictatorship’s suppression of human rights and freedom of speech in Hong Kong.

Taking the latest crescendo of political repression in Hong Kong – amidst a global pandemic that the CCP regime has been rather successful in shrewdly turning to its advantage, despite its origin in the large-scale Wuhan outbreak, through a mask diplomacy followed by a vaccine diplomacy and manipulating of international discourse backed by its global financial influence – as the latest manifestation of the power and success of the “China model” style of governance in crushing the hope and aspiration for liberal democracy, for freedom of expression-endowed civil liberties and political freedom, this final issue of the journal in 2021 has begun with the timely paper by Joseph Yu-shek Cheng, “The Hong Kong Policy of the Communist Party of China – Reflections on Its Nature, Priorities and Strategies”. This paper in a way represents a topping off of our past seven years of furnishing critical analysis of the political economy of Communist China – mainland China under one-party dictatorship of the Communist Party of China – since

the launching of this triannual academic journal in 2015, and especially its policy towards the Special Administrative Region of Hong Kong since our first special focus issue *From Handover to Occupy Campaign: Democracy, Identity and the Umbrella Movement of Hong Kong* (Vol. 2, No. 2, August/September 2016, pp. 635-984, 350 pp. + xviii)⁴ that was put together for the second anniversary of the Occupy Campaign / Umbrella Movement in Hong Kong, marked on 28th September 2016. That was also the last anniversary of the said sociopolitical event that arguably marked a most important milestone in Hong Kong’s post-1997 development before 1st July 2017 which would mark the 20th anniversary of the “Handover”. It was on 28th September two years earlier that pro-democracy protesters occupy the Admiralty (金鐘), Causeway Bay (銅鑼灣), Mong Kok (旺角)⁵ and Tsim Sha Tsui (尖沙嘴) areas of Hong Kong in a momentous campaign initially planned out earlier by the “Occupy Central with Love and Peace” (讓愛與和平佔領中環 / 和平佔中, OCLP) movement, but launched earlier than scheduled when overtaken by the development of events, metamorphosised into unprecedented scale of demonstrations in multiple locations and was transformed into what was dubbed by the world media as the “Umbrella Movement” when umbrellas, which protesters were using to protect themselves when the police attacked them with tear gas and pepper spray, became a symbol of the occupation campaign. The scale of the protest movement, the zeal and passion of the participants and the personal sacrifices they were willing to make in pursuing the objective of the campaign and the bravery they showed in facing the formidable machinery of repression wielded by the State and at one stage an ominous prospect of a repeat of the 1989 Beijing massacre, as well as the broad-based support from the wider Hong Kong society, reflected a culmination of almost two decades of grievances then against the central government of the so-called “People’s” Republic of China

(PRC)⁶ whose one-party dictatorship not only continues to exhibit and strengthen its relentlessness in suppressing dissent in the vast Mainland but also spawns an incremental, creeping infiltration of authoritarianism into the Hong Kong society, as reflected most lately at that time by the disappearances of the Causeway Bay Five. That special focus issue represents a collection of specially selected articles focusing on this momentous event, over those tumultuous 79 days, its background of determining factors, theoretical and ideological underpinnings, as well as its implications for the future of the Hong Kong people's valiant struggle for democracy against the backdrop of the formidable odds, since the 1997 "Handover", as being under the sovereignty of a gigantic country with an entrenched ruling Chinese Communist Party regime that has no foreseeable intention of allowing for a transition from the repressive one-party dictatorship to liberal democracy that would respect political freedom and civil liberty, or of relaxing its intolerance for dissent. The obstacles are daunting for the cold reality that the "many freedoms and rule of law Hong Kong people enjoyed were less appealing to a regime that preferred a population obedient to its strictures and a legal system more pliable at the service of Communist Party power", as the late Arif Dirlik expressed plainly in his prologue of that issue, "The Mouse That Roared: The Democratic Movement in Hong Kong", and the fact that the mainland Chinese government now appears to consider its relationship with Hong Kong's pro-democracy movement "as contradiction between enemies", as Joseph Yu-shek Cheng (鄭宇碩) reminded us in his contribution to that issue's prolegomena, "The Occupation Campaign in Hong Kong: A Participant's View".⁷ It will be a very difficult period ahead for the pro-democracy forces of Hong Kong, as Cheng foresaw, and the struggle between them and the establishment-backed, increasingly powerful and resourceful local pro-Beijing United Front (統戰) is set to bring about further deterioration of the polarisation of

the Hong Kong society – which three years later culminated in the turbulent anti-extradition bill protests.

In the following year’s special focus issue, *Hong Kong Twenty Years after the Handover: Quo Vadis?* (Vol. 3, No. 2, July/August 2017, pp. 523-999, 477 pp. + xv)⁸, we traced Hong Kong’s sociopolitical contradictions today to the handover of Hong Kong by Great Britain to the PRC on 1st July 1997, thus ending 156 years of British Crown rule (from 1841 to 1997, though from 1941 to 1945 it was actually under the Japanese occupation). Although the Hong Kong Island (香港島) was ceded from the Ch’ing Empire (大清帝國) to Great Britain in perpetuity after the First Opium War (1839-1842) after which the colony expanded to the Kowloon Peninsula (九龍半島) in 1860, with 1997 approaching and the 99-year lease of the New Territories (新界, leased from 1898) ending the British did not find it feasible and viable to retain the rest of Hong Kong outside the leased territory. Hence the “Handover” was total. There are three peculiar features that marked disturbingly the handover of Hong Kong to the PRC. First, the decolonisation process – the reversion negotiation – was conducted without the participation of the colonial subjects themselves, the Hong Kong people, but solely between the British and the PRC, which made it look less like decolonisation but *transcolonisation* – the transfer of the Hong Kong island and its people from one colonial master, the British crown, to another, the ruthless, repressive one-party dictatorship of mainland China. Secondly, unlike the usual public mood that accompanied almost all decolonised territories’ return to the motherland which was marked invariably by joy and pride, the Hong Kong public and intellectuals’ feeling when the reversion was imminent and during the reversion had been one of unwillingness, sadness and trepidation. Thirdly, and probably most disturbingly, the “Handover” represents transferring the fate of a society that for 156 years had been enjoying the

respect for human rights, freedom of thought and expression and independent judiciary, as subjects first of a crown colony and later a dependent territory (from 1981) of a liberal democratic colonial master, into the hands of regime, arguably a new colonial master, which is a self-justifying one-party dictatorship that has been maintaining and continues to maintain its grip on absolute power through enforcing public amnesia, brainwashing the young, and brutal treatment of dissidents. It has been particularly ironic that this is a territory that has provided a safe haven for refugees from the PRC after 1949, escaping the economic policy disaster and brutal political excesses of the Chinese Communist Party, who had by 1960 swelled the Hong Kong population to four times the population at the end of the World War II, where, as the Brookings Institution's senior fellow Richard Bush, the co-director of the institution's Center for East Asia Policy Studies (CEAP), wrote in his 2016 book: "... [the British colonial government] provided public health and education (free primary education became available for all by 1970). It moved refugees from unsafe and unhealthy shanty towns into basic, low-rent public housing [...] built transportation infrastructure, both to get workers to their jobs and the goods they produced onto the ships headed for global markets. The Hong Kong Police fostered a relatively safe social environment and the courts protected property rights. This social management was accomplished by a competent civil service through which talented Chinese officials rose to higher and higher positions of responsibility ..." (Bush, 2016)⁹ At last, these refugees were safely settled in this British colony, and gradually were able to both physically and psychologically distance themselves from the danger, hunger and persecution in the Mainland where they had risked their lives to escape from, and "... [w]ith the border with China closed, the colony's Chinese population became far less transient than it had been before the war. Hong Kong became truly their home. The refugees

and their children came to acquire a separate Hong Kong identity that complemented their sense of being Chinese [...] As for the “New China” whose policies had driven them from their native places, Hong Kong’s refugee population was happy to have nothing to do with it.” (*ibid.*)

One can of course argue that the post-Mao China has changed so much, and that the economic success brought about by ditching Maoist central command economy for rugged capitalist market economy has legitimised the CCP’s continued monopoly of political power, but how would one explain the reaction of the Hong Kong people, especially the major part of the intelligentsia and the younger generation – that fear for and that distaste towards the CCP regime? How would one explain the eruption of 2014’s Occupy Campaign a.k.a. Umbrella Movement and 2019’s anti-Extradition Law Amendment Bill 2019 (*fansongzhong* / 反送中, “anti-extradition-to-China”) protests? How would one explain their reaction towards Beijing’s creeping authoritarian intervention in Hong Kong’s governance, be it introduction of brainwashing school curriculum extolling the CCP, time-and-again interpretation of the Basic Law, or kidnapping of Hong Kong booksellers and publishers, as well as towards the death of persecuted dissidents, be they Li Wangyang (李旺陽), Cao Shunli (曹順利) or Liu Xiaobo (劉曉波)? Such CCP dictatorship’s brutal persecution of dissidents brought us to produce our next special focus issue, ***Dissent, Political Freedom, Civil Liberties and the Struggle for Democracy: Essays in Honour of Liu Xiaobo*** (Vol. 4, No. 2, July/August 2018, pp. 283-764, 482 pp. + xiii)¹⁰, dedicated to Liu at the first anniversary of his passing, as a tribute to a most noble soul, a true lover of his country who care about democratic rights of the country’s vast population who he hoped one day would be able to fully enjoy political freedom and civil liberties. His deeds and sacrifices truly put to shame those supporters and apologists, not only in China but also among the overseas Chinese, of the present one-party dictatorship who

shamelessly resorts to twisting the notions of freedom, democracy and human rights to suppress dissent and criticisms and to perpetuate its power monopoly. “Dissent is the highest form of patriotism”¹¹ – the unwillingness on the part of Beijing to take into consideration such inner feeling of the conscientious mainland China citizens, the socio-psychological makeup of the Hong Kong people as the legacy of long British rule and the Taiwanese who have fought hard and shed blood to gain today’s political freedom and civil liberties thus spells the failure of its “soft power” offensive to win the hearts and minds of the people. The right to dissent as the highest form of patriotism is something the conscientious mainland China citizens, the Hong Kongers and the Taiwanese have learned through hard lessons, through blood and sweat, and that marks their democratic patriotism apart from the authoritarian patriotism¹² promoted by the CCP Party-State in Beijing that sees political dissent as highly dangerous and destabilising and persecution of dissidents, even to death in the cases such as those of Cao Shunli, Li Wangyang, , Tenzin Delek Rinpoche, allegedly Abdurehim Heyit, Yang Tianshui, Liu Xiaobo and others too many to name, as justifiable in the name of maintaining stability and prosperity.

While early in the germination period of classical Chinese philosophy two and a half millennia ago the founder of contemplative Taoism (道家), Lao Tzu (老子, c. 571-471 BC), had already commented, “民不畏死，奈何以死懼之？” [The people do not fear at all to die; / What’s gained therefore by threat’ning them with death?] (*Tao Te Ching* / 《道德經》, Chapter 74), who would have foreseen the death-defying action of the supposedly docile subjects conditioned by more than 3 decades of personality-shattering brutal political campaigns of the Chinese Communist Party dictatorship during the one and a half months of April-June 1989 in Beijing – as Jean-Philippe Béja says it well in his article, “April 27th, 1989: The Day the Chinese People

Stood up”, in our next special focus issue for the thirtieth year in remembrance of the Tiananmen protests and the June Fourth massacre – or the incredible political awareness of the Hong Kong people during the momentous Occupy Campaign a.k.a. Umbrella Movement of 2014 and the anti-extradition bill protests of 2019? In all these cases, such actions by a long-considered politically docile (in mainland China) or apathetic (in Hong Kong) people can be seen as a “civil society in self-defense”¹³. Such action, of course, demands a high level of human dignity and integrity, which the CCP Party-State has been relentless in destroying with both carrots (economic miracle, financial prosperity for conformists) and sticks (brutal persecution of dissidents), that Ian Johnson¹⁴ sees in the personality of Liu Xiaobo: “When the 1989 protests erupted, Liu was abroad but chose to return. After one stint in jail after the Tiananmen protests were bloodily suppressed, he had opportunities to leave China but again chose to stay. And then after a second harsher stint in jail he again decided to remain and keep pushing. He was risking [unlike T’an Ssu-t’ung (譚嗣同) who in 1898 stayed to face death hoping that his execution might help shock his fellow citizens awake] not the immediate arrival of soldiers, but the inevitable and life-threatening imprisonment that befalls all people who challenge state power in China today.” It brings to tears in awe those who note as Ian Johnson does: “This was not an active decision to die, but a willingness to do so”, as like T’an Ssu-t’ung, Liu Xiaobo “knew his responsibility in history.”

Liu Xiaobo, though, is but one of the tens of thousands of human rights-defenders, lawyers, dissidents, and journalists who have been thrown into prison, physically and mentally tortured while in custody, many of whom did or will eventually perish therein like Liu, or come out broken and a shadow of their former self.

As Confucius once said, “The determined scholar and the man of virtue will not seek to live at the expense of injuring their virtue. They will even sacrifice their lives to preserve their virtue complete.”¹⁵ (《論語》衛靈公第十五：“子曰：「志士仁人，無求生以害仁，有殺身以成仁。」”) In these myriad of valiant human rights-defenders from Wei Jingsheng to Liu Xiaobo, from the Yu-Lu-Yu Mao portrait incident trio to Li Wangyang, from Tenzin Delek Rinpoche to Ilham Tohti, surviving or dead, self-sacrificing sense of mission and character of unbending human dignity represent the virtue of a true Confucian gentleman. This of course would pose a grave threat to a Party-State which ironically has been shamelessly exploiting the name of Confucius for its United Front work through the “Confucius Institutes”, a subject of inquiry of an article in the present Vol. 7, No. 3, issue of the journal, which *La Plataforma Ciudadana Stop Instituto Confucio*’s co-founder Fernando Romeo calls “the hard side of the Chinese Communist Party’s soft power” in his commentary article in this journal’s special focus issue the following year, *Upon the Thirtieth Anniversary of Tiananmen Protests and June Fourth Massacre: Value Renewal and Path Finding for China’s Pro-Democracy Movement* (Vol. 5, No. 2, June/August 2019, pp. 509-900, 392 pp. + xviii)¹⁶, which represents a collection of selected papers in marking the thirtieth year in remembrance of the Tiananmen protests and the June Fourth massacre of 1989 from among those presented at the international academic conference on “Value Renewal and Path Finding for China’s Pro-democracy Movement” held by the New School for Democracy (華人民主書院) and the Hong Kong Alliance in Support of Patriotic Democratic Movements of China (香港市民支援愛國民主運動聯合會 / 支聯會) at National Taiwan University in Taipei on May 18-20, 2019.

As an active practitioner and supporter of switching from direct protest for democratic reforms, which has clearly been futile in years

after the massacre, to a more subtle citizens’ rights movement, Liu Xiaobo’s thinking and his inveterate action, according to Perry Link and Weiping Cui’s article in that focus issue, “Liu Xiaobo and the Citizens’ Rights Movement: A New Face for China’s Democracy Movement in 2003”, did much to shape the movement that, while being less confrontational, aimed at concrete change with an ultimate goal of more profound transition than what the 1989 protesters had declared, until it was dealt a severe blow in late 2008 when the State crushed *Charter 08* (零八憲章) and imprisoned Liu Xiaobo, who eventually died in the hands of this Orwellian State that has in the decades after the massacre been rapidly progressing on the scale of ruthlessness and brutality towards what Teng Biao (滕彪), exiled persecuted human rights lawyer and activist of China and a visiting scholar at Harvard, NYU, and Yale Law Schools and Grover Human Rights Scholar at Hunter College, City University of New York, has termed a *high-tech totalitarianism* today in the his paper, “From 1989 to “1984”: Tiananmen Massacre and China’s High-tech Totalitarianism” in that focus issue.

Perry Link’s heartrending prose poem that begins that focus issue, “Why We Remember June Fourth”, touchingly gave us a description of the human tragedy that had unfolded during the night of 3rd-4th June thirty years earlier. The poem’s focus on an individual, human level has made the episode even more poignant, and the State’s attempt to obliterate all citizens’ memory of these individual tragedies over the past thirty years so monstrous, and the struggle to maintain that memory so important, not only because of a measure of obligation of the world to those who died by the sword of a ruthless State in 1989 – as Alan Wood says in his “Preface” to *Limits to autocracy* (1995), “... while I recognize the dangers to truth of relating scholarship to life, I also believe that we who live by the pen bear some measure of obligation, however tenuous, to those who die by the sword”¹⁷ – but also a duty to

thwart the relentless attempt to force a mass amnesia on not only the Chinese citizens but all people in the world, as highlighted in the Hong Kong Alliance in Support of Patriotic Democratic Movements of China and the New School for Democracy's Conference Declaration, by the Party regime that "exploits the strengths of speedy economic development and the powers of science and technology to tighten domestic control and expand its international influence", as we are well warned by Larry Diamond's article in that focus issue, "Thirty Years after Tiananmen: The PRC as an Emerging Global Threat to Freedom". And against the Party-State's ruthless efforts to enforce public amnesia, it is imperative to keep alive the memory of that tragic event as described by Michel Bonnin in his paper in that special focus issue, "June 4th, 1989: A Founding Non-Event, a Breaking Point in Time and Space", as a breaking point in the history of contemporary China that generated a fracture that not only affected time but also space – a momentous event that resulted in a fault line in time between the PRC's rather liberalising period of the 1980s and the subsequent period of increasing repression as well as another in space wherein China took a turn that cut it from the major part of rest of the hitherto Communist world from Eastern Europe through the Soviet Union to Mongolia where Communist Party dictatorships were toppled one after another from the late 1989 to early 1990. Ironically, such a momentous, fundamental event has been transformed by the ruthless State into a non-event, erased from all domestic official records and media, as well as from the collective memory of the citizens, in its relentless effort to stop the tide of democratic transition to again gaining momentum. As Salman Rushdie, the literary world's most well-known fugitive from dogmatic terror, says in *Joseph Anton: A memoir*, "Against ruthlessness, remembering was the only defense. The Chinese leadership knew this: that memory was the enemy."¹⁸

The fact that that conference marking the thirtieth year in remembrance of the Tiananmen protests and the June Fourth massacre of 1989 could only be held outside Hong Kong – for the first time such an event could no longer be held in Hong Kong – by itself was an ominous sign of the evil tentacles of the Beijing dictatorship looming over this last bastion of freedom at a corner of mainland China. By 2019-2021 even the yearly vigil for the 1989 massacre has been unannouncedly proscribed, with the jailing of organizers and participants of the vigil under the charge of illegal assembly or with the excuse of anti-pandemic measures, while political repression has been intensified on all fronts from disqualifying popularly elected pro-democracy district councillors and legislators to arresting publishers of pro-democracy newspapers and forcing their closure by freezing their assets under the new draconian National Security Law for Hong Kong SAR in the wake of the tumultuous anti-extradition bill protests that formed the subject of our next special focus issue, *For Rights and Liberty: The Anti-Extradition Law Amendment Bill (Anti-ELAB) Protest Movement and Hong Kong’s Struggle for Democracy* (Vol. 6, No. 3, December 2020, pp. 819-1455, 637 pp. + xiv)¹⁹.

“They want freedom the same way we wanted it,” so said the Lithuanian supporters of Hong Kong’s anti-extradition bill protests as tens of thousands of protesters formed the “Hong Kong Way” human chains across Hong Kong on 23rd August 2019 at the 30th anniversary of the 1989 “Baltic Way”²⁰ when 2 million people in Lithuania, Estonia and Latvia held hands to form a thousand-and-hundred-mile human chain spanning the three nations in their valiant struggle for democracy and freedom from the Soviet Communist yoke. While the element of regaining independence from the Soviet Union that re-occupied them after the defeat of their German Nazi occupiers at the end of World War II bears little similarity to the practical reality of the case of Hong Kong,

free thought and free speech and related political freedom and civil liberties are international ideals, *sans* borders, and the struggle against political persecution of dissent and human rights infringement is also transborder, and it has to be recognised as such, despite the efforts of autocratic, repressive regimes to discredit this international link by resorting to exclusionist ethnonationalism.

A week after an estimated 1.03 million people marched on 9th June 2019 to protest against the introduction of the Fugitive Offenders amendment bill by the Hong Kong government which triggered the fear that the bill if enacted would subject Hong Kong residents and visitors to the jurisdiction and legal system of mainland China, thereby undermining the region's autonomy and Hong Kong people's civil liberties, on 16th June 2019 up to approximately two million people, i.e. approaching 30 per cent of Hong Kong's population, again took to the streets in Hong Kong to further the protest and to voice anger towards the perceived excessive use of force by the police on 12th June when protesters gathered outside the Legislative Council Complex to stall the bill's second reading.

Following the activists' 1st July storming of the Legislative Council Complex on the anniversary of the Handover there was further escalation of the protests that was aggravated by apparent police inaction when suspected triad members assaulted protesters and commuters in Yuen Long (元朗) in the New Territories (新界) on 21st July and the violent police storming of Prince Edward station on 31st August. Though the extradition bill was suspended on 15th June and finally withdrawn on 23rd October, the protests have by then morphed into a broader-purpose movement including demand for the introduction of universal suffrage for election of the Legislative Council and the Chief Executive, one of the five demands on which the government has continued to refuse to concede other than the bill withdrawal.

As the protests dragged on, confrontations escalated as both sides became increasingly violent, with increasing allegations of police brutality and misconduct that were further aggravated by the death of students Chan Yin-lam (陳彥霖) in September and Chow Tsz-lok (周梓樂) in November and the shooting of an unarmed 21-year-old protester in November. There was another death, that of Luo Changqing (羅長清), an elderly man who died after being struck in the head by a brick during a clash in Sheung Shui (上水) in the New Territories.

While after the unprecedented landslide victory of the pro-democracy bloc in the November 2019 District Council election, which was widely viewed as a *de facto* referendum on the protest movement, the most intense stage of the protests seemed to have passed, the continuing refusal of the government to concede on most of the demands of the protesters did not augur well for any prospect of resolving the political impasse that has persisted since the 2014 Occupy Campaign/Umbrella Movement, and the temporary lull in the most severe social upheaval since June 2019 in fact just turned out to be temporary calm before the onset of a returning storm with a bombshell in the form of a Beijing-imposed National Security Law for Hong Kong SAR that has begun, with intensified repression of pro-democracy organizations and media houses from the Hong Kong Alliance in Support of Patriotic Democratic Movements of China and New School for Democracy to *Apple Daily* (蘋果日報) and *Stand News* (立場新聞), and arrest and persecution of their leaders and chief executive officers and even writers, in every practical sense to spell the end of the “One Country, Two Systems” arrangement and a Hong Kong that has so far been spared the outright suppression of dissent that the Mainland populace has long endured. In an earlier special focus issue (Vol. 4, No. 2) then University of Hong Kong’s legal scholar Benny Yiu-ting Tai (戴耀廷), the persecuted initiator of the 2014 Occupy

Central campaign contributed an article aptly titled “Hong Kong No More: From Semi-democracy to Semi-authoritarianism”²¹ that warned us of the dismal outlook of Hong Kong’s political future under the increasing tightening of political space by her Beijing overlord since the 1997 Handover, especially after the tumultuous Occupy Campaign / Umbrella Movement, through the unprecedentedly violent “Fishball Revolution” State-civil society conflict, the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress (NPCSC)’s various “interpretations” of the Basic Law and disqualifying of Legislative Council members from the pro-democracy camp, harsh sentencing of organizers of civil disobedience, to repeated and bolder and bolder encroachments of Beijing into Hong Kong affairs – one of the most outrageous being the kidnapping of Hong Kong booksellers including Gui Minhai (桂民海) who was snatched from Pattaya, Thailand, by CCP agents – that make a mockery of the so-called “One Country, Two Systems”. Today with the new white terror raging in full force, the “patriots-only” Hong Kong SAR administration, newly armed with the National Security Law for Hong Kong forcefully imposed by Beijing’s CCP dictatorship on the Hong Kong people in the wake of the anti-extradition bill protests, has made even “semi-authoritarianism” a gross understatement, as the territory is tragically being dragged further and further into the repressive web of mainland China’s one-party governance model of zero tolerance for political dissent.

Our readers must have noticed the prominence of Hong Kong as featured in this journal and some might wonder why. In a great irony of this era, British colonialism in Hong Kong has actually shielded this island territory from the brutal excesses of the Communist Party dictatorship on mainland China until its “Handover” to the mainland regime in 1997 – just like the same irony that cultural artifacts shipped overseas to museums of the colonial powers during the late Ch’ing

dynasty to early Republican China periods had turned out to have been protected later from the almost total cultural-genocidal destruction by the Party-State’s “Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution” of the 1960s – and made this British crown colony the only corner of mainland China that enjoy a level of civil liberty, freedom of expression, and human rights-protection by a rule of law that could not even be dreamt of by the people in other parts of the vast mainland under the boot of a one-party dictatorship, a “People’s Liberation” Army that has no qualms about shooting the people when ordered to do so by the Party, and the thought police of the *guobao* (國保), the “national security” agents whose ultimate mission is to safeguard the security of the Party’s unchallenged permanent rule over one fifth of the global population. Thus the fate of a free Hong Kong represents a touchstone for the liberal democratic future not only for the vast mainland China citizens or the precarious vibrant liberal democracy of the island nation of Taiwan across the Taiwan Strait that has come under the daily increasing threat of invasion from the mainland since Xi Jinping’s rise to almost absolute power in the CCP dictatorship, but unmistakably also with a far wider implication for the liberal democratic future of the global community.

The excruciating death of a free Hong Kong that the world is now witnessing is reflecting a broader ominous spectre that is haunting the liberal democratic world: the spectre of a rising PRC with one fifth of humanity under the dictatorship of the Communist Party of China – the march of Communist China towards world superpower status. The rise of China is not a disaster for the world – the rise of any nation *per se* to prosperity should never be considered a disaster. But the rise of a PRC still under the boot of a strengthening CCP dictatorship is not merely a disaster for the liberal democratic world, but a calamity, for it shows the world’s nations a “China model” – a Hu Jintao-Xi Jinping-esque “building of Humanity’s Community of Common Destiny” (構建人類

命運共同體) – a model in which a repressive, brutal dictatorship can bring and maintain economic prosperity, and can be equally or even more efficient in economic management – a major contributing factor being the low-human-rights advantage²² – than liberal democratic systems that respect civil liberties and political freedom, that protects freedom of expression and free political choice. The loss of a free Hong Kong signals this coming calamity. And the struggle against the global *saturnic* power²³ of this totalitarian regime that still has a fifth of humanity directly under its boot is in the main an ideational battle, like that between rationalist humanism and religious obscurantism from the Renaissance to the Enlightenment, and that between liberal democratic values and Nazism/Fascism and Soviet totalitarianism from the Second World War to the disintegration of the “prison of nations” Soviet Union and the fall of Communist Party dictatorships from Eastern Europe to Mongolia.

So, seven years on, we have continued to carry out the journal’s mission of providing constant critical analysis of the political economy of contemporary China, both her domestic sociopolitical and socioeconomic development and her international strategic relations, as well as the intricate *innenpolitik-außenpolitik* nexus²⁴, without fear or favour. As Rebecca E. Karl succinctly describes in her essay “In memoriam: Arif Dirlik (1940-2017)”²⁵ in Vol. 3, Issue 3 of this journal, Arif Dirlik – having been with us as an advisory board member of our predecessor journal since 2012 and of this journal since 2015, a great friend, colleague, founding member of this journal and a great pillar of support for its mission – who had sadly passed away on 1st December 2017, has long been inspiring us to be *fearlessly radical and radically fearless* in staying true to the principles and holding dear the ideals forming the cornerstone of this journal since its founding in 2015 and over 2010-2014 of its predecessor journal.

Before ending this postscript, we would like to thank all the contributing authors of the articles in the various sections of this issue, and the anonymous reviewers of these articles, for their invaluable efforts in making the publication of this special focus issue, *Communist China’s Superpower March, Party-State’s Entrenchment, and the Remaking of the Global Order*, the final issue of the seventh volume of *Contemporary Chinese Political Economy and Strategic Relations: An International Journal* (December 2021) possible. We are also grateful to Miss Wu Chien-yi (吳千宜) for the journal’s website construction and maintenance. The responsibility for any errors and inadequacies that remain is of course fully mine.

*Dr Emile Kok-Kheng Yeoh**

Chief Editor

Contemporary Chinese Political Economy and
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Notes

1. Alexander Cooley (2013), “The League of Authoritarian Gentlemen”, *Foreign Policy*, 30th January 2013 (Argument) *<<https://foreignpolicy.com/2013/01/30/the-league-of-authoritarian-gentlemen/>>*. (The quip apparently had taken a cue from the title of the comic book series-based 2003 Hollywood superhero film *The League of Extraordinary Gentlemen*.)

2. See also “中國—東南亞關係：中國能源安全政策的區域安全戰略分析” [China-ASEAN relations: analysis on regional security strategy of China’s energy security policy] by Emile Kok-Kheng Yeoh (楊國慶), in Chung-Chian Teng (鄧中堅) and Ren-Rang Chyou (邱稔壤) (eds.) (2014), 探索中國大陸石油戰略與外交：合作、競爭與衝突 [exploring Mainland China’s oil strategy and diplomacy: cooperation, competition and conflict], Taipei: 五南图书出版股份有限公司 (Wu-Nan Book Company Ltd) (for 國立政治大學國際事務學院 (政大國際事務學院邁向頂尖大學計畫專案) / College of International Affairs, National Chengchi University (Top University Project), Taiwan), pp. 215-242. (See §2 to §6, pp. 221-229.)
3. The original unaltered issues are available at <https://www.dropbox.com/s/mqg4t2eq1kb54xi/IJCS-V5N1-combined-text-cover.pdf>, <https://www.dropbox.com/s/1x335y8yf504anr/IJCS-V5N2-combined-text-cover.pdf> and <https://www.dropbox.com/s/t7k0tyocl5xeqqk/IJCS-V5N3-combined-text-cover.pdf>.
4. <http://icaps.nsysu.edu.tw/var/file/131/1131/img/2375/165090456.pdf>
<https://www.dropbox.com/s/laezk1sfx85mr93/CCPS-V2N2-full-issue.pdf>
5. The transliteration being from the older names 望角, 芒角.
6. “People’s Republic of China” (中華人民共和國) consists of 31 provincial-level administrative units including *sheng* / 省 (i.e. provinces of Anhui / 安徽, Fujian / 福建, Gansu / 甘肅, Guangdong / 廣東, Guizhou / 貴州, Hainan / 海南, Hebei / 河北, Heilongjiang / 黑龍江, Henan / 河南, Hubei / 湖北, Hunan / 湖南, Jiangsu / 江蘇, Jiangxi / 江西, Jilin / 吉林, Liaoning / 遼寧, Qinghai / 青海, Shaanxi / 陝西, Shandong / 山東, Shanxi / 山西, Sichuan / 四川, Yunnan / 雲南 and Zhejiang / 浙江), *zizhiqu* / 自治區 (literally “autonomous regions” – each a first-level administrative subdivision having its own local administrative government, and a minority entity that has a higher

population of a particular minority ethnic group – of Guangxi / 廣西 of the Zhuang, Nei Monggol / Inner Mongolia / 內蒙古 of the Mongols, Ningxia / 寧夏 of the Hui, Xizang / Tibet / 西藏 of the Tibetans and Xinjiang / 新疆 of the Uyghurs) and *zhixiashi* / 直轄市 (i.e. municipalities directly ruled by the central government – Beijing / 北京, Chongqing / 重慶, Shanghai / 上海 and Tianjin / 天津). After the “Handover” (or *huigui* / 回歸 from the perspective of the PRC, i.e. “return” [to the motherland]), the British colony of Hong Kong and Portuguese colony of Macau officially became the “Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (香港特別行政區) and Macao Special Administrative Region (Região Administrativa Especial de Macau, 澳門特別行政區) of the People’s Republic of China” respectively in 1997 and 1999. The now vibrantly free and democratic island state of Taiwan – officially still “Province of Taiwan, Republic of China” (中華民國臺灣省) – remains a sovereign country of her own, since the conclusion in 1949 of the Chinese Civil War, outside the control of Mainland China’s ruthlessly authoritarian Chinese Communist Party regime.

7. <[https://icaps.nsysu.edu.tw/var/file/131/1131/img/2375/CCPS2\(2\)-Dirlik.pdf](https://icaps.nsysu.edu.tw/var/file/131/1131/img/2375/CCPS2(2)-Dirlik.pdf)> and <[https://icaps.nsysu.edu.tw/var/file/131/1131/img/2375/CCPS2\(2\)-Cheng.pdf](https://icaps.nsysu.edu.tw/var/file/131/1131/img/2375/CCPS2(2)-Cheng.pdf)>.
8. <[http://rpb115.nsysu.edu.tw/var/file/131/1131/img/2374/CCPS3\(2\)-full-issue\(2\).pdf](http://rpb115.nsysu.edu.tw/var/file/131/1131/img/2374/CCPS3(2)-full-issue(2).pdf)> <<https://www.dropbox.com/s/4d4hackrq0dz743/CCPS-V3N2-full-issue.pdf>>
9. Richard C. Bush (2016), *Hong Kong in the shadow of China: Living with the leviathan* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press), Chapter 1: “The Hong Kong hybrid” – § Becoming Hong Kong. See also: Emile Kok-Kheng Yeoh (2017), “Hopes against Hobbes: On authoritarianism, regime legitimation and soft power with a review of Richard C. Bush’s *Hong Kong in the shadow of China: Living with the leviathan* (2016)”, *Contemporary Chinese Political Economy and Strategic Relations: An*

- International Journal (CCPS)*, Vol. 3, No. 2, July/August 2017, pp. 889-987. <[https://icaps.nsysu.edu.tw/var/file/131/1131/img/2374/CCPS3\(2\)-Yeoh.pdf](https://icaps.nsysu.edu.tw/var/file/131/1131/img/2374/CCPS3(2)-Yeoh.pdf)> <<https://www.dropbox.com/s/dq1z15ggssld6v/CCPS-V3N2-Yeoh.pdf>>
10. <<http://icaps.nsysu.edu.tw/var/file/131/1131/img/2375/462206506.pdf>> <<https://www.dropbox.com/s/0n08xkg54tz98ai/CCPS-V4N2-full-issue.pdf>>
 11. “Dissent is the highest form of patriotism” (by Anna Berkes), *Thomas Jefferson’s Monticello*, 20th May 2008 <<https://www.monticello.org/site/blog-and-community/posts/dissent-highest-form-patriotism>> <<https://www.monticello.org/site/jefferson/dissent-highest-form-patriotism-spurious-quotations>>.
 12. Joel Westheimer (2006), “Politics and patriotism in education”, *Phi Delta Kappan* magazine, April 2006, Arlington, VA: Phi Delta Kappa International, pp. 608-620.
 13. As described by Professor Ma Ngok (馬嶽) of the Chinese University of Hong Kong, cited in Richard Bush (2016), *Hong Kong in the shadow of China: Living with the Leviathan* (Chapter 4, “Hong Kong’s Liberal Oligarchy”).
 14. Ian Johnson (2018), “‘Liu knew his responsibility in history’: A eulogy for Liu Xiaobo”, *ChinaFile* (New York: Center on U.S.-China Relations at Asia Society), 13th July 2018 <<http://www.chinafile.com/reporting-opinion/viewpoint/eulogy-liu-xiaobo>>.
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Contemporary Chinese Political Economy and Strategic Relations: An International Journal

Volume 7 Number 2 August 2021 (Special Issue) ISSN 2410-9681

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