

Xi Jinping's Ideology: A Hybrid between Marxism and Nationalism

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Abstract

The purpose of this paper was to explore the tendency of Xi Jinping's ideology in the context of modern Chinese politics. This article argued that Xi Jinping's ideology is a hybrid between Marxism and nationalism. Through a qualitative method that relies on official documents, archival sources, and specific literatures on Xi Jinping's thoughts and policies, this paper has further analyzed the format of Xi Jinping's ideology used to concentrate on power as well as to build legitimacy and public support. Xi Jinping used the Marxism method to advance his transformative agenda as Marxism changes over time. In addition, he used the Socialism rhetoric to strengthen his personal and party legitimacy amid many problems, such as economic inequality and injustice. Xi Jinping used a nationalism approach to gain public sympathy through the slogan of Chinese Dream.

Keywords: *Xi Jinping; Ideology; Marxism; Nationalism; China; Chinese Dream*

1. Introduction

This paper analyzed Xi Jinping's ideological trends in modern Chinese politics and development. As a leader with a powerful influence in China, Xi Jinping certainly brought his ideas on the conception and manifestation of communism ideology to face the increasingly complex domestic and global challenges. Since officially served as the Secretary General of Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in 2012, Xi Jinping argued that Socialism with Chinese Characteristics had entered a new era.

In several speeches, Xi Jinping briefly conveyed the aims and efforts of implementing Socialism with Chinese characteristics in the New Era. This set of policies and ideas to be acknowledged as "Xi Jinping's Thoughts." Subsequently, at the 2018 National People's Congress, China's national legislature issued the constitutional amendments which immortalized President Xi Jinping's thoughts entitled "Xi Jinping's Thoughts on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era" into constitution.

Referring to Xi Jinping's rhetoric, the use of term "Socialism" with Chinese characteristics in the New Era was not to show China's new ideology, but to strengthen the identity of China's doctrines, known as Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong Thoughts, to adapt with the global challenges. When giving a speech at the 200th anniversary of Karl Marx's birthday on May 4, 2018, Xi Jinping emphasized that Marx's thoughts and the legacy of Marxism-Leninism were integrated with the progress of China's development. He said that "the decision of CCP to stick with Karl Marx's political theory is still completely correct" (Reuters.com, 4th May 2018).

However, this issue attracts me to investigate further whether or not it is true that Xi Jinping's thoughts remain committed to Marxism? This question rose as many analyses suggested that the Chinese Communist

Party was no longer genuinely motivated by Marxism. Since the 1970s, China's development direction was believed to have abandoned the Marxism ideas and made several market-oriented reform stages which tended to support the adaptation of western capitalism ideas into its economic system. This belief became more robust since China, which recently developing into a capitalist country, has completely contradicted the Marx's socialism ideals.

On the other hand, Xi Jinping had a big plan to restore the China's past glory as a country with a high, prosperous, and influential civilization. In addition, many other narratives accompanied the big agenda above, such as bringing China to adapt the ever-changing domestic and international environment, strengthen the position of party rulers, imagine China as a modernized socialist state, concentrate the personalized power, and strengthen internal consolidation to achieve public legitimacy.

Therefore, this paper argued that Xi Jinping's ideology not only rested on the idea of Marxism but also collaborated with the nationalism values. Thus, I considered this as an ideology of "Hybrid between Marxism and Nationalism."

2. Literature reviews

Several previous studies have inspired the idea of this article. The first article was written by Arif Dirlik (2019) entitled, "Posts socialism? Reflections on socialism with Chinese characteristics." This paper is fascinating because it seems to be trying to straighten out some opinions of people who link the ideas of Chinese-style socialism with the changes in China's mindset towards the acceptance of capitalism as an economic system. This article examines the concept of Chinese-style socialism from the historical perspective and logic of Chinese leaders when

presenting the ideas, starting from Mao Ze Dong, Deng Xiaoping, and other parties involved in preparing the ideas. This article has greatly contributed valuable information on the concept of Chinese-style socialism to this paper.

Meanwhile, Michael A. Peters (2017), in his article entitled "The Chinese Dream: Xi Jinping's Thoughts on Socialism with Chinese characteristics for a new era." said that Xi Jinping's Chinese-style Socialism Idea was closely related to the political and economic mission that the Xi government sought to achieve. To support his statement, Peter attached a series of supporting opinions from various writers who reviewed Xi Jinping's political ideology. Besides, Peter also discussed the Chinese Dream as a grand narrative presenting China as a humble challenger to the world hegemony.

On the other hand, John Garrick and Yan Chang Bennett (2018) in their article entitled "Xi Jinping's Thoughts" Realization of Chinese Dream of National Rejuvenation?" described Xi Jinping's efforts to realize his political ideas through what is called a "four-pronged comprehensives strategy." The strategy consists of building a "moderately prosperous society," deepening reform, governing the nation according to law, and tightening party discipline. According to Garrick and Chang, several factors could potentially hinder the implementation of this mission.

Furthermore, Heike Holbig (2018) in her article entitled "China After Reform: The Ideological, Constitutional, and organizational Making of a New Era," defined the word "new era" in Xi Jinping's thoughts as a construction of "chrono-ideological narratives" connecting the past and future. In addition, the term is also designated to support the strengthening of China's domestic politics and the country's self-image in the international arena in a broader context.

I also found an interesting discussion from Cong Lin and Liz

Jackson (2020), in their article entitled "Make China great again: The blood-based view of Chineseness in Hong Kong." Although not discussing the political idea of socialism at all, this article provided information on the other side of Making China Great Again strategy through identity politics. This article argued that a blood-based view potentially encouraged an oversimplified and racialized understanding of Chinese identity. This can become an obstacle to the forward-thinking Chinese identity. As highlighted, the blood-based view links with ethnic nationalism, constructing a fabricated image of homogenous Chinese ethnicity. Ethnic nationalism can be used to fuel in-group amity and out-group enmity. However, the Chinese people's ethnic heterogeneity in Hong Kong in terms of many aspects and multicultural orientations emphasized the sense of Chineseness risks misrepresenting the situations.

In addition, several academic works written by William A. Callahan, a professor of international relations from the London School of Economics and Political Science, cannot be overlooked to observe the dynamics of China's ideational development in global politics. Callahan explored the China's development process from various points of view, such as history, ideology, role of individual, political vision, and idea of foreign policy. He was considered as one of the most popular Chinese analysts through his writings which frequently used a constructivist approach.

In his book, *China Dreams; 20 visions of the future* (2013:2), Callahan noted that China has entered a phase of peace and prosperity (Taiping Shengshi). In this phase, China tried to strengthen the country's internal political system and transformed into a new world power. This phase was performed after implementing "Tao Guang Yang Hui"; meaning hiding power and humble in the international policy scene (Sørensen, 2015: 53). This phrase became a well-known philosophy as

the motto of China's diplomacy in the Deng Xiao Ping era in the early 1990s. Currently, China is implementing a new approach, "Fen Fa You Wei," meaning striving and working hard to achieve success and gain strength at the domestic, regional, and global levels (Sørensen, 2015: 53).

In the other work, Callahan (2016a: 226) asserted that the China's recent movement was to rebuild the world order with a new inter-subjective meaning, including principles, such as mutual respect, mutual trust, reciprocity, equality, and a win-win strategy. In addition, this movement also accommodated the traditional ideas of hierarchical concept adopted by China, where peace might be achieved if there was a single ruling leader. In this context, China wanted to change the mindset of its neighbors with the idea that peace and prosperity might be realized when China has become a regional leader.

On the other hand, Callahan (2016b: 3) believed that China's current engagement with global players through the Belt and Road Initiatives (BRI) and Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) was a worldwide intervention mechanism grounded in the idea of "periphery diplomacy." China has currently maneuvered to become the center of world (Sino-centric), while other countries were under its auspices.

The results of Callahan's (2016c) analysis might be used to assess Xi Jinping's foreign policy style, which was said to be based on the principles of friendship, sincerity, and reciprocity. Two essential factors: economic slowdown after the 2008 crisis and the US axis strategy in Asia were believed to have triggered the emergence of Xi Jinping's strategic initiatives. The entire content of China's national policy under Xi Jinping's commands, including innovations and ideas to bring his country to become a leading country in Asia, could reflect how to appropriately and accurately design and implement an ideology.

Based on those works, this paper emphasized the practice of Xi

Jinping's ideology, combining the values of Marxism and Nationalism as an instrument to domestically and internationally realize his political and economic ambitions.

3. Methods

This study applied qualitative methods to produce the expected conclusions. Denzin and Lincoln (2005) stated that qualitative research used a natural setting to interpret the occurring phenomena and involve various existing methods. Qualitative research has the characters to explain, describe, and interpret the research results with word and sentence structures as answers to the problems under study. Qualitative methods are more empirical and can examine more in-depth information to determine the effects of research. Thus, As Babbie (2013) also called a qualitative analysis as "non-numerical examination and interpretation of observations, to discover the underlying meanings and patterns of relationships."

This study collected the data through document analysis. Document analysis is the activity of extracting information from various literature sources, including reference books, journals, news sources, personal documents or official documents of the related institutions, and official information from the specific institutional online sites related to this research. The main objective of conducting a literature study was to figure out variables to study, differentiate things to do, determine things to complete 'to synthesize and get a new perspective, as well as select the meaning and relationship between variables. In addition, literature study techniques were based on the limited costs and lack of access to direct research because the research area was hit by a conflict with no solution (Sarwono, 2006).

The data analysis technique in this study used descriptive methods

to figure out the elements, characteristics, and properties of a phenomenon. This method began with survey techniques, case studies, comparative studies, time and motion, behavior analysis, and documentary analysis. Descriptive methodologies were used to determine the development of individual physical facilities or the occurrence of something in a particular phenomenon and explain a phenomenon in details (Suryana, 2010).

4. Concept and Theoretical Approach

4.1. Basic Marxism Concepts

Marxism, or Scientific Socialism, is a term for a set of ideas formulated by Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels. Overall, these ideas provide the working-class theoretical basis to achieve a more excellent form of society; socialism (Marx and Engels, 1964).

The communist manifesto published in 1848 was the teachings of Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, seen as the primary sources of communist thoughts. Marx identified three main classes in a capitalist society: wage laborers, capitalists, and landowners (Marx and Engels, 1964). The classes were differentiated based on their basic incomes, consisting of wages, profits, and land rent for each. Each class has its own awareness and agenda of interest. Therefore, Marx then awakened the workers' consciousness against the bourgeoisie by creating two primary weapons: social criticism through his philosophical thinking and call to action known as the revolution of proletariat or poor's struggle (Marx and Engels, 1964).

Furthermore, Lenin had a significant influence on the practical development of Marx's ideas. He overhauled and added the other components to strengthen Marx's paradigm, such as the concept of leadership. According to Lenin, the communist doctrine of Karl Marx

paid less attention to the role of leader since emphasizing more on economic forces, groups, and classes than the prominent individuals.

Lenin changed the doctrine by proposing the concept of Professional Revolutionary (Mayer, 1993: 249). According to Lenin, the liberation of proletariat from the oppression of capitalism could not be spontaneously achieved from the organized working class as argued by Karl Marx but could be acquired by the planned activities of a group of the elected leaders, known as professional revolutionaries (Mayer, 1993: 252).

The sections below outlined how China adopted and modified these ideas to meet the Chinese context.

4.2. Marxism in China's Ideology

PRC was officially established as a communist country after the victory of Communists led by Mao Zedong over Kuomintang led by Chiang Kai-shek. When communism began in PRC, the Soviet Union became one of its biggest allies, followed by North Korea and several other countries, such as Vietnam. Therefore, the Chinese Socialism-Communism doctrine adopted the teachings of Soviet Union's Marxism-Leninism. However, in the history of its development, the concept of Russian revolution adopted by the PRC proved to be a failure due to the different conditions of the country, such as the mass base. China then created its concept of communism, adapted to its country's character and context.

Mao Zedong had his point of view in understanding Marxism. For Mao, Marxism was a means of struggle to achieve his ideals against imperialism and capitalism in PRC (Knight, 1985: 198).

There are three strategic dimensions in the idea of Chinese socialism (Mao Zedong, 1937: 5). First, Mao views socialism as a force

against the global domination of international capitalism. Second, capitalism is not an internal development, but an instrument of external hegemony to the third world countries. Therefore, for Mao, socialism was a means to break foreign hegemony and restore Chinese sovereignty. Third, Marxism has become a means to reconfirm the Chinese identity. In other words, Marxism promises the possibility of strengthening national identity for a society threatened to be colonized by the capitalist world.

The overall condition of PRC is different from that of several other communist countries. Nearly 70 per cent of PRC area is agricultural. Therefore, Mao Zedong, the leader of China's first-generation, adjusted the ideas of Marxism-Leninism, especially regarding the basis of revolution, to the actual reality of China. In contrast to the views of Marxism-Leninism the workers were designated as the basis of revolution in China: peasants were the majority of Chinese people (Huang, 1975: 271).

Since the era of Deng Xiaoping in its later development, the People's Republic of China tended to change its ideological direction to a market orientation. Of course, this change was in contrast with the teachings of Marxism-Leninism and Mao's Thoughts (Boer and Li, 2015: 313). On the one hand, China is a socialist-communist country using the principles of shared ownership and opposing the private ownership considered the seeds of capitalism. On the other hand, China seemed to have a dilemma in meeting the development of the increasingly open world, and inevitably the government (in this case, the Chinese Communist Party as a government) was slowly shifting its ideological direction increasingly to the "right" through a series of "compromise" policies. So far, the CCP has at least used a set of theories to guide their ideology.

For the CCP, Marxism-Leninism was a form of pure ideology,

serving as a political guidance. From this pure ideology, practical ideologies emerged and developed: Mao's Thoughts, Deng Xiaoping's Theory, and Jiang Zemin's "Three Represents" Theory. The emergence of this practical ideology, according to the CCP, was a form of cyclization or adjustment to the conditions at home and abroad in China, based on reality and liberating thoughts.

4.3. Concept of Nationalism

Etymologically, nationalism is initially derived from the word "nation". According to Anderson (1983), a country is an imagined community because the members of that nation often do not know, face, nor hear each other, although they live in an image in their togetherness minds. So, there is no real community. In fact, all communities are imaginative.

Long before, Kohn (1965: 9-10) had stated that a nation has certain objective factors which make them different from the other countries, such as heredity, language, region, political unity, customs and traditions, as well as religion. None of these factors are essential in formulating a nation.

Furthermore, Smith (2001: 5-9) defined nationalism as an ideological movement to achieve and maintain the autonomy, unity, and identity of a population whose members considerably make a real "nation." According to Smith, these various aspects were the doctrine of nationalism. National autonomy is an effort to self-regulate, self-determine, has its own rules and regulations, hears one's inner voice, has freedom from all foreign pressures, and was free from politics. Smith added that national identity was a continuous reproduction and re-translation of values, symbols, memories, myths, and traditions forming a unique national heritage and identification of individuals with these patterns and inheritance as well as cultural elements.

In conclusion, nationalism is teaching us to love our nation and country. Furthermore, nationalism is a nation's political attitude with harmony in culture, territory, shared ideals, and goals to defend the country from any internal and external threats. Besides, they also potentially achieve, maintain, and perpetuate the nation's identity, integrity, prosperity, and strength. Thus, nationalism teaches three things: nationalism as a sentiment or feeling, nationalism as an action or movement, and nationalism as an idea or doctrine.

5. Xi Jinping's Ideology: Hybrid between Marxism and Nationalism

5.1. Xi Jinping's Thoughts

Xi Jinping's thoughts on socialism with Chinese characteristics for the New Era, better known as Xi Jinping's Thoughts, are a set of policies and ideals developed by the Chinese Communist Party's Secretary General Xi Jinping. These thoughts were first formally mentioned at the 19th National Congress of Chinese Communist Party, where they were later incorporated into the Chinese Communist Party's Constitution. At the First Session of the Thirteenth National People's Congress on March 11, 2018, the Preamble to the Constitution of the People's Republic of China was amended by mentioning the Xi Jinping's Thoughts.

President Xi Jinping formulated his political ideology to strengthen his position as a supreme leader. The doctrine, commonly called Xi Jinping's Thoughts on Chinese Socialism Characteristics for a New Era, began to be echoed by the top CCP figures since the 2017 Party Congress. A year later, after the 19th Party Congress, Xi Jinping's Thoughts were included in the CCP Constitution affirming that Xi Jinping had completely controlled the CCP and made nearly impossible to be politically challenged. Throughout PRC's history, there were only two leaders whose ideas were driven into constitution: Mao Zedong and

Deng Xiaoping.

Chris Buckley, in *The New York Times* (26th February 2018), said that "The doctrine is a blueprint to consolidate and strengthen the power at three levels: state, party and Xi Jinping himself." Meanwhile, the Xinhua news agency (17th March 2018) referred to Xi Jinping's Thoughts as, "Recent achievements in adapting Marxism to the Chinese context and summarizing the practical experience and collective wisdom of the CCP and Chinese people."

President Xi Jinping had also set a series of Chinese national goals for 2050 (Peters, 2017; 1300). He wanted to make China the global political power leader, turned its military into a world-class power, and eradicated extreme poverty. He envisioned China as a modernized socialist country. Xi Jinping, who rose to power as CCP Secretary-General on November 15, 2012, also promised to deepen the economic reform by opening his market to foreign investors as one of his steps.

Xi Jinping's new doctrine still respected Marx and Mao's figures and thoughts (Peters, 2017; 1301). For Xi, the current state ideology was Marxism, long considered as the foundation for the PRC's founding and liberating China from foreign powers. Guided by Marxism, communist China managed to defeat Japan and the Nationalist groups supported by the West.

According to Xi Jinping, Marxism should be integrated with the local culture to be effective (Garrick and Bennett, 2018: 102). To realize the ideals of Marxism, a strong party and great leaders were needed. Furthermore, Xi Jinping used Marxism to unite the people and not to inspire the class struggle.

Xi Jinping and the CCP had recently inclined to base their ideology and policies on Maoism. Like Mao, Xi Jinping had prioritized strengthening the party, instilling the collective socialist values, and eliminating the incompatible political opponents. Thus, he was

frequently referred to as Neo-Maoist. Through this policy, he ensured all Chinese political, social, and economic activities served the interests of CCP. Xi Jinping abolished the public and private dichotomy in politics and economy to remove the presidential term limits. He also aspired to draw the political and physical boundaries separating the mainland China from Taiwan and Hong Kong. Finally, he offered the China's political and state systems as a model for the other countries which did not like the liberal democratic system.

Xi Jinping's thoughts consisted of the following 14 essential policy points (Straits Times, 18th October 2017):

1. Ensuring the Party leadership over all work.
2. Committing a people-centered approach.
3. Continuing the comprehensively deepen reform.
4. Adopting a new vision for development.
5. Seeing that people run the country.
6. Ensuring every dimension of governance is law-based.
7. Upholding the core socialist values.
8. Ensuring and improving the living standards through development.
9. Ensuring the harmony between humans and nature.
10. Pursuing a holistic approach to national security.
11. Upholding the absolute Party leadership over the people's forces.
12. Upholding the principles of "one country, two systems", and promoting a national reunification.
13. Promoting the building of a community with a shared future for humanity.
14. Exercising full and rigorous governance over the Party.

Xi Jinping's thoughts on socialism with Chinese characteristics in the new era were the succession and development of Marxism-Leninism, Mao Zedong's Thought, Deng Xiaoping's Theory, the critical thought of

'Three Represents.' Xi Jinping's concept of scientific development was the latest achievement of the sinicization of Marxism. The practical experiences of the party and the people, as well as the crystallization of knowledge and collective wisdom were an essential part of theoretical system of socialism with Chinese characteristics and a guide for action for all parties and societies across the country to strive for the great revival of Chinese nation.

5.2. Xi Jinping's ideology: Hybrid between Marxism and Nationalism

Xi Jinping's thoughts illustrated his ideological construction in fighting for his political beliefs and ideals. I believed that Xi Jinping's ideology was not purely based on Marxism, but also on nationalism's values. In the other words, the current use of socialist rhetoric in Xi's leadership, in my opinion, was not only a pragmatic instrument of CCP to maintain the state political control, but also involved nationalism as a significant component of the country's political legitimacy. This structural factor made the CCP re-mobilize the idea of socialism with Chinese characteristics. Therefore, I tried to place this fact proportionally by categorizing Xi Jinping's recent ideology as a Hybrid Ideology between Marxism and Nationalism.

Why is that? According to Timothy Cheek and David Ownby (2018), in an article published by Dissent Magazine, as China's official ideological guidance, Xi Jinping thought that Marxism changed over time. On the other hand, according to the Director of Asian Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR), Elizabeth C. Economy, in an article published in *Foreign Affairs* (2019), Xi Jinping had revived the Maoist method not only to commemorate the past victories, but also to advance its transformative agenda.

In my opinion, the revival of socialism in China did not take place in an empty space. After the 2008 global capitalism crisis, China was forced to review Chinese-style market socialism practices. At that time, China had suffered from a series of losses, including export bottlenecks due to the falling international market demands. Therefore, China changed the orientation of production results to be more focused on domestic consumption. As a result, the government's legitimacy at that time decreased in the eyes of public.

According to some observers, this situation was the basis for the revival of the rhetoric of socialism within the party. The socialist rhetoric was the CCP's attempt to strengthen the political legitimacy in front of a Chinese public increasingly pressured by the existing economic weakness. To deal with the public pressure changes, the CCP needed to consolidate its internal political-ideology-organization in line with the socialist spirit. It was no wonder that under Xi's leadership since 2012, the CCP had launched a massive anti-corruption campaign. The CCP had implemented the internal discipline where cadres were required to live simply and prohibited from living in luxury.

The CCP even reintroduced Mao Zedong's policy of a "mass line" whereby all CCP cadres should serve the people's daily needs. The rhetoric of socialism was limited to gain the public sympathy in maintaining the existing political control.

The propaganda frequently appearing on the western left was that CCP politics tended to be pragmatic rather than socialist in nature. Thus, the promotion of market socialism was only a superficial justification for the party's attempts to implement capitalist production in China. No one argued that CCP had implemented a capitalist economy in China. Yet, we also needed to understand why China needed to implement this.

In his evaluation of China's political economy practices under the leadership of CCP, Domenico Losurdo (2017: 15) believed that efforts

to realize socialism were never final. Even though the capitalist class had been overthrown, the communists still had to face capitalism as an abstract system with its all movements and dynamics. Thus, instead as a complete agenda, socialism must be recognized as a politics which was full of experimentation in the face of abstract flexibility of capitalism.

This made the China's recent socialist politics so unique. Although China's market economy was greatly obvious, the economic sector was still dominated by the public sector, controlled by the state. In addition, the political influence of capitalist class was limited in China. The capitalist class could not positively influence the political decisions set by the CCP Politburo. It was not surprising that China's market situation was widely open to intervention by the state powers if, indeed, the country saw that economic correction was necessary.

Furthermore, the increasing neglected "proletarian politics" in the Chinese socialist politics had recently become a sign of Marxism's waning value in the CCP as a Marxist political organization. This argument rose since the development of Chinese market socialism, which created a high economic inequality in society, was not accompanied by a balance of the organized labor forces. Moreover, Chinese scientific socialism seemed to be more focused on the economic growth or production modes than on the production relations and class struggle (Shi Anshu et al., 2018: 145).

Therefore, when Xi Jinping announced the revitalization of Marxism and Socialism, it opened room for the emergence of a neo-Maoist thought tradition (The Chinese New Left) in the contemporary Chinese situation. They were united because of anxiety seeing the development of capitalism in China, causing the inequality and injustice. In addition, they also highlighted Xi's power, considered deviating Mao's thoughts.

Interestingly, amid these developments, the CCP could not limit the

rise of Maoism because this idea was an integral part of the CCP's historical existence. Therefore, this paper concluded that the ideological battle in the CCP indicated that the CCP's political line was not final. The ideological dynamics in China might open up opportunities for changes in the party political lines. In this context, Xi Jinping had probably realized that Marxism's revitalization possibly had a stumbling block if its policy practice did not follow the theory. Therefore, Xi Jinping used nationalist sentiments to shore up the weaknesses of Marxism implementation.

5.3. Nationalism

Xi Jinping's government vision of nationalism is illustrated by his political campaign entitled "Chinese Dream." The slogan is a reflection of Xi Jinping government's image. The use of slogans as a vision in government has been traditionally inherited and still implemented by the Chinese leaders. On one hand, this slogan's selection aimed at gaining sympathy and arising public enthusiasm. On the other hand, this slogan also represented a vision showing the country's political policies.

Xi Jinping first chanted the term Chinese Dream in November 2012 when promoted to the top office of communist party (BBC News, 6th June 2013). On one occasion, he said:

"We must make persistent efforts, press ahead with an indomitable will, continue to push forward the great cause of socialism with Chinese characteristics, and strive to achieve the Chinese Dream of the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation"

Xi Jinping further elaborated this idea in a speech at the closing ceremony at the First Session of the 12th Chinese National People's Congress in Beijing (Lee, 2014).

Since he was at the pinnacle of supreme power, Xi Jinping brought China into big ambitions towards a developed country. For example, Xi encouraged China to implement the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) at all costs. China's growing capability economically and militarily also made China more confident in its international relations. For example, China continuously strived to maintain its territorial integrity in the South China Sea region. Despite not having a clear legal foundation, China continuously holds its claims in the area based on the historical reasons (Hayton, 2018: 2). In general, Xi Jinping's high ambition could be simplified into keywords; the remarkable rise of Chinese nation (Peters, 2017). China, in the past, was called the center of the world and the hub of civilization. To commemorate this triumph, China should build a strong country, prosperous nation, and happy society (Yu Wujin, 2013).

Xi also stated that the Chinese Dream did not only belong to the Chinese nation. The prosperity achieved through the China Dream was expected to be felt by all people in the world. This fantasy made the Chinese Dream different from the American Dream. Indeed, the western media accused Xi Jinping of being talkative and stealing the ideas of the American Dream launched by James Truslow Adams in 1931 (Tao, 2015). In fact, there were striking differences. The American Dream focused more on achieving the individual goals, namely personal happiness and success, while the Chinese Dream had a collective dimension rooted in collective progress at the national level.

The Chinese Dream rested on the concept of rejuvenation – fixing risen from the century of humiliation, starting from the opium war (1839-1842) until the founding of China/PRC. Furthermore, China was eager to rise and regain the preeminence in the past. The revival is a kind

of moral responsibility to return to the role used to be, not intentionally becoming a superpower country, yet a 'natural' world leader (Kai, 2014).

Under Xi Jinping, the China Dream was no longer a domestic issue, yet international resonance. Xi performed the Chinese Dream on an international orchestral stage. This development of Chinese model was definitely different from what was known as the 'Washington Consensus'; Chinese-style reforms had nothing to do with a democratic country. This model was meant to legitimize that the Chinese Communist Party would never be disbanded. From a long-term perspective, the Chinese government wanted to broadcast that they were committed to the welfare of humankind without passing through the electoral legitimacy.

In other words, the Chinese Dream was an instrument to commemorate the China's past glory with the aspiration to become a world leader on the international stage, leaving China's paradigm of weak and sick. Thus, Xi needed to ensure the success of his medium-term goal of what was known as a "moderately proper society/xiaokangshèhuì." This term is taken from the legacy of Confucian teachings, in which Hu Jintao reinvigorated after Confucianism was denounced during the Cultural Revolution.

Furthermore, as the supreme leader, Xi Jinping needed popular supports to strengthen his position and political legitimacy. The idea of Chinese Dream was a means to enhance not only the legitimacy of Xi's leadership but also the legitimacy of CCP's strength. Amid the political dynamics and the emergence of various problems in China, especially the issues of social inequality and poverty that never ended, the hope of awakening and prosperity through the slogan brought up by Xi Jinping was a breath of fresh air.

By asserting that the Chinese Dream was the dream of all Chinese people, it was easier for Xi Jinping to associate each other's imagination

with its vision. The people would also hang their dreams on the party as the power holder in the country. This made the position of CCP and the state crucial to the people. He seemed connecting the country's destiny with the fate of each of its people. Besides, Xi Jinping tried to build a relationship between China and its people, like the relationship between parents and children. In this context, the people's aspirations were seen as the aspirations of families who would jointly realize the dreams with China.

Xi also performed a patriotic campaign using historical narratives. China had experienced 100 years of suffering due to the Western occupation known as "century of humiliation." Territories that were previously under Chinese sovereignty became fragmented and colonized. During the pressure and threats of Western imperialism, the Chinese people began to rise and resist. The formation of Chinese Communist Party and the establishment of People's Republic of China under Mao Zedong's leadership were considered opening the points for China's path to regain what was rightfully entitled to. Territories previously occupied by the colonial government were successfully regained.

In the past two decades, China had experienced the most considerable economic and geopolitical rise in history, measured by the spectacular growth, the alleviation of extreme poverty, and the most significant increase in the frontier technological dominance of 21st-century innovation. This miracle happened not because of the application of capitalism model in China, yet because of their success in interpreting the 21st-century Marxist ideas and combining them with the greatness of nationalism doctrine.

To summarize, referring to the aforementioned facts, Xi Jinping's political ideas and policies were rooted in two main instruments: Marxist ideology as the guidance for socialism with Chinese characters and

nationalism to domestically and internationally support the political face of China. This fact further confirms that Xi Jinping's ideology was a Hybrid between Marxism and Nationalism.

6. Conclusion

Xi Jinping is a visionary and brilliant Chinese leader. He well knew how to concentrate power while consolidate political legitimacy to realize the ideals of his state. Although he repeatedly said that Marxism was still utterly true for China, the essential elements of Xi Jinping's political ideology did not rely on the teachings of Marxism alone but also included another structural urgency in the form of nationalism.

Therefore, this paper concluded that Xi Jinping's ideology was a hybrid between Marxism and nationalism. He seemed combining two approaches to present China's face on the international stage; top-down and bottom-up. Marxism, according to Xi Jinping, was the CCP's inviolable leading guidance. Therefore, we called the idea of Marxism represent a top-down approach.

Meanwhile, the values of nationalism seemed raising the awareness in Chinese society that China was a country with a great culture and civilization. When Xi Jinping campaigned for Chinese dream slogan, he appeared to be inviting the Chinese people to restore their glory and reclaiming a central player's position in an international political orchestra.

We called this situation representing a bottom-up approach. If many experts argued that China had recently deviated far from the main principles of Marxism, then Xi Jinping, through his thoughts, legally stated in the party constitution, had answered that in the current new era, socialism had well adapted the demands of age while maintaining the characteristics of China: Marxist and nationalist.

Notes

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