

## **Tiananmen Protests and Lessons for Democratization in Vietnam**

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### **Abstract**

Tiananmen Protests is a shorthand for a seven-week long, nation-wide social movement that spread throughout mainland China in 1989. Looking back at the Tiananmen Protests after 30 years we can learn some lessons to emulate or to avoid in any democratization process elsewhere. In this paper, I try to single out some episodes of the protests and see them in light of “eventful democratization”, a framework promoted recently by Donatella della Porta, to understand better the process of the 1989 student protests and especially why they succeeded in mobilization but failed in the end which led to the massacre of June 4. This paper also tries to draw a few lessons from the Tiananmen Protests (and from other successful or failed mobilizations for democracy including the Taiwanese one) that have influenced formulation of a strategy in 2013 for democratization in Vietnam. A strategy will be briefly summarized at the end of the paper.

**Keywords:** *Tiananmen Protests , mobilization, eventful democratization, China, Vietnam, Phan Chau Trinh, Civil Society Forum, strategy, East Asian lessons*

## 1. Description

Tiananmen Protests is a shorthand for a seven-week long, nation-wide social movement that spread throughout mainland China in 1989. In this paper, I try to single out some episodes of the protests and see them in light of “eventful democratization”, a framework promoted recently by Donatella della Porta, to understand better the process of the 1989 student protests and especially why they succeeded in mobilization but failed in the end which led to the massacre of June 4. I think it is useful to divide the players into several groups at different levels of abstraction and also divide this seven-week period into several phases according to specific players.

For the players the crudest division (at P0 level) is to divide them into the rulers and the ruled; a bit more sophisticated one (at P1 level) is composed of: (a) an assemble of not unified students and intellectuals trying to win the support of the rest of the population to represent the ruled on the one hand and; on the other hand, the rulers are composed of (b) the softline faction of leaders with Zhao Ziyang at the top; (c) the hardline fraction with Li Peng at the top; and (d) Deng, the ultimost decision maker, (and other Party elders) in between whose support the two factions (b) and (c) are trying to win.

Because Deng is a true reformist in the economic sphere but very conservative in the political sphere, the faction that won his support would prevail and the other lose. Deng always took the hardline approach toward the student protests as demonstrated by many of his actions in the past, and the most recent one was his attitude towards the student demonstrations of December 1986 which contributed to his decision to remove Hu Yaobang on January 4th, 1987.

Regarding specific timelines, we follow Dai Qing (1999) (she divided the process into five phases from the point of view of

intellectuals and students, our four phases are similar but follow the actual decisions of the rulers which were not available to Dai ten years before). This timeline singles out the events that show vividly the dynamic and mechanisms which (della Porta, 2014) has synthesized into a theoretical framework from China's experiences and other countries':

1. The first phase, from April 17th to the afternoon of 23rd, during the first week when Zhao Ziyang, the general secretary, was responsible for managing students' affairs. On April 19th, the *World Economic Herald* (a liberal publication in Shanghai) and *New Observation*, a magazine, jointly held a symposium on the commemoration of Hu Yaobang. On the 22nd of April the students organized their own memorial for Hu on the square while the official one was taking place in the Great Hall. Three students knelt on the steps of the Hall holding a large sign demanding dialogue with the government. The attitude of the authorities was one of unprecedented restraint.
2. The second phase is from the evening of 23rd to 29th, when Zhao was taking the train to North Korea for an official state visit until the time he returned to Beijing. On the evening of 23rd, Li Ximing and Chen Xitong of the Beijing Party Commission asked Wan Li (Chairman of the National People's Congress, who is NOT a member the Politburo Standing Committee, PSC), to call for a meeting of PSC to listen to their report. Wan Li directed their request to Li Peng, as Li Peng was temporarily in charge of PSC activities while Zhao was abroad. The very next evening of 24th, Li Peng called for a PSC meeting. On the same day, April 24th, in Shanghai, the *World Economic Herald* published a detailed report on their symposium of April 19th against the warning of the Party Commission not to publish it. And on April 25th, Li Peng and Yang Shangkun reported to Deng Xiaoping about the meeting. After listening to their report, Deng immediately agreed

to label the student demonstrations as “anti-Party, anti-socialist turmoil”<sup>1</sup> and then proposed to resolve the situation quickly. The hardline faction had won Deng’s support. Li Peng had disseminated Deng’s remarks on that very evening to all cadres at all levels and instructed the *People’s Daily* to issue an extremely hardline editorial on April 26th. In Shanghai, on the same day of April 26th, Party Chief Jiang Zenmin removed Qin Benli the editor-in-chief of the *World Economic Herald* and banned the newspaper which had caused protests among journalists nationwide. Li Peng hoped the *People’s Daily’s* editorial would scare the students but instead it had made them even more angry that they were ready to go down to the streets to express their opinion because they were greatly encouraged by events that took place during the first phase and the media coverage worldwide therefrom. As a result, demonstrations that took place on the next day, April 27th, involved ten to fifteen thousand students, and many more residents took to the street. Li Peng therefore felt pressured and asked Yuan Mu, the State Council Spokesman, He Dongchang, Yuan Liben and Lu Yucheng to hold a dialogue with students’ representatives from 16 Beijing universities and independent intellectuals on April 29th.

3. The third phase is from 30th of April to 17th of May. After having returned to Beijing, Zhao Ziyang tried to learn what had happened when he was out of Beijing and tried to do his best to manage the protests. On May 1st, Zhao proposed at a Politburo Standing Committee that the Politburo should order the Central Disciplinary Commission and the Ministry of Supervision to open an investigation into his family members for alleged corruption accusations to respond to the students’ demands to fight against corruption and special privileges given to officials. On May 3rd, Zhao discussed with Wan Li, the NPC Standing Committee Chairman, about the student

demonstrations and Wan totally agreed with Zhao; he also tried to persuade others to change the tone of the editorial of April 26th.

On May 4th, Zhao Ziyang delivered his speech to Asian Development Bank delegates that called for dealing with the student demonstration “based on principles of democracy and law.” The students returned to their universities. On May 6th, Zhao discussed with Hu Qili and Rui Xingwen and he “proposed that attention be paid when drafting new press laws to relax restrictions on news reporting, editorials, and commentary” in relation to the students’ demands for press freedom. And on May 9th “Hu Qili organized Zhao’s remarks into a brief that was disseminated to press organizations after Zhao had inspected and approved it.” On May 10th, the Politburo decided that holding discussions with every group involved in the protests would be an ideal path to resolving the students’ issues. On May 12th “Hu Qili and Rui Xingwen briefed leaders of Beijing press organizations at a meeting for dialogue. By that time, more than a thousand people from Beijing’s press organizations had signed a petition and taken to the streets to protest.”

Due to the authorities’ adoption of this kind of attitude, the students in all universities in Beijing agreed to announce the suspension of their class strike. Social order was therefore restored. On May 13th, two days before the official visit of Mikhail Gorbachev and the students’ plan to use the occasion for protest again, Zhao Ziyang delivered a speech to persuade the students not “to disturb international state talks and do damage to the Sino-Soviet Summit.” The students did not respond to Zhao’s plea however, and instead they entered Tiananmen Square to stage a sit-in and hunger strike in which hundreds of them took part. The occupation of the square thus started. The attempts of allies of Zhao, Yan Mingfu and Li Tieying, to negotiate on May 14th failed. Yan even went to the square on May

16th to persuade the students to end the hunger strike, but he also failed.

The protest was not only in Beijing, but in other major cities too. For example, “In Chengdu, the movement’s turning point came in the early hours of May 16th, when more than a thousand policemen scuffled with about two hundred students, beating them with sticks and belts to try to clear the square... this act served to galvanize the movement, even winning it support from university authorities, who had previously locked school gates to prevent students from taking part in demonstrations.” (Lim, 2014: 184)

As for the students’ part, encouraged by the successful mobilizations of the first few weeks, the students’ demands escalated, proposing dialogue with officials, and further, demanding that it be aired live on TV. After the April 29th dialogue, and after the decision of May 10th Politburo meeting which led to Yan Mingfu, a Secretary of the Politburo and an ally of Zhao, going to the square to negotiate with the student leaders without results; Yan and Li Tieying (a member of the Politburo in charge of education) held a dialogue on May 14th with the intellectuals (including Dai Qing) and students’ leaders but it came to a sudden halt when a group of students from the square came and demanded that the dialogue be ended because it was not broadcasted live. On May 16th, at the square, Yan even offered himself as a hostage to demonstrate the sincerity of his belief that all issues would soon be solved. The students would like the government to capitulate.

On May 17th Zhao requested a personal meeting with Deng, but when he arrived at Deng’s home that afternoon, it turned out that Deng had called all other members of the Politburo Standing Committee and Yang Shangkun to the meeting. The decision to impose martial law had been made. Zhao Ziyang had been in effect

ousted.

Assessing this phase, Dai Qing stated: “There still has not been at this point sufficient evidence to be able to explain why in this context some radical students’ leaders would have once again caused the situation to escalate. And moreover, used extreme methods, a hunger strike. From the 13th to the 17th, the radicals insisted on conditions which the authorities could never have accepted. They gambled with the lives of the young, and there [sic] wouldn’t yield, even to a minimum request from the government, that is, temporarily restore and give way from the Tiananmen Square for the national affair saluting President Gorbachev.” On the evening of May 17th, Zhao went to visit the hunger-striking students who were in the hospital.

4. The fourth phase is from May 18th to the final suppression by force. Zhao had been effectively ignored by the hardliners. On May 18th, Li Peng, Beijing Party chief Li Ximing and Mayor Chen Xitong (the hardline conservatives) as well as Yan Mingfu, Li Tiesing (the reformists) held a meeting with the students’ leaders (Wu’erkaixi, Wang Dan and Xiong Yan). Li Peng considered the meeting not as a negotiation between two sides and asked students to end the hunger strike and treated the students as “children”. And the meeting ended without any results because Li Peng did not consider the student leaders as negotiating partners as they had requested.

On May 19th, having known what would happen to the students, Zhao went to the square making his last effort to persuade the students to leave the square immediately and unconditionally. With tears in his eyes, he could not tell the youngsters who were around him more. What he only said was that “it’s too late for me to meet you. And I’m an aged man, you, you youngsters should take care of yourselves, because you have a bright future.” But the student leaders did not respond. That was Zhao’s last public appearance.

On May 19th, a Politburo Standing Committee meeting was called to announce martial law. Zhao was asked to chair that meeting but he refused to attend. On May 20th, martial law was made public. This once again mobilized the masses. Troops were blocked by citizens from entering the city to implement martial law. The standoff lasted more than ten days, martial law became ineffective and this encouraged more and more people to join the protests. “The people had stood up to the army—using nothing but their bodies and their wits—and had won. For the students, this was a major triumph, a sign that their movement had become a mass movement.” (Lim, 2014: 13)

Although effectively marginalized, Zhao Ziyang tried to rectify the situation by sending a letter to Deng on May 18th, talking to several people to call Wan Li to return home from official state visit abroad and called for a National People’s Congress’s Standing Committee meeting or a Politburo meeting, but all of these efforts were in vain. He was in fact under house arrest, and heard himself intense gunfire from his house on the night of June 3rd. “On the 2nd of June, the reformers’ last effort, representatives of Deng Xiaoping’s eldest son tried to advise the students to initiate withdrawal and the young Deng said he would do his best to reason with his father not to use force. Unexpectedly, it, too, failed to bring success. At midnight on June 3rd, tanks entered the square. Four moderates, a singer, a teacher, a scholar, and editor, with the company of a doctor, went out and reached an agreement with the army, unconditional retreat at an appointed time. The radical leaders didn’t stop them this time and again they had gained help in fleeing. This was the most tragic day in China’s twentieth century political history.” (Dai, 1999)

There are several analyses of the Tiananmen Protests, for example, Lim (2014) and della Porta (2014), particularly those of Craig Calhoun

that have been cited extensively by her. The mechanisms in eventful democratization, which have been synthesized by della Porta (her table 2.1, page 64) not only from China's case but from several other cases of East Germany, Czechoslovakia, Tunisia, Egypt and elsewhere, are very useful. The cognitive, emotional and relational mechanisms as well as framing of democracy and mobilization of resources were all very clear in these seven weeks of mobilization in China (della Porta, 2014: 64-65, 134-137, 304). All these causal mechanisms and the framings as well as mobilization and creation of resources are dynamic in nature and interact with the actions of the opponents (the rulers) which are always not so clear to the protesters and may cause misjudgments. For more analysis, see those works mentioned above and references therein. The brief description above also tries to highlight those mechanisms and the escalation process from both sides.

## **2. Some Lessons**

We try to draw a few lessons from the Tiananmen Protests, as well as from democratization efforts elsewhere, which may be relevant to the democratization process in Vietnam.

Nonviolent struggle for democratization is a long and difficult struggle. Its success or failure depends on many factors. We can distinguish these factors (or parts of these factors) into two types: the relatively stable ones (in the sense that they change slowly), such as structural conditions, action resources, prevalent (emancipative) values (see Welzel, 2013: 45-46), and those factors (or their parts) that can change quickly during the mobilization process, especially in its intense phase, such as relations and cognitive, emotional and relational mechanisms (see della Porta, 2014: 27-65). We call the former ones structural factors and the latter, emergent ones (della Porta, 2014: 32).

We observe that democratization seems to be more likely to be successful in those cases where the structural factors are more favorable (or put figuratively these background conditions are high enough) either in the form of mass-driven eventful democratization or participatory pact, or elite-driven pacted transition (della Porta, 2014: 16). However, if the structural factors are less favorable, then eventful democratization likely fails *ceteris paribus*.

According to Donatella della Porta, “in China, nonviolence failed during the Tiananmen Square protests due to the absence of coalitions of the opposition; instead, divisions increased with a lack of leverage for support from abroad, and the regime maintained control of the military. While resilience in fact requires decentralized structures, which, being more democratic, strengthen oppositional consciousness although allowing for coordination, attempts at domination by one part have the opposite effect.” (della Porta *et al.*, 2018: 8) This judgement is in line with that of Dai Qing, “The demonstrators basically had the opportunity many times to withdraw without any great gain but without terrible loss either. And their dignity could also have been maintained. But the movement had already slipped out of control. Many organizations had been established at this time, and some of them considered to take Solidarity as their title. Calculating the authorities’ intention and preparing their own future, the radical leaders employed only the highest emotional intensity in their conversation with the regime, which for those people who continued staying in the square was like pouring oil on fire.”

The civil society organizations were rare or such independent student groupings were just created during the protests, and there were no such independent organizations among workers, intellectuals or other segments of the population because the Chinese Communist Party strictly forbade formation of such organizations or informal groupings.

After Zhao had effectively been ousted and the hardliners had won Deng Xiaoping to their side, the rulers were united. In other words, structural conditions were not favorable for democratization.

The students tried to imitate the Polish Solidarity model asking for dialogue but there were no opposition forces behind them as in the case of Poland.

An extremely important lesson from the Tiananmen protests (and so many others such as currently in Algeria, Sudan or Venezuela) is that the army plays a crucial role, and ways to persuade the military, to win over them (*bing yun* / 兵運) are important in mobilization for democracy and to “nationalize” the army in consolidation of democracy.

The moderation debate is also worthy to be considered. Moderation has been long considered as favorable for democratic transition (della Porta, 2014: 9, 197-198). However, there are also many cases that proved that radicalization (or contestation) is helpful in eventful democratization (della Porta, 2014: 9, 199-200; Bermeo, 1999). This would mean that we have to consider moderation versus radicalization on a case by case basis or in different phases of democratization (in phase of preparation to transition contestations occurred nearly in every case, but in short period of transition, moderation can create good conditions in elite-driven pacted transition and mass-driven participatory pact, as well as in eventful democratization (which can fail or succeed). I think that we have to consider the Tiananmen protests either as they happened in the preparation phase of democratization (that is the transition did not start yet in China and in that case the radicalization of the students were justifiable) or as a failed transition (and in this case the radicalization can result in failure).<sup>2</sup>

Successful lessons of the Tiananmen mobilization of 1989 are very useful, but lessons of its failures are also worth to study to avoid such pitfalls.

### **3. A Strategy for Democratization in Vietnam**

Vietnam and other former socialist countries (particularly PRC) have a lot of similarities but also many differences. Before discussing a strategy for democratization in Vietnam, let me take a step back to an early development of Vietnam at the beginning of the last century.

Maybe you have never heard of Phan Châu Trinh. He was born on 9th September 1872, and passed away on 24th March 1926. From 1905 to 1907 he developed his ideas of non-violent struggle for democracy and popular rights (now human rights) in Vietnam to which I shall return later on. Regarding the tax-protest riots that erupted in Central Vietnam in 1908, despite the fact that Phan Châu Trinh insisted on non-violent methods, he was accused of inciting the public to join in the revolt and he was arrested and sentenced to death. Due to the intervention of the Ligue des Droits de l'Homme (Human Rights League) the death sentence was changed to life imprisonment and later on to house arrest in a village, then he was released in 1910 and deported to France. From April 1911 he spent fourteen years in exile. He returned to Saigon in 1925 and died on 24th March 1926.

Phan Châu Trinh's ideas to fight for democracy and human rights can be reformulated concisely within his 5 slogans (policies) which we, the Civil Society Forum (CSF), have adopted as ours:

- 1) (A strategy to) Building Democracy (composes of):
- 2) Exercise the People's Rights
- 3) Invigorate the People's Spirit
- 4) Broaden the People's Mind
- 5) Enrich the People's Well-being

Phan Châu Trinh was an astonishing modern thinker of modernization. Let us start with his fourth and fifth policies from the

bottom: “Enrich the People’s Well-being” and “Broaden the People’s Mind”. They were not only his thoughts, but he himself had started a program to put them into practice. By establishing schools, associations, enterprises and encouraging other people to do so, he made an example to others by encouraging people to create the so-called “action resources”, so to speak, using the language of the neo-modernization theory: the material resource (equipment, tools, and income), the intellectual resource (knowledge, skills, and information) and the connective resource (networks of exchange and contact interface) in the basic, fundamental level (Welzel, 2013: 46).

In a recent essay (Nguyen, 2017), I have mapped Phan Châu Trinh’s ideas more than a century ago into those of neo-modernization theories<sup>3</sup>. I have shown that the fourth and fifth policies of Phan correspond to the “action resources” of neo-modernization theory on a basic level and that the values generated by the third policy of Phan, “Invigorate the People’s Spirit”, corresponds with the emancipative values in the next, cultural, motivational level; these values promote and encourage social movement activities (in an upper level of action, expressed by the second policy of “Exercise Your Rights”). And these social movement activities of “Exercising Your Rights”, that is just exercise those rights and not waiting for anyone (the government, the ruling party or any person) to allow you to do that in everyday life.

This proactive way of life gives rise to the constant pressure on the authorities to provide legal guarantees for freedoms and ensure that those freedoms are respected in the daily life, that is, those freedoms are entitlements or citizen’s rights at the top level (that empowerment process is the essence of democratization which can be done partially even in the middle of a dictatorial regime and have to be done even in the mature democracies since the number of those human rights that can become entitlements are infinite). This thick, vibrant and inclusive civil

society<sup>4</sup> is crucial not only to the process of democratization leading to democratic transition, but also to consolidation of democracy if a transition did take place.

Unfortunately, in more than a century Vietnam did not follow the wise strategy of Phan and today we are still suffering under a Communist dictatorship. We try to reformulate this strategy and supplement it with 9 principles to form a coherent strategy that befits our times.

Phan Châu Trinh was a firm and consistent non-violent fighter for democracy and human rights. He adopted the nonviolent methods as early as 1905, at the same time as Mahatma Gandhi (1906); Phan was in fact 3 years younger than Gandhi. This coincidence may not be a surprise, I think, because both of them were heavily influenced by non-violent ideas of Indian thinking expressed thousands of years ago, for example, in Buddhist teachings disseminated by the Dalai Lama and Zen Master Thích Nhất Hạnh in our time.

Non-violence is one of the principles guiding our activities in Vietnam civil society in general, and in CSF in particular.

Our strategy for democratization in Vietnam is composed of the above-mentioned five policies and the following 9 principles.

We, at the CSF, follow 9 principles (or core values) in the struggle to transform peacefully the post-totalitarian regime in Vietnam into a true democracy. These are:

- 1) Legality: CSF and its members act legally, respect the laws, do not fight against the state.<sup>5</sup> The legality here is understood as the conformity with international treaties which Vietnam has joined, with the constitution, laws and other state regulations not contradicting the higher ones (in the following strict order specified by Vietnam's Constitution and laws: international treaties, the constitution, laws,

decrees by government, circulars by relevant ministries). In other words, legality includes disobedience of state regulations which are in contradiction with the international treaties, constitution, laws, ...

- 2) Autonomy: all members of CSF have equal rights and obligations in the operation of CSF, no one can ask a member to do what that member does not want. Each member (or group of members) acts autonomously with its creativity, its initiative in its own way in order to achieve the objective of CSF but must accept the core values and principle of CSF and this does not exclude joint-activities.
- 3) Real name: all members of CSF use real names in CSF's activities; pen-name is acceptable if it can identify clearly that is the pen-name of the person. No pseudo-name or false name is accepted in conducting CSF's activities. Integrity is a paramount requirement.
- 4) Openness: CSF is open and acts publicly. Nothing needs to be hidden. This also applies to each member in doing CSF's activities.
- 5) Non-violence: CSF and its members strictly adhere to non-violence. Non-violence has two aspects. First, CSF and its members do not use any violent means to achieve its goal. Second, CSF and its members use all non-violent and legal measures in their activities and jointly with other people or organizations to convince those who advocate violence to abandon their violent policy in order to prevent violent activities of any one or any organization. Violence also means bad, hate speech, other forms of inciting violence, ... and must be avoided.
- 6) Tolerance: the principle to accept and respect different opinions, those of the minorities in particular, has to be observed strictly.
- 7) Truthfulness: All information needs to be crosschecked to ensure that it is as precise as possible. Distortion, falsification, counterfeit, lies are not acceptable.
- 8) Trust: To trust each other is an important principle. It does not encourage any procedure or measure causing doubtfulness. CSF does

not fear infiltration of any forces (including the communists and security forces)<sup>6</sup>. Membership is even welcome if they accept the objectives, values and principles of CSF as any other member.

- 9) Solidarity: the spirit of solidarity is maintained in action of groups as well as CSF as a whole; solidarity with other groups or organizations, especially when a member of those groups or anyone has been harassed or maltreated.

CSF, founded on September 23rd, 2013 by those intellectuals who signed Petition 72, is not a hierarchical organization. It is a flat network, a self-organizing network sharing common values, principles and goals. It encourages overlapping, i.e. one person can be a member of several groups. In other words, it tries to be an umbrella network of loosely connected networks. And the strategy for democratization in Vietnam mentioned above has been announced by CSF in the year 2013.

Needless to say, that in the above-mentioned goals, values, and principles you can find so many features of several civil society organizations of former communist countries in Central and Eastern Europe and elsewhere in the world, including those in our region (Hsiao (ed.), 2006).

We think that our current situation is quite similar to that of Taiwan in the first half of 1980s before its democratic transition. Then the ruling party of Taiwan, Kuomintang, was a Leninist party and its economy was a capitalist one. The VCP today is still a Leninist party and Vietnam's economy is a capitalist one. We have learned the experiences of former socialist countries in Eastern Europe as well as experiences from Taiwan, South Korea, the Philippines to formulate the strategy presented above.

To summarize, a viable strategy for democratization in Vietnam is to develop a strong, vibrant and inclusive civil society with the above-

mentioned 5 policies and 9 principles in order to create constant pressure on the authorities and force them to democratize (by negotiation or a rupture).

## Notes

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1. All quotes without reference are from Zhao (2009: 3-87).
2. Were the Party elders and specially Deng supportive for Zhao's political reforms a transition would start. This observation may indict that a failed

transition was indeed the case. And radicalization happened from both sides as shown in the brief discription.

3. Developed by Ronald Inglehart and Christian Welzel.
4. A thick, vibrant and inclusive civil society is important in a succesful democratization process and to avoid “troubled democratization” (see, for example, Donatella della Porta (2014: 237-267) and the warning of Renske Doorenspleet (2019: 70, 240) that “the process of democratization is dangerous” which may happen in case of an aggressive and exclusive civil society (or social movements).
5. As the government of Vietnam used to accuse the dissidents and those informal civil society organizations (CSOs) who advocate democracy and human rights. That accusation is meaningless, if you understand correctly the state as a notion composed of four elements (in an enhanced Weberian sense) and their relations: (1) a state territory, (2) a state population, (3) a state apparatus, and (4) the state ideas and projects. On the other hand, to fight against a government or its policies is a RIGHT, if we use the term government as a specific set of men and women who occupy positions in the state apparatus (particularly, of the elected and/or appointed high officials).
6. We have an open policy to win them over, to convert them (in fact, there were many reform-minded party members among our founders). We try to transform the well-known communist tactics of *min yun* (民運) into *dang yun* (黨運), ... to convert them. And the communist party has tried hard against that policy.

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*(With exceptions of Doorenspleet (2019) and Lim (2014), seven books mentioned above plus dozen of other works on democratization are available in Vietnamese as an effort to Broaden the People's Mind.)*

