

The Dynamics of Migration within China: A Study on Socio-Economic Aspects

Manganelly Sumesh*

Department of Politics, East China Normal University

Abstract

Based on socio-economic aspects, the article describes the overall trends and factors of migration in China. The Chinese society was divided into urban and rural areas since 1949 under a rigid *hukou* (household registration) system. The analysis is concerned with the historical and structural environment in which rural people move to the city and trying to become new urban citizens. This study has chosen 1995 as the starting year because it is from this year that large-scale migrations started towards Chinese cities. The urban reform led to a certain degree of marketization, which gave rise to peasant migration and this migration, in turn, pushed further the institutionalisation of the market. The Chinese economy was in transition from a socialist planned economy to the more market-driven economy during reform period. The article begins by defining migration and floating population in both general and Chinese perspectives. The second section discusses the trends and factors of migration. The third part deals with socio-economic aspects of migration. The fourth part talks about the impact of migrant labour.

Keywords: *China, economic reform, migration, household registration system, labour*

1. Introduction

An underdeveloped nation for three decades after its founding, the People's Republic of China (PRC) experimented with new economic policies and opening up of its borders for Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in the late 1970s. These reforms led to the creation of a new social order and ushered in some economic prosperity in the country. China has shown a tremendous and consistent economic growth during the past three decades with an average growth rate of 9.5 per annum (Li and Roulleau-Berger, 2013). China's open door policies and market reforms are the major steps taken by the Chinese leadership in 1978 to overcome its economic crisis. These reform policies were the starting point of Chinese industrial and economic developments. What are those factors that accelerated the Chinese economic growth? Are they only the state policies, the institutional mechanism, FDI and the role of science and technology? Yes, definitely these all contributed towards its economic prosperity, but the real role player behind its boom is the millions of its floating population (*liúdòng rén kǒu*, 流动人口)¹. Since the 1980s, China has transformed itself from a relatively segregated society to one where migrant work has become the way of life for rural families and where migrant workers are part of everyday urban life. They were the wandering beggars in the 1990s and now the new urban citizens of China. Almost all the large cities, small cities and towns are filled with this migrated population. An approximate number of migrants amounted to more than 275 million distributed in different cities (Becker, 2014) which are noted as the largest peaceful migration ever in human history. From the traditional agricultural sector, they started exploring other life

and employment opportunities in the cities. With the economic liberalisation policies, the invitation of FDI in Chinese land created a lot of employment opportunities for these poor and unskilled farmers. They began moving to cities by leaving their fields and searching for jobs. Migration is becoming an important topic in the scholarly approaches that study China. There are an enormous number of studies that have been done on internal migration in China. However, most of them are macro-level researches which are not addressing the basic issues of migrants and migration process.

In this article, the author argues that the relaxation in *hukou* (*húkǒu*, 户口)² system led to the massive population movement from rural to urban areas. Also, the author argues that the vast income gap between rural and urban people and economic reforms that created abundant employment opportunities in urban space invited the surplus agricultural labour into the cities. So certain questions need to be addressed at this juncture: What are the economic and social factors that led peasants to migrate to cities? What are the main determinants of floating population? How do the rural peasants find employment in cities?

1.1. Definition

Migrants are commonly categorised according to their registration status. The Chinese government officially uses the word “migrant labour” (*nóngmíngōng*, 农民工) only to refer to those who have crossed an administrative border with permission, transferring their *hukou* with them. These migrants may also be referred as legal, formal or official migrants (Davin, 1999). We can call these the state-led or -sponsored migration and migrants. In other words, *hukou* migration is only considered migration in China, and the remaining all is just floating population. Unofficial migrants are those who move to cities without permission and are referred to as the floating population

(*liúdòng rén kǒu*, 流动人口). This kind of migration is a relatively new phenomenon in China at least since 1949. The *liudongrenkou* is a unique terminology used in China that is tied to the *hukou* system. Individuals who are not living at their particular *hukou* location are considered “floaters”. This concept is based on the notion that the *hukou* location is where one belongs and that migration is not considered official and permanent until the migrant’s *hukou* location is also changed. The floating population is a stock measure. Regardless of when actual migration occurred, a person is counted as part of the floating population as long as his or her usual place of residence is different from the *hukou* location (Fan, 2002). Presently approximately 277.5 million such floaters are working in China’s cities; they contribute about 36 percent of the total workforce of around 770 million in China (according to a survey conducted by the National Bureau of Statistics on migrant workers in Chinese cities, 2015).

“Migrant workers” (*nóngmíngōng*, 农民工) can be defined in the Chinese context as referring primarily to individuals who are from rural areas, have a rural registration (*húkǒu*), and are working outside their village and town (Wu *et al.*, 2014). For better understanding, in this article, the author uses the terms “migrants”, “migrant workers”, “migrant population”, “floating population”, “floaters”, “transient population” and “sojourners” interchangeably. The research on migrants in China is increasingly getting attention into two groups of people, i.e. the new generation and old generation of migrants. However, the usage, criteria and definitions of the terms are not consistent. To add to the confusion, other terms such as “first generation” (*dìyìdài*) and “second generation” (*dì’èrdài*) are also used and sometimes interchangeably with, respectively, the terms “old generation” and “new generation” (Fan and Chen, 2014). However, here it is talking about migration in general.

1.2. “Floaters” in Cities

The phenomenon of migrant labour is hardly new in China. Lee (1995) has documented the pattern whereby particular localities cultivated specific occupational skills, ranging from academic and administrative talents, military specialists, traders, business people to carpenters, barbers and blacksmiths, for export to other localities in late Imperial China. During the pre-1949 era, with the opening of treaty ports along coastal provinces and the establishment of manufacturing enterprises, peasant workers migrated from the countryside into Tianjin and Shanghai. Like these previous sojourners, those who swarm train stations during the Lunar New Year month in the 1990s become migrant workers under specific political, economic contexts. Two developments in the political economy of south China have played prominent roles in shaping the politics of migrant labour: rural economic reforms in the mainland and economic restructuring in Hong Kong.

In 1996, China’s total labour force increased to 688.5 million, of which 340.8 million were non-agricultural, over the period 1952-96, 194.6 million workers had moved from agriculture to non-agriculture. Between 1978 and 1996, a total of 156 million agricultural workers were absorbed by various non-agricultural sectors, accounting for more than 80 percent of the cumulative off-farm migration of labour over the entire period since 1953. This population is equivalent to more than half of China’s total non-agricultural labour force at that period (Lloyd and Zhang (eds.), 2000: 212).

The story of rural reforms in China is by now well-known. Most relevant to the present discussion is the release of massive surplus labourers, many of whom became migrant labourers after the demolition of the commune system in the early 1980s. Numerous articles in the Chinese press asserted by the mid-1980s that some 30-40 percent of China’s rural labour force was redundant. It was widely estimated that

by 1993, there was between 150 million and 260 million surplus labour in rural China, and it was predicted that by the year 2000, the figure would reach 300 million. The gradual erosion of the Household Registration Regulations, which had for four decades restricted the movement of peasants into cities, also facilitated rural-urban migration. The year 1994 has seen further development in the loosening of the registration system. A proposal has been drafted by the Public Security Ministry allowing peasants to obtain residence registration in small towns and cities provided that they could find stable accommodation and employment (Lee, 1995).

In the age of globalisation with the compression of space and time, population mobility has increased substantially, and the patterns of migration have become more complex and diverse, facilitated by relaxed regulations on migration, close economic integration, and an expanded communication and transportation infrastructure. The assumption of the neoclassical economic theory of migration that migration is driven by wage differences has been challenged. Instead of unidirectional migration, return migration and circular migration have become common in both internal and external migration driven by economic, social, cultural, political, household, and personal factors (Shen, and Chiang, 2011).

Fan's article on this issue questions two conventional assumptions about migrants and families: migrants move in order to settle down, and the family lives together in the same place most of the time. Fan argues that settling down in the city is not inevitable. By circulating between the city and the home village, the migrants can obtain the best of both worlds. Migrants can earn urban wages but support the rest of the family at a lower cost (Fan, 2002).

Largely because of the existing *hukou* system and associated institutions and attitudes, new migrants in cities are easily marginalised.

The situation of these Chinese newcomers face is comparable to the experiences of ethnic minorities and immigrants in cities elsewhere (Solinger, 1999). Except those who are working in factories with housing provided, migrants have to find accommodation in the still rudimentary urban housing market. One of the results has been the establishment of “migrant villages” based on village houses or land rented at the urban fringes. These migrant enclaves are places where new migrants from the same native place, speaking the same dialect, congregate. This is a self-help mechanism, as well as a natural outcome of non-*hukou* migration, most of which is chained by social networks based on native place. Migrant villages are often without proper infrastructure services and may present a menace to public health. In the second half of the 1990s, as migrants become more established, many family members also arrived in the cities. Providing affordable schooling for migrants’ children has now become a major issue of concern among the migrant communities in Beijing and Shanghai (Chan, 2001: 144).

Another concern is that migrants have too many children. China’s draconian population planning policy tries to limit urban families to having only one child and rural couples two. Communes, urban work units and city neighbourhoods have been the most important instruments of policy enforcement. When communes vanish, rural governments are less capable of enforcing this structure, and migrants away from home escape this control. More significantly, 70 percent of city migrants are in the most fertile age group (sixteen to thirty-five). According to official estimates, most of the unplanned births in cities are attributed to temporary residents. Such hysterical labels as “above plan birth guerrillas” or “corps that break the birth control policy” underscore state worry over unbridled fertility as well as the state’s failure to manage the problem (Wong, 1994).

1.3. What Determines Migration within China?

A simple yet crucial step in emphasising the central position of the migration phenomenon is to recognise that any economic and social policy that affects rural and urban real incomes will directly and/or indirectly influence the migration process. This process, in turn, will itself tend to alter the pattern of social and geographic economic activity, income distribution and even population growth. Since all economic policies have direct and indirect effects on the level and growth of either urban or rural incomes or both, they all will have a tendency to influence the nature and magnitude of the migration system. Although some policies may have a more direct and immediate impact (e.g. wages and income policies, programmes of employment promotion, etc.), there are many others which, though less obvious, may in the long run be no less important. These policies would include, for example, alterations in the system of land tenure, commodity pricing, rural credit allocation, taxation, export promotion, import substitution, commercial and exchange rate policies, the geographical distribution of social services, the nature of public investment programmes, attitudes towards private foreign investors, the organization of population and family planning programmes, the structure, the content and orientation of the educational system, the structure and functioning of urban labour markets, and the nature of public policies, towards international technological transfer and the spatial allocation of new industries. There is a clear need to recognise this by integrating the two-way relationship between migration and population distribution, on the one hand, and economic and other variables, on the other, into a more comprehensive analytical framework designed to improve development policy (Todaro, 1976).

Over the past 50 years, China has achieved quite rapid economic growth. The structure of the economy also changed dramatically.

Regarding output composition, China can no longer be seen as an agrarian economy. Regarding the sectoral distribution of labour, however, China remains an agriculture-oriented economy: in 1996, over 50 percent of the labour force is engaged in agricultural production, though the sector produces only 6 percent of GDP (Lloyd and Zhang (eds.), 2000).

According to last population census in November 2010, the total population in Mainland China was 1.34 billion. There was a “temporary population” of 221 million people. They were not living in the town, township, or urban districts where their *hukou* (household registration) was located and had left the place of *hukou* for over half a year. Such rural migrants constitute the bulk of migrants in mainland China. Some of them have lived and worked in urban areas for a long time. However, many rural-urban migrants in mainland China circulate between the city and their home village, and they have not settled down permanently in the place of working and living. The *hukou* system has been considered the primary cause of such temporary population in previous studies. However, recent studies have pointed to other structural factors, household strategies, and migrants’ agency. Some recent studies have focused on the settlement intention of rural migrants (Shen and Chiang, 2011).

2. Internal Migration: Policies, Trends and Factors

Migration became a significant topic at the beginning of the 1990s after the Chinese paramount leader Deng Xiaoping’s Southern Talk in 1992 (Sen, 2011). Migration has been uncontrollable in that period. Therefore the state came up with specific policies to control it.

2.1. State Policies and Migration

The modern household registration system (*hukou*) was officially declared as a permanent program in 1958 in China to control and prohibit peoples' flow from one place to another, especially rural to urban migration. It was implemented since 1958 and this system used to ensure the socio-economic and political stability of the state. *Hukou* acts the state's institution to provide welfare scheme of the government. It primarily divided Chinese society into rural and urban by their class character (peasant or working class). During the first decade of the PRC, the population of the urban area was limited which was around 10 percent of total population (Zhan, 2011). The PRC wanted to maintain the urban population in a limited size and phase of urbanisation was low. The urbanites had many privileges to which their rural counterpart were not entitled. The state had created an invisible wall between rural and urban people and migration was only allowed in certain cases such as military recruitment, people displacement due to dam construction and natural disaster.

Since 1978, with the opening up and market reform policies, the invisible wall broke and the officials deliberately ignored some migration from rural to urban areas especially to work in newly created Special Economic Zones (SEZs). However, this migration was only possible when both the rural and urban local authorities pass their order. But the migration was in slow process with knowledge of the state. However, when the necessity of labour was becoming demanded by the infrastructural development in the cities, the local authorities had loosened their grip on people. This situation led to a large people flow from rural areas to cities especially to the southern provinces. So the central government decided to control the migration with various means according to the respective local government's capacity.

The first step for coping with the migrant population was to introduce a system of registration for temporary residents. In July 1985, the Ministry of Public Security announced a set of temporary regulations. People visiting cities and towns for three days or more are required to notify the local police. Outside visitors over age sixteen who intend to stay for more than three months have to obtain a temporary residence permit (*zànzhùzhèng*, 暂住证). On 6 September 1985, the Twelfth Meeting of the Standing Committee of the Sixth National People's Congress promulgated the People's Republic of China Residents' Identity Card Regulations (Fan, 2002). These require all citizens over sixteen to apply for a personal identity card and support the police to make identity checks. No doubt useful as a tool of law enforcement, the ID card is also a pass to mobility and business transaction. In place of a letter from one's work unit or village official, Chinese citizens can buy a rail ticket, check into a hotel, and apply for a job or a business licence upon presenting this document (Wong, 1994). In the late 1980s and early 1990s, many urban local governments began charging migrants high fees which were ranging from five thousand to tens of thousands of *yuan* in exchange for *hukou* in urban localities. Those governments justified this act because they should be compensated for extending urban privileges and rights to migrants. In the mid-1990s, big cities, such as Shenzhen and Shanghai, began to issue the "blue-stamp" *hukou* to rural migrants who met high skill requirements and were able to make decent investments (Wong, 1994). The blue stamp *hukou* could be converted into a permanent urban *hukou* after a specified period. In 1997, the State Council approved a scheme to grant urban *hukou* to migrant workers who held better jobs for two years and had resided in selected towns and small cities (Chen and Hoy, 2002). In this case, reform did not require qualified migrants to pay a hefty sum, unlike earlier practice. The State Council approved specific

policies to expand *hukou* reform in 2001 after testing the scheme in 450 towns and small cities. Then the core requirement for obtaining *hukou* in small towns and cities was a legal and permanent place of living and a decent and stable source of income (Cai and Wang, 2003). However, in the major cities, *hukou* still acts as a gatekeeper. There are no such *hukou* reform policies implemented in the major cities like Beijing, Guangzhou and Shanghai.

2.2. Trends

Internal migration in China follows some specific trend which shows an outflow of population from less developed Central and Western provinces to highly developed provinces and large cities in the Eastern parts.

The creation of the Special Economic Zones (SEZs) in the coastal cities in the 1990s needed a huge labour supply, in which the doors of some Eastern provinces open in a way for it. Since the 1990s, when income disparity began once more to widen in different regional levels and, at the same time, markets became much more important forces in the allocation of capital and labour, the booming coastal cities have attracted massive flows of labour. The coastal provinces have been leading in the development of markets and their economies due to benefiting from the early openness of their economies towards foreign direct investments (FDIs). This situation eliminated the institutional barricades which prevent factors of production from moving across regions, and it causes those regions to become major destinations of labour flows.

China witnessed a big population wave since 1995 into its cities. They started migrating from one province to another and within the provinces. Table 1 gives an illustration of the regional distribution of migration which shows the origin point and destination places of floating

Table 1 Regional Distribution of Migration (%), 1987-2000

Destination	Origin			
	East	Central	West	National
East				
1987	91.0	13.6	9.7	40.5
1990	87.0	18.6	18.1	43.2
1995	92.6	30.5	22.5	54.5
2000	95.4	32.0	22.5	54.5
Central				
1987	5.6	82.7	4.7	30.3
1990	8.4	75.8	7.5	29.2
1995	4.1	62.9	4.9	21.6
2000	2.5	65.1	2.6	22.7
West				
1987	3.4	3.7	85.6	29.2
1990	4.6	5.5	74.4	26.9
1995	3.3	6.6	74.4	26.9
2000	2.0	3.3	74.9	22.8

Source: National Bureau of Statistics, *China Labour and Social Security Yearbook* (various years).

population. The data examine a primary view that most of the population movement has occurred within regions, which means they move either within provinces or to nearby provinces in their particular region. Such movement seems like very high in Eastern region of China and their

percentage at the national level was also high when compared to other regions. During 1987 to 2000 only small percentage of people were willing to go to another province which proves that rural people do not want to go to long distant places for jobs; rather they would like to move to live in a nearby place so that they can easily have a connection with their respective villages.

Based on the 2000 census, there were around 124.6 million counted as internal migration in China in which 73.4 percent of whom were inter-provincial migrants. When we consider only inter-provincial migration, it is visible that the Eastern region is the prime destination chosen by migrants. The data in Table 2 show the spatial distribution of such migrations. In 2000, about 65 percent of migration (inter-provincial) in the Eastern region happened within this region. However, 84 percent of migration from the Central region and 68 percent from the Western region have moved to the east. The trend shows that the share of migration happened in inter-provincial level within the east increased by nearly 15 percent, and from Central and Western to Eastern regions increased by around 24 percent.

For the better understanding of the features of the origins and destinations of migrations, it is helpful to divide the flows of migration into four different categories: (a) urban to urban migration, (b) urban to rural migration, (c) rural to urban migration, and (d) rural to rural migration (Cai and Wang, 2003).

The rural to urban migration (40.7 percent of the total) and urban to urban migration (37.2 percent) are the two major forms of migration in China during the reform period. Other migration types like rural to rural migration shares 18.2 percent and urban to rural only 4 percent of total migration.

Table 2 Regional Distribution of Inter-provincial Migrants (%), 1987-2000

Destination	Origin			
	East	Central	West	National
East				
1987	49.7	61.7	44.2	52.0
1990	56.0	59.0	49.3	54.6
1995	63.5	71.8	56.5	63.1
2000	64.4	84.3	68.3	75.0
Central				
1987	31.3	21.8	21.2	24.6
1990	28.4	23.5	20.4	24.0
1995	20.5	12.7	13.4	18.8
2000	19.7	7.1	7.9	9.8
West				
1987	18.9	16.6	34.6	23.3
1990	15.6	17.5	30.3	21.4
1995	16.1	15.5	30.2	18.1
2000	15.9	8.6	23.9	15.3

Source: National Bureau of Statistics, *China Labour and Social Security Yearbook* (various years).

2.3. Factors

The phenomenon of migration always depended upon various social, economic, cultural and geographic reasons. As like any other country,

China also follows same reasons for its internal migration, but here in this case, the total structure of migration is very different due the strong presence of *hukou* policies.

2.3.1. Push and pull factors

Rural poverty was major push factor which led peasants to go away from their villages. The continued crop failures and bad weather conditions made peasants' life miserable which led to poverty in the rural areas. The rural migrants totally depended on their yield rather than any other income; as they worked in the collectives they only get grains and low income to survive. Unlike working class in the urban area, peasants were not protected under the state scheme. The Chinese agricultural sector was very labour-intensive in nature and they did not have many options for earnings. They had to work in rural collectives, but since reforms those collectives were dismantled in villages. Peasants' income fluctuated with the success of yield. The crop failures always brought them into great difficulty and they experienced widespread starvation. The establishment of Township and Village Enterprises (TVEs) gave peasants work in those firms. The abolition of the collective system created an enormous rural off-farm labour and surplus labour availability in the countryside. The relaxation of *hukou* policies allowed these labour forces to move into cities and search for jobs. So a massive number of off-farm peasants started going to urban areas for better earnings and job opportunities.

Social structure was another push factor for migration. The structure had created two sections of people in China which were a privileged working class in the urban area and ordinary peasants in the rural area. The urbanites were entitled many rights and social benefits such as lifelong employment opportunity, free rations, health insurance and so on, whereas villagers had not had such good facilities. So this structural


discrimination always brought inferior feelings in the peasants giving them urge to be an urbanite. They always carried a dream of going to the cities and staying there as an urbanite.

Natural calamities were a push factor for migration where peasants did not want to stay in their villages anymore. The natural calamities like flood, earthquakes made peasants' life problematic and they somehow wanted to leave their place and settle in the cities.

On the other hand, economic motives were the major pull factor for migration in China. The peasants were much aware that they can earn a better income and good life in the cities. The market reforms in urban centres and inflow of Foreign Direct Investment (FDIs) in China's coastal regions attract labour there. For the infrastructural developments and other low-skilled works, the state wanted more and more workers. Migrants get jobs very easily in the cities due to economic and infrastructural development process. Because of higher wages and better employment opportunities the villagers migrated largely to the cities.

2.3.2. Regional inequality

The unequal exchange between agriculture and industry has existed for a long time in China, and consequently, this has been an important factor for the rural-urban differences (Zhang, 2003). Despite a political responsibility to bring about greater equality, economic development till the 1970s has not succeeded in eliminating regional inequalities. Indeed, regional inequality still exists, but with the help of migration and remittance China's rural areas are also under the developmental phase. Peasants started moving to cities which shows a flow from the place with less development and fewer employment opportunities to the place with high development and large job opportunities. So people slowly moved into the highly developed coastal regions from the relatively less developed Central, Western and Northern parts of the country.

Figure 1 Rural-Urban Income Gaps, 2005- 2009

Source: National Bureau of Statistics, *China Labour and Social Security Yearbook* (various years).

Figure 1 presents the income gap between the rural and urban people. The data show the per capita income of rural and urban people from 2005 to 2009 to throw light on the income inequality in the geographic location-wise. The data reveal the huge income difference between rural and urban people. It is very clear that all these five years (2005-2009) the urbanites earn more than three times what rural people earn. This region-wise income inequality was another factor for migration in China because rural low-earning people also wanted to earn more income for their better life.

2.3.3. Rural surplus labour

In the countryside, different factors in social development, such as the decrease in cultivated land and rapid increase in the rural population, have impelled larger number of people to migrate from villages to cities. The most important factor was the large surplus labour force in the countryside caused by higher labour efficiency since the introduction of the production responsibility system in the late 1970s (Zhang, 2003). Table 3 shows the numbers of labour engaged in agricultural and non-agricultural sectors. It examines that the ratio of agricultural to non-agricultural is greater in Central and Western regions when compared to Eastern region. So there is surplus labour flow from these two regions to the Eastern region.

Table 3 Comparison between Agricultural and Non-agricultural Labour among Various Regions in China in 1996

	Agricultural labour		Non-agricultural labour	
	(million)	% of whole labour force	(million)	% of whole labour force
East	149.14	66.50	75.12	33.50
Central	155.25	79.88	39.10	29.12
West	120.02	84.38	22.23	15.62

Source: National Bureau of Statistics, *China Labour and Social Security Yearbook, 2000*.

The high urban economic growth and creation of many employments attract the rural population to come to urban areas and work there. To increase production with low wages, urban industries

hired more migrants than locals so that there is no need to pay extra for their pension, insurance and medical care. The number of employees in many urban firms are higher than the local urbanites only because of this reason (for example, the main cotton mills in Shanghai and urban construction industries). However, the number of surplus rural labour continued to exist and this labour keeps on moving into the urban labour market.

With the presence of such a surplus labour in the rural area which is always providing a supply of labour to the urban industrial growth, it is an advantage for a state like China to provide employment to surplus rural labour through migration and it helps to keep the momentum of economic and industrial growth of China.

3. Migrant Labour and Urban Society in the Era of Market Reforms

Another interesting area which has been explored by various scholars on China's society is about its social stratification and social mobility. Along with economic transition the Chinese society was also in transition process where the peasants are trying to compete and merge with urban society. The three things that have always been focal points of debate since the 1980s are politics, economy and society within China as well as abroad. There were only two distinguished classes in China since the formation of PRC till the end of the 1970s, i.e. working class and peasant class which were also based on *hukou*. Those who were staying in the villages and working in farmlands and carrying agricultural *hukou* belongs to peasant class (basically working in rural collectives) and those who stayed in urban centres and working in State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs) or other state-led functionaries and carrying urban *hukou* are known as working class (basically working in *danwei*). Ironically, the post-1978 regime under the leadership of Deng Xiaoping

began what now is known to be a remarkable reform policy that has de-collectivised and commoditised both rural and urban economies, eroding the institutional bases of the pre-reform status hierarchy. Since then, an open, evolving class system has been in the making (Davis, 1995).

Solinger (1999) claims that social structure is one of the major factors which lead to vast internal migration in China. There was an apparent structural discrimination in China which divides Chinese into two distinct groups according to people belonging to their place. The urban residents enjoyed many privileges (“iron rice bowl”³) from the state which was not given to the villagers and those staying in the periphery. They have had to feed the urban working class. The village people had to be fully dependent on agriculture and remain marginalised and live in poverty. Chinese society witnessed a drastic transition from its dual class system into the emergence of different classes from the very beginning of market reforms both in rural areas and urban centres. Peasant class has faced the major transformation here in the Chinese case; the majority of them wanted to leave the field and go to cities for the better other life opportunities. *Farewell to peasant China* (Guldin, 1997) gives a clear idea of peasants moving into the cities and transition of their peasant life into peasant labourers in various urban jobs after substantial field work.

3.1. “Making” of New Urban Classes

However, social transition and market reform implementations in urban centres occurred only after the rural reforms, apparently from the mid-1990s and these have been strictly guided and adjusted by the state. Then there was a move to decentralise state industry and the fiscal system, giving financial incentives to local governments, factory managers, and individual workers. However, the redistribution-oriented polity and macroeconomic structure were coupled with a paternal

factory culture, which presented resistance to reform directives. The emergence of labour and capital markets after 1992 finally put the urban economy under a market allocation of resources, although the new policy of “grasp the big, release the small” created a state monopoly sector containing strategically vital industries and firms and sent the rest of state firms to an “open” sector to compete with non-state entities. Massive layoffs and organised transfers of state-sector workers paralleled the flooding of migrant peasants who work in the informal, expanding labour market in the cities.

Bian (2002) in his article states that post-1978 market reforms eroded this status recognition and differentiated the working class into wage labour in the private sector (12 million as of 1998), unprotected labour in the state sector (70 million), layoff labour wandering in search for a job (30 million), and deprived migrant peasant-labour (60 million). One vivid description that appears in the local newspaper is the “3-no world” of private-sector wage labour: no definite working hours, no medical insurance, and no labour contract (“*wuriye, wuyiliao, wushouxu*”). While state properties are becoming productive assets for officials’ and managers’ private gains, the unprotected state labour has begun to feel that they are truly proletarians (*wuchanzhe*). A new urban poverty stratum is emerging from layoff labour and retired labour and labour opposition became a sensitive and serious issue in a changing structure of state and society. On the other side, communist cadres give up their political commitments in order to catch the growing opportunities due to market reforms. The first decade of market reform led to the phenomenon of “local state corporatism” in which local government played pivotal role of becoming the industrial firms and in that local officials either gain benefits “from within” or build “network capitalism” by taking advantage of being local leaders and their political and social capitals. During the second decade of reform, assets and

profits of state enterprises were massively diverted into the private hands of cadres through “informal privatisation”, organisational proliferation, consortium building and “one manager, two businesses”. The most recent move is a state-imposed property rights reform, letting administrative and managerial cadres be the shareholders of the transformed state enterprises (Bian, 2002: 96-97).

Another predominant and newly emerged class was private entrepreneurs like a bourgeois cadre class. Nationally, registered private entrepreneurs reached more than 2 million in 1997 and hired 12 million workers. However, intellectuals, professionals, cultural elite and technocrats have always had an ambiguous class status since the foundation of PRC. These classes have always been under surveillance during the Maoist era, but later they were cheerful when given a “working class” status in 1979 by Deng Xiaoping. Middle class is another group of people in present China: state factory workers, because of their lifelong employment and a high level of benefits, were seen to be Mao’s “quasi-middle class”, and this once politically and economically protected group has become differentiated in the reform era (Bian, 2002).


3.2. Demographic Distribution of Migrants

The Chinese state claims that those who migrate to urban centres from rural areas are not officially recognised as migrants and they are known as floating population. However, contrary is that peasant labour comes to cities and they stay there quite long time. The age groups which are travelling to cities are mainly youngsters. China has a huge number of youth population which always helps in the labour force and actively participates in its economic development. The present generation of migrants have very little knowledge about peasantry or they hardly knew anything about agricultural works. They do not want to do their

traditional agricultural works. They feel migrating to cities will give them better life status than staying in villages.

Figure 2 illustrates the age distribution of migrants in China during 2010 to 2015. The data show that age group lies between 21 and 30 decreases during last five years. At the same time, the age group lies between 31 and 40 maintains the uniform growth rate. On the other hand, the age group above 40 but below 50 steadily increases during these years which shows particularly migrants' long stay in the cities. The youth as well as middle-aged population almost reached the equal in numbers in the recent times. These data substantiate that China is having a large human resource in that major portion of the age group of 20-40.

Figure 2 Age Distribution of Migrants, 2010-2015



Source: China Labour Bulletin report, 2015.

3.3. Education Level of Migrants

Normally rural migrants are less educated when compared to their counterpart in the cities in the 1990s whom we could call the first-generation migrants. But almost all migrants attained primary education from their villages.

Table 4 Migrants by Educational Attainment (%)

Educational level	National population 1990 (Age 6+)	1990 Census		Rural migrant labour	
		<i>Hukou</i> migrants	Non- <i>hukou</i> migrants	Jinan Survey 1995	MOA National Survey 1993
College	1.6	22.2	2.2		
Technical middle	1.7	11.3	1.9	12.1	9.8
Senior middle	7.3	13.6	9.6		
Junior middle	26.5	26.3	43.2	71.0	54.1
Primary	42.3	20.5	30.8	16.0	31.6
No or little education	20.6	5.6	11.2	0.9	3.8

Note: MOA = Ministry of Agriculture.
 Source: Chan (2001: 134).

Table 4 shows the educational attainment of first generation of migrants in the 1990s. The 1990 census data reveal that around 74 percent of non-*hukou* migrants attained primary or junior middle class education rather than higher education. The percentage of junior middle class educational status of non-*hukou* migrants is higher than *hukou* migrants (non-*hukou* migrants: 43.3 percent, and *hukou* migrants: 26.3). At the same time, other survey reports like Jinan survey 1995 and MOA (Ministry of Agricultural) survey 1993 also support the 1990 census survey that majority of the rural migrants attained primary and middle class educational status. Less education and rural unemployment along with poverty are the major factors for mass migration in the beginning of 1990s. However, the new-generation migrants are attaining higher educational level than the old-generation migrants.

4. Migrant Labour and Economic Condition

The major factor that has led to massive internal migration in China is the economic motive of the migrants. Therefore one must study the economic condition of the migrants and their job opportunities in the Chinese cities for the better understanding of China's domestic population movement. The sojourners come to the cities with various aims which include better earnings, seeing the outside world, making a new living, learning new skills etc. However, not all rural migrants are able to fulfil their dreams after arriving in the city. Some of these people have to return to their villages when they become older or suffer injuries related to work. Some decide to settle down in the medium or small-sized cities, and others who are more successful settle down in larger cities permanently. Many scholars find that *hukou* is still limiting migrants' life chances in cities, but in reality, *hukou* is no longer a major factor in limiting their life chances. Zhan finds that the impact of *hukou*-

based legal exclusion has declined substantially due to market reforms and policy changes since the 1980s (Zhan, 2011). Indeed, migrants find different kinds of employment opportunities and try to fit with the urban culture.


4.1. Migrants Recruitment in State-owned Enterprises

Since the reforms in the late 1970s, rural people were moving into cities and some of them got a chance to work in the state-owned enterprises. During Mao's period, the state-owned units used to dominate the economy of China. In the 1990s, these units had undergone several rounds of reform. The extent of the state enterprises' employment of migrant workers varied by region and by industrial sector. There were a large number of migrants employed by the state industries in regions traditionally dominated by the state economy (Guang, 2005). In 1996 about 14 percent of the migrants from Sichuan and Anhui started working in the state sector. Regarding sector-wise concentration, more migrants were employed in state industries like textile, mining and construction than other industries (Solinger, 1999). A national survey conducted by China's official trade union, the All-China Federation of Trade Unions (ACFTU), in 1997 revealed that migrants comprised 8 to 14 percent of the workforce in textile, mining, construction and agricultural-related industries. But the relatively small proportion of all rural migrants ended up working in the state sector rather than in the informal or private economy.

Figure 3 presents the rural recruitment by state-owned enterprises during 1978 to 2000. It shows that immediately after reform the number of rural recruitment was high when compared to following years (see 1979 and 1980). But from 1981 to 1993, that means till urban reform begins, the rate of rural recruitment was less than before. However, with the beginning of urban reforms, the state-owned enterprises recruited

more migrants in these industrial sectors. But it also slowly went down and migrants had to rely more and more on informal and private industries. Presently the number of migrants working in the state-owned units is smaller in size than ever.

Figure 3 Rural Recruitment by the State-owned Units, 1978-2000




Source: Guang (2005).

4.2. Employment Opportunities for Migrants in Urban Area

As already mentioned, *hukou* policies never limited life chances of any migrant; instead the migrants have been a vital part of the urban labour market since market reforms began. Once they enter the labour market, they take on whatever jobs they get. They do not worry about the working conditions. Migrants are willing to do any work even the ones which are highly risky. In the beginning, we saw that generally migrants

used to go for 3D works (dirty, dangerous and difficult) and they were ready to work on very low wages. So the employers preferred migrants than the local people for their industrial works. Even today the situation is the same: the migrant workers continue to work in low-paid, labour-intensive, less prestigious and manual jobs. Fan argues that the old-generation migrants were engaged in a variety of works which were agriculture, retail, catering, construction, wholesale and manufacturing. But the new-generation migrants are mostly and heavily concentrated in the manufacturing sector (Fan and Chen, 2014). An interesting finding is that the present migrants are hardly aware of agricultural-related work and they do not want to engage in those works anymore (Wu *et al.* (eds.), 2014).

Figure 4 Job Opportunities for Migrants



Source: China Labour Bulletin report, 2014.

Figure 4 represents the different job opportunities for migrants in the Chinese cities according to China Labour Bulletin data in 2014. These data find that the vast numbers of migrants are working in their favourite field which is manufacturing sector (31 percent). The second largest area where the migrants are distributed is in construction (22 percent). With the growing infrastructures and real estate boom in China, migrants easily find jobs in this sector. While 12 percent of rural people work in sales, only 7 percent is involved in the transport and logistics sector; 6 percent of migrants work in hotel and catering services whereas 10 percent is involved in the household service. This figure substantiates the view that most of the present migrants like to work in manufacturing and construction fields rather than any other jobs.

In the next section, we discuss the income of migrants from these above-mentioned sectors and comparison of migrants' earning in the past and present as well as the income inequality between rural migrants and local urbanites.

4.3. Migrants and Income

Despite different jobs, the amount of time they spend in their work area is the same. Some reports find that they need to work 26 days in a month and minimum nine hours per day of work (*China Labour and Social Security Yearbook, 2010*). Based on the "Floating Population Monitoring Survey" conducted by National Population and Family Commission (NPFPC) in 2010, it is clear that the migrants work more than six days a week and more than 10 hours a day (Fan and Chen, 2014). The present-day migrants earn pretty good income and they send a decent amount to their family.

Figure 5 Average Monthly Income for Migrant Workers (*yuan*)



Source: China Labour Bulletin report, 2015.

Figure 5 presents the average monthly income of migrant workers in *yuan*. As already mentioned the favourite sector of migrants is manufacturing, but here data reveal that the average monthly income from manufacturing sector is comparatively lesser than construction and transport and logistics. The migrants earn only 2832 *yuan* from manufacturing sector, whereas migrants get 3292 *yuan* from construction field. The highest earning sector is transport and logistics and in this migrants make an average 3301 *yuan* in a month. Migrants work in other sectors like sales, hotel and catering and household services and here they make an average income of 2500 *yuan*. However,

despite more income motive many migrants like to prefer manufacturing sector than other high-earning construction and transport and logistics. It shows that migrants consider working in manufacturing (31 percent of total migrants like to work there as described in the previous section) as more prestigious than working in any other field.

Migrants' entry into the cities somehow helped to overcome the labour market shortage since the late 1970s. Their presence in the urban centres accelerated the total economic growth in China. Most importantly they created positive impact not only in the urban economy but also their remittance contributed towards the development of rural villages. So the next part will be discussing different impacts of migration in China and how it affects the rural and urban areas.

5. The Impact of Rural-to-Urban Migration

The rural-to-urban migration created a huge impact in China's labour market in the 1990s. After four decades of segregation, the rural and urban economies started to be linked by massive labour mobility. Millions of rural people, attracted by better urban incomes, moved to the cities. The economic implications of this continuing migration from the countryside to the cities are enormous.

5.1. The Uniqueness of Rural-Urban Migration

The phenomenon of migration is very new to China since its foundation in the late 1940s. The rural population were segregated from the main stream of China. The segregation only ended at the end of 1970s when China went for market reforms and opening up its economy. The *hukou* system is the one which kept the Chinese population into two distinct categories, i.e. rural and urban. This system has provided urban residents with generous subsidies and benefits that rural residents are not entitled

to. The agricultural population is ineligible for such subsidies and benefits and they cannot gain urban residency right by simply moving to the cities. They were not allowed to obtain permanent positions even if they are employed in the state-owned sector (Meng, 2004). The *hukou* was enforced strictly till mid-1980s. Since then, such enforcement has been gradually liberalised, but institutional barriers to people's migration still exist in some way.

In addition, floating population is not entitled to the any social benefits provided in urban areas. In the case of children's education, it is very a serious concern to migrants. Although free primary education is provided in China, migrants' children are not eligible to claim that in the cities. They have to pay high fee to send their children to school. So in most of the cases, those who migrate are usually young and those without children. All these factors show China's uniqueness in its internal migration and that the role of migrant's in economic growth in China is somewhat different from any other developing country.

5.2. Urban Unemployment

There has been always urbanities blaming migrants for the urban unemployment situation. But in reality many surveys indicate that migrants are mainly allocated in jobs that are relatively inferior in nature. For urbanites, these are less privileged works and migrants mostly do go for 3D jobs (dirty, dangerous and difficult). The different studies reveal that migrants work in construction and manufacturing or service sectors rather than white-collar jobs. A survey conducted by the institute of Population Studies at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences in 1996 suggests that around 42 percent of transients worked as construction workers, and 15 percent worked in the service sector (Meng, 2004). Another survey by the Rural Development Institute finds that about 33 percent of rural workers employed in construction sites and

around 31 percent in the service sector (*ibid.*). Still there is a large wage gap and income inequality existing in urban areas between urbanites and migrants. However, certain jobs were occupied by migrants in the cities which urbanites are also willing work in. But employers hire migrants instead of local people due to low salary for the migrant workers.

5.3. Impact on Urban Economy

Rural-urban migration has greater impact on urban economy especially in urban labour market. The massive presence of migrant labour in the cities brought a reduction in urban labour costs. The average income gap and income inequality were very high between rural and urban at the end of 1980s but with the help of migration, migrants' entry into urban labour market leads to reduction in the average income gap between those categories.

Presently an approximate number of 300 million migrants entered into the urban labour market which comprises more than 50 percent of total urban work force in China. The cheap labour as well as the remittance sent by the migrants to their villages creates huge impact in both rural and urban areas. So migration is a serious concern about China's economic development and people's prosperity.

6. Conclusion

The study of migration is very important to understand the rapid economic growth of China. Migration played a vital role in socio-economic prosperity of the people as well as the nation. China arose from an underdeveloped nation to world's second largest power now. Migration is a new phenomenon in the People's Republic of China since its foundation in the late 1940s. The *hukou* system acted as gatekeeper till the end of 1970s to prevent internal migration in China. Chinese

government introduced a number of policies to relax *hukou* and informally promote internal migration to satisfy the increasing labour force requirement in the newly opened SEZs and boost the urban economic reforms. China has witnessed massive population flow between the regions and within the regions, especially a huge flow from less developed regions like Central and Western to Eastern coastal regions. There are many factors influencing internal migration like regional inequality, surplus rural labour, abolition of rural collectives, etc. The economic reforms and opening up in the late 1970s led to changes in urban society and emergence of new classes. The present generation of migration brings both quantity and quality of people from rural areas due to better educational qualification of rural migrants than before. The income gap has been reduced to a certain level with the help of migration and migration has created huge impact in urban economy as well as in its social structure. The major issues with migrants in the cities is that already many big cities carry more people than its actual capacity which leads to increase in health and hygiene issues and increase in crime rates.

Notes

- * Manganelly Sumesh currently works as PhD Research scholar under the Department of Politics at the East China Normal University in Shanghai, China. He has completed his Master of Philosophy (MPhil) program at the Centre for East Asian Studies, School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University in New Delhi, India, in 2016. He has obtained his Master's Degree from the Department of Politics and International Studies, Pondicherry University in Puducherry, India, in 2014. He completed his Graduation in BSc Statistics from Kannur University in Kerala, India, in 2011. His research interest includes the migrant workers, society, political

system and international relations of China, Marxism and Ambedkar's writings. <Email: sumeshmn08@gmail.com>

1. *Liúdònggrénkǒu* (floating population) is the official term used by the Chinese government to refer to the population mobility and movement from rural areas to different urban centres in a transient manner. But the reality is that those migrants used to stay in cities for more years and travel from one city to another according to their idea of better earning and livelihood. These are people having agricultural *hukou*.
2. *Hukou* refers to the household registration system in China which was established in 1958. It determines one's belonging to the locality. Chinese population has been divided into two categories under the *hukou* dual classification which are agricultural and non-agricultural population staying in rural and urban areas respectively.
3. Urban people have many privileges in China such as guaranteed employment and many social and individual rights and benefits but peasants are not entitled to many privileges like their urban counterpart.

References (* indicates a primary source)

- Becker, J. (2014). *Social ties, resources, and migrant labor contention in contemporary China: From peasants to protesters*. London: Lexington Books.
- Bian, Y. (2002). Chinese social stratification and social mobility. *Annual Review of Sociology*, Vol. 28, pp. 91-116.
- Cai F. and Wang D. (2003). Migration as marketization: What can we learn from China's 2000 census data? *China Review*, Vol. 3, No. 2, pp. 73-93.
- Chan, K.W. (2001). Recent migration in China: Patterns, trends, and policies. *Asian Perspectives*, Vol. 25, No. 4, pp. 127-155.
- Chen, Y. and C. Hoy (2008). Rural migrants, urban migrants and local workers in Shanghai: Segmented or competitive labour markets? *Built*

- Environment*, Vol. 34, No. 4, pp. 499-516.
- China Labour Bulletin (2012). *A decade of change: The workers' movement in China 2000-2010*. Hong Kong, March.
- China Labour Bulletin (2008). *No way out: Worker activism in China's state-owned enterprise reforms*. Hong Kong, September.
- China Labour Bulletin (2014). *Searching for the union: The workers' movement in China 2011-13*. Hong Kong, February.
- China Labour Bulletin (2007). *Speaking out: The workers' movement in China 2005-2006*. Hong Kong, December.
- China Labour Bulletin (2003). *The Liaoyang workers' struggle: Portrait of a movement*. Hong Kong, July.
- China Labour Bulletin (2011). *Unity is strength: The workers' movement in China 2009-2011*. Hong Kong, October.
- China Labour Bulletin report. <http://www.clb.org.hk/en/sites/default/files/File/research_reports/Decade%20of%20the%20Workers%20Movement%20final.pdf>, accessed 01-07-2016.
- Davin, D. (1999). *Internal migration in contemporary China*. New York: St. Martin's Press.
- Davis, D.S. (1995). Inequality and stratification in the nineties. *China Review*, Vol. 19, pp. 1-25.
- Fan, C.C. (2000). Migration and gender in China (pp. 217-248). In: C.M. Lau and J. Shen (eds.), *China Review 2000*. Hong Kong: Chinese University Press.
- Fan, C.C. (2002). The elite, the natives, and the outsiders: Migration and labor market segmentation in urban China. *Annals of the Association of American Geographers*, Vol. 92, No. 1, pp. 103-124.
- Fan, C.C. and C. Chen (2014). The new-generation migrant workers in China. In: F. Wu, F. Zhang and C. Webster (eds.), *Rural migrants in urban China: Enclaves and transient urbanism*. New York and London: Routledge.

- Guang, L. (2005). The State connection in China's rural-urban migration. *International Migration Review*, Vol. 39, No. 2, pp. 354-380.
- Guldin, G.E. (ed.) (1997). *Farewell to peasant China: Rural urbanization and social change in the late twentieth century*. Oxon: Routledge.
- Lee, C.K. (1995), Production, politics and labour identities: Migrant workers in south China (pp. 15.1-15.28). In: Lo C.K., S. Pepper and T.K. Yuen (eds.), *China Review 1995*. Hong Kong: Chinese University Press.
- Li, P. and L. Roulleau-Berger (2013). *China's internal and international migration*. New York: Routledge.
- Lloyd, P.J. and X. Zhang (eds.) (2000). *China in the global economy*. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd.
- Meng, X. (2004). *Labour market reform in China*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Meng, X. (2012). Labor market outcomes and reforms in China. *The Journal of Economic Perspectives*, Vol. 26, No. 4, pp. 75-101.
- *National Bureau of Statistics of China (2005). *China Industrial Economic Statistical Yearbook, 2004*. Beijing: China Statistics Press.
- *National Bureau of Statistics of China (1996). *China Labour and Social Security Yearbook, 1995*. Beijing: China Statistics Press.
- *National Bureau of Statistics of China (1997). *China Labour and Social Security Yearbook, 1996*. Beijing: China Statistics Press.
- *National Bureau of Statistics of China (1998). *China Labour and Social Security Yearbook, 1997*. Beijing: China Statistics Press.
- *National Bureau of Statistics of China (1999). *China Labour and Social Security Yearbook, 1998*. Beijing: China Statistics Press.
- *National Bureau of Statistics of China (2000). *China Labour and Social Security Yearbook, 1999*. Beijing: China Statistics Press.
- *National Bureau of Statistics of China (2001). *China Labour and Social Security Yearbook, 2000*. Beijing: China Statistics Press.

- *National Bureau of Statistics of China (2002). *China Labour and Social Security Yearbook, 2001*. Beijing: China Statistics Press.
 - *National Bureau of Statistics of China (2003). *China Labour and Social Security Yearbook, 2002*. Beijing: China Statistics Press.
 - *National Bureau of Statistics of China (2005). *China Labour and Social Security Yearbook, 2004*. Beijing: China Statistics Press.
 - *National Bureau of Statistics of China (2006). *China Labour and Social Security Yearbook, 2005*. Beijing: China Statistics Press.
 - *National Bureau of Statistics of China (2007). *China Labour and Social Security Yearbook, 2006*. Beijing: China Statistics Press.
 - *National Bureau of Statistics of China (2008). *China Labour and Social Security Yearbook, 2007*. Beijing: China Statistics Press.
 - *National Bureau of Statistics of China (2009). *China Labour and Social Security Yearbook, 2008*. Beijing: China Statistics Press.
 - *National Bureau of Statistics of China (2010). *China Labour and Social Security Yearbook, 2009*. Beijing: China Statistics Press.
 - *National Bureau of Statistics of China (2010). *China Labour and Social Security Yearbook, 2009*. Beijing: China Statistics Press.
 - *National Bureau of Statistics of China (2011). *China Labour and Social Security Yearbook, 2010*. Beijing: China Statistics Press.
- Sen, N.C. (2011). *China's economic reform: Ideological legitimacy and Deng Xiaoping theory*. London: FrontPage Publications.
- Shen, J. and L.H.N. Chiang (2011). Chinese migrants and circular mobility: Introduction. *China Review*, Vol. 11, No. 2, pp. 1-10.
- Solinger, D.J. (1999). *Contesting citizenship in urban China: Peasant migrants, the State, and the logic of the market*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Todaro, P.M. (1976). *Internal migration in developing countries: A review of theory, evidence, methodology and research priorities*. Geneva: International Labor Office.

- Wong, L. (1994). China's urban migrants – the public policy challenge. *Pacific Affairs*, Vol. 67, No. 3, pp. 335-355.
- Wu, F., C. Webster, S. He and Y. Liu (eds.) (2014). *Urban poverty in China*. Northampton, Massachusetts: Edward Elgar Publishing, Inc.
- Zhan, S. (2011). What determines migrant workers' life chances in contemporary China? Hukou, social exclusion, and the market. *Modern China*, Vol. 37, No. 3, pp. 243-285.
- Zhang, M. (2003). *China's poor regions: Rural-urban migration, poverty, economic reform and urbanisation*. London: Routledge.

Beyond the Sea

