POSTSCRIPT

A Belt, a Road, a Trade War, and a Pandemic:
Exploring Global Relations and Governance

At the time of the preparation of this April 2020 issue (Volume 6, Number 1) of *Contemporary Chinese Political Economy and Strategic Relations: An International Journal*, the world is deep in the grip of a horrific novel coronavirus (nCoV) pneumonia pandemic which the World Health Organization has officially named “COVID-19” that in a global massacre has taken away more than 370 thousand innocent lives around the world by the end of May 2020 and permanently damaged the health of millions more among the rest of the more than 6 million people infected by the virus by then, with no sign of slowing down in infection rates and fatalities. After the initial large-scale macabre outbreak in the city of Wuhan in the Hebei province of the People’s Republic of China in late 2019, the deadly disease soon spread throughout the world to all continents due to the exponentially increased international human mobility greatly aided by the convenience of modern means of transport unseen during the time of the last China-originated related deadly disease, the severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) of 2002-2004 (the 2019’s Wuhan new virus strain has been officially named the “severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2” (SARS-CoV-2)).
More significantly for China-watchers in the academic domain of domestic and international political economy, besides being a global public health crisis, the speedy and deadly spread of the pandemic has quickly taken on a political dimension, as attention is increasingly being directed towards China’s political governance model as a factor in the global spread of the deadly vector, and how the pandemic and its mounting death toll across countries are affecting China’s international image and influence that it has been ambitiously building not least through President Xi Jinping’s signature “One Belt, One Road”, later renamed “Belt and Road Initiative”.

While the Communist Party of China’s non-electoral one-party political monopoly regime has spared no effort, after the country has more or less pulled through the first wave of the virus attack though with official confirmed number of cases and death toll (at just around 83,000 and 4,600 respectively) widely questioned by international observers given the lack of free press and the environment of tight censorship in the country, to turn the global pandemic situation into a soft-power advantage for itself by promoting its governance model’s perceived superiority to deal with the epidemic vis-à-vis the clumsy performances of some of the major Western liberal democracies as well as embarking on a “mask-diplomacy” to recast itself as a saviour of the a pandemic-ravaged world, much of these efforts has since apparently backfired. This backlash is partly aided by the weirdly undiplomatic arrogant “wolf warrior” approach of part of its diplomatic corps that has added to the already simmering resentment among many countries’ population who have experienced indescribable family tragedies and suddenly been put under round-the-clock house arrests that before this seem only to be the fate of dissidents in a distant land – sadly to put it, essentially an exponential explosion of Liu Xiaobos and Liu Xias.
China has again risen to be in the world’s limelight, this time probably for an unsavoury reason, and attention has been concentrated much on, besides the role played by its centralised and repressive Leninist-corporatist governance model in, if not the creation of a pandemic, the inadvertent contribution to turning a local epidemic into a global pandemic, and China’s foreign policy manoeuvres including aggressive propaganda campaigns in a “virus source” blame game (that has at different times targeted at the United States, Italy and France) for culpability deflection. This is reflected in an unusually combative, querulous effort to reshape the virus narrative to elude blame by conflating the disease’s initial large-scale outbreak source – from which the virus was carried by multitude of people infected in this initial large-scale outbreak as tourists and other types of travellers around a globalised world to infect others who then carried the disease further around the world – and the ultimate genomic origin of the virus with a result that terms and expressions like “Wuhan pneumonia”, “Wuhan virus” and “China the origin of the novel coronavirus pneumonia outbreak” that have not been disputed originally even within China itself have become taboos and points of furious contention for the CCP\(^1\) State narrative since late February this year.\(^2\)

Such an effort is aided by the continuing hijacking of the racism narrative levelled against anyone who points a finger at the Communist Party of China regime with the usual, strategically effective conflation of ruling party, government, state, nation and ethnicity, which is compounded by a major part of the Chinese Overseas who become instrumental in propagandizing this warped narrative under an emotional extortion that has conflated their individual ethnic identity within a current homeland and a deceptive blood-tie loyalty towards an ancestral
homeland accentuated by CCP’s exhortation that “Overseas Chinese are a major force to tell the China story well” in promoting President Xi’s China Dream of a glorious motherland that they should take pride in, and while not being PRC’s “fifth column”, an “Overseas Chinese is a daughter married out from China” (an expression attributed to former premier Zhou Enlai) who is morally expected to support and promote the good name of her parental family and to bring good things back to her parental abode.\(^3\) Falling victim to such a “transborder Chinese nation” emotional extortion, a major part of the Chinese Overseas have invariably responded in a way akin to what citizenship education scholar Professor Joel Westheimer refers to as the social psychology of authoritarian patriotism (as opposed to democratic patriotism) which depends on a deliberate and complicit populace full of fiercely nationalistic and jingoistic sentiments\(^4\).

At the same time, against foreign countries’ accusation and drives to pinpoint the CCP regime’s repressive mode of governance for culpability in tuning a local epidemic into a global mass-killer pandemic and of the regime’s perceived pulling the WHO into complicity of playing down the disease’s potential explosive global danger, the regime’s response has been rancorous, pulling no punches in flexing the country’s economic muscle and exploiting its market power in punishing the regime’s ardent critics. An apparent example probably to serve as a warning to others is the regime’s escalating its economic coercion against Australia by imposing two tariffs (a 73.6 percent tariff and then an additional 6.9 percent) on the import of Australian barley in tandem with a beef import ban on four Australian slaughterhouses, after Canberra called for an independent investigation into the origins and early handling of the Covid-19 outbreak.\(^5\)
Table 1 The Politics of Patriotism (Joel Westheimer, 2006)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Authoritarian Patriotism</th>
<th>Democratic Patriotism</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ideology</strong></td>
<td>Belief that one’s country is inherently superior to others.</td>
<td>Belief that a nation’s ideals are worthy of admiration and respect.</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td>Primary allegiance to land, birthright, legal citizenship, and government’s cause.</td>
<td>Primary allegiance to set of principles that underlie democracy.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Nonquestioning loyalty.</td>
<td>Questioning, critical, deliberative.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Follow leaders reflexively, support them unconditionally.</td>
<td>Care for the people of society based on particular principles (e.g., liberty, justice).</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Blind to shortcomings and social discord within nation.</td>
<td>Outspoken in condemnation of shortcomings, especially within nation.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Conformist; dissent seen as dangerous and destabilising.</td>
<td>Respectful, even encouraging, of dissent.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Slogans</strong></td>
<td>My country, right or wrong.</td>
<td>Dissent is patriotic.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>America: love it or leave it.</td>
<td>You have the right to NOT remain silent.</td>
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<td><strong>Historical Example</strong></td>
<td>McCarthy Era House Un-American Activities Committee (HUAC) proceedings, which reinforced the idea that dissenting views are anti-American and unpatriotic.</td>
<td>The fiercely patriotic testimony of Paul Robeson, Pete Seeger, and others before HUAC, admonishing the committee for straying from American principles of democracy and justice.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Contemporary Example</strong></td>
<td>Equating opposition to the war in Iraq with “hatred” of America or support for terrorism.</td>
<td>Reinforcing American principles of equality, justice, tolerance, and civil liberties, especially during national times of crisis.</td>
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Imperative are the implications of such CCP politically charged campaigns for Chinese domestic audience and its foreign relations, the short-term and long-term impact on China’s international relations, especially on Sino-US relations having already been troubled by the ongoing trade war and the issue of Huawei and 5G, and the possible effect on Xi Jinping’s signature Belt and Road Initiative and debt diplomacy.

All these are important questions to pose and targets of research in China studies during this unusual time, for the global humanity indeed a time of living (mortally) dangerously. While the present issue of this journal is not to address these issues directly, the papers herein do provide important background context to understand them.

The first paper in the beginning section China and Taiwan in the Global Arena, “Chinese Direct Investments in the EU and the Changing Political and Legal Frameworks” by István Csaba Moldicz provides us a context of Euro-China relations in terms of China’s direct investments in the member countries of the European Union. The paper’s focus on the geopolitical aspect and its analysis of how the EU’s transatlantic alliance with the United States could be affected by changes in US foreign policy will serve to provide the readers a good background understanding to aid comprehension of the European countries’ foreign relations with China under the unavoidable twin shadows of the ongoing US-China trade war and the deterioration in US-China relations over the deadly impact of the current nCoV pneumonia’s global spread after the initial Wuhan outbreak on the American population.

The issue of Taiwan, an imperative topic in China studies, forms the subject of investigation in the second paper of the above section, “India-Taiwan Economic Relations: Charting a New Path” by Sriparna Pathak and Obja Borah Hazarika, and the first paper in the second section From Global Governance to Domestic Challenges, “Bringing
Ethics of Global Governance Back In: A Case Study of the Republic of China (Taiwan)” by Kwei-Bo Huang.

The global pandemic situation today has indeed brought Taiwan – officially the Republic of China, the East Asian island state that is the 7th largest economy in Asia and 22nd largest in the world measured by purchasing power parity (PPP), an advanced economy by International Monetary Fund (IMF)’s categorisation and one of the 1960s-90s’ Four Asian Tigers (the others being South Korea, Hong Kong and Singapore) that have graduated into high-income economies (by World Bank’s categorisation) – into the international limelight. The World Health Organization (WHO) has been bearing the brunt of the opprobrium from the Western liberal democracies (US, Western Europe, Australia in particular) for insisting on excluding Taiwan not only from the organisation (of which the Republic of China now on Taiwan was a founding member when the global health body was created in 1948) but even from its former observer position at the World Health Assembly (WHA) – a status she held from 2009 to 2016 (under the name “Chinese Taipei” as allowed by Beijing) till rescinded by WHO under pressure from China as punishment of the Taiwanese people for electing candidate Tsai Ing-wen from the independence-minded Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) as president of the island state in 2016.

Accusation about WHO’s perceived submissiveness towards China that led to its downplaying the seriousness of the Wuhan epidemic and repeated delay in giving adequate warning to the rest of the world centres mainly around its uncritical acceptance of information and data provided by China, a country under the rule of a one-party dictatorship whose penchant for secrecy, suppression of information, fake data, censorship, muzzling of civil societal free speech, and proscription of free press and of investigative journalism has long become a cause célèbre for people who are concerned with the rise of new
totalitarianism, unfettered raw power of the State aided by modern technology and the emergence of a digital dictatorship unseen before in the history of human civilisation. For this behaviour, some observers have started to question cynically whether WHO should now be more properly renamed CHO with the “C” standing for China.

Adding to such damning indictment of WHO’s perceived pro-Beijing stance are its ignoring the highlighting of the possibility of SARS-like human-to-human infectiousness of the Wuhan pneumonia in an early e-mail of inquiry Taiwan sent it at the end of December 2019, and its repeated cold-shouldering Taiwan’s request to at least be allowed to join the May 2020 WHA. This request has been very much strengthened by the island state’s extraordinary success in preventing the spread of Wuhan’s nCoV pneumonia from China into the country which is separated from mainland China by only a narrow Taiwan Strait (with a width of just 180 kilometers (110 miles), narrowest part being only 130 km (81 mi)) – thus providing a good model to emulate for many other liberal democracies that are struggling to balance the need for temporarily constraining certain individual civil liberties and avoiding permanent damage to the system’s core values concerning safeguarding civil liberties and political freedom – and as the world’s second largest face mask producer, in supplying good-quality face masks to a world stricken by the novel coronavirus pneumonia.

As Taiwan has emphatically pronounced, how can a world body under the pressure from Beijing forces a sovereign state that has its own democratically elected government, one of the world’s most vibrant human-rights respecting multi-party liberal democracy that is the product of the region’s exemplar of best-case democratisation, the first stable electoral liberal democracy par excellence fully respecting the people’s civil liberties and political freedom in five thousand years of Chinese history and thus a beacon and model to emulate for mainland
citizens’ aspiration for a future of democratic freedom, to give up her authority and sovereignty, and submit to and be represented by the present repressive one-party dictatorship across the Strait? For a world body to go on doing that is not only unrealistic, but also unethical – as regarding the ethical dimension of global governance that Huang’s article focuses on, for “a very important economy with twenty-three million population and advanced development”, yet having “been excluded from the mainstream international community since late 1971”.

For the Taiwanese state, with the world being expected to remain for some time under menace from the pandemic, what would be the prospect for its survival and resiliency? Talks for economic decoupling from China and moving supply chain out of China have been rife among the world’s developed nations from US to Australia, with the pandemic disaster suddenly revealing the danger of over-dependence on China for its market and labour, and for cost-effectiveness. A question will arise for Taiwan in this context, given her close economic relations with China, her mounting investments in China, and the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA), regarding the future prospects of the New Southbound Policy (NSP), including the complementarities between India’s Act East policy and Taiwan’s NSP that as Pathak and Hazari point out in their paper that can make India one of the important alternative targets for her outbound direct investments as economic growth continues to slow down in the PRC. This scenario has become even more urgent and serious with the severely damaging effect of the drastic lockdown of cities and months-long halting of economic activities to break the circuit of infection (or flatten the curve) that leads to firms going insolvent and mounting unemployment. Economic growth will definitely suffer, and exports will shrink as foreign demand drops with this Wuhan’s epidemic becoming not only a country-wide disease but a global pandemic with horrifying,
huge loss of lives, first in Italy, Spain and France and then further across the world. Will that lead to social instability and upheaval in the PRC? No one will expect that to happen immediately given the CCP State’s strong grip over society, but in the medium to long term that cannot be completely ruled out, as ongoing social grievances such as those described and analysed in the second article in the second section of this journal issue, “Migrant Labour in China: A Case Study of Labour Discontent, Unrest and Protests” by Manganelly Sumesh, may multiply and grow more acute.

One casualty could be President Xi Jinping’s signature project, the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Already calls for rescheduling debt repayment and outright debt relief are resonating among poor countries that are heavily indebted to China due to ambitious infrastructure projects under the BRI as projects have slowed to a crawl or are almost completely halted under the shadow of the pandemic that is adding to the woes of a world economy already suffering from the US-China trade war. The next section of this journal issue, Southeast Asia in Time of Trade War and BRI, provides a valuable context to understand what is set to emerge on the horizon with its three papers on the particular regional case of Southeast Asia: “A Vietnamese Perspective on China’s Belt and Road Initiative in Vietnam” by Duong Van Huy, “The Implication of Trade War on Contested Leadership between United States and China in Southeast Asia” by Affâbile Rifawan, Arief Bustaman, Kodrat Wibowo, Maman Setiawan, Bagja Muljarijadi and Ferry Hadiyanto, and “High-Level Visits and the Belt and Road Initiative: The Case of Southeast Asia” by Wooi Yee Tan and Chong Foh Chin.

As shown in these articles, there remain so many pitfalls along this so-called 21st Century Maritime Silk Road, having been referred to by some observers as a return to tributary system established by imperial
China in the seventeenth to eighteenth centuries, though now with a different format. As Duong Van Huy points out in his paper, while Vietnam has so far responded positively to BRI, there are at least ten pitfalls which he has listed that raise worries amidst this improvement in bilateral relations, not least of which being security concerns that in the main are related to the territorial sovereignty disputes between the two countries in the South China Sea. These include the May 26, 2014’s ramming and sinking of a small wooden Vietnamese fishing boat by a large ship of China’s that chased it near an oil rig in contested waters in the South China Sea, which Hanoi decried as an “inhuman act” by China – the worst since the two countries’ stand-off began in early May that year that Vietnam claims has seen Chinese vessels guarding the oil rig injuring 12 people including the 10 on the sunken boat, and damaging 24 Vietnamese law enforcement vessels. There have been so many untoward incidents in that disputed maritime region all these years, and suspected of taking advantage of a strategic vacuum created by the current pandemic crisis, China has been seen to be engaging in a new series of stand-offs with rival claimants in the recent months including one involving the ramming and sinking of a Vietnamese fishing boat, with eight fishermen on board, by a Chinese maritime surveillance/coastguard vessel in the disputed waters in the South China Sea.

While open conflicts over the South China Sea like those between Vietnam and China and between the Philippines and China in recent years have not occurred between China and Malaysia which is located around the southernmost part of China’s U-shaped nine-dash lines, in May 2009 China did protest against submissions by Malaysia and Vietnam to the United Nations Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf when it officially submitted a map of its own claims depicting the nine-dash lines in a U-shape covering an estimated 80 per
cent or more of the maritime area of the South China Sea. However, this U-shaped baseline basically put ASEAN-5 and their oil exploration facilities in areas claimed by China. It is clear from China’s map that these dash marks, covering nearly all of the South China Sea, cut deep into the exclusive economic zones (EEZs) declared by especially the two ASEAN claimant states of Vietnam and the Philippines. These EEZs were created by drawing straight baselines around their coasts that extend 200 nautical miles (nmi) seaward, in accord with the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) – an EEZ being a sea zone over which a state has special rights regarding the exploration and use of marine resources, including energy production from water and wind, as prescribed by UNCLOS.

In the case of Malaysia, while the ASEAN country that China has viewed as an indispensable important hub in the BRI’s Southeast Asian outreach has so far avoided adopting a confrontational stance or statements with regard to its South China Sea dispute with China in order not to jeopardise the tremendous benefits she receives from her economic and investment ties with China, incidents in recent years in the region inevitably make such restraint less tenable. For instance, James Shoal, whose surrounding waters China considers its southernmost territory, the bottom of that looping so-called nine-dash line on maps that comprises an estimated 80 per cent or more of the South China Sea’s 3.5 million km2 (1.35 million sq mile) waters, falls approximately 80 km from Malaysia’s state of Sarawak on the island of Borneo. On 26th January 2014, a PLAN (People’s Liberation Army Navy) flotilla comprising an amphibious landing craft and two destroyers patrolled the shoal while soldiers on board conducted an oath-taking ceremony vowing to safeguard China’s sovereignty and maritime interests. Chinese foreign ministry spokesman Qin Gang emphasised at a regular press conference the following day China’s “indisputable sovereignty”
over James Shoal and said that Malaysia had not lodged an official protest over the 26th January patrol. While this was the second time in two years that PLAN warships visited James Shoal to assert Chinese sovereignty claims, according to the Malaysian government at that time, there have been seven instances of Chinese military incursion into Malaysian South China Sea territory involving a total of 16 Chinese warships.  

In fact, since 2011 such incursions by Chinese warships into Malaysian maritime territory have occurred almost every year, mainly around the shoals of BPA, BRJ and Bating Serupai which are all within the Malaysian EEZ. While Chinese foreign ministry spokesman Qin Gang said that China “is willing to use negotiations to resolve the dispute and is committed to protecting regional peace and stability” and Malaysia has expressed a similar approach but with an emphasis on basing any solution to the conflict on UNCLOS, such increasing Chinese aggressive assertiveness in the South China Sea definitely has the potential to shift the state of play in the maritime territorial dispute by antagonizing this largely friendly neighbour who is also an influential member of ASEAN. There is another high-profile standoff in early 2020 when the West Capella, a Panamanian-flagged drillship hired by Malaysia’s state-owned Petronas, was tailed by China’s government-owned research vessel Haiyang Dizhi 8 and armed Chinese coast guard and China Maritime Militia vessels for several weeks, just a few months after Malaysia submitted to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf on 12th December 2019 information on the limits of its continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles from the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured in the South China Sea, to be considered in the provisional agenda of the fifty-third session of the Commission to be held in New York from 6th July to 21st August 2021. This same Chinese vessel was also at the centre of a months-
long maritime standoff with Vietnam in 2019 over an offshore-drilling project that Hanoi had authorised.\textsuperscript{16}

After having been patrolled around by Chinese coast-guard vessels maintaining an intimidating presence, tensions intensified further in mid-April when the Malaysia-authorised \textit{West Capella} saw the Chinese oil-and-gas survey ship \textit{Haiyang Dizhi 8}, which was escorted by Chinese coast-guard ships and fishing-militia ships, arriving close to where it was operating, at one point as close as 8.5 nautical miles from the \textit{West Capella}, and in a show of support for Malaysia the U.S. sent three naval ships on patrols near the said oil-and-gas operations off Malaysia’s coast (\textit{ibid.}). Finally China backed down and the \textit{Haiyang Dizhi 8}, after a whole month of tensions, left Malaysia’s exclusive economic zone on 15th May en route to China, flanked by at least two other Chinese ships, according to data from Marine Traffic cited by Reuters.\textsuperscript{17}

Such flurry of aggressive intimidating manoeuvres by China’s vessels in the South China Sea has prompted China-watchers to suggest that China has indeed been tempted to take advantage of this global pandemic disaster that the country has exported, inadvertently as it may be, which has shaken the world powers, to be a good opportunity to exert its international law-defying territorial claims when others are too occupied with the mass-killing disease to put up a prompt effective response to China’s actions.\textsuperscript{18} Such suspicion is strengthened further by the repeated flyover incursions by China’s warplanes into Taiwan’s airspace provocatively crossing the middle dividing line between the mainland and Taiwan in mid-February and again in mid-March 2020\textsuperscript{19} and the half a dozen sorties by China’s military aircraft operating near Taiwan’s airspace since the beginning of 2020\textsuperscript{20}, as well as the shocking mass arrests of Hong Kong’s prominent pro-democracy activists in mid-April 2020\textsuperscript{21} and China’s rubber-stamp parliament, the National People’s Congress (NPC)’s passing in May a national security and anti-
sedition law on the city’s behalf bypassing Hong Kong’s legislature and overriding the territory’s constitution, all during this time when the world including the Asia-Pacific region is deeply engaged in a life-and-death battle to combat the novel coronavirus pneumonia COVID-19, which has spread ferociously throughout the world since its original outbreak in Wuhan, China. The articles in the section Southeast Asia in Time of Trade War and BRI thus provide a good understanding of the background context in which current events might evolve.

To extend the discussion covered by the above section but more focussed on economics and finance are three articles in the final section of this journal issue, NSP and BRI: Prospects and Challenges. While Pei Yi Wong and Tuck Cheong Tang in their paper “Should I Stay or Should I Go? – Taiwan’s Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) Inflows and Outflows” focuses on the relationship between Taiwan’s approved foreign investment (inflows) and approved outward investment, covering the Go South policies since being initiated by the Lee Teng-hui administration to the New Southbound Policy under the Tsai Ing-wen presidency, Chang Le and Cheong Kee Cheok’s paper, “Chinese Outward Foreign Direct Investment in Belt and Road Countries: Trends, Characteristics and Policies”, analyses the characteristics and trends of Chinese investment in Belt and Road Initiative-participating countries from the geographical and industrial perspectives by using both micro- and macro-level data. Further extending the discussion into China’s foreign trade relations is a paper “China’s Service Export Challenges and Future Potential: Benchmarking the USA” by Hang-Hang Dong, Chen-Chen Yong and Sook-Lu Yong that analyses the competitiveness of China’s exports by computing the revealed comparative advantage (RCA) indices of its service exports and comparing them with those of the United States, one of the country’s top competitors.
While the present journal issue has begun with an article on Chinese direct investments in the European Union, it also ends with a review of a report edited and published by the Netherlands Institute of International Relations ‘Clingendael’ (Clingendael Institute), *Europe and China’s New Silk Roads* (2016).

Before ending this postscript, we would like to thank all the contributing authors of the articles in the various sections of this issue, and the anonymous reviewers of these articles, for their invaluable efforts in making the publication of this Volume 6, Issue 1 (April/May 2020) of *Contemporary Chinese Political Economy and Strategic Relations: An International Journal* possible. We are also grateful to Miss Wu Chien-yi (吴千宜) for the journal’s website construction and maintenance. The responsibility for any errors and inadequacies that remain is of course fully mine.

*Dr Emile Kok-Kheng Yeoh*

*Chief Editor*

*Contemporary Chinese Political Economy and Strategic Relations: An International Journal*

Notes

1. “Chinese Communist Party”, or officially the “Communist Party of China” (CPC, 中国共产党).
3. “华侨是讲好中国故事的重要力量”；“周恩来总理曾经有一个比喻，华侨是我们嫁出去的女儿。这个比喻，实际包括两层意思；

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一是，是人家的人了；二是，还是我的亲人。女儿回娘家，左手一只鸡，右手一只鸭，这是正常的。” (See the 2016 speech of Qiao Wei, vice-chairman of China’s Overseas Chinese Federation: 〈连接中国梦和世界梦的“侨务新主张”〉[“new suggestion in Overseas Chinese work” linking the China Dream and the world dream], 《新民周刊》 (Xinmin weekly), 2017 年 4 期，18th March 2017 <http://m.fx361.com/news/2017/0318/1186377.html>. The article mentions that upon hearing Qiao Wei describe how the PRC motherland takes to heart Overseas Chinese’s welfare, a Southeast Asian Chinese was so overwhelmed by emotion that he almost broke down in tears.


6. Joel Westheimer (2006), “Politics and patriotism in education”, Phi Delta Kappan magazine, April 2006, Arlington, VA: Phi Delta Kappa International, pp. 608-620 (see p. 610). That “dissent is patriotic” as a principle of democratic patriotism in Westheimer’s formulation, as opposed to authoritarian patriotism’s demanding allegiance to the government’s cause and therefore opposing dissent, harkens back to the quotation “dissent is the highest form of patriotism”. This is often attributed to Thomas Jefferson, though no evidence has been found
according to Anna Berkes in her *Thomas Jefferson Encyclopedia* entry of “Dissent is the highest form of patriotism (Quotation)” that found the earliest usage of the phrase, which was used repeatedly during the Vietnam-War era, in a 1961 publication, *The use of force in international affairs* (Working Party on the Use of Force in International Affairs (1961), *The use of force in international affairs*, Philadelphia, Pa.: Friends Peace Committee, p. 6.): “If what your country is doing seems to you practically and morally wrong, is dissent the highest form of patriotism?” <https://www.monticello.org/site/blog-and-community/posts/dissent-highest-form-patriotism> / <https://www.monticello.org/site/jefferson/dissent-highest-form-patriotism-quotatation>


source=getresponse&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=rsis_publications&utm_content=RSIS+Fortnightly+Summary+%28Issue+71%29


opposition-veterans-arrested-police-over>.


Book Review