

When Dragon Meets Garuda in *Hutan Belantara* Energy

Yuli Isnadi*

Universitas Gadjah Mada, Indonesia

Chin-Fu Hung**

National Cheng Kung University, Taiwan

Abstract

It is generally believed that China will continue to dramatically expand her presence and influence in Indonesia's energy market in the years ahead. Yet, we would argue that China's economic prospect in Indonesia's energy sector becomes blurred and even complicated once she intends to further partake in Indonesia's domestic energy production and crude oil extraction. Through careful examination of Indonesia's regulations, liberalization, and social protection in its energy sector, this paper aims to explain how and to what extent Indonesia responds to China's strategic energy actions and its implications.

Keywords: *Indonesian energy market, double movement, liberal movement, social protection*

1. Introduction

In political economy discourse, it is uncontested that energy is a crucial issue for development.¹ There were many researches who investigated the supply-demand and the acceptability of local people to international trading of energy and proved that domestic interest influences energy trade significantly.² It is in this regard that investigating China-Indonesia energy trade becomes important. Both countries have long history of cooperation in energy trade, high economic development rate, and are getting closer to each other in recent years. Many scholars realized the importance of China-Indonesia issue in energy, and a lot of investigation has been done by scientists. To illustrate, they discussed energy trade in macro analysis,³ in relation to ACFTA,⁴ and based on specific commodities, such as coal and LNG.⁵

Moreover, conflicts within the South China Sea between Indonesia and China in recent years have triggered heated discussions among policymakers and academia with regard to the future Indonesia-China energy trade. Many investigations have already revealed the correlation between geopolitics and bilateral trade. Some of them believe that defense pacts affect trade agreements, while others describe how politics (geopolitics) influences economic matters.⁶ It means that geopolitics issue in the South China Sea might be able to shed light on the Indonesia-China energy trade in the years ahead.

However, we argue that the previous researches with special reference to the geopolitics approach may still be one-sided account in comprehending the current situations between Indonesia and China. Government in this regard is arguably not the most decisive actor that ultimately makes the energy policies, when considering that China-Indonesia relationship is built more than merely on energy trading, and export-import, and so on. Instead, it is also about exploring and managing Indonesia's resources which are increasingly affected by

domestic responses and players. Thereby, this paper argues that there exists a number of actors involved in this relation of the energy market in Indonesia. It will be further investigated thereafter.

What we have learned from the current situation is that relation between China and Indonesia in energy is moving to the new era where China has chance to increase her existence in Indonesian energy market. This raises a notable question: would China's existence in Indonesian energy market be more significant? For most scholars and practitioners, it is plausible because of Indonesian government's support and the strengthening of China's energy investment in Indonesia, and China as the fifth in Indonesian investment's top list of which a half has been directed toward energy.⁷ Additionally, after President Joko Widodo (Jokowi) was re-elected in April 2019, China's investment rose significantly and took the second highest investment in Indonesia.⁸

Although most of the people believe that China's contribution in Indonesian energy market would rise, we challenge it since it is developed by weak premise, partial analysis. It imagines that there is solely a peace market, but ignores the fact that the market has been met by combat. It assumes that the merely important variable to determine how China's contribution in future is Indonesian government support, and claims energy market is smooth, under government control. This assumption fails to describe the real condition where the market is fulfilled by a battle between liberalism and social protection movement. There are two main premises. First, Indonesian energy market is not empty-space, it has been filled by many companies (Multinational Corporation or MNC, national, and local), they usually fight for liberalism movement, compete each other to ensure getting maximum profit, and has a complex political economy relationship with policy makers. In this market, China is insignificant player. Second, Indonesian are not passive entity accustomed receiving any government's policy,

but they are active and progressive accustomed to express and defend their opinion and interest to against liberalism in energy. Since years ago, both of these movement has been involved in a field of Indonesian energy market. Regarding to the China position in Indonesia's energy market in future, the analysis has to put China on these two main premises. We believe, its conclusion is worthier to be believed.

In light of the discussion above, this article uses a set of research methods and organizes some chapters. Methodologically, this article assumes that the reality as contextual field of information⁹ to map the real condition of Indonesian energy market, by using secondary data, such as journals, Indonesian documents, articles, websites, and more. In order to answer the research question, this article has several parts. The first part is introduction which explains the literature review and research question and followed by China-Indonesia Relationship in Energy Trade discussion as the second part. Theoretical discussion is the next chapter where double movement perspective would be positioned as instrument analysis. Ups and Down Energy Market Regulation as the fourth illustrates the position of Indonesia in managing her natural resources. It is clear that even though the highest law regulates all of natural resources must be managed by Indonesia's companies, the long Indonesia's history showed that the final decision determined by the result of fierce fighting of actors. The two next part discuss the condition of liberalism movement in Indonesian energy market and her counter-movement, social protection. Along with "Ups and Down Energy Market Regulation", these two parts are main finding of this article. These three parts becomes main source of the next part, it is "Real Map and China's Mission: A Discussion", where the common believe above about the increasing of China-Indonesia relationship would be refused. Conclusion, then, is the final part where research question meets its blunt answer added by theoretical contribution reflection.

2. China-Indonesia Relationship in Energy Trade

In the warm relationship, China-Indonesia has clear and strong reason to keep and improve their cooperation, especially in energy trade. The story is started by the China's worse condition under The Tantamount Mao Zedong (1949-1978). China under Mao had implemented three ambitious national projects – The Hundred Flowers Campaign, The Great Leap Forward, and The Cultural Revolution— which led to calamity: economic collapse.¹⁰ In 1978, Deng Xiaoping as new leader chosen liberalism economic. Even though there were many critics for his radical policies, the facts proved that economic made some improvements, hence it has been continuously implemented and success to reach several achievements until today.¹¹ It has succeeded to get an amaze economic growth.¹²

Move to deeper discussion, China's economic growth has a crucial position for domestic politics and a consequence to national energy security. Economic growth is the modern form of Chinese Communist Party (CCP)'s legitimacy which actually has changed few times since 1949. In domestic politics, CCP is the 'hearth' of China as socialist country. CCP monopolizes power and rules China in the name of people.¹³ It is the reason why absolute legitimacy from populace is completely important for CCP. In 1949, Mao developed CCP's legitimacy by using nationalism and anti-colonialism spirit,¹⁴ empowering the countryside, restoring pride after the century of humiliation, and organizing against Japanese colonization.¹⁵ After the Tiananmen tragedy, Deng Xiaoping changed the source of CCP's legitimacy to ensure power is sustainable. Economic development became important to keep Chinese happy and obtain a sense of political legitimacy.¹⁶ Since this time, economic growth has been the main source of CCP's legitimacy and accordingly very important for China. Yet, along with the massive economic growth, the need of energy advanced

consistently in which the main source, coal and oil must be imported from other countries.¹⁷ In regard to this China has been involved in Indonesian energy market since 2002 and manage three areas in 2016.¹⁸

Move to Indonesia's side, the calamity in 1998 was the most important reason for Indonesia to increase her energy's income to national budget. Started by monetary crisis in 1997, Indonesia's economy collapsed rapidly. Basic needs were not only costly, but also rare, and there was a worse inflation. Riot identified by strikes insisting President Soeharto stepping down and horizontal conflict happened massively as its impact. All of this ended in resignation of President Soeharto preceded by ethnicity violence and the death and loss the several number of activists. This tragedy has become politics and social trauma for Indonesian, especially in politics and social aspects.

What Indonesia have learned from 1998 incident is there are two main causes that cause this tragedy, they are politics and economy. Unfortunately, after 1998, economic condition has not as well as politics. The growth of economy should be more improved to guarantee social and politics stability. Since 1980s, Indonesia as country of natural resources has good experience in improving her economic through mining, especially by producing energy, such as oil, gas, coal, and other sources. Unfortunately, the number of production units in energy sector has collapsed in recent decades. For example, in oil, the number of production decrease gradually, even lower than domestic consumption. It is the fact that since 2004 the number of consumptions units has overtook production. Rather than gaining economic profit from oil trade, Indonesia as one of country who has oil reserves in the world must import oil from international market.

After year 1998, Indonesia had well relationship in energy trading to China. The number of Indonesia's export to fulfill China's need in energy was huge. At least, in 2013, about 31 per cent of coal has been

exported to China in which during 2002-2013 the average number of Indonesia's coal export was 20 per cent. For gas, the recent years export record proves that gas is potential commodity for China. In 2004, China just absorb about 2 per cent of total Indonesia's export, yet two year later it grew radically to be 20 per cent. Overall, during 2000-2015, China is destination for 8.7 per cent Indonesian gas. Oil has different record, because it shows the declining trend. In 2000, the number of Indonesia's export to China is around 18,5 per cent, but in 2015 it fell to be 4,2 per cent, though as general, during 2000-2015, Indonesia succeeded to export 10,1 per cent of total. In conclusion, energy trading between China-Indonesia is significant. China-Indonesia is mutual dependent, when China rely most of her energy's needs to Indonesia and Indonesia take China as her important consumer at once.¹⁹

3. The Map of Indonesian Energy Market: The Clash of Two Movements

This part discusses the theoretical background of this inquiry. Along with discussion above, we use "Double Movement" perspective because of its relevancy in describing the real map of Indonesian energy market and challenge the common opinion at once. This belief is underpinned by three reasons, they are ontology, context, and the infirmity of other perspectives. Ontologically, double movement is appropriate to research question, especially in describing the 'real map' of Indonesian energy market. This article criticizes the partial map which has been the basic of common belief. The partial map illustrates Indonesian energy market as a peace market and under government's control in which the Indonesian Government's support is the most decisive. Yet we totally believe that Indonesian energy market is not a peace market, it has been filled by a fierce battle. Due to its ability to describe real map of Indonesian energy

market, double movement is used.

Furthermore, “contexts” is the second reason why “Double Movement” is precise perspective to be used. Due to her long story of energy’s policies, Indonesian energy is managed by economic liberalism ways, it has been a market since several decades ago. There have been a large number of producers competing against each other and influencing the Indonesian regulations in energy sector. Again, for this condition, double movement finds its appropriate when it discuss the strategy of liberalism movement to expand self-regulating market by controlling and influencing government’s regulations. The last, the incompleteness of other perspective gives double movement tight reason to be used. For example, liberalism perspective partially illustrates the positive impact of market and ignores bad impacts and people power who fight to impede those. On the other hand, Marxist’s perspective tends to explore industrial relationship and pass the bigger issues, such as liberalism movement, bad impact to environment, cultures, and other dimension, and surely, social protection movement. Similar to previous reason, double movement meets its relevancy.

Given that above consideration, this part consists of three main parts. First, we discuss liberalism, neoliberalism, and globalization which its aims are to address main assumption of liberalism, its transformation to be neoliberalism, and globalization’s contribution in this transformation. Shortly, this shows liberalism (neoliberalism) main characteristics and its real form in Indonesian energy market. Second, Karl Polanyi’s critics to liberalism are discussed, especially when Polanyi proves that all liberalism assumptions are illusion. Positive impact is limited, while the vicious poor impacts should be faced by most people. Third, Indonesian double movement thus rises to accentuate the reality that the two-opposing movement, liberalism vs. social protection, is eternal and lead them to Indonesian’s context.

3.1. Liberalism, Neo-Liberalism, and Globalization

One of the core theses of liberalism is “freedom” which exists in three levels: individual, society, and government, in order to create an ideal market. Freedom can be found in those levels with different design, but they have perfectly strong connection. Liberalism assumes freedom is essential right of human which is obtained from God, nature, and social contract. Freedom to own property, without coercion, is primarily right encouraging people to produce and exchange goods in market. The kind of goods depend on consumers’ needs (spontaneous market), the price is determined by comparing money and value of goods (miracle of prices), there is free movement of capital (people, goods, services, money, and ideas), and the solely motivation is self-interest. Due to neither coercion nor command, market will be run by competition, and it will run self-regulation. This is the most efficient and effective market which benefits all people.²⁰

Liberalism assumes that individual is more important than society. Society is merely accumulation of individual and the condition of society is determined by individual condition. Related to this, individual freedom and creating market have significant contribution to fulfill all society’s needs. Adam Smith argues that when everyone gets freedom in pursuing their self-interest, the ‘invisible hand’ of market will create the public goods.²¹ Finally, when individual freedom creates this ideal market, the wealth will flow to all member of society.²² Accordingly society has to guarantee individual freedom.

Furthermore, liberalism gives special attention to the position of government and its regulation. Government rules is needed, but government’s intervention is not. In liberalism, the source of government’s legitimacy is individual, consequence government subject to individual interest. Government uses its monopoly power to expand

individual freedom and property right through its regulations. On the other hand, government is assumed knowing how to easily do abusing power, corruption. It is the reason for keeping market from government's intervention. When market is run without government, the self-regulating market will exist.²³

Since some decades ago, post the fall of Keynesian in 1978, liberalism has risen in a little bit different form, its name is neo-liberalism. Principle of individual freedom steadily exist in neo-liberalism, but it gives stronger accentuation to relation between government and market. To create an ideal market, self-regulating market, market has to be freed from government's interventions.²⁴ Harvey, then, described the role of state, "The role of the state is to create and preserve an institutional framework appropriate to such practices."²⁵ It is completed by Hall revealing two watchwords of neo-liberalism: privatization and deregulation.²⁶

The existence of neo-liberalism, then, has been underpinned by globalization, and the result is the "age of MNC" (Multinational Corporation). Globalization, which means as the integrity of national economy into the world economy, relies on trade, MNC, foreign investment and international finance.²⁷ It can be easily understood the result of these paradigms. Neo-liberalism encourages self-regulating market, privatization, and deregulation, while globalization support MNC and foreign investment to penetrate in every single country. It is clear that the era of neo-liberalism in globalization age can be identified by self-regulating market, privatization, deregulation, MNCs in every country, and there is free movement of capital, and competition between MNCs.

3.2. Karl Polanyi's Critiques

In his magnum opus, *The Great Transformation*, Polanyi argues that the result of liberalism is not wealth, but society destruction.²⁸ By using history, culture, politics, and economy approach, Polanyi reveals the flaw of liberalism premises. Polanyi describes the origin of liberalism's step in order to build self-regulating market. It is started by claiming human and soil as labor and land. This commodification is followed by a premise of scarcity. Labor and land, then, have price which is determined by supply-demand. This will work properly, because action of human as economic creature is based on self-interest. Interconnected of self-interest creates all human's needs. In here, government's intervention is not necessary. The final result is market society, a condition where everyone has purchasing power to buy goods in self-regulating market.²⁹

Polanyi gives critiques to the liberalism's premise. First, liberalism did a fault by doing commodification, because labor and land actually are human and soil, never have they been created by God to be traded. Second, culturally and historically, there were many motivations of human's economic actions, where the self-interest is just a part of them. Third, liberalism has not respected human right since it used starvation to force human (poor people) to work. Fourth, self-regulating market is illusion, because liberalism needs government's intervention (regulation) to create freedom which is appropriate to its interest. Fifth, liberalism separated economic to politics (government) which causes government unable to protect society, whereas the main function of government is to protect people (poor people), included in economic affairs.³⁰ For Polanyi, these flaws create a horrible creature; a market society. All human's actions are driven by two motivation: self-interest (looking for profit) and the fear of starvation. This will impact to social destruction,

when there are many problems in labor (wage, working hour, more), land (ecology and environment), and money (currency).³¹

3.3. Indonesian Double Movement

3.3.1. The discourse of double movement

The destruction of society, happening in labor and land, for Polanyi, is the main reason for society to protect themselves. This is the beginning of the double movement; a situation describing the struggle of liberalism's advocates to defend and enlarge self-regulating market versus social protection who fight to impede liberalism. Social protection, in Polanyi's vision, has several characteristics. It is mechanically, spontaneously, a multitude of dispersed and fragmented reactions. The real action is obeying managerial commands, protest high food prices, striking for higher wage, criticizing law, environment and cultural destructions, and other market society bad impacts.³²

Move to the deeper discussion, contemporary scholar critics the Polanyi's double movement theory. Some of them have proved that the characteristic of Polanyi's double movement was not appropriate to recent phenomena, whilst the other propose crucial questions. There was a doubt that social protection was the mechanically, spontaneously, and fragmented counter-movement. Moreover, the researchers also questioned the detail of social protection, how does the composition of social protection? This is significant question, because since years ago, society has consisted of many groups with various backgrounds, such as politics, economics, environment, culture, religious, ethnic, and human right. This question is followed by another, i.e., how does social protection organize their movement? All of these challenges have not articulated well and investigated enough from Polanyi's seminar work.

With regard to critiques above, the social protection theory is revised. In contemporary phenomena, it has some characteristics. Firstly, social protection is an organized movement to protect society from destruction. Secondly, its composition is various, there is not strict border, the solely ‘rule’ in social protection movement for its proponents is the same aim, to against neo-liberal globalization and to avoid society destruction. In some cases, the social protection movement have been done by labor federation, agrarian movement, human rights supporter, beyond age, gender, religious, ethnicities, and many kinds of structural positions in economy. Thirdly, social protection is organized as informal. The communication and exchanging resources have been done without formal regulation, used culture and social strategy.³³

3.3.2. Indonesian energy market

Indonesian double movement has three mains areas, namely regulation of energy market; MNC, national, and local companies which support liberalism and getting competition; and social protection counter-movement impeding liberalism. Indonesia is one of the richest natural resources in the world, especially for oil, gas, and coal. Since 1967, under President Soeharto, Indonesia has explored and exported oil, gas, and coal massively. From that period, the regulation has been changed several times.

Since 1967, there was three kinds of companies which operated in Indonesian, they are MNC, national companies called Pertamina (Perusahaan Tambang, Minyak dan Gas Bumi Negara/ State Oil and Natural Gas Company), and smaller companies owned by local entrepreneurs. The prominent MNCs in Indonesian energy market are Chevron (USA), British Petroleum (BP), Exxon (USA), PT Newmont (USA), Total E&P Indonesie (France), and Freeport, while smaller

companies owned by local investor are, such as, PT Bumi Resources Tbk owned by Aburizal Bakrie (The former president of GOLKAR party, the winner in 2014 general election), PT Mitra Energi Persada owned by Jusuf Kalla (Vice President of Indonesia), and others.

The last, social protection in Indonesia has a little bit different to the other countries. Counter movement has been represented by the kinds of group/ organization which refuse liberalism. Some of them in formal organization, for instance NGO, political party, student association, and academician's organization, while the other are informal, such as community in a village or districts, labor's federations, and etc. In this movement, they exchange the resources easily. Moreover, the Indonesia's countering movement in this research is heavily influenced by the relationship of Indonesia indigenous inhabitants Pribumi with those Chinese Indonesians and even the Chinese authorities in Beijing. The special characteristics of the Indonesia's counter movement are mostly derived by Pribumi's prejudice and their resistance to a few groups of Chinese Indonesians tycoon as well as the Chinese authorities.³⁴

4. Ups and Downs of Energy Market Regulation

In 1967, under Soeharto regime, Indonesia started to explore and exploit her natural resources massively. Since that period, regulation of energy management has been changed several times, and those represented the Indonesian condition in multiple aspects.

Table 1 illustrates how Indonesian regulation in energy has been changed, consisting of authority, law, main point, focus, and reason. Basically, Indonesia has Undang-Undang Dasar tahun 1945 (UUD 1945) or constitution of 1945 as a highest regulation which orders the state to monopolize natural resources for people's welfare, because the mere

purpose of state is to create prosperity for Indonesians. Moreover, Indonesia interprets constitution of 1945 to be law. The dynamic, then, happened in this interpretation process.

Table 1 Changes in Indonesian Energy Regulation, 1945-2010

Period	Authority	Regulation	Main Point	Focuses	Reason
1945-Now	State	Constitution of 1945	State monopolizes natural resources for people's welfare	Economics	The existence of state is to create people's prosperity
New Order (1967-1997)	Central Government	Law 11/1967	Centralized administration	Economics	Natural resources is solution for economic collapse
		Presidential Decree 20/1968	Centralized administration		
		Law 8/1971	Pertamina monopoly of oil management (upstream and downstream)		
Post-Reformasi (1998-2010)	Central Government and Local Government	Law 22/2001	Pertamina as a state enterprise and privatization business	Fighting corruption, Economics, Politics, Equality, Environment, Culture	Deliberation of natural resources can keep Indonesia's unity
		Law 41/1999	Prohibition of open mining in protected forest		
		Government Regulation 75/2001	Decentralization of Indonesian mining		
		Law 4/2009	Central government devolves significant power to local governments		
		Government Regulation 22/2010	Mining areas		
		Government Regulation 23/2010	Mining business operations		
		Government Regulation 78/2010	Mine reclamation and closure		
		Government Regulation 55/2010	Mineral and coal mining direction and supervision		
Law 32/2004	Decentralization				

Source: Compiled from several resources, 2020.

In the New Order, natural resources were dominated by the central government, i.e., President Soeharto. It can be found in Law No. 11/1967, Presidential Decree No. 20/1968, and Law No. 8/ 1971. The core concern of these laws was economic growth. This is quite understandable considering Indonesia's economic difficulties at that time. When the first president Soekarno stepped down, the Indonesian economy was also collapsed. Soeharto as successor took radical policies by claiming "economic as command". He used natural resources to improve economic growth excessively. For example, Soeharto established Pertamina, state enterprise, to monopolize oil from upstream to downstream. Gradually, this strategy improved Indonesian economic growth, and even foreign observers claimed Indonesia as one of the "Asian Tigers".

In line with this condition, there were many problems happens and finally forced Soeharto to resign in 1998. Due to centralized management without a fair control and monitoring, corruption happened in all energy sectors. All corruptors were Soeharto's cronies, and this run nearly couple decades. Robinson,³⁵ to illustrates, describes how Soeharto's son-in-law, Ibnu Soetowo, did corruption in Pertamina, while the other Soeharto's family did it in other minerals mining. Accordingly, the abundance of oil, gas, coal, tin, and other minerals had not given significant wealth to Indonesia as whole.

Corruption, collusion, and nepotism (Indonesian name KKN or Korupsi, Kolusi, and Nepotisme) forced Soeharto to step down in 1998. Following this moment, new regime faced several prominent demands from Indonesia's people. Indonesian insisted the new regime to clean government from KKN, shared more power and authority to local government (Province and district/ city), and improved equality of development and wealth. In this moment, the threat was separation. If

central government failed to manage the people's demand, there would many separatist movements. The unity of Indonesia would be end.

This situation succeeded to change Indonesian system. In energy management, there were three implications. First and foremost, supported by International Monetary Fund (IMF), government liberalize energy market. MNC was easier to invest and compete in Indonesian energy market. Meanwhile, Pertamina's authority is reduced, it just was a common company, and it has equal position and right to other MNCs. This regulation aims to create clean, effective, and efficient energy market (Law 22/2001). Furthermore, central government shared her authority to local government through Law 32/2004, especially in natural resources management. Practically, to operate in an area, district/city and province's permit is the first and the most significant requirement. This policy would improve local economic growth, wealth, equality, quality of environment, and existence of local wisdom (culture). Last, but not least, central government gave local government to manage Artisanal and Small Scale Mining (ASM) through Law 4/2009 (license), Law 22/2010 (mining area), and Law 55/2010 (supervise and enforce mining). Due to ASM has strong historical background in Indonesia, in addition, it is full-employed, central government gave society her permit to operate it and managed by local government.

In recent years, those regulation has been changed partially. In 2012, Indonesian Constitutional Court cancelled several clauses of Law 22/2001. Consequently, Pertamina could get back its authority to manage oil and gas in Indonesia. This has been believed will improve Indonesian's profit in minerals. Moreover, in 2014, energy ministry released new regulation which forced mining companies to build smelter in Indonesia.³⁶ It was same as Pertamina case in which as sign the growing of nationalism because it created jobs and more prosperity for

local people. Until today, the ups and down of Indonesian energy regulation steadily happen.

5. Liberalism of Indonesian Energy Market: Movement and Competition

In Indonesian energy market, there are many kinds companies manufacturing mineral, such as oil, gas, coal, tin, and others. Especially for oil, gas, and coal in 2012, Indonesian government released information of MNC which operated several blocks in Indonesia. Chevron and ExxonMobil, both of them are owned by USA, dominated Indonesian energy market, particularly for oil and gas. Meanwhile, BP (British Petroleum), Total E&P Indonesie (France), Petrochina, and other companies share remain block. This would be more crowded if other mining's sector and small and medium companies were put on it. All companies are involved in two kind activities, such as liberalism movement and competition.

5.1. Liberalization Movement

Liberalism movement in Indonesian energy market run in two main actions, namely entering market and continuing their existence. Those activities need one important precondition, namely Indonesian's politics and regulations should welcome to liberalism. Due to Indonesian's constitution claims that natural resources must be managed by and for Indonesian (Constitution of 1945), so, actually, welcoming liberalism politics and regulations were a controversy in Indonesia. The solely plausible reason why, finally, Indonesian energy was opened to market, is caused by a terrible turbulence politics which happened few times before this controversial politics and regulation was created by government. In this case, international liberalism's interventions could

be observed easily.

First of all, liberalism can be identified by MNC's efforts to enter Indonesian energy market. In here, the first and most crucial event was the smooth coup d'état of The First President, Soekarno, between year 1965-67 by Soeharto, CIA, and Freeport and its causation to Law 1/1967, the first liberal law welcomed MNCs since 1968, particularly from USA. The coup d'état of Soekarno was the main strategy of Freeport to able operate in Irian Jaya Barat (Papua) by using Soeharto and CIA.³⁷ Soon after Soekarno stepping down, Soeharto arranged Law 1/1967 in Geneva (Swiss) and was dictated by Rockefeller, the president of Freeport. In the same year, Freeport succeeded to get authority managing a mountain of gold in Irian Jaya, after President Soeharto had signed Freeport's proposal. Since 1967, Freeport has been the biggest gold mining and the third place for nickel companies in the world with the lowest cost production.³⁸ Following this politics and regulation, other MNC came to Indonesia, such as Caltex (Now Chevron), Total E&P Indonesia, and others.

Post-Reformasi 1998, as mentioned above, Indonesia released a liberal law in energy which invited many MNCs investing in Indonesia. Due to massive corruption, Indonesia's people insisted Soeharto to resign. This chaotic situation ends to a situation when Indonesian government created Law 22/2001 by using USAID's fund and World Bank and IMF's support.³⁹ The essence of this regulation was Indonesia must open her energy market and reduced the authority of Pertamina as state's enterprise, meaning that this regulation fully supported liberalism movement. This liberal law succeeded making liberalism easier to enter Indonesian energy market and continued their existence. To illustrate, by Law 22/2001, Petrochina, China's state enterprise, has operated in Indonesia since 2002.⁴⁰ It has authority to manage Jabung Block, lied in Jambi, the area which has an abundance natural gas.

In line with the discussion above, post-Reformasi 1998, political turbulence happened in politics at the local level which led to the blind improvement of liberalism. Decentralization politics meaning that there were two implications for local government, notably district and city government. First, local election system to choose regent or mayor has been changed, from representative to direct election. This was, by central government, reasonable to fulfill local people's demand for more democratic politics in local level and ensure the leader appropriate and representing local interest. Second, in same period, Law 32/2004 regulates that authority of mining and energy's activities are in regent or mayor, with based on national laws. The main reason was to accommodate local interest in order to improve local welfare. These radical changes, unfortunately, gave bad impact in mining sector. In fact, direct election was costly because every candidate must campaign excessively to get more voters. When candidates succeeded to be winner, they tended to recoup their money which is spent in campaign process.⁴¹ Giving permit to mining became popular strategy to gain back money in 5 years (a period), because each petty capitalist provides bribery for license. Finally, there were many new small and medium companies which have operated in local level, most of them violated national laws. For instance, in 2012, Indonesian Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources found roughly 10.000 new license, in which a half of those was problematic. In 2019, this condition has not changed significantly, the same problem still happens.⁴²

5.2. Wild Competition

In Indonesian energy market, all companies must compete to both defense and enlarge their positions. Since regulation is important, all companies try to obtain their interest by influence government. Some

time, they lobby Indonesian government, on the other case, they also use politics' influence.

In 2005-2006, two main oil companies were involved competition, namely Pertamina and ExxonMobil. In this competition, liberal law (Law 22/ 2001) and intensive lobby became a definitive variable. Competition was started once a research proved that there was a vicious number of oil in Cepu, Jawa Tengah Province, even it was believed that it has the largest oil reserves in Indonesia. In spite of the fact that Pertamina was state's enterprise, due to Law 22/ 2001, its position was same to ExxonMobil. Furthermore, to be winner, ExxonMobil used its home country political influence, USA. It was viewed when President of Indonesia, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY), has been invited by USA, followed by visiting of Foreign Minister of USA, Condoleezza Rice, to Indonesia. As result, Cepu was ExxonMobil's authority.⁴³

Years later, along with the increasing nationalism spirit, Pertamina is stronger thereof get good position in competition. First, in 2015, Pertamina competed with Inpex (Japan) and Shell (Netherland) in managing Block Masela, Maluku Province. Inpex, in fact, has explored Masela since 1998, but it could be produced on 2018. This was problematic, because its contract would finish in 2028. Producing merely in a decade after spending resources during two decades is surely uneconomical. In this case, however, Indonesian government have decided to give 10-15 per cent of shareholding for Pertamina in 2018, and would give dominant stock on 2028.⁴⁴ The same case happened in Petrochina operating in Tuban, Jawa Timur Province. Petrochina permit will over on 2028, and it has interest to extend its contract. However, Indonesian government tend to move its authority to Pertamina.⁴⁵ Both cases show how Pertamina obtains benefit from political condition of Indonesia.

In addition, competition also happens between MNC, which economic bargaining becomes prominent factor. As described above, in 2014 Indonesian government forced all companies to build smelter. The reason was to improve economic value, create jobs, increase local welfare, and others. Beyond this calculation, some researchers and observers believed that this policy was ordered by a giant company from Russia. They argued that it will invest a huge amount of the money to new mega project in Borneo. Regardless to plausible reasons, this new policy gave problem to mining companies especially for smaller companies which budgeting will be obstacle the most.⁴⁶ Despite mining companies protested this policy, Indonesian government steadily implemented this policy.

6. Indonesian Social Protection: A Counter-Movement

Social protection in Indonesia has by and large had three characteristics: criticizing the liberal laws in energy, contesting the bad impact of liberalism movement, and having prejudice against Chinese Indonesians and China's companies. All of these have aims to impede liberalism to enter into Indonesian energy market, to stop their production process and support national's enterprise (Pertamina), and to prevent the miserable impact brought about by some Chinese Indonesians tycoons and the Chinese companies. This movement consist of various components, from individual, organization, to common villagers with various backgrounds. They have been organized through formal and informal way. Since years ago, they have won in some battles, but lost in others.

6.1. Criticizing Liberal Laws

Society as victim of liberalism movements has fully recognized that regulation is the protector of those, therefore criticizing liberal laws,

both national and local, is the first aim of social protection movement. There are some forms of this action. First, it criticized national law, Law 22/ 2001. This was crucial to do since all liberalism movements lied on this law, changing the essence of this law meaning that to impede liberalism. This movement can be represented by the event when Indonesian criticized some clauses of Law 22/ 2001. This movement consisted of many organizations with diverse backgrounds, namely religious-Islamic organization (Muhammadiyah), environment (Walhi and Jatam), professionals, and others; in addition, there were many public figures and politicians involved on this. They united in one aim, to rise nationalism in Indonesian energy market by returning the lost authority of Pertamina. They did substance discussion and comparing Law 22/ 2001 to the highest law (constitution of 1945) to bold its inconsistency. They were well-organized, used constitutional court to criticize some clauses of liberal law, and did intensive communications. As result, they won their battle, Pertamina's authority has been returned in 2012.⁴⁷ It is why after 2012 Pertamina gradually became stronger, for example when it competed with Inpex and Petrochina, as stated above.

Furthermore, the second, social protection criticized law in local regulation level (district, city, and province). The main point was the inconsistency of local regulation compared to national law. For example, in Yogyakarta, since 2008, farmers of south coastal of Kulon Progo District has questioned the consistency of Kulon Progo District and Yogyakarta's local regulation to the higher law (national law and constitution of 1945) in order to stop PT Jogja Magasa Iron (JMI) operating on their land. In Agrarian Law, they have full right to decide the function of their land, in addition, the previous local regulation said that their area was farming zone. These were two of many reasons to question the consistency of local government's regulation and policy. The member of this counter-movement consisted of activists, scholars,

public figures, progressive students, and NGOs. They have been well-organized and used informal communication, identified by exchanging resources to the other social protection movements in other areas.⁴⁸ The same case has happened in Pati, Jawa Tengah Province. The farmer of Kendeng Mountains insisted local government to subject to national policies which, finally, met their demand to cancel mega project PT Semen Gresik, a cement plant.⁴⁹

6.2. Contesting Liberalism's Impact

Since decade ago, there were many companies have operated in Indonesia. Those have horrible impacts on environment, cultures and labor. Society as victims, supported by many elements, fought to stop this bad impact. Some of them got victory, whereas the other was lost. Some of battle was fully formal and vertical, while the other was more informal and horizontal.

First and foremost, the most prominent social protection movement, questioning the bad impact of liberalism was a movement to stop Freeport by criticizing the law and policy. The aim of this movement was to cancel, or renegotiate, or at least, refuse new contract of Freeport. This based on the fact that Freeport has a vicious number of bad impact without significant benefit for Indonesia. Two mounts (Garsberg and Ertzberg) has been lost, completed by their entities, can be described how cruel the Freeport in Papua. There has a horrible social, economic, culture, and environment destruction since 1967.⁵⁰ Stopping Freeport, meaning that, stopping massive destruction in Papua. In order to reach this target, social protection used formal ways, such as insisting government to brave renegotiate or at least cancel the new contract of Freeport. This movement consisted of many elements, they are top public figures, such as Amien Rais (former of People's Consultative Assembly and President of PAN), Rizal Ramli (former minister of some

ministry), Faisal Basri (professor of Universitas Indonesia), and more; organizations, such as Walhi, Jatam, and others; and even common people. They have two kind strategies, both formal and informal. Formal strategy has been used to the advocates who fought in Jakarta, while informal in several cities or provinces. When formal action meant that court or public hearing in house representative, the informal actions meant that striking. The result was not appropriate to their hope. There was nothing happen to Freeport. Freeport can extend its contract until 2041.⁵¹

Second, social protection focusing on impact of liberalism movement can be viewed in actions which have been done by labor. In this case, the companies tended to ignore their duty to their workers, for example giving a proper hour for resting and paying severance pay for retiring labor, or government neglect labor's interest by releasing controversial draft of "Omnibus Law Cilaka". To illustrate, the labor of Exxon Mobil did an anarchy striking triggered by insufficient resting hours. On the other case, in 2016, due to decreasing oil price in world's trade, Chevron fired its 2.000 labors and invited labor's strike.⁵² Additionally, in 2020, government neglect labor's interest by relasing new draft "Omnibuslaw Cilaka" that was claimed by government would create a huge job. Thousands labor do strikes demanding government to cancel this law because it exploit workers more.⁵³ In these kind of social protections, the composition of movement was simple, they are labor federation, some NGOs and scholars. It is caused by the locus of the problems. In line to this, the strategy was formal action identified by tripartite-meeting between company, labor, and government.

Third, social protection run in informal and horizontal scheme. It was represented by the clash of two different groups who lived in one area, but they have different position. One group is a petty capitalist, whereas the other was farmer and social protection supporters. Hence

local government has authority to give permit for mining, there were many small and medium mining in local area, especially remote village. The clash of owner of the small mining and farmers was unavoidable. In this case, social protection's composition was so simple, consist of farmers and sometime supported by NGO which focused on environment and legal defense. This battle can be described properly by case "Salim Kancil: a farmer who has been killed sadistically by the owner of small mining who actually leader of village and also his relative. The end of this case was social protection was win, but it needed victims to gain it.⁵⁴

6.3. Prejudice against the Chinese Indonesians and the Chinese Authorities

Indonesia's counter-movement is arguably influenced heavily by Pribumi's prejudice against some Chinese Indonesians tycoons and the growing impact of the Chinese authorities. In fact, pribumi's prejudice has actually took place for centuries. During the colonial era which was around 1800s, Dutch set Chinese Indonesians as tax collector and gave them economic privileges to impede the rise of pribumi's middle class. This policy has fundamentally led to later pribumi's prejudice to the Chinese Indonesians where Pribumi perceived Chinese Indonesians as part of colonizer. As result, there were many tragedy cases when Pribumi massacre Chinese Indonesians during the colonial era.⁵⁵

Moreover, China's *jus sanguis* law in the year 1909 and the establishment of the People's Republic of China from 1949 onward have also affected the rise of 'pan-Chinese movement' during the early period of Indonesia's independence between 1945 and 1966. *Jus sanguis* law means that every child whose father or mother is Chinese is considered a Chinese citizen, and accordingly, all Chinese Indonesians are effectively Chinese citizens. Whereas the Chinese Communist Party took office

from 1949, the Chinese nationalism was seen particularly on the rise among the Chinese Indonesians. As Coppel stated (2008: 125), they became a “fifth column” for communist China.⁵⁶ Their loyalty was for China by giving financial support to K’ang Yu-wei and Sun Yat-sen in order to support their homeland developing process.⁵⁷ However, Indonesia experienced a terrible tragedy between 1965 and 1966 that the Chinese Indonesians and the PRC was accused of involving the coup d’état that aimed to subvert Republic Indonesia into another communist regime. This had severely resulted in the strong disbelief held by Pribumi against the Chinese Indonesians and the PRC, and the large scale of massacres on those Chinese Indonesians.⁵⁸

During the period of 1966-1998 when former President Soeharto took office, he had implemented two main policies relating to the Chinese descents. On the one hand, he selected a few Chinese Indonesians tycoons as his collaborators when involving in many corruption cases. On the other hand, he also enacted some racist policies against the Chinese Indonesians.⁵⁹ According to Purdey, this institutionalized racial prejudice policies created anti-Chinese violence that becomes “normal” every day.⁶⁰ At the end, as Freedman said, Pribumi have accustomed to generalizing the Chinese Indonesians by perceiving their descent bad.⁶¹

From 1998 onwards, given the Indonesia’s leaders implemented a number of policies that target to overcome racism against the Chinese Indonesians, yet Pribumi’s perception to a few groups of Chinese Indonesians’ tycoons and Chinese companies are still notorious. After President Soeharto stepped down, Indonesia promulgated some favorable policies towards the Chinese Indonesians, such as the recognition of Confucianism as one of national religions and the set-up of a national holiday for the Chinese New Year. Nonetheless, the major corruption scandals from a few Chinese Indonesians tycoons during

Soeharto era and the post-Reformasi up until recent years, together with intimate relations between some Chinese Indonesians tycoons and the Chinese authorities,⁶² have largely contributed to the continuing negative stereotype among Pribumi.⁶³

The Pribumi's prejudice against a few Chinese Indonesians tycoons and the Chinese authorities are especially running high for the past few years. For example, the discourse "Asing dan Aseng" (While "Asing" refers to China, "Aseng" points directly to the Chinese Indonesians tycoons) was one of the most important issues during the presidential election both on years 2014 and 2019. Supporters of a specific candidate launched black campaigns by calling their opponents as henchmen of "Asing dan Aseng". Today this tactics however continues to exist and widely utilized by President's oppositions, labors, and student movement organizations.⁶⁴ These have summed up to the Indonesia's countering movements in recent years when it comes to the highly sensitive matters relating to the Chinese Indonesian tycoons and the Chinese authorities as a whole.

7. The Real Map and China's Mission: A Discussion

Discussion above proves that actually Indonesian energy market is not a peace map, but it is a map filled by battle. Constellation of regulation, liberalism movement, and social protection is so dynamic. In order to answer whether China will increase her existence in Indonesian energy market in the future, China should be placed on this real map.

Based on early discussion, it can be concluded that, first, Indonesian regulation in energy has not guarantee China able to increase her contribution in energy market. The essence of Indonesian energy management is managing natural resources by and for Indonesian (Constitutional of 1945). It is true that practically there were many

inconsistency, but nowadays, nationalism spirit lead Indonesia to go back to the essence of natural resources management principle. If Indonesia's politics stable, there is no chance for China to increase her influence significantly in Indonesian energy market.

Second, Indonesian energy market has been filled by many companies, which have longer experience and stronger bargaining position to influence Indonesian government, and they have competed for long time. They have operated on several decades, could influence, and even dictated, Indonesian regulation, and unwelcomed to new competitors. In recent days, the most valuable mining areas are steadily dominated by strong MNC (Freeport, Chevron, ExxonMobil, and others), while the others gradually move to be Pertamina's right. Comparing to this, China has not good chance.

Third, social protection movement in Indonesian energy market have had long-lasting experiences; they themselves are well-organized movements. There are indeed many elements involving these movements, including those aforementioned prejudice against some Chinese Indonesians tycoons and the Chinese authorities. Whilst the solely problem which failed to counter is related to the big companies. Though some liberalism movement still run easier, social protection in Indonesian energy market gradually has stronger and more organized. It means that, it is easier for social protection to impede China due to China is weak and new actor and has not enough experience yet to tackle Indonesian social protection movement.

These three findings develop explanation about China's influence in Indonesian energy market in future. The clash in map of Indonesian energy market run intensively. It seems that nationalism policy and regulation rise gradually, while the giant companies protect their existence by influencing government and its regulations from the threat of social protection. On the other hand, social protection has not lost

their energy, they are stronger and more organized. All of these meaning that the mainly purpose of Indonesian regulation now is managing natural resources by and for Indonesian, while protecting their position is the most important mission of bigger companies, the last, the solely target of social protection is to beat liberalism, including the Chinese companies. In this map, China, who is new, weak, and has not experience yet in Indonesian energy market, has not chance.

8. Conclusion

When most scholars and practitioners argue that China's position in Indonesian energy market would increase prominently, this work proves that this opinion is not reasonable. Though China's investment rise significantly in recent years, but Indonesian energy regulation, competitors, and social protection movement would be a huge obstacle. It must be recognized, increasing existence in a map filled by fierce battle is nearly impossible. The merely plausible action for China now is to defense her position.

Furthermore, this study has theoretical implications for Polanyian's double movement and political economy of energy. In double movement discourse, Indonesian case actually is similar to other countries. In line with Levien's conclusion,⁶⁵ social protection's movement has been organized beyond organization with different background or issues where local's structure of power determines its success. In Indonesia, liberalization of energy market has gave bad consequence to many groups, it is why social protection's movement has a broad support from different background, such as religious, culture, land, human right, and others. Yet, different to Levien's finding in India, the local power in Indonesia gives positive support to social protection. Politicians, political parties, public figures, and several the most influenced civil

society organization, all together fight to impede the negative effect of liberalism movement. Then, ethnic relationship has also impacted on social protection system. However, Polanyian's double movement can steadily be used to describe the reality. The merely action needed is contextualization of this perspective.

Move to theoretical implication in political economy of energy, this finding proves that it is difficult for countries to change their position from consumer to be producer in international energy market. By putting China case in Indonesia energy market, China which has desire to change her position from consumer to producer, meaning that managing energy source, faces two main obstacles. First, China would face resistance of bigger and more experience MNCs which has dominated energy market for decades. Second, China will confront refusing of local communities which are well-organized, experience, stronger, and stereotyped prejudice. As new player, China nearly impossible to change her position. The implications are not solely limited to the Chinese case under review in this article, but many other likeminded countries across the globe.

Acknowledgement

The research of this article is supported by Department of Public Policy and Management, UGM (Indonesia), and Graduate Institute of Political Economy, NCKU (Taiwan).

Notes

- * Yuli Isnadi is a Lecturer at the Department of Public Policy and Management (DPPM), Universitas Gadjah Mada (UGM), Indonesia. He is currently a PhD candidate at the Department of Political Science and Graduate Institute of Political Economy, National Cheng Kung University (國立成功大學, NCKU), Taiwan. His research interests are political economy of natural resources and Internet politics. <Email: yuliisnadi@yahoo.co.id>
- ** Dr Chin-Fu Hung (洪敬富) is a Professor at the Department of Political Science and Graduate Institute of Political Economy, National Cheng Kung University, Taiwan. Dr Hung's main research interests are primarily the political and economic transitions of the People's Republic of China, Internet politics, and the socio-political development in East and Southeast Asia. <Email: bcfhung@mail.ncku.edu.tw>
1. See, for instance, Matutinovic (2009) and Fankhauser and Jotzo (2017).
 2. See Tugwell (1980); Matutinovic (2009); Austvik (2009); Hughes and Lipsy (2013); Mitchell (2002).
 3. Atje and Gaduh (1999); Booth (2011); Wu (2011); Rachmayanti (2013).
 4. Chandra and Lontoh (2011); APINDO-ACTIVE (2013).
 5. Badaruddin (2013); Luo (2014); Springer (2016).
 6. See Eichengreen *et al.* (2019); Ademuyiwa and Siklos (2019).
 7. Bria and Winanti (2016); *Kompas* (21st March 2016).
 8. *BenarNews* (29th September 2019); *Antara News* (16th November 2019).
 9. Morgan and Smircich (1980); King, Keohane and Verba (1994).
 10. Dreyer (2015).
 11. Saich (2015); Dreyer (2015); Lam (2015); Yu (2014).
 12. Chen and Naughton (2017); Joseph (ed.) (2014).
 13. Saich (2015).
 14. Dreyer (2015).
 15. Downs and Saunders (1998-1999); Hung and Dingle (2014).

16. Hung and Dingle (2014).
17. Stang (2014).
18. Badaruddin (2013); *Kompas* (17th July 2012).
19. BPS (2016).
20. Butler (2015); Siegel (2011).
21. Siegel (2011); Siddiqui (2012).
22. Butler (2015).
23. Butler (2015); Siegel (2011); Siddiqui (2012).
24. Siddiqui (2012); Hall (2012); Thorsen and Lie (2007); Roach (2007); Crotty, Epstein and Kelly (1998); Friedman (1982); Saad-Filho and Johnston (eds.) (2005).
25. Thorsen and Lie (2007: 11).
26. Hall (2012: 10).
27. Siddiqui (2012).
28. Polanyi (2001).
29. Polanyi (2001); Prastowo (2014); Block (2008).
30. Polanyi (2001); Prastowo (2014).
31. Polanyi (2001); Prastowo (2014); Ozgur and Ozel (2013); Maertens (2008).
32. Polanyi (2001); Levien (2007); Block (2008).
33. Levien (2007); Block (2008).
34. On President Soeharto period (1966-1998), some Chinese Indonesians became Soeharto's family corruption collaborator and gained economic privilege, and had closeness to their homeland: China. It leads Pribumi to generalize that all Chinese Indonesians companies are merely exploiting Indonesia's economy. See in-depth news of *Tirto.id* (1st November 2016; 30th July 2019a; 30th July 2019b; 31st July 2019a; 31st July 2019b; 1st August 2019) and Freedman (2003).
35. Robinson (1986).
36. *Republika* (24th January 2014).

37. Pease (1996); Wardaya (2007); *Tempo* (7th October 2015).
38. See, for example, Leith (2002).
39. Chrisna *et al.* (2012).
40. Kementerian BUMN (15th November 2017).
41. Solechah (2012).
42. *CNN | Indonesia* (9th January 2019); *Kompas* (30th August 2016); *Republika* (15th February 2016); *Tempo* (1st January 2016).
43. *Gatra* (20th March 2006).
44. *The Jakarta Post* (26th March 2016); *Tempo* (26th March 2016).
45. *Kompas* (17th July 2012).
46. *CNN | Indonesia* (25th May 2015).
47. *BBC News | Indonesia* (29th March 2012); *Kompas* (13th November 2012).
48. Isnadi (2012).
49. Isnadi (2017); *Republika* (23rd November 2015).
50. *The Guardian* (12th October 2011).
51. *CNN | Indonesia* (21st December 2018).
52. *Republika* (20th April 2016).
53. See, for example, *detikNews* (12th February 2020); *Tirto.id* (7th March 2020).
54. *Republika* (28th September 2015); *Kompas* (26th September 2016).
55. Smith (2015); Chong (2016).
56. Lan (2017).
57. Chong (2016).
58. Chong (2016); *Tirto.id* (1st November 2016).
59. Government prohibits Chinese Indonesians to use the Chinese language, celebrate Chinese New Year, establish Chinese organizations and schools. Chinese Indonesians were also informally banned from being bureaucrats, joining the military, and studying in university. See Chong (2016).
60. Purdey (2002).

61. See Freedman (2003).
62. The newest case is the Jakarta North Coastal Reclamation case where some Chinese Indonesians were involved in bribery scandal, while the reclamation area has been offered to China's buyer. Agung, a Chinese Indonesian who was the owner of PT Kapuk Naga Indah (Agung Sedayu Group), has been banned from leaving Indonesia by KPK (Indonesia's Corruption Eradication Commission) due to bribery case in Jakarta North Coastal Reclamation (see *Okezone News* (4th April 2016)). While another Chinese Indonesian, Trihatma Kusuma Haliman, the owner Agung Podomoro, offered the reclamation area to China's buyer (see *Youtube* (9th November 2016)). Corruption case and benefiting China are two main reasons that triggered thousands of Pribumi to protest against this project.
63. The Pribumi's resistance increased when some Chinese Indonesian tycoons involved in corruption in the Soeharto era fled from Indonesia to China. Some of them became great entrepreneurs and philanthropists in China, such as Eddy Tansil (Tan Tjoe Hong / Tan Tju Fuan). See in-depth news of *Tirto.id* (30th July 2019a; 30th July 2019b; 31st July 2019a; 31st July 2019b; 1st August 2019).
64. In several moments, President Joko Widodo expressed his worries when his political opponents used 'Asing and Aseng' discourse. This shows that 'Asing and Aseng' is important issue in Indonesia. See, for example, *detikNews* (18th September 2019); *Liputan6.com* (12th January 2020). An actor, for example, who used this issue is Front Pembela Islam (FPI) / Islamic Defender Front that led a mega demonstration of '411' and '212' regarding Al-Maidah verse humiliation case on 2016-2017 (see *VOA Islam (Voice of Al Islam)* (7th June 2014)).
65. Levien (2007).

References

Journals, Books and Reports

- Ademuyiwa, Idris and Pierre L. Siklos (October 2019). The global interplay between trade, geopolitical and commodity shocks. *CIGI Papers*, No. 229. <<https://www.cigionline.org/sites/default/files/documents/no.230.pdf>>.
- APINDO-ACTIVE (2013). Indonesia-China trade in ACFTA: Mapping of Competitiveness and Specialization. *ACTIVE Working Paper* No. 1. <https://apindo.or.id/userfiles/publikasi/pdf/Paper_Indonesia-China_Trade_in_ACFTA.pdf>.
- Atje, Raymond and Arya B. Gaduh (September 1999). Indonesian-China economic relations: An Indonesian perspective. *Working Paper Series*. <https://www.researchgate.net/publication/24130632_Indonesia-China_Economic_Relations_An_Indonesian_Perspective>.
- Austvik, Ole Gunnar (2009). EU natural gas market liberalization and long-term security-of-supply and demand (pp. 85-118). In: Gunnar Fermann (ed.), *Political economy of energy in Europe: Forces of integration and fragmentation*. Berlin: Berliner Wissenschafts-Verlag GmbH (BWV). <<http://www.kaldor.no/energy/berlinerwissenschaft200910-Political%20Economy%20of%20Energy%20in%20Europe-oga.pdf>>.
- Badaruddin, Muhammad (2013). Indonesia-China energy trade: Analyzing global and domestic political economic significance in Indonesia-China LNG trade. *Journal of ASEAN Studies*, Vol. 1, No. 1, pp. 25-40.
- Block, Fred (2008). Polanyi's double movement and the reconstruction of critical theory. *Revue Interventions Économiques / Papers in Political Economy*. Montréal: Association d'Économie Politique (AÉP), Université du Québec à Montréal (UQÀM). <<https://interventionseconomiques.revues.org/274>>.
- Booth, Anne (2011). China's economic relations with Indonesia: Threats and opportunities. *Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs*, Vol. 30, No. 2,

pp. 141-160. <<https://journals.sub.uni-hamburg.de/giga/jsaa/article/view/448>>.

Badan Pusat Statistik (National Bureau of Statistics of Indonesia) / BPS (2016). *Statistik Pertambangan Minyak dan Gas Bumi 2011-2015* [mining statistic of gas and oil 2011-2015]. Badan Pusat Statistik, Indonesia.

Butler, Eamonn (2015). *Classical liberalism: A primer*. London: Institute of Economic Affairs. <<https://iea.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/Butler-interactive.pdf>>.

Chandra, Alexander C. and Lucky A. Lontoh (2011). Indonesia-China trade relations: The Deepening of economic integration amid uncertainty? *Trade Knowledge Network*. Winnipeg: International Institute for Sustainable Development. <<http://www19.iadb.org/intal/intalcdi/PE/2012/09603.pdf>>.

Chen, Ling and Barry Naughton (January 2017). A dynamic China Model: The co-evolution of economics and politics in China. *Journal of Contemporary China*, Vol. 26, Issue 103, pp. 18-34.

Chong Wu Ling (2016). Rethinking the position of ethnic Chinese Indonesians. (Paper presented at The 9th International Conference of International Society for Study of Chinese Overseas, 6-8 July / *SEJARAH: Journal of the Department of History*, Vol. 25, No. 2, November 2017. Kuala Lumpur: Department of History, University of Malaya.) <<https://ejournal.um.edu.my/index.php/SEJARAH/article/view/9341>>.

Chrisna, Yosephine Tiara *et al.* (2012). Pengaruh Amerika Serikat terhadap Keluarnya Undang-Undang No. 22 Tahun 2001 [the US's influence on the Law 22 Year 2001 making process]. Paper presented at Universitas Jember. <<http://repository.unej.ac.id/bitstream/handle/123456789/59095/Yosephine%20Tiara%20Chrisna.pdf;sequence=1>>.

Crotty, James, Gerald Epstein, and Patricia Kelly (1998). Multinational Corporations in the Neo-Liberal Regime. In: Dean Baker and Gerald Epstein (eds.), *Globalization and progressive economic policy*. Cambridge:

Cambridge University Press.

- Downs, Erica Strecker and Phillip C. Saunders (1998-1999). Legitimacy and the limits of nationalism: China and the Diaoyu Islands. *International Security*, Vol. 23, No. 3 (Winter, 1998-1999), pp. 114-146.
- Dreyer, June Teufel (2015). *China's political system: Modernization and tradition* (ninth edition). London and New York: Routledge.
- Eichengreen, Barry *et al.* (February 2019). Mars or Mercury redux: The geopolitics of bilateral trade agreements. *Working Paper Series*, No. 2246. Frankfurt: European Central Bank. <<https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/scpwps/ecb.wp2246~1a43a0b375.en.pdf>>.
- Fankhauser, Sam and Frank Jotzo (2017). Economic growth and development with low-carbon energy. *Working Paper*, No. 301. Centre for Climate Change Economics and Policy (hosted jointly by the University of Leeds and the London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE)). <<https://www.ccecep.ac.uk/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/Working-paper-267-Fankhauser-Jotzo.pdf>>.
- Freedman, Amy (2003). Political institutions and ethnic Chinese identity in Indonesia. *Asian Ethnicity*, Vol. 4, No. 3, pp. 439-452.
- Friedman, Milton (with the assistance of Rose D. Friedman) (1982). *Capitalism and freedom*. Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press. (Originally published in 1962 by the University of Chicago Press, by Milton Friedman.)
- Hall, Peter A (2012). The changing role of the state in liberal market economies (Chapter 23). In: Stephan Leibfried, Frank Nullmeier, Evelyne Huber, Matthew Lange, Jonah Levy and John D. Stephens (eds.), *The Oxford handbook of transformation of the state*. Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press.
- Hughes, Llewelyn and Phillip Y. Lipsy (2013). The politics of energy. *Annual Review of Political Science*, Vol. 16, pp. 449-469.

- Hung, Chin-fu and Stuart Dingle (2014). Revisiting the role of the media in the Chinese Communist Party's legitimation strategy in post-Tiananmen China: Case study of News Corporation. *International Journal of China Studies*, Vol. 5, No. 2, June/August 2014 (Emile Kok-Kheng Yeoh (ed., special issue) – *June Fourth at 25: The quarter-century legacy of Tiananmen*), pp. 371-398. (Institute of China Studies, Universiti Malaya.) <<https://www.dropbox.com/s/1x335y8yf504anr/IJCS-V5N2-combined-text-cover.pdf>>.
- Isnadi, Yuli (2012). *Orang-Orang Cubung: Kisah konflik kebijakan pertambangan pasir besi Kulon Progo* [Cubung people: the tale of iron mining policy conflict of Kulon Progo]. Yogyakarta: Capiya Publisher.
- Joseph, William A. (ed.) (2014). *Politics in China: An introduction* (second edition). Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press.
- King, Gary, Robert O. Keohane and Sidney Verba (1994). *Designing social inquiry: Scientific inference in qualitative research*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Lam, Willy Wo-lap (2015). *Chinese politics in the era of Xi Jinping: Renaissance, reform, or retrogression?* New York: Routledge.
- Lan, Thung Ju (December 2017). Chinese Indonesian relations: A juxtaposition of identity and politics. *Masyarakat Indonesia* [Indonesian society], Vol. 43, No. 3, pp. 197-206.
- Leith, Denise (2002). Freeport and the Suharto regime, 1965-1998. *The Contemporary Pacific*, Vol. 14, No. 1, pp. 69-100.
- Levien, Michael (2007). India's double-movement: Polanyi and the National Alliance of People's Movement. *Barkeley Journal of Sociology*, Vol. 51, pp. 119-149.
- Luo Chunchun (2014). China and Indonesia coal trade present and future after 2008 Financial Crisis. *SHS Web of Conferences* 6, published by EDP Sciences. <http://www.shs-conferences.org/articles/shsconf/pdf/2014/03/shsconf_ifsr2013_01001.pdf>.

- Maertens, Eppo (2008). Polanyi's double movement: A critical reappraisal. *Social Thought & Research*, Vol. 29, pp. 129-153.
- Matutinovic, Igor (2009). Oil and the political economy of energy. *Energy Policy*, Vol. 37, pp. 4251-4258.
- Mitchell, John V. (2002). A new political economy of oil. *The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance*. Vol. 42, pp. 251-272.
- Morgan, Gareth and Linda Smircich (October 1980). The case for qualitative research. *Academy of Management Review*, Vol. 5, No. 4, pp. 491-500.
- Ozgun, Gokcer and Huseyin Ozel (2013). Double movement, globalization, and the crisis. *American Journal of Economics and Sociology*, Vol. 72, No. 4, pp. 892-916.
- Pease, Lisa (1996). JFK, Indonesia, CIA & Freeport Sulphur. *Probe*, March-April, 1996. <<http://www.theseecrettruth.com/freeport-indonesia.htm>>.
- Polanyi, Karl (2001). *The great transformation: The political and economic origins of our time* (second edition). Boston, MA: Beacon Press. (First edition published in 1944.)
- Prastowo, Justinus (2014). *Ekonomi insani: Kritik Karl Polanyi terhadap sistem pasar bebas* [Human economy: Karl Polanyi's critique of the liberal market system]. Tangerang Selatan, Indonesia: Marjin Kiri.
- Purdey, Jemma Elizabeth (2002). Anti-Chinese violence in Indonesia, 1996-1999. (PhD thesis, Department of History and Melbourne Institute of Asian Languages and Societies, University of Melbourne, Australia.) <<https://minerva-access.unimelb.edu.au/handle/11343/38907>>.
- Rachmayanti, Nahdia (2013), Dinamika hubungan bilateral Indonesia-China (Tiongkok) pada era pemerintahan Presiden Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (2004-2013) [the dynamics of Indonesia-China bilateral relationship of President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono era (2004-2013)]. (Jurusan Ilmu Hubungan Internasional, Fakultas Ilmu Sosial dan Ilmu Politik, Universitas Brawijaya, Indonesia.) <http://www.gelora45.com/news/DinamikaHubunganBilateralIndonesia_Tiongkok.pdf>.

- Roach, Brian (2007). Corporate power in a global economy. *GDAE Teaching Module on Social and Environmental Issues in Economics*. Medford, MA: Tufts University Global Development and Environment Institute, Tufts University.
- Robinson, Richard (1986). *Indonesia: The rise of capital*. North Sidney: Allen and Unwin.
- Saad-Filho, Alfredo and Deborah Johnston (eds.) (2005). *Neoliberalism: A critical reader*. London: Pluto Press.
- Saich, Tony (2015). *Governance and politics of China* (fourth edition). London and New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Siddiqui, Kalim (2012). Developing countries' experience with neoliberalism and globalisation. *Research in Applied Economics*, Vol. 4, No. 4, pp. 12-37.
- Siegel, Charles (2011). *Classical liberalism*. Berkeley, CA: Preservation Institute.
- Smith, Philip (2015). Writing in the rain: Erasure, trauma, and Chinese Indonesian identity in the recent work of FX Harsono. *Journal of Southeast Asian Studies*, Vol. 46, No. 01, pp. 119-133
- Solechah, Siti Nur (2012). Realisasi desentralisasi sektor pertambangan [realization of decentralization of the mining sector]. *INFO Pemerintahan Dalam Negeri* [INFO domestic government], Vol. IV, No. 12/II/P3DI/Juni.
- Springer, Cecilia (18th March 2016). The China-Indonesia energy entanglement moves in a new direction. *ISEAS Perspective*, Issue: 2016 No. 13. Singapore: ISEAS-Yusuf Ishak Institute. <https://www.iseas.edu.sg/images/pdf/ISEAS_Perspective_2016_13.pdf>.
- Stang, Gerald (2014). China's energy demands: Are they reshaping the world? *EUISS Briefs*, 28 March 2014. Paris: European Union Institute for Security Studies (EUISS). <<https://www.iss.europa.eu/content/china%E2%80%99s-energy-demands-are-they-reshaping-world>>.

- Thorsen, Dag Einar and Amund Lie (2007). What is neoliberalism? (Dag Einar Thorsen and Amund Lie (2007). Kva er nyliberalisme? (pp. 33-48). In: Per Kristen Mydske et al. (eds.), *Nyliberalisme – ideer og politisk virkelighet*. Oslo: Universitetsforlaget.) <<http://folk.uio.no/daget/neoliberalism.pdf>>.
- Tugwell, Franklin (October 1980). Energy and political economy. *Comparative Politics*, Vol. 13, No. 1, pp. 103-118.
- Wardaya, Baskara T. (2007). *Membongkar Supersemar! Dari CIA Hingga Kudeta Merangkak Melawan Bung Karno* [disassemble Supersemar: from CIA to Crawl Coup against Bung Karno]. Yogyakarta: Galang Press.
- Wu, Chongbo (2011). Forging closer Sino-Indonesia economic relations and policy suggestions. *Ritsumeikan International Affairs*, Vol. 10, pp. 119-141. Institute of International Relations and Area Studies, Ritsumeikan University (立命館大学), Japan. <http://r-cube.ritsumei.ac.jp/bitstream/10367/3402/1/asia10_wu.pdf> <<https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/60536609.pdf>>.
- Yu, Fu-Lai Tony (2014). China's Economic Change in Entrepreneurial Perspective: Mao Zedong (Transformative Entrepreneurship) versus Deng Xiaoping (Adaptive Entrepreneurship). *International Journal of China Studies*, Vol. 5, No. 3, December 2014, pp. 599-625.

News

- Antara News* (16th November 2019). Chinese investment in Indonesia reaches US\$2.3 billion. <<https://en.antaranews.com/news/136671/chinese-investment-in-indonesia-reaches-us23-billion>>.
- BBC News | Indonesia* (29th March 2012). Muhammadiyah dan ormas gugat UU Migas [Muhammadiyah and NGOs sue Oil and Gas Law]. <http://www.bbc.com/indonesia/berita_indonesia/2012/03/120327_muhammadiyah_hjudrev>.
- BenarNews* (29th September 2019). China doubles investments in Indonesia through 'very aggressive' approach, official says. <<https://www.benarnews>>.

.org/english/news/indonesian/international-investment-01292020162954.html>.

Bria, Emanuel and Poppy S. Winanti (2016). Can China champion accountable investments in ASEAN? *The Jakarta Post* (Indonesia), 1st February 2016 (Opinion). <<http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2016/02/01/can-china-champion-accountable-investments-asean.html>>.

CNN | *Indonesia* (25th May 2015). Faisal Basri tuding Hatta Rajasa di balik kisruh tambang [Faisal Basri accuses Hatta Rajasa behind the mine chaos]. <<http://www.cnnindonesia.com/ekonomi/20150525155018-85-55552/faisal-basri-tuding-hatta-rajasa-di-balik-kisruh-tambang/>>.

CNN | *Indonesia* (21st December 2018). Freeport resmi ganti status dari kontrak karya Menjadi IUPK [Freeport changes her permit]. <<https://www.cnnindonesia.com/ekonomi/20181221165518-85-355576/freeport-resmi-ganti-status-dari-kontrak-karya-jadi-iupk>>.

CNN | *Indonesia* (9th January 2019). ESDM desak gubernur cabut ratusan izin tambang bermasalah (Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources insist on governor cancelling the problematic mine permits), <<https://www.cnnindonesia.com/ekonomi/20190109155055-85-359627/esdm-desak-gubernur-cabut-ratusan-izin-tambang-bermasalah>>.

detikNews (18th September 2019). Geramnya Jokowi pada istilah antek aseng dan asing [Jokowi Growled at the terms henchmen aseng and asing]. <<https://news.detik.com/berita/d-4712046/geramnya-jokowi-pada-istilah-antek-aseng-asing>>.

detikNews (12th February 2020). Buruh akan demo di DPR tolak Omnibus Law, Polisi Siaga [Labor will demonstrate at Legislative Office against Omnibus Law, police standby]. <<https://news.detik.com/berita/d-4895912/buruh-akan-demo-di-dpr-tolak-omnibus-law-cilaka-polisi-bersiaga>>.

Gatra (20th March 2006). Kado Cepu buat Ibu Menlu [Cepu gift for Mrs. Foreign Minister]. <<http://majalah.gatra.com/2006-03-20/artikel.php?id=93111>>.

- Isnadi, Yuli (2017). Kendeng dan kemerdekaan ekonomi [Kendeng and economic independence]. *Koran Tempo* (Indonesia), 10th April 2017 (Opinion). <<https://indonesiana.tempo.co/read/110208/2017/04/10/yuliisnadi/kendeng-dan-kemerdekaan-ekonomi>>.
- Kementerian Badan Usaha Milik Negara (Ministry of State-owned Enterprises) / *BUMN.go.id* (15th November 2017). CNPC-Pertamina teken nota kesepahaman [CNPC-Pertamina signed MoU]. <<http://www.bumn.go.id/pertamina/berita/1-CNPC-Pertamina-Teken-Nota-Kesepahaman->>.
- Kompas* (17th July 2012). Ini blok migas yang akan habis kontraknya hingga 2021 [This is oil and gas block with their contracts going to end till 2021]. <<http://bisniskeuangan.kompas.com/read/2012/07/17/14405050/Ini.Blok.Migas.yang.Akan.Habis.Kontraknya.hingga.2021>>.
- Kompas* (13th November 2012). MK: BP Migas bertentangan dengan UUD 1945” [MK: BP Migas contrary to the 1945 Constitution]. <<http://ekonomi.kompas.com/read/2012/11/13/12055149/MK.BP.Migas.Bertentangan.dngan.UUD.1945>>.
- Kompas* (21st March 2016). Indonesia jadi negara terbesar kedua tujuan investasi China [Indonesia becomes the second biggest countries for China’s investment]. <<http://bisniskeuangan.kompas.com/read/2016/03/21/181500726/Indonesia.Jadi.Negara.Terbesar.Kedua.Tujuan.Investasi.China>>.
- Kompas* (30th August 2016). KPK sebut dari 11.000 izin tambang, hampir 4.000 izin bermasalah [Corruption Eradication Commission says that out of 11,000 mining permits, nearly 4,000 are problematic]. <<http://nasional.kompas.com/read/2016/08/30/18433041/kpk.sebut.dari.11.000.izin.tambang.hampir.4.000.izin.bermasalah>>.
- Kompas* (26th September 2016). Kasus pembunuhan Salim Kancil dinilai belum sentuh Aktor Intelektual [the murder case of Salim Kancil has not covered its mastermind]. <<http://nasional.kompas.com/read/2016/09/26/20315051/kasus.pembunuhan.salim.kancil.dinilai.belum.sentuh.aktor.intelektual>>.

- Liputan6.com* (12th January 2020). LSI: Isu asing-aseng masih laku di pemilu [Indonesian Survey Institute (Lembaga Survei Indonesia (LSI)): “asing and aseng” discourse still sells well in election]. <<https://www.liputan6.com/news/read/4153967/lsi-isu-asing-dan-aseng-masih-laku-di-pemilu>>.
- Okezone News* (4th April 2016). Mengenal Aguan, konglomerat properti yang dicekal KPK [knowing Aguan, property tycoon banned by KPK]. <<https://nasional.okezone.com/read/2016/04/04/337/1353317/mengenal-aguan-konglomerat-properti-yang-dicekal-kpk>>.
- Republika* (24th January 2014). Ini alasan smelter tambang harus dibangun [this is the reason why smelter should be built]. <<http://www.republika.co.id/berita/ekonomi/bisnis/14/01/24/mzw6ml-ini-alasan-smelter-tambang-harus-dibangun>>.
- Republika* (28th September 2015). Ini kronologi pembunuhan sadis Salim Kancil [this is the chronology of Salim Kancil sadistic murder]. <<http://nasional.republika.co.id/berita/nasional/hukum/15/09/29/nvdeah361-ini-kronologi-pembunuhan-sadis-salim-kancil>>.
- Republika* (23rd November 2015). Perjuangan petani Kendeng belum tuntas [Kendeng farmers’ struggle has not been completed yet]. <<http://nasional.republika.co.id/berita/nasional/umum/15/11/23/ny9fp5365-perjuangan-petani-kendeng-belum-tuntas>>.
- Republika* (15th February 2016). KPK usut 3.966 izin tambang bermasalah [KPK investigates 3,966 problematic mining permits]. <<http://nasional.republika.co.id/berita/nasional/hukum/16/02/15/o2ky5d335-kpk-usut-3966-izin-tambang-bermasalah>>.
- Republika* (20th April 2016). Serikat buruh kecam PHK massal Chevron Indonesia [labour unions condemn Chevron Indonesia’s massive layoffs]. <<http://www.republika.co.id/berita/ekonomi/makro/16/04/20/o5xqyc299-serikat-buruh-kecam-phk-massal-chevron-indonesia>>.
- Tempo* (7th October 2015). G30S 1965: Inggris sudah lama ingin singkirkan Soekarno [England has long wanted to get rid of Soekarno]. <<https://>>

m.tempo.co/read/news/2015/10/07/078707196/g30s-1965-inggris-sudah-lama-ingin-singkirkan-soekarno>.

Tempo (1st January 2016). Ini target ESDM tertibkan izin tambang bermasalah [this is the target of Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources to curb problematic mining permits]. <<https://m.tempo.co/read/news/2016/01/01/090732403/ini-target-esdm-tertibkan-izin-tambang-bermasalah>>.

Tempo (26th March 2016). Pertamina dapat lampu hijau beli saham Blok Masela [Pertamina gains green light to buy Masela Block shares]. <<https://m.tempo.co/read/news/2016/03/26/090757008/pertamina-dapat-lampu-hijau-beli-saham-blok-masela>>.

The Guardian (12th October 2011). Everyone profits from West Papua, except for Papuans. <<https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2011/oct/12/west-papua-striking-miners-indonesia>>.

The Jakarta Post (26th March 2016). SKK Migas encourages Pertamina's role in Masela. <<http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2016/03/26/skkmigas-encourages-pertamina-s-role-masela.html>>.

Tirto.id (1st November 2016). Rasisme terhadap etnis Tionghoa dari masa ke masa [racism against ethnic Chinese from time to time]. <<https://tirto.id/rasisme-terhadap-etnis-tionghoa-dari-masa-ke-masa-bZQN>>.

Tirto.id (30th July 2019a). Pelarian mulus Eddy Tansil [the smooth flee of Eddy Tansil]. <<https://tirto.id/pelarian-mulus-eddy-tansil-ke-singapura-efhl>>.

Tirto.id (30th July 2019b). Eddy Tansil Kabur dari Indonesia lalu bikin onar di China [Eddy Tansil fled from Indonesia then makes trouble in China]. <<https://tirto.id/eddy-tansil-kabur-dari-indonesia-lalu-bikin-onar-di-china-efhn>>.

Tirto.id (31st July 2019a). Kiprah Eddy Tansil di China: Menikmati kedekatan dengan Beijing [the story of Eddy Tansil: savoring the closeness to Beijing]. <<https://tirto.id/kiprah-eddy-tansil-di-china-menikmati-kedekatan-dengan-beijing-eflp>>.

- Tirto.id* (31st July 2019b). Sisi lain Eddy Tansil: Filantropi keluarga China kaya [the other side of Eddy Tansil: the rich Chinese family philanthropist]. <<https://tirto.id/sisi-lain-eddy-tansil-filantropi-keluarga-china-kaya-efnn>>.
- Tirto.id* (1st August 2019). Gurita bisnis Eddy Tansil di Tiongkok: Raja Bir dari Fujian [Eddy Tansil's business octopus in China: the Beer King from Fujian]. <<https://tirto.id/gurita-bisnis-eddy-tansil-di-tiongkok-raja-bir-dari-fujian-efpw>>.
- Tirto.id* (7th March 2020). Saat LSM satu suara tolak undangan KSP bahas Omnibus Law RUU Cilaka [when NGOs agree to refuse the Presidential Office's invitation to discuss Omnibus Law Cilaka Draft]. <<https://tirto.id/saat-lsm-satu-suara-tolak-undangan-ksp-bahas-omnibus-law-ruu-cilaka-eDfP>>.
- VOA Islam (Voice of Al Islam)* (7th June 2014). Tolak asing & aseng, ini 6 sikap nasionalisme Front Pembela Islam [rejecting asing and aseng, these are 6 nationalist viewpoints of Islamic Defender Front]. <<https://www.voa-islam.com/read/indonesiana/2014/06/07/30809/tolak-asing-aseng-ini-6-sikap-nasionalisme-front-pembela-islam/>>.
- Youtube* (9th November 2016). Gawat!! Indonesia mau dijual! Iklan proyek reklamasi Podomoro di Cina [Danger!!! Indonesia would be sold! Podomoro's reclamation project advertisement in China]. <<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mSB9Fd4KRRY>>.

